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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to understand the relationship between decentralized service delivery 
arrangements and the institutional performance of local government in Pakistan. This is 
achieved by examining the structures and processes associated with local governance, 
and situating public sector organizations in their wider context.  
The key aim of this thesis was to empirically evaluate the relationship between 
decentralization and institutional performance. The thesis contends that problem of 
service delivery can only be understood by examining the whole system of service 
delivery. Although, the focus of the research was on public sector management, 
however, it is argued that public sector organizations cannot be separated from their 
political environment. To address this concern, the thesis developed a conceptual 
framework based on three theoretical perspectives; the economic, political and New 
Public Management. Each perspective focused on a different level of analysis and 
identified a different way of explaining the phenomenon of decentralization and its 
impact on institutional performance.  
The study utilised a comprehensive research methodology to study the link between 
decentralization and performance through a multiple case study approach. The main 
empirical elements of the research were a community survey of two communities in two 
local authorities, an organizational survey of two sectors - education and water and 
sanitation. Detailed semi-structured interviews were undertaken with multiple 
stakeholders at various levels of service delivery. The research findings indicate that 
there is a relationship between decentralization and institutional performance; however 
the contextual environment plays a significant role in affecting the performance of 
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service provision. The empirical findings indicate that decentralization reforms in 
developing countries remain focused on structural decentralization and need strong 
political and bureaucratic commitment for real autonomy to be transferred down the 
hierarchy. One implication of this research is that it provided a comprehensive 
assessment of the decentralized service delivery model in Pakistan and identified the 
nature of reforms developing countries are taking up and the constraints on public sector 
organizations, and hence contributed to the emerging literature on public management 
reforms in developing countries (McCourt and Martin 2001; McCourt 2008).  
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PART 1 
DECENTRALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL 
PERFORMANCNE 
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CHAPTER 1  
DECENTRALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The decentralization reforms in Pakistan under the Devolution Plan 2000 are the 
starting point of this study. On October 1999, General Perveiz Musharaff removed the 
democratic government of that time and promised a ‘Seven Point agenda’ of reforms for 
reconstructing the institutions through the creation of new local governance 
arrangements under Devolution Plan 2000. It stressed the transfer of powers to the grass 
root level emphasizing accountability and citizen participation as key elements. These 
reforms aimed to devolve political, administrative and fiscal autonomy to newly created 
local bodies.  The main objective of these reforms was efficient and responsive service 
delivery framework. 
“It was argued that local government, appropriately empowered, staffed and 
resourced, would deliver better on primary health, education and municipal 
services and agricultural extension. Consequently mandating local government 
with service obligation will improve both productive efficiency -that is local 
government will more efficiently turn resources into services-and allocative 
efficiency-that is decentralization will turn institutions more attuned and 
capable to respond to local needs and preferences”.(DFID, ADB and World 
Bank 2004, p: 1)  
 
The term ‘decentralization’ denotes various institutional arrangements (Minogue 1998). 
According to Rondinelli (1986: P. 5), decentralization is:  
“The transfer of responsibilities for planning, management, and the raising and 
allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field 
units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-
autonomous public authorities, or corporations, area-wide regional or 
functional authorities, or non-governmental private or voluntary organization.”  
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Based on this definition, Rondinelli (1989) has proposed a fourfold typology of 
decentralization:  
1. Deconcentration: defined as the transfer of limited operational autonomy to 
field offices of central ministry which remain subject to their direct control. It is 
also defined as administrative decentralization (Parker, 1995) 
2. Delegation: the creation of semi-autonomous organizations or parastatals. 
3. Devolution: the transfer of authority and responsibility with associated resources 
to the local government. Devolution is also equated with the term democratic 
decentralization. It is the transfer of political, fiscal and administrative autonomy 
to the newly created sub national government.  
4. Privatization: the transfer of economic and production roles from the public 
sector to the private entities.  
 
Studies on decentralization can be grouped into three broad streams; that of political 
analysis of local government reforms (Blair 2000; Crook and Manor 1998; Heller 2007; 
Hope 2000; Manor 2004; Olowu 2003), fiscal analysis of local government (Ahmad and 
World Bank. 2005; Dillinger 1994; Faguet 2004; Huther and Shah 1998; Litvack, 
Ahmad and Bird 1998; Mello and Barenstein 2001; Prud'Homme 1995; Smoke 2001), 
and a managerial analysis of decentralization reforms (Batley and Larbi 2004; Islam 
1993; Larbi 2001; Mellon 1993; Polidano 1999; Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998). 
This study has attempted to group these streams under three main strands; a ‘Political 
perspective’, a ‘Fiscal perspective’ and a ‘New Public Management (NPM)’ 
perspective. It is argued that in order to better understand the nature of decentralized 
service delivery frameworks, and we need to adopt a more holistic approach by 
combining multi-perspectives on decentralization. This study therefore intends to 
understand the political, fiscal and managerial problems of service delivery framework 
to fully grasp the link between decentralization and institutional performance. 
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1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF STUDY  
The principal aim of this research is to understand the relationship between 
decentralization and institutional performance in developing countries. This will be 
achieved by examining the service delivery reforms initiated under the Devolution Plan 
2000, assessing the local government institutional arrangement and their context with 
specific interest in the service delivery arrangements of the Education, Water and 
Sanitation sectors. Within these aims were specific objectives: 
 To explore the extent and scope of decentralization reforms at sub-national 
level. 
 To analyze the service delivery framework and service delivery 
improvement, particularly focusing education and water and sanitation 
sector. 
 To assess how changes in accountability mechanisms have in turn improved 
the performance of local government. 
 Identifying external and internal environmental constraints affecting the 
performance of local government and identifying potential barriers to 
achieve the goal of efficient, responsive service delivery.  
The key research questions of this study are: 
 What has been decentralized and has decentralization really taken place? 
 Has decentralization been able to improve the institutional performance of local 
government? 
 How do accountability mechanisms affect the institutional performance of local 
government? 
 What are the institutional factors that affect the link between decentralization 
and the institutional performance of local government? 
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1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into six parts as presented in Figure 1-1. Part One provides an 
introduction of the thesis and background of the research focusing on the service 
delivery reforms under the Pakistan Devolution Plan 2000. Part Two develops the 
conceptual framework of this study using the literature on decentralization followed by 
outlining the integrative approach of this study by synthesizing these perspectives. Part 
Three provides the research methodology. Parts Four and Five provide the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis followed by discussion and conclusion chapters.  
The development of the conceptual framework (Part 2) proceeds by reviewing the 
literature on decentralization and institutional performance, organizing it into the three 
main perspectives (Political, Fiscal and Public management) with a focus on 
decentralization and institutional performance. Constructing a framework in this way 
provides a multidisciplinary approach and allows for different dimensions of 
decentralization to emerge as significant variables to provide an appropriate approach to 
study decentralized service delivery arrangements. These variables include 
‘participation, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer systems (IGFTs), and the institutions 
and processes of the public service delivery organization. Subsequently, an integrative 
framework is provided which synthesizes all these perspectives (Section 4.7). This 
integrated approach argues that although these perspectives with their individual focus 
extend our understanding of the relationship between decentralization and institutional 
performance, each perspective focuses only on one aspect of decentralization. 
Therefore, in order to understand decentralized service delivery arrangements and 
improved performance we must take a broader analysis. One consensus that runs across 
all three literatures is that decentralization alone cannot solve the problems of service 
delivery; one has to look at the entire service delivery framework to fully appreciate the 
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link between decentralization and institutional performance. Combining literature in this 
way could provide a more integrated view of decentralized service delivery 
arrangements.  
Part three presents the research methodology of this study. This part is further divided 
into chapters (chapter 5 and 6). Chapter 5 considers the ontological and epistemological 
issues of research, methodological concerns and outlines the research design. While, 
chapter 6 provided how the empirical work was carried out. This research has based its 
research philosophy in interpretive/naturalistic paradigm and has adopted a mixed 
method approach for the empirical work. The main empirical elements of this research 
consisted of organizational and community surveys, semi structured interviews with key 
stakeholders and document analysis. The selected field sites were two local 
governments in Pakistan: City district government Lahore (CDGL) and City district 
government Pakistan (CDGF). Within these two local governments, two sectors were 
selected for in-depth study: Education and Water and Sanitation.  
Part four comprises of quantitative data analysis section and is further organized into 
two chapters: organizational survey (Chapter 7) and community survey (Chapter 8).  
Part 5 provides qualitative analysis. This part is further divided into five chapters (9, 10, 
11, 12, and 13). Chapter 9 provides the political analysis of local government and is 
based on the policy level. Chapter 10 provides an analysis of the Education sector 
followed by Chapter 11 which provides analysis of Water and Sanitation Sector (WSS), 
followed by a cross case synthesis of quantitative and qualitative empirical analysis 
(Chapter 12). Chapter 12 consists of the discussion and links it with the perspectives 
employed in building up the analytical approach of this study and ends with concluding 
remarks in Chapter 13. An overview of the structure of this thesis is presented in Figure 
1-1. 
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Figure 1-1: Plan of the Thesis 
Part 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 2: Political 
Perspective 
Part four: Quantitative Research Findings & 
Analysis 
Part 2: Conceptual Framework 
Chapter 4: Public Management 
Perspective 
Chapter 3: Fiscal 
Perspective 
Part 3:  Research Methodology 
Chapter 5 & 6 
Chapter 8: Community 
Survey  
Chapter 7: Organizational 
Survey 
 
Part 5: Qualitative Analysis 
 
Chapter 9:  
Political Analysis 
Chapter 11:  
Sector Analysis –WSS 
Chapter 10: 
Sector Analysis - Education 
Chapter 12 & 13: 
Discussion & Conclusion 
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1.4 BACK GROUND TO THE THESIS: NATIONAL CONTEXT 
This Section provides an overview of decentralization reforms in Pakistan. It provides 
the background of devolution and the ‘Devolution Plan 2000’, explaining the political, 
administrative and fiscal reforms and how they were implemented. The purpose is to 
present an overview of the socio-political context of the reforms highlighting factors 
which influenced the reform process. 
1.4.1 Background of Devolution 
The devolution reforms were initiated by the military government of General Perveiz 
Musharaff as part of the broader reform strategy linked to his main agenda of 
“reconstructing the institutions of the state” by establishing representative local 
government. The devolution reforms emphasized citizen participation in the planning, 
development and oversight of service delivery. The National Reconstruction Bureau 
(NRB), an organization charged with the task of local government design, proposed 
various structural changes for the existing de-concentrated provincial administrative set 
up in its discussion paper released in August 2000. The NRB proposed a three tier local 
government structure: Districts (known as city districts in five big cities of Pakistan), 
Tehsil (Towns in five city districts) and Union administration. These arrangements were 
implemented by the promulgation of ‘Local Government Ordinance’ (LGO) 2001 
(National Reconstruction Bureau 2000).  
The reports of various surveys conducted in the early years of devolution (Participatory 
Poverty Assessment 2003; ADB 2002; CIET 2003) highlighted the dissatisfaction of 
people with service delivery in health, education and water and sanitation based on the 
public sector’s failure to provide adequate access to justice, redress mechanisms, access 
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to information, and citizen involvement in policy making and implementation process 
(DFID, ADB and World Bank 2005).  
Historically, Pakistan has a poor record of democracy and has been ruled by military 
governments for more than half of its existence. Paradoxically, it was the military 
government who established local government as a means to legitimize their 
government and create local patronage by neutralizing the influence of political parties 
at national and regional levels (Cheema, Khwaja and Qadir 2005). 
Prior to the present devolution reforms, Pakistan had two previous attempts at local 
government reform. These were: Basic Democracies (1959) and Local Government, 
1979. The Basic Democracies (BD) system was introduced by General Ayub Khan 
through the promulgation of the Basic Democracy Ordinance in 1959. It created 80,000 
union councilors known as “basic democrats” who served as the Electoral College for 
the presidential election of General Ayub Khan and for the National and Provincial 
Assemblies under the 1962 constitution. These local governments were abandoned by 
General Yahya Khan in 1970 and then revived again by General Zia Ul Haq in 1979. 
General Zia increased the power of elected local councillors. During the democratic 
regime of Bhutto (1971-1976), local governments were abandoned on the charges of 
corruption and nepotism. During this period two local government ordinances were 
passed in 1972 and 1975, however, they were not implemented and the country 
remained a deconcentrated administrative unit, administered by the bureaucratic 
structure of a Commissioner (head of division), Deputy Commissioner (DC- head of the 
district administration and Assistant Commissioner (AC- head of the Tehsil 
administration) (Ziadie 2005). A brief chronology of local government initiatives in 
Pakistan is illustrated in Figure 1-2 which reflects that Local government remained 
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dysfunctional during a democratic government but whenever a military regime took 
over, a local government system on non-party basis was revived.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author prepared from document analysis 
1.4.2 Structure of Local Government  
Local government, under the Local government ordinance of 1979, was a four tier 
hierarchical structure in urban areas and a three tier hierarchical structure in rural areas 
as given in Table 1-1. The organizational structure of the union council, town 
committee consisted of three main departments: general administration, finance and 
engineering. In Municipal Corporations, health and education departments were created 
to support the work of the Municipal Corporation. However, in the two biggest 
metropolitan corporations of that time (Karachi and Lahore), a more extensive 
Figure 1-2: Chronology of LG Reforms in Pakistan 
 
 
n 
Source;  
(Source: Author, prepared from document analysis) 
Chronology of Local Government Reforms 
 
 1959-1970 (Martial Law regime) 
Basic Democracies (BDs) 1959 under the Basic Democracy Ordinance 1959 
 1971-1976 (Democratic Government) 
Democratic regime passed local government legislation 1972, 1975, however, they never 
implemented these legislations, and hence, no local government elections were held during 
democratic regime of Prime Minister Bhutto  
 1977-1985 (Martial Regime) 
Local government revived in 1979 under the Local Government Ordinance 1979 by the military 
coup General Zia Ul Haq. (1979-1985) 
A comparison of local government ordinance 1979 and BD 1959, reveal that there was no 
changes in the functions and responsibilities assigned to the local government (Cheema and 
Mohammad (2003). Interesting difference was that Zia incorporated the populist measures 
passed in legislation of 1972, 1975 which abolished the direct representation of bureaucracy as 
chairman and members of local government. Instead, it was stipulated that all members of all 
the local government tiers would be elected representatives on adult franchise basis.  
 1985-1999 (Democratic government) 
In 1985, a democratically elected government at the federal and provincial government took 
control of the country and it ended the 6 years of Martial law regime (1979-1985). These 
governments were elected on non-part basis. During the period 1993-1998, local government 
were once again abandoned as provincial government perceive them as a threat to their power.  
 1999-2008 (Military regime) 
Devolution plan 2000 
In 1999, democratic government of Nawaz Sharif was replaced by a military coup, and General 
Perveiz Musharaff took over the charge of the country.  
 2010-till now (Democratic government) 
Local bodies’ elections are not held by any of the provincial government.  
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organizational structure was present which consisted of additional departments to 
handle legal affairs, land management and development authorities acting as parallel 
organizations (Zaidi 2005).  
Table 1-1: Structure of Local Government 
Rural Areas Urban Areas 
 
1. Union council (the lowest tier) 
2. Tehsil council 
3. District council 
 
 
1. Town committee 
2. Municipal committee 
3. Municipal corporation 
4. Metropolitan Corporation 
                                                                                                                      Source: LGO 1979 
1.1.1 The responsibilities assigned to Urban/Rural Councils under the Local 
Government Ordinance 1979 and BDO, 1959 
Two sets of functions were assigned to local governments under LGO 1979 and BDO 
1959; compulsory and optional (see Table 1-2). However, local councils were mainly 
restricted to the provision of services such as maintenance of roads, streets, water and 
sanitation, and preventive health care in urban areas.  
Table 1-2: Responsibilities assigned to the Local Government under BDO 1959 & 
LGO 1979 
Responsibilities Compulsory Functions Optional Functions 
 
 
Urban councils 
 
 Sanitation and Garbage 
Disposal, Water Supply, 
Drainage, Education(Primary)  
 Firefighting,  
 Public Streets,  
 Street Lighting, and  
 Social Welfare 
 
 Public Health 
 Foods and Drinks  
 Parks 
 Culture (libraries, fairs 
etc.) 
 Social Welfare (maintain 
welfare homes, asylum, 
other institutions of relief 
etc.). 
                                                                                                          Source: LGO 1956 & 1979 
The main constraints of these local governments during 1959 and 1979 were the lack of 
adequate resources and institutional capacity. Neither did they have a constitutional 
safeguard, as these were not part of the federal constitution and remained a provincial 
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subject. This is one of the reasons why during democratic regimes local governments 
were either marginalized or abandoned as provincial governments considered them a 
threat to their autonomy. Local governments, despite their extensive organizational 
structures, failed to deliver efficient and responsive services to the community due to 
limited financial autonomy. They were a means to legitimatize the military dictatorship 
by providing a strong political patronage at local level. Local governments were mainly 
under the purview of bureaucratic administration and subject to a dominating 
relationship; they could not operate independently of the provincial government and 
could hardly exert any influence on the functions assigned to them.  They were 
dependent on the provincial government for appointments; increase in resources; in 
levying taxes and rates. The budget of local government was also subject to provincial 
government approval (Paracha 2003).  
During the tenures of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996) and Nawaz Shariff 
(1996-1999) local governments performed only a marginal role as they were perceived 
by the democratic regimes as ‘potentially destabilizing interlopers’ (DFID, ADB and 
World Bank 2005) and competing structures of ‘patronage’ (Wilder 1999). The 
National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) stated that prior to devolution, development 
planning and management was centralized. Development funds were distributed to 
provincial governments under a top down approach. The identification, appraisal, and 
approval of development projects were devoid of local preferences as citizens could not 
participate in the entire process. Development funds were used by politicians according 
to their priorities on target audiences and not on the public at large. Local bodies were 
unable to change the plight of people and improve service delivery, as efforts seemed 
superficial in nature. The system was unable to transfer real power to the people at grass 
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root level, bureaucratic control continued to dominate and the style of government 
remained colonial in nature (NRB 2006). 
1.1.2 Impact of Devolution on Local Governance 
Pakistan is a federal state consisting of four provinces; Punjab, Sindh, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. The provinces were divided into three administrative 
levels: Divisions, Districts (also known as Zila) and Tehsils. Overall, Pakistan had 26 
Divisions, 105 Districts and 354 Tehsils. The urban areas were covered by two 
Metropolitan Corporation (Karachi and Lahore), 12 Municipal Corporations, 144 
Municipal Committees and 303 Town Committees. Under the local government 
ordinance 2001, the four provinces have three tiers of local government: 
 1st tier-District (City District in big cities) 
 2nd tier-Tehsil   (Town in big cities) 
 3rd tier-Union 
Under the new system of local government, the basic unit of administration is a city 
district/ district, replacing the unit of administration- Division. The district is divided 
into Tehsil, known as Towns in the City District, and the lowest level is a Union 
Council. The total number of local bodies is displayed in Table 1-3.  
Table 1-3: Local Bodies under LGO 2001 
Provinces City Districts Districts Tehsils Towns Unions 
 
Punjab 05 30 106 38 3464 
Sindh 01 22 103 18 1108 
Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa 
1 23 50 4 989 
Balochistan 01 27 75 2 567 
Source: Election Commission (2005) 
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1.1.3 Decentralized Service Delivery Framework under the Devolution Plan 2000 
Under the old system provinces administered the Districts and Tehsils directly. 
Governance was centralized so that decisions regarding planning and development were 
not taken by the local bodies and so were not responsive to local needs and priorities. 
Bureaucracy was not accountable directly to the public so there was no incentive for 
high quality service delivery. The new Devolution Plan aimed to address all these issues 
by introducing a 5D Model: 
1. Devolution of political power; elected politicians articulate community 
needs. 
2. Distribution of resources to the districts; taxation powers and transfers. 
3. Decentralization of administrative authority; autonomy of district 
departments. 
4. Diffusion of the power authority nexus; checks and balances through 
monitoring by   citizens 
5. Deconcentration of management functions; specialization of staff, 
performance based appraisals (National Reconstruction Bureau 2001). 
The devolution reforms intended to create a political hierarchy to replace the existing 
bureaucratic model so that political ownership of the institution and its output could be 
created. Decentralization was achieved by devolving political power, decentralizing 
administrative and financial authority to accountable local governments for good 
governance, effective service delivery, and decision making through participation of 
people at grass root level. Now elected people are responsible for effective service 
delivery at all levels and their performance is monitored by local councils. 
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1.4.3 Political Reforms  
1.4.3.1 Electoral Reforms 
Elections are held on a non-Party basis. The Union Council (UC) is the only level where 
the election is direct. It becomes the Electoral College for the election of Tehsil and 
District councils. The Nazim (mayor) and Naib Naizm (deputy mayor) of union 
councils are elected on a joint ticket.  Union Nazim and Naib Nazim become part of the 
district and the Tehsil council respectively. Union councilors also constitute an electoral 
college for the election of Tehsil and district councillors and the election of the district 
and Tehsil Nazim and Naib Nazim. One third of the seats are reserved for women who 
contest directly at UC level and through the electoral college of UCs at the district and 
Tehsil level. Additionally, 5% of seats are reserved for peasants and workers and 5% for 
minorities which are elected by this Electoral College (Figure 1-3). This is how the 
three tiers are linked. However, this also poses a serious accountability problem as the 
District Nazims are elected on an indirect basis by a few hundred union councils. Their 
re-election dependency on them may lead to potential abuse of power. A brief overview 
of the electoral arrangements is presented in Figure 1-3. 
According to the amendments to LGO 2001, the union council seats were reduced from 
21 to 13. Now a union council is comprised of 6 Muslim general seats, 2 seats for 
women, 4 seats for peasants and workers, and 1 seat for minorities. The number of seats 
for minorities remains the same.   
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Source: Adapted from World Bank (2004) 
The Local Government elections in 2001 and 2005 were regarded as fair and as 
competitive as the election of national and provincial assemblies (Hasnain 2008; 
Paracha 2003). The voter turnout in local government elections in 2005 was 47.38% 
(Election Commission 2005) but varied across provinces from 53.45% in Punjab to 
31.06% in Balochistan.  
1.4.3.2 Community Participation 
Although, direct elections provide the most significant form of citizen participation, the 
Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001 also made provision for citizen participation 
in service provision, finance and oversight of local service providers. These forms of 
citizen engagement can be categorized as:  
 
Figure 1-3: Electoral Arrangements of Local Government 
                                                                                                    
 
Union Naib Nazim 
Union council: Comprised of general seat 6, 
peasants/workers 4, 2 seats reserved for women, 1 seat 
for minority 
District council: comprised of 2/3 union 
nazim and 1/3 of indirectly elected (reserved 
seats for minorities, peasants and women) 
Tehsil council: comprised of 2/3 of the 
union Naib Nzim and 1/3 indirectly 
elected through union council 
Union Nazim 
Tehsil Nazim 
 Tehsil Nazim 
District Nazim 
District Naib 
Nazim 
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 External oversight bodies 
 Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) for community development and 
facilities management  
 School Management Committees (SMCs)/School Councils (SCs) 
The oversight bodies consist of District Public Safety Commission (DPSCs), accounts 
committees, Village and Neighbourhood Councils, Zila Mohtisb, Anjuman Musalihat, 
monitoring committees of different sectors such as Education, Water and Sanitation. 
The majority of these committees remained non-functional, but in some areas like 
Karachi, many committees were functional. Likewise SMCs were effective in areas 
where Nazims were taking an interest and community involvement resulted in 
considerable improvements in terms of teacher attendance and school quality (DFID, 
ADB and World Bank 2004).  
The Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) are the mechanism to ensure citizen 
participation in development planning and 25% of development budget is reserved for 
them (LGO 2001). The CCBs are non-profit organizations which were created for 
proactive involvement and ownership of development projects by the communities 
involved. Prior to devolution, development planning and the management process was a 
top down approach. This system also lacked transparency and accountability. Therefore 
LGO 2001 made provision for CCBs to enable people to assess their needs, set priorities 
and implement development projects. This involvement will generate community 
ownership which will further ensure transparency. Fifty percent of the development 
budget is reserved for CCBs at District, Tehsil, and Union levels. In case of non-
utilization of this share, it will be carried forward. The CCBs will be assessing, 
designing, and implementing projects by taking initiatives at grass roots level.  
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However, there are mixed findings about the success of CCBs. For instance, in the city 
district of Faisalabad (Punjab) 300 CCBs were registered but only 15 were able to get 
funding. Although, through the active involvement of councilors and community 
organizations in the Bahawalpur district, the sewerage system was improved through 
CCB projects (DFID 2003). In Faisalabad, 107 CCB projects were identified, out of 
which 85 projects were fully completed and 15 were under progress (DFID, ADB and 
World Bank 2004). It emerges from these reports that local governments are trying to 
pass bylaws to streamline the CCB process.  
1.4.4 Administrative Reforms 
1.4.4.1 Local Governance Structure  
The Local Government Ordinance 2001 also proposed a local governance structure at 
the district, Tehsil and Union levels in accordance with the political reforms (Appendix 
5- Figure 1). The administrative structure consisted of 10-13 departments to carry out its 
assigned functions. District Coordinating Officers (DCOs) were responsible for district 
coordination. The DCO was the highest civil servant at district level replacing the 
Deputy Commission (DC) designation of previous deconcentrated arrangements. Each 
department was headed by Executive District Officers (EDOs). This structure also 
changed the accountability arrangements as DCOs and EDOs reported to the 
District/Zila Nazim who is the head of the District administration.  
At the Tehsil/Town administration, the coordination function was performed by a 
Tehsil/Town Muncipal Officer (TMO) who was further assisted by four Tehsil Officers; 
regulation, infrastructure and development, finance and planning. The TMO reported to 
the Tehsil/Town Nazim as head of the Tehsil administration. At the Union level, the 
administration has three secretaries; for union committee, municipal function, and 
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community development. The role of these secretaries is the coordination of various 
functions assigned to the union administration and they work under the political heads; 
Nazim and Naib Nazim 
1.4.5 Fiscal Reforms 
Decentralization requires a well-defined institutional framework outlining expenditure 
responsibilities and corresponding revenue responsibilities. The fiscal reforms had two 
components; expenditure assignment followed by revenue assignment.  
1.4.5.1 Expenditure Assignment 
LGO 2001 transferred various functions from the provinces to the local government 
tiers which are listed in Figure 1-4. According to the constitution of 1973, the federal 
government performs functions listed in the federal legislative list such as foreign 
affairs, defence, banking and currency, postal and transportation services (air, railway, 
and ports). The concurrent list of the constitution indicates the functions which can be 
carried out by either federal or provincial governments. However, provincial 
governments are responsible for services such as police, roads, education and health. 
Overall, it exhibits the centralization of power. For revenue sharing among the 
provinces, a National Finance Commission (NFC) was set up. 
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Source: Adapted from World Bank (2004) 
1.4.5.2 Revenue Assignment 
The constitution of Pakistan gives very limited tax powers to provincial governments or 
local governments. In both cases taxes do not play a significant role in the revenue 
raising capacity. The tax structure and administration is similar in all four provinces of 
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Pakistan. In the Punjab province, out of 14 tax basis available to the provinces, 8 
account for only 14% of the tax revenue of the provincial government.  
Local governments were assigned tax basis by the provinces and provinces have very 
limited powers in this regard (Bahl, Cyan, Wallace In Menifield 2011). Although, 
districts have been assigned tax basis such as education and health tax, considering the 
social indicators in these sectors, it seems difficult to impose such taxes. A relatively 
buoyant tax basis is allocated to the TMA. They are assigned an Urban Immovable 
Property Tax (UPIT). According to the World Bank study of districts in 2004, 
encouraging trends are visible in Own Source Revenue (OSR) collection in cities where 
Nazims are actively engaged and supported by the councils in the collection of such 
taxes.   
Intergovernmental transfers are the main sources of revenue for provincial and local 
governments. It constitutes nearly all of the finance from district governments and 60-
80% of the Tehsil/Town administration (Cyan 2007). A Provincial Finance Commission 
(PFC) was charged with the task of designing a system of intergovernmental transfers in 
2005. The PFC is comprised of the provincial Minister of finance, provincial finance 
secretaries, local government and planning secretaries, three Nazims and three 
independent members appointed by the governor of the province.  
Other revenue sources are transfers from provincial or federal ministries to finance 
vertical projects. These are specific conditional grants; ring fenced funds. These grants 
reflect the influence of federal and provincial governments at the local level. Until the 
establishment of the PFC, the funds were provided as annual interim awards. Provincial 
allocable funds are broadly divided into two categories: recurrent expenditures and 
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development expenditures. Recurrent expenditures constituted 88% of the local 
government budget (Hasnain 2008).  
Prior to this arrangement, the lower tiers of government received no transfers except 
some discretionary funds or in some cases property tax (UIPT). Until 2002, the budget 
was determined by the Provincial Finance department and then sent to the district 
governments for approval (Cyan 2007; DFID, ADB and World Bank 2004). Other 
limitations on fiscal autonomy were: 
 A large amount of the budget was earmarked for salary expenditures 
 Limited autonomy in preparing development budgets as each provincial 
government provided special purpose grants for specific projects. These 
vertical programs make up half of the annual development plan of the 
districts. This leaves a district government with less autonomy in planning 
development projects according to its priorities. Another drawback of 
vertical programs is the lack of ownership at the local level. Once 
completed, they add to the maintenance cost which is added to the local 
government budget. In some cases this results in duplication of schemes by 
provincial and local governments.  
 ‘Throw- forward’ schemes which were under development before the local 
government system 2001. A large number of such schemes limited local 
government autonomy in planning new development schemes (DFID, ADB 
and World Bank 2004). 
However, local government ownership of the budgeting process is increasing. In 
2005, the Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) was established for the design of 
intergovernmental transfer. The PFC award is based on indicators such as 
‘population’ and ‘backwardness’ indicators. Sindh and Punjab calculate 
backwardness by ranking district against health, education, housing, employment 
and residential services. This index is derived from Multi Indicator Cluster Survey 
(MICS) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Province of Sindh and Punjab also include tax 
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efforts in the determinations of the formula (Cyan 2007; DFID, ADB and World 
Bank 2004). The Punjab was awarded its first PFC award for the period 2006/7- 
2008/9 in July 2006. The breakdown of the grants as provided in the Punjab Gazette 
(2006) is presented in Table 1-4.  
Table 1-4: PFC Grant System (2007-2009) 
Type of Grant Share of Provincial 
Allocable 
Distribution of Grants 
in Local Government 
Distribution of 
Grants in Local 
Governments 
(%) 
1. General Purpose and 
Equalization Grant for 
City Districts/District 
Government 
67.50%  General Purpose 
Grant 
 Equalization Grant 
 89% 
 11% 
2. General Purpose and 
Equalization Grant for 
Tehsil/Town 
Administration or Union 
Administration 
13.00%  General Purpose 
Grant TMA 
 Equalization Grant 
TMA 
 General Purpose 
Grant for Union 
 57.28% 
 14.32% 
 28.40% 
3. Development Grants for 
City Districts/District 
Governments or 
Tehsil/Town 
Administration 
11.30%  Development Grant 
for CDG/DGs 
 Development Grants 
for TMA 
 78.26% 
 21.74% 
4. Tied Grants for City 
Districts/District 
Governments or 
Tehsil/Town 
Administration 
8.20%  Tied Grants for 
CDGs/DGs 
 Tied Grants for 
TMA 
 91% 
 9% 
  Source: Adapted from Punjab weekly Gazette (2006) 
 
It is broadly divided into three types of grants: general purpose grants, equalization 
grant to fill the fiscal gap, and development and tied grants. General purpose grants 
were awarded on the basis of population, equalization grants were based on the 
calculation of the fiscal gap, development grants were based on the population and 
an index of under-development calculated from Multiple Indicator survey data 
(MICS). Local governments, however, remained dependent on intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers from the provinces. Tied grants (ring fenced grants) were accorded 
based on the following formula:  
1) Education component 
 Population: 60% 
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 Performance: 40% 
2) Health component 
 Population 70% 
 Health deprivation index: 30%  
1.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a snapshot of the Devolution Plan 2000. It has highlighted 
major shifts in managerial power, accountability arrangements and community 
participation in service delivery. It also highlighted the politics of service delivery 
reforms in Pakistan. Although the Local Government Ordinance of 2001 provides roles 
and responsibilities for local government, provincial government exerts an informal 
influence over their administrative autonomy by retaining control on appointments, and 
transfers of employees; limiting fiscal autonomy by controlling budgets through vertical 
programs. The World Bank reports (2004) stated that although LGO empowered local 
governments to have a district cadre, to create new posts and hire them, in practice, 
senior staff of the district, such as Executive District Officers (EDOs), is still subject to 
federal and provincial government appointments, promotions and transfers. This results 
in confused lines of authority and dual accountability arrangements. The counter 
argument is that provincial government restraints restrict local patronage in the 
recruitment of staff. Likewise vertical programs ensure that sectors like Education and 
Health should not suffer based on equity consideration.  
So far, studies on the Devolution Plan have been funded by international donor 
organizations.  In 2004, a comprehensive analysis of reforms was carried out by the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Department for International 
Development (DFID). This study based its results on 6 districts and within each district, 
2 TMAs were studied. Other studies focused on issues like fiscal decentralization (Cyan 
2007; DFID 2003; Hasnain 2008; Bahl, Cyan, Wallace In Menifield 2011) or conducted 
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surveys such as CIET (2003). The Punjab government also carried out a perception 
survey of the local government system (Urban Institute/Neilson Survey 2008). 
Particularly, the latter was used to make changes in the local government system by 
reducing its autonomy and proposing strong checks and balances. The researcher did 
not find any independent comprehensive assessment of local government performance 
in the sectors of Education, Health, Water and Sanitation or whether local government 
was able to improve these sectors. This research intends to assess the decentralized 
service delivery framework and its impact on the institutional performance of local 
government particularly focusing education and water and sanitation sectors.  
The reason for the selection of these two sectors is twofold: Firstly, both of these sectors 
saw a major shift from provincial to local government. An assessment of local 
government performance in these sectors will help us to understand the extent of 
devolution and its impact on social sectors which was the overarching goal of the 
Devolution Plan 2000. Secondly, both have different organizational arrangements. 
Water and sanitation services are provided by a semi-autonomous organization, the 
Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA), in big city districts and tehsil/TMA in areas not 
covered by WASA. While Education was previously provided by the provinces, 
devolution placed this responsibility on the districts. A new organizational structure was 
created in accordance with the political reforms. New posts were created and placed 
under the control of the district administration. An analysis of the service delivery 
framework in these sectors will shed light on how different sectors provide services 
under the new devolved arrangements. 
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PART 2:  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this chapter is to build up the conceptual framework of this study. This 
is achieved by organizing a literature review according to the three main streams of 
academic thought that attempt to provide us with an understanding of decentralization. 
These academic streams are the: ‘Political’, Fiscal’, and ‘New Public Management’ 
perspectives. Every perspective focuses on a different level of analysis and defines 
decentralization in different ways. For instance, the focus of the political literature is on 
viewing decentralization as transfer of authority to the sub national level and usually it 
equates decentralization with the term devolution. This literature emphasizes the 
institutions of participation and accountability as the key to achieve decentralization 
outcomes. The main argument is that local government proximity to the community will 
enable them to respond better to their needs and match public spending to community 
needs. According to this literature, decentralization is intrinsically valued as it 
institutionalizes the participation of those affected by local decisions. However, 
participation needs to be effective and there should be a combination of direct and 
indirect mechanisms of participation to foster responsiveness and accountability. 
Although decentralized decision making increases the level of local participation, a 
close link is required between the functional responsibilities and revenue 
responsibilities of local government to establish accountability. This is the focus of the 
next Chapter; Fiscal perspective.  
Decentralization of responsibilities without the assignment of adequate resource to 
finance those activities cannot work.  This is the main concern of Fiscal decentralization 
literature. The emphasis is on matching expenditure assignment with revenue 
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assignment and on designing the Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (IGFTs). However, 
studies mostly focus on measuring fiscal autonomy as a percentage of sub national 
expenditure and revenue in the total public sector which fails to provide an assessment 
of the true autonomy given to the sub national level which can only be examined by 
looking at the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
The next concern arises with how political institutions transform their decisions into 
allocative outcomes. The public management perspective addresses this issue by giving 
line managers autonomy to manage and introducing competition in service delivery to 
achieve accountability and efficient service delivery. It is directly concerned with the 
mechanics of service delivery organizations, and studies the administrative structures 
and processes. Hence, the focus of public management perspective is on the 
administrative decentralization (referred in literature as management decentralization) 
and defines it as the transfer of authority, resources and responsibilities down from the 
central ministry to the lower levels of government, field offices, and agencies. 
Depending upon the accountability arrangement, two main types are: de-concentration 
and delegation. When New Public Management perspective combines competition such 
as contracting out and collaborative forms of service provision with administrative 
decentralization, it uses the term management decentralization to encompass the use of 
market and collaborative forms of service provision as well.  
There is a growing recognition in all three academic streams that decentralization is a 
context specific phenomenon and for its assessment a cautionary approach should be 
applied. This requires locating decentralization in the broader socio-political 
environment and the capacity of decentralized service delivery arrangement to 
undertake new roles. How different factors impede or facilitate its success. While 
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discussing different decentralization perspective, each chapter will try to substantiate 
theoretical argument with empirical findings as well. Indeed, these studies are unable to 
establish a clear link between decentralization and efficient service delivery, or 
improved accountability, however, these studies provide some general lessons about 
what works best under what situation, and how decentralization reforms can be tailored 
according to the need of the country concerned and call for more empirical studies to 
understand the phenomenon of decentralization. The concluding section (Section 4.7) 
outlines the integrated the approach of this study which synthesises all three 
perspectives to provide a more holistic approach to analysing decentralization and 
performance. Building up a theoretical framework in this way helps to identify different 
features of decentralized service delivery framework from different perspectives and 
helps in understanding the link between decentralization and service delivery outcomes 
and provides a more integrated approach to study the relationship between 
decentralization and institutional performance. An overview of the three perspectives 
has been provided in Figure 1-5.  
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Figure 1-5: Organization of Decentralization Literature 
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CHAPTER 2  
POLITICAL / DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE ON 
DECENTRALIZATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main argument for local government is that their close proximity to the people will 
enable them to make responsive local policies and people can hold them accountable in 
case of poor performance. There is an increasing emphasis on having a representative 
local government based on multiple benefits. For instance, local government plays a 
vital role in promoting political liberties, creating a civic culture, providing avenues for 
political education, and promoting political diversity. In essence, it enables the views of 
local people to be incorporated into the local decision making and contributes to the 
betterment of national polity (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994). Usually the term 
democratic decentralization, political decentralization and devolution are used 
interchangeably in the literature (Blair 2000; Crook and Manor 1998; Heller 2001). 
This chapter will attempt to understand the extent to which decentralization results in 
service delivery improvements in terms of responsiveness and, in addition to this, 
highlight the mediating role played by the institutional, political, economic and social 
factors which affect service delivery outcomes. This chapter is divided up into 6 
sections. Firstly a definition of democratic decentralization is provided (Section 2.2), 
followed by the theoretical case for democratic local government (Section 2.3). Section 
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2.5 reviews empirical evidence on linking democratic decentralization to improved 
service delivery outcomes. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter. 
2.2 DEFINING POLITICAL/DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION 
Political decentralization is mainly concerned with who decides (Bird, 2000) and 
determines the extent to which local government has the right to make political 
decisions. Mostly the term ‘democratic decentralization’ refers to devolution (Crook 
and Manor 1998; Olowu 2001). Blair (2000, p: 21) has defined democratic 
decentralization as the “meaningful authority devolved to local units of governance that 
are accessible and accountable to the local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and 
liberty”.  
Democratic decentralization through meaningful participation of the community 
promises to translate popular input into what local government should do and through 
participation it can hold local government accountable for what it has done or not done. 
The most direct argument in the literature is that local government brings government 
closer to the local people and brings in the benefits of responsiveness, efficiency and 
accountability to the citizen (Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956). Decentralization by shifting 
authority from the central government to local government promises that it will become 
easier for the voter to monitor the performance of local government (Musgrave 1965).  
2.3 THEORETICAL CASE FOR DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The early advocates of local government theories, such as John Stuart Mill (1912, p: 
2357) base the case for local government on two arguments: firstly, local political 
institutions provide a greater opportunity for participation and capacity to educate 
citizens in the practice of politics and government. Secondly, significant scope for local 
33 
 
government seems more practical as local interest, knowledge and capacity to oversee 
are more likely to achieve efficient and effective service provision: “In the details of 
management, therefore, the local bodies will generally have the advantage” (Mill 1912, 
p: 2357).  
Later, this role of local government as an efficient provider of services which are 
essentially local in nature as advocated by John Stuart Mill was further advocated by 
Sharpe (1970). Sharpe (1970) advocated the efficiency value of local authorities as the 
strongest argument for modern local government. It appeared that local government is 
justified more on the grounds of an efficient service provider than involvement. In 
subsequent years, Hill (1974) warned against such a notion of local government and 
argued that “to be an effective provider of services local authorities must be more than 
efficient. They must still be judged by justice, fairness, equality, and openness by which 
democratic society as a whole is judged” (Hill 1974, p: 236). Sharpe (1970, p: 165) 
while acknowledging the limits of participation, also argued that: “Participation in its 
different forms emerges as an undoubted value, if not in the full glory of its promoters at 
least as an important justification for local government in a democracy”.  
Young (1986) criticized Sharpe’s work because he justified local government solely as 
a service delivery role. Contrary to this, Young laid emphasis on two political 
dimensions of local government: his first argument was based on pluralism-local 
government should be valued as it limits the concentration of powers, and his second 
argument was based on the values of local government for providing political education 
and political participation at the local level. Young, while acknowledging the efficiency 
arguments, gave these arguments a political perspective. According to him, “any valid 
theory of local government must be a political theory” (Young 1986 In Goldsmith 
1986, p: 18). 
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Pluralist theory of local government espouses that local government is a means for 
group participation and conflict resolution in the political process. However, Hunter 
(1953) has argued that in reality important decisions are made by a group of elites 
behind the scenes and are devoid of the electoral process and public opinion. Besides 
the criticism advanced on pluralist theory, its contribution mainly lies in laying 
emphasis on widespread group participation other than a sole provider of local services. 
Underlying much of the debate of local democracy is the importance of active 
involvement of citizen in local politics. Participation in itself is valued as a good thing 
as it empowers those who were previously the mere recipient of the services. 
Empowerment strategies may be designed in a top down manner or a bottom up 
approach. 
2.4 PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS 
Local governments are based on the justification of providing people with at least voice 
because they are democratically elected and therefore are accountable to the people. 
Following this logic people can exercise their voice in two ways:  indirectly-through the 
ballot box- in a view - “representative” democracy and directly through various 
mechanisms such as neighbourhood committees, and user participation - “participatory” 
democracy. According to Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999, p: 29) elections serve 
two purposes in a democracy: electing representative governments - the “mandate” 
view- who make policies which are reflective of local preferences and to hold their 
representatives accountable based on their performance - the “accountability” view(). 
However, both views are based on contradicting assumptions. As, government is 
responsive if, “Elections are contested, If participation is wide spread, and if citizens 
enjoy political rights and liberties, it is reasonable to assume that government will be 
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responsive to citizens” (In Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999, p: 334). Therefore, 
contested elections may be a necessary condition for ensuring responsiveness and 
accountability but not a sufficient condition. To secure democratic accountability, 
representative democracy should be infused with participatory democracy. Since, 
politicians have their own goals and interest which necessarily do not coincide with the 
community preferences. Under the mandate model, voters compare promises politicians 
make of the future and select the best candidate. Under the accountability model, voters 
use their vote to sanction bad performers based on retrospective information on 
performance. However, voters do not make such distinction whether to use their vote as 
a sanction tool or select a better government.  
Ideologically, a government is ‘responsive’ if it pursues policies which are signalled as 
preferred by the citizen. These signals may come from public opinion, elections, and 
votes for particular purposes - referendum etc. whereas, the government is accountable 
if the citizen can sanction them appropriately. As depicted in Figure 2-1, according to 
the ‘mandate view’, voters reveal their preference in elections by giving their mandate 
to their representatives. These representatives transform that mandate into policies 
which reveal voters' preferences. And a government is responsive if it pursues policies 
which are signalled by the citizen as their preferences. The citizen can reveal their 
preferences through various mechanisms of exit and voice particularly through electoral 
mandates. If government is not accountable to their community, then community 
members can sanction them appropriately by retaining those who are accountable and 
ousting those who are not. In this framework the main assumption is that government is 
responsive or accountable if people know about the outcome of policies and other 
exogenous conditions. People will signal their will through giving government 
mandates in the election and the government will implement policies that people want 
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them (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). However, as argued earlier it is too 
simplistic that the whole system works in such an ideological manner as drawn in 
Figure 2-1.  
 
Figure 2-1: Local Government Policy Process 
Source: Adapted from Przeworski, Stokes and Manin   (1999) 
Beetham (In King and Stoker 1996, p: 33) has argued that validity of participation lies 
in the fact that it requires an active citizen body, without which “government will not be 
representative, responsive, or accountable; nor will they enjoy the full legitimacy that 
comes from popular participation”. How far participation can be “democratic” depends 
on its contribution in securing a popular control over collective decision making and 
greater equality in its exercise. This raises three questions; participation in what?, by 
whom?, and to what effect? However, popular participation is a necessary condition but 
not an alternative to the representative democracy. Arnstein (1969) further provided a 
ladder of citizen participation which is illustrated in Figure 2-2. This ladder identifies 
eight stages which correspond to the citizen powers in determining the policy outcomes.   
 
Responsiveness 
Preferences Signals Mandates Policies Outcomes 
Sanctions 
Voters 
Accountability 
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1.  
Citizen control  
Degree of citizen power 2.  
Delegated power 
3.  
Partnership 
4.  
Placation  
Degree of Tokenism 5.  
Consultation 
6.  
Informing 
7.  
Therapy  
Nonparticipation 
8.  
Manipulation 
    
Figure 2-2: Ladder of Participation 
                                                                                            Source: Adapted from Arnstein (1969) 
 
As depicted in Figure 2-2, the lowest stages (Manipulation and Therapy) of the 
participation ladder represent nonparticipation. At this level, the purpose of power 
holders is not to enable people to participate, but to ‘cure’ the participants through 
manipulation or therapy tactics. The next three stages (Informing, Consultation and 
Placation) refer to tokenism. Here citizen are involved in different ways such as one 
way communication (through pamphlet, leaflets, posters etc.) two way communication 
(through meetings, surveys), and co-optation (through giving membership to citizen on 
various committees or boards etc.).  Further, up the ladder, are the stages (7, 8) which 
give citizen greater control over the decision making process such as partnership, 
delegated authority, and citizen control. This ladder provides a starting point to consider 
various forms of and the extent they give citizens empowerment in the true sense of 
meaningful participation. Burn, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) have further extended 
the argument that voice mechanisms can be strengthened by employing four broad 
strategies as listed in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1: Strategies for Promoting Voice in Local Government 
STRATEGIES 
 Improving representative democracy e.g., voter registration, citizen rights at meetings, better 
support to councillors 
 Extending representative democracy e.g., area committees of councillors based on wards or 
groups wards 
 Infusing representative democracy with participatory democracy e.g. co-option onto 
committees, neighbourhood committees of councillors and representative from community and 
disadvantage groups 
 Extending participatory democracy e.g. funding of non-statutory groups, community 
development, user group participation, valuing grass root movements 
                                                                           Source: Adopted from Burn, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) 
According to Table 2-1, the first strategy emphasizes improving representative 
democracy through various tactics such as giving community member right to ask 
questions at local meetings, information dissemination to the public regarding the 
council activities, and improving support services to councillor so that they can work 
more effectively. This will result in more effective representative democracy. The 
second strategy may be to extend representative democracy by creating a more local 
setting such as ward committees which can decide over local issues. The third strategy 
can be an intermingling of representative democracy with participatory democracy such 
as cooptation of community members in council committees. Another related strategy is 
the community driven development approach for service provision. The fourth strategy 
is shifting the focus from representative democracy to participatory democracy and 
community action. Some examples of this strategy include: user group involvement in 
service delivery, involving disadvantage groups representation in various committees 
etc. (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994).  
Participation needs to be effective i.e. it not only the matter of magnitude of 
participation (election, turn out etc.) but also the depth and process of participation. 
There should not only be the avenues for the citizen to ‘Voice’ their concerns but this 
voice should also be heard by those who are responsible for service provision and 
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reflected in the decision outcomes. To put it in another way, as discussed earlier 
representative democracy needs to be infused with participatory democracy to make 
participation effective (Table 2-1).  It also reflects the idea that increased participation 
in the form of representation need to be transformed into empowerment of the citizen to 
influence decisions that affect their lives.   
2.4.1 Responsiveness 
The second criterion of democratic local government is being responsive to community 
preferences. Responsiveness is defined as congruence between community preferences 
and public policies (Fried and Rabinovitz 1980). Local governments are justified on the 
consideration that they can accommodate the diversity of needs among localities. The 
needs of the urban councils may be different from the needs of the rural council. This 
diversity of solution offers avenues for experimentation and innovation which cannot be 
provided under a uniform standardized provision of services from the national 
government. Secondly, local councillors are more accessible to the people rather than 
nationally elected representatives. Local councillors are also regarded as an important 
avenue for expressing local opinion, and complaints both because they carry more 
weight with the non-elected member of the local government and they share the 
responsibility for policy making at the local level. Therefore, their accessibility to the 
local people is an important consideration (Young In Goldsmith 1986; Parry, Moyser 
and Day 1992). Moreover, they have an additional incentive to develop more 
participatory mechanisms for community involvement. Elections provides and 
incentives for them and service providers to look for more responsive ways of involving 
people (Beetham In King and Stoker 1996). 
40 
 
2.4.2 Accountability 
A democratic local government is accountable to the people as it derives its powers 
directly or indirectly from the people. Electoral institutions are used not only to select 
good policies but also to hold incumbents accountable to the public and in this way they 
make polices responsive or less responsive to public demands (Ferejohn In Przeworski, 
Stokes and Manin 1999). Through elections citizen can ensure that politicians act on 
their behalf and pursue their policy preferences. As Dahl has argued, “a key 
characteristic of democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the 
preferences of its citizen” (1970, p: 1). At election time, voters will listen to political 
campaigns, try to compare and choose those who they think are trustworthy and can act 
responsively on their behalf. However, elections will also serve as a retrospective 
mechanism to oust those who did not perform well based on the incumbent’s past 
performance.  
Elections may be a necessary condition but not the sufficient condition of accountability 
and responsiveness. Electoral process provides popular authorization of the key decision 
makers and from there follows the concept of accountability to the people for the 
policies and actions that are undertaken by this popular local government. However, to 
be effective, public accountability should be supplemented by other institutional 
arrangements such as an independent judiciary, free media, accountability of non-
elected officials to the elected representatives, and independent audits for auditing the 
local government accounts, other associations and so on. In order to be responsive, there 
should be regular consultation of people in the local decision making process and access 
to information. Elections on its own cannot assess public opinion (Beetham In King and 
Stoker 1996).  
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2.5 REVIEWING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The previous section (2.4) has provided a justification of local government on three 
grounds: participation, accountability and responsiveness. This section focuses on 
reviewing the empirical evidence in order to substantiate the theoretical arguments 
provided earlier and to examine whether there is a link between ‘participation, 
accountability and improved service delivery performance’. However, before 
proceeding to the empirical review of literature, we will attempt to understand the 
politics of decentralization reforms which provide the context of motives behind 
decentralization reforms. 
2.5.1 Politics of Decentralization Reforms 
The politics of decentralization reforms explain what interests might gain or lose from 
any set of institutional reforms, and policy initiatives and in turn may impact the reform 
implementation process and its outcomes. Therefore, it seems pertinent to understand 
the ideology or motives behind decentralization reforms to fully appreciate the process 
of reforms and its intended outcomes. The literature has provided us with various 
motives for decentralization reforms which Blair (1998) has clustered as inspired either 
from an administrative ideology or a democratic ideology. The difference between the 
two lies in the fact that pursuit of decentralization reforms under an administrative 
ideology fosters decentralization not for the pursuit of genuine democratically 
empowered local government but for the purpose of curbing regional political conflicts, 
fragment regional or state’s political power bases and to create a local patronage of its 
own. Quite contrary to the administrative ideology, a democratic ideology promotes 
democratic decentralization for genuine participation and to empower people in the 
decision making process. A comparison of both ideologies is provided in Table 2-2. 
42 
 
Table 2-2: Motives for Decentralization Reforms 
Administrative Ideology Democratic Ideology 
 Administrative ideology promotes 
democratic decentralization for 
effective planning and 
implementation of service delivery 
at the local level and to 
accommodate variations in the local 
preferences. 
 According to the administrative 
argument, democratic 
decentralization will cultivate local 
patronage for the central 
government. Administrative 
ideology favours democratic 
decentralization in order to 
accommodate regional differences 
and prevent social movements. 
 Administrative ideology favours 
democratic decentralization to shift 
the burden of service delivery from 
central to local level. 
 According to the democratic ideology local 
governments are better informed of local 
needs and hence will provide a mix of 
services tailored to the community needs 
and at the end people will be able to hold 
them accountable. 
 From a democratic mentality, grass root 
participation will generate the mechanisms 
of accountability and will result in an 
accountable local government. 
 Democratic ideology advances democratic 
decentralization for social inclusion of 
those groups who are being marginalized 
in society and take advantage of diversity 
of ideas. 
 Democratic arguments favour local 
provision of services to make them more 
responsive and efficient. 
                                                                                                                   Source: Adapted from Blair (1998) 
The literature on political decentralization has stressed that the motives of 
decentralization reforms- whether it is for a genuine desire to empower grass root 
communities or a central government commitment to extend their own control, can have 
a significant impact on service delivery outcome (Crook 2003). For instance 
decentralization reforms in West Bengal and Brazil were the outcome of a strong 
political commitment of central government to challenge the existing local elite and a 
commitment to pro-poor policies which reflected in the support of central government 
to pro- poor policies in the form of funding to local government and local government’s 
commitment to implement such policies with the support of local employees and 
political activists (Op-Cit). Compared to this, decentralization reforms in African 
countries are attributed to central government’s intent to create a local base and foster 
patronage. Hence, decentralization could not result in pro-poor service delivery 
outcomes because of weak accountability culture and corruption at the local level. 
These findings are also shared by Olowu (2003; 2004) and Francis (2003). Therefore, it 
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seems significant to view decentralization reforms in their broader socio-political 
context in which they occur.  
2.5.2 Participation, Accountability and Performance 
The comparative empirical evidence suggests that decentralization does lead to 
broadening the depth and scope of participation but it may not result in effective 
accountability arrangements or responsive service delivery. This is provided by the 
comparative case studies of Crook and Manor (1998), Crook and Sverisson (2001) and 
Blair (2000). This is also well established in the literature that elections are not 
sufficient to extend participatory democracy. Elections may increase representation of 
disadvantaged groups, however, it may not empower these groups in local politics. Even 
in cases where marginalized groups are given representation in local councils through 
legislations such as a quota system, it does not necessarily result in effective 
representation in local council meetings and deeply embedded structure that sustain elite 
domination of local politics remain the most powerful at the local level.  
Blair (2000) found that in Bangalore, the capital city of Karnataka (a State of India), the 
president and vice president of local councils were females, yet council affairs were run 
by their husbands. Women were largely playing a silent role in council meetings. The 
same was true for the scheduled cast (Untouchables) who either do not participate or 
participate on the dictation of the elite groups. This was further supported from the case 
studies of Ghana, and Cote d’ Ivories (Blair 2000; Crook and Manor 1998). 
“Democratic Local Government initiatives have encouraged participation and 
have increased representation, but they have provided little in the way of 
empowerment, and even less in making the distribution of benefits more 
equitable or reducing poverty” (Blair 2000, p: 25).  
Empirical evidence from Colombia and Bolivia also highlighted that indeed, citizen 
were given representation on local planning committees and administrative boards to 
44 
 
monitor local government service delivery performance; however, the level of 
participation remained ineffective partly owing to the lack of continuity of such 
participatory initiatives in Colombia and Bolivia and, partly such legislative 
requirements to increase direct community representation on such bodies needed change 
in the existing administrative structures and procedures which these local government 
initiatives failed to implement (Nickson 2001). The empirical evidence from Ghana also 
suggested that bedsides a high level of participation (contact between the community 
and councillors, electoral participation, active civil society, high level of public interest 
in local affairs) the local authorities were unable to articulate popular demands into 
service delivery outcomes. The main factors were legal and political structures of the 
local authorities. The political executives had no executive authority. They lacked 
political and legal capacity to establish accountability over the local bureaucracy and 
appointed officials of the central government. It also lacked political commitment from 
the central government to fully implement the decentralization plan. Therefore, local 
authorities were unable to fully participate in the policy formulation and implementation 
process.   
The empirical literature on accountability mechanisms (Blair 2000; Olowu 1994) 
indicates that it is structured differently in different contexts, and these strategies work 
best when they are applied in a combined way (see Table 2-3). Indirect voice 
mechanisms: election, local media, political parties, and civil society, remains imperfect 
without the direct voice mechanisms: service delivery surveys, participatory budgeting 
techniques, and increased transparency in revenue sharing and resource allocation, 
complaint bodies or Ombudsman etc. Likewise, evidence from countries like Brazil and 
Porto Alger (Campbell and Fuhr 2004) and Kerala (a State of India) (Heller 2007) 
suggest that more direct voice mechanisms such as participatory budgeting techniques 
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have been able to make service provision more responsive and local government more 
accountable. However, the evidence from Uganda regarding the participatory budgeting 
approach is met with mixed findings because of weak fiscal autonomy and downward 
accountability mechanisms -accountability of elected representative to local citizens 
(Francis 2003). Blair (2000) has assessed the impact of decentralization on 
accountability and participation. He mainly assessed the effectiveness of voice 
mechanisms: free and active media, civil society, political parties, elections, formal 
procedures, public meetings, opinion surveys as depicted in Table 2-3.  
Table 2-3: Viable Mechanisms of Accountability in Local Government 
Type of Accountability Philippine Bolivia Honduras Karnataka Ukraine Mali 
Bureaucrats to elected 
officials 
X X X XX X  
Political accountability-
elected officials to the 
public 
      
 Electionb X X X XX X X 
 Politicalb parties XX XX XX X   
 Civil societyb X     X 
 Mediab X XX XX  X X 
Public meetings X      
Formal procedures X XX XX    
Opinion surveys X      
        XX- Viable source of accountability; X- Potential source of accountability, b-most important mechanisms 
Source:  Adapted from Blair (2000) 
According to Table 2-3, Blair categorized elections, political parties, media and civil 
society as stronger accountability mechanisms compared to public meetings, formal 
procedures, and opinion surveys. He found that the most robust mechanism of 
accountability in the Philippines was civil society. In Bolivia, political parties, media 
and formal procedures were strong accountability mechanisms whereas political parties 
and public meetings played a major role in Honduras. While, elections and institutional 
accountability were very strong accountability mechanisms in the Indian state of 
Karnataka. Overall, he concluded that though local government had been able to 
improve the quantity and depth of participation, increased representation; but, there had 
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been little success in the empowering of marginalized groups and even less in making 
the service delivery responsive to local community needs.  
All these forms of participation have problems of their own. For instance, competitive 
and free elections are essential to hold government accountable, the strength of election 
system depends on factors such as the structure of electorates, the regularity of 
elections, and extent of genuine voters' choice as vote buying  and vote bargaining are 
common features of developing countries (Devas 2003). There is also an argument in 
the literature that civil society organizations are no guarantee that they will represent 
excluded social groups and it is more likely that they may reinforce the existing pattern 
of social inequality and exclusion. In many cases they have been captured by elite 
groups for their networking and result in policies which benefit those who are already 
better off. Empirical evidence from Bolivia and the Philippines has indicated that 
besides the presence of a strong civil society there is a lack of evidence that genuine 
civil society participation exists at the local level and it has made any significant impact 
on service delivery outcomes (Blair 2000).  
Advocates of decentralization argue that a decentralized system is more responsive to 
local preferences. However, there is little support to substantiate this assumption and it 
seems that decentralization alone is not a sufficient condition to induce participation or 
responsiveness; it is contingent on the context in which it is implemented. To fully grasp 
the much advocated assertion that decentralization is dependent upon the context, this 
section has attempted to map the relationship between decentralization and responsive 
service delivery by drawing on the evidence of comparative studies from different 
country context-Africa, East Asian Region, and Latin America. The pattern of 
relationship between participation, accountability and service delivery performance is 
47 
 
provided in Table 2-4. According to Table 2-4, the most significant variables which 
affect the link between decentralization and service delivery performance are: Effective 
participation, institutional environment, resource adequacy and accountability 
arrangements. The empirical evidence on assessing the impact of political 
decentralization mostly assessed this impact in terms of improved participation, 
effective accountability and responsive services which are the main objectives of 
political decentralization.   
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Table 2-4: Patterns of Relationship Between Participation, Accountability and Performance 
Regions Country Participation Accountability Socio-Political 
Context 
Explanation of Performance Outcomes Authors 
A
fr
ic
a
 
Ghana Poor 
participation  
Weak Moderately 
Favourable 
Resource constraints, lack of political and institutional 
accountability, elite capture 
 Crook (1995) 
Uganda Poor 
participation  
Weak Weak 1) Weak resource base, central transfers in the form of earmark 
grants, capital grants specified for the sector, unconditional 
grants mainly used for the operational and administrative cost 
Frnacis & James 
(2003) 
 2) However, main factor remained a lack of genuine 
participation in the planning process of local government and 
lack of administrative capacity of councillor and 
administration 
Cote D’Ivoire Poor 
participation  
Weak Weak Inadequacy of resources, elite capture, weak political 
accountability  
Crook & Manor 
(2008) 
Tanzania Poor 
participation  
Weak Weak  Lack of genuine local democracy, weak resource base, however 
main factor for poor performance is lack of participation in 
decision making at the local level and weak political 
accountability. 
Munkandala (1998) 
Moderately 
favourable 
Some improvements in roads and health facilities after 
decentralization 
Crook & Sverrison 
(2001) 
Kenya Very Poor/ 
Participation  
Weak  Weak 1) Weak participation, lack of resources, elite capture N’gethe, (1998) 
2) Some improvements in resource allocation to poor 
regions, however, the main reason was more political 
than serving the needs of the poor 
Smoke (1993) 
Zimbabwe  Very poor  
participation 
Weak  Weak Weak participation, elite capture, weak resource base Brand (1991) 
Nigeria Very poor 
participation  
Weak  Very weak Weak participation, weak  and institutional accountability, mayors 
involved in political patronage, corruption and exhibiting 
dictatorial behaviour 
Olowu (1993) 
Botswana  High 
participation 
Good  Supportive Adequacy of resources, authority and high level of political 
process (civil society, popular participation, free media) leading to 
genuine participation in the decision making process at the local 
level 
Wunsch (1998) 
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Regions Country Participation Accountability Socio-Political 
Context 
Explanation of Performance Outcomes Author 
L
a
ti
n
 A
m
er
ic
a
 
 
Colombia Medium 
participation  
Medium  Supportive The real level of participation is not effective in spite of the 
institutional arrangements such as local planning committee, 
administrative boards for monitoring local government 
performance 
Nickson (2001) 
Bolivia Medium 
participation  
Medium  Supportive Improved participation, Some evidence of improved participation 
as local authorities in some regions has allocated resources for 
school construction in remote areas, however, same authorities 
have allocated resources for building automobile race track.  
Blair ( 2000) 
Philippines  Medium 
participation  
Medium  Supportive Improved participation, some evidence of distributional benefits 
going to the poor or disadvantaged groups in some regions.  
Blair ( 2000) 
 
 
A
si
a
 
Bangladesh Medium/ 
participation 
high 
Weak  Political 
context not 
supportive, 
social context 
supportive 
High level of participation, and resource adequacy, however, 
poor performance is an outcome of weak political and 
institutional accountability, elite capture; corruption is the 
outcome of weak accountability mechanisms. 
Crook & Manor 
(2008) 
Karnataka High  
participation  
Good  Very 
supportive 
political and 
social context 
Participation medium, adequacy of resources, strong political and 
institutional accountability. 
Crook & Manor, 
(2008) 
Kerala  High 
participation  
Good  Very 
supportive 
political and 
social context 
High level of participation in budgeting and planning process, 
social inclusion of all groups in the local decision making process 
leading to overcome the problem of elite capture and challenge 
the historical pattern of social inequalities of the region 
Heller, Harilal & 
Chaudhuri (2007) 
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2.5.3 African Case Studies 
The findings of African case studies (Crook 1994; Crook 2003; Crook and Manor 1998; 
Francis 2003; Hope 2000; Olowu 2003; Wunsch 1998) as provided in Table 2-4 
indicate that there is a lack of congruence between decentralization and responsive 
service delivery. It raises the question of why decentralization outcomes are so 
disappointing. Empirical studies have highlighted different factors. Francis and James 
(2003) indicate that although local government in Uganda has shown significant 
improvements in education and water provision, these cannot be attributed to the local 
government decision making process. The improvements in these sectors are the result 
of increased central government conditional funding tied to these specific sectors. 
Uganda’s experience with decentralization indicates a heavy reliance of the local 
government on conditional grants. 80% of the grants were conditional leaving less 
leeway for the local government to influence the spending pattern (Op-Cit).  
Hence, the decentralized institutions had very limited scope in terms of local decision 
making. Therefore, improvements in social sectors are the outcome of this factor rather 
genuine local level decision making process. Decentralization provided local 
community opportunity for participation in local planning process, such as committees 
for bottom up planning, their suggestions were never articulated into policy outcomes. 
According to Francis and James (2003), the main reasons for ineffective participatory 
mechanisms were; firstly, lack of capacity of the politician and local bureaucracy to 
make any realistic development plans and secondly, there was a lack of financial 
resources to implement such plan. Thirdly, social norms also prevented local 
community to take part in discussion during the meeting of such committees as they 
conceived that “such decisions are the prerogative of elected representative” (p: 332). 
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In rhetoric and reality, there were institutions of wider social inclusions. However, as 
the resources which local authorities could actually control were very limited, 
participation could not be translated into service delivery outcome. Moreover, 
decentralized structures lacked a genuine participatory system of local government, a 
culture of transparency and civic engagements to ensure downward accountability (Op-
Cit). 
The cases of Ghana and Cote d’ Ivories further suggest the importance of socio-political 
context, elite capture and institutional arrangements (the structure and power of local 
authorities, accountability arrangements) as significant variables in determining the 
service delivery outcomes. According to Crook and Manor (1998), the motives behind 
Ghana’s decentralization reforms were not to relinquish the central government’s 
control, but rather the military government of Ghana considered it as an opportunity to 
extend its power base at the local level. However, the social context was quite 
favourable. For them, the explanation of Ghana’s local government poor performance 
was the weak institutional arrangements. The elected leader of the assembly had no 
executive powers. Local authorities were unable to fully participate in the policy 
formulation and implementation process, lacked political and legal capacity to establish 
accountability over the local bureaucracy and appointed official of the central 
governments. It also showed a lack of political commitment from the upper tiers of 
government to fully implement the decentralization plan. In addition to this, communes 
did not have the power or administrative capacity to take action in various policy areas. 
However, as far as participation is concerned, there was a high level of contact between 
public and elected representatives, well developed civil society, high level of electoral 
participation, higher level of public interest in local affairs, however, despite the 
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awareness of popular demands, the local authority was unable to articulate these 
demands into outputs such as roads, schools, health facilities etc.  
While Cote d’ Ivories presented a different socio-political context. There was a single 
party system, opposition fully excluded from the council, weak civil society and low 
contact among councillors and constituents. The main explanation of poor performance 
was the inability of the elected official to maintain contact with the people. Elected 
officials (Mayors and Assistant Mayors) were able to exert influence over local 
administration and bureaucracy which is reflected in their ability to execute budgets. 
However, mayors and assistant mayors had a strong social network with elite groups 
both at the centre and at the local level, and they had experience of national and regional 
politics and enjoyed elite status. Consequently, their policies were politically sensitive 
and mainly benefited the elite groups whose interest they represented rather than the 
marginal groups of society. Other factors responsible for poor performance, as found in 
Ghana case, were: lack of administrative capacity and resource constraints. Overall, 
elected representatives failed to establish strong contact with their constituencies as they 
never felt accountable to the local community. Their accountability was to the central 
government (Crook 2003; Crook and Manor 1998) 
The case study of Tanzania also indicated poor performances of local government. 
According to the survey findings of Munkandala (In Barkan et al. 1998) service 
delivery benefits were not targeted to the marginalized groups and local representatives 
have little influence in making service delivery more responsive. The elite local 
politicians were unable to establish strong public accountability with their electorates. 
However, besides poor performance outcomes, it was interesting to note that the 
majority of the respondents were of the opinion that local government should not be 
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abandoned and should have more features of democratic character. Similar evidence is 
found from Kenya (Barkan et al. 1998; Smoke 1993), Zimbabwe (Mutizwa‐Mangiza 
1990) and Nigeria (Olowu 1994). These case studies found that the poor performance of 
local governments in these countries was the result of weak accountability mechanisms 
and political patronage. N’gethe (1998) found popular participation in Kenya as a 
delusion referring to the interviewee of a district official in Meru district council office: 
“To say that ordinary people participate in making decisions is a joke: they have to be 
guided by the ‘elite’ or at least energized to participate” (Barkan et al. 1998, p: 44). 
Smoke (1993) found local authorities in Kenya non responsive to their electorates, even 
in situations where they have a certain amount of autonomy. Overall, popular 
participation was unable to translate representation into responsiveness and effective 
public accountability to the electorates. Even to the extent that the head of the District 
Development Committees (DDC) could delete any project proposal they felt irrelevant 
without any democratic procedure. Likewise, in Zimbabwe and Nigeria, local 
authorities were found more responsive to the central government policies rather than to 
the needs of their local community.  
Olowu (2003, p: 50) has summed up African decentralization experiences as:  
“Many institutions of local accountability in Africa do not yet meet two 
conditions required for effective voice mechanisms: citizens lack information 
and power to compel local politicians to account. Moreover, both central and 
local government systems have weak incentives to make service providers 
responsive to citizen’s voices. In the absence of effective voice institutions, many 
local governments in Africa remain weak and corrupt, and citizens have often 
resorted to violence or social resistance----but there must be a political desire to 
do so.”  
To sum up the literature from the African country context has provided examples of 
increased participation but little evidence that they have resulted in pro-poor policies or 
responsive service delivery owing to the politics of decentralization reforms. These 
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studies support the proposition that “participation is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for greater responsiveness” (Crook 2003, p: 79). Therefore, based on the 
empirical literature it cannot be assumed that empowerment and participation will 
automatically lead to responsive service delivery or better accountability arrangements. 
For this to happen, participation needs to be effective. It is not enough that citizen voice 
should be encouraged, it needs to be heard by those who hold the government 
accountable (Goetz et al. 2001; Olowu 2003) and translated into policy outcomes. It 
also reveals that in order to assess participation we need to track accountability 
mechanisms; both accountability within the local government institutions such as 
accountability of bureaucrats to the political head (institutional accountability) and 
accountability of local government to the public (political accountability).  
The empirical evidence from African countries (Hope 2000; Wunsch 1998) has 
highlighted Botswana as one of the success stories of decentralization. The comparative 
evidence suggests that Botswana had a combination of favourable socio-political 
context, resource adequacy and mix of participatory arrangements for better 
accountability mechanisms. For instance, Hope (2000) while assessing the impact of 
decentralization reforms in Botswana concluded that local democracy has considerably 
improved local accountability. Local communities are successful in providing important 
input to their authorities regarding local needs. In turn, local councillors are articulating 
their local preferences in the policy making process. The councillors of the local 
government have been the most vocal in representing their community voice at local 
council meetings besides a weak civil society. These findings were also supported by 
Lekorwe (1998), Reilly (1997) and Wunsch (1998). According to Lekorwe:  
 “Though interest groups are weak, Botswana offers another option in which 
political elites existing political structures-----to encourage political 
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participation. Using this approach, Botswana has built a strong democracy 
whilst its civil society remains weak.” (Lekorwe 1998, pp: 95-6)  
 
Similarly, Wunsch’s (1998) comparative findings from African countries such as South 
Africa, Swaziland, and Botswana, ranked Botswana high on service delivery 
performance. The study assessed the relationship among three independent variables; 
resource availability, authority, and local political process on local government 
performance. All the three variables were found very strong in the case of Botswana 
contributing to the improved performance outcomes. Moreover, Wunsch (1998) and 
Hope (2000) found that Botswana had a culture of tolerance, openness to criticism, a 
committed national government to the devolution reforms and national government 
efforts to enable them by providing sufficient financial and operational autonomy. This 
all contributed to creating a favourable context for the local government performance. 
2.5.4 Asian Case Studies 
The empirical evidence from Asian regions - Bangladesh and Indian state of Karnataka 
and Kerala further substantiate the argument that decentralization outcomes depend on a 
favourable socio-political context, resource adequacy, level of participation and 
accountability arrangements. For instance, Crook and Manor in their comparative study 
of Asian and African context found that Bangladesh besides having a favourable socio-
political context, central government’ commitment in the form of resources, the pattern 
of service provision reflected “elite bias, the domination of patronage, extensive 
corruption and electoral manipulation. Vulnerable groups received few of the resources 
provided” (Crook and Manor 1998, p: 320-321). They found that local governments 
had weak administrative and technical capacity to carry out newly assigned functions, 
however, the main limitation was local councils could not hold the executive chairman 
accountable for its action (just like the case of Cote D’Ivoire). Consequently, the result 
56 
 
was corruption, political patronage and domination of elite groups. As the chairman 
derived its powers mainly from the connections with the central government, he 
allocated resources to attract a network of supporters of the military government.  
“The military regime was more concerned to throw resources into creating a 
network of clients loyal to itself, and social norms were such that most villagers 
had a ‘servant-master’ relationship with bureaucrats and council 
representatives, which did not easily support the making of complaints about 
bad behavior or lack of accountability” (Crook and Manor 1998, p: 326). 
Compared to this, the Indian State of Karnataka demonstrated significant positive 
outcomes in terms of institutional performance (Crook and Manor 1998). However, 
according to Crook and Manor, the success of Karnataka cannot be attributed to 
decentralization alone. First of all, Karnataka had a free press, competitive party system 
and a supporting bureaucracy, thus there was a ‘culture of accountability’ (p: 327) 
exhibited through the willingness of people to complain or report any illegal behaviour. 
While summing up the findings of their research Crook and Manor (1998) concluded 
that the main factors which resulted in poor performance in case of Cote D’Ivoire, 
Ghana and Bangladesh - resource constraints, poor administrative capacity, and lack of 
public and institutional accountability - were not a major problem in the case of 
Karnataka. However, participation was not found a very significant explanatory factor 
as it was much higher in Bangladesh. They suggested that a combination of fiscal, 
administrative, and democratic element can only ensure responsiveness and 
accountability of local governments: 
“participation alone could not be a satisfactory explanation of performance.-----
only in Karnataka there was a benign combination of adequate resources, a 
supportive political and social context, a well-established administration, at 
least adequate level of participation, and publicly accountable elected 
representatives who were able to make the fruits of participation effective at the 
institutional level” (pp: 327-329).  
However, Blair’s (2000) research findings from the State of Karnataka contradicted 
Crook and Manor’s findings. He reported that popular participation was not able to turn 
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distributional benefits to the poor or disadvantaged groups and as local council were 
composed of local elites, therefore, they directed most of the benefits into policy 
outcomes which benefited them. According to Blair (2000), decentralization has 
improved community representation, yet it could not empower disadvantaged and 
marginalized groups of society even though their seats were reserved in local councils. 
Overall, local council decision making remained susceptible to elite capture. A 
comparison of both studies directs our attention on the methodological issues of 
measuring performance.  
According to a World Bank report (2000,  pp: 28-29) Kerala has not only the greatest 
degree of fiscal autonomy and is the most fiscally decentralized state in India and 
second to Colombia in the developed world, its Panchayat system (local council) are 
fully empowered to make decisions and implement them. Heller (2007) examined the 
relationship between decentralization and its impact on performance in the context of 
Kerala (Heller 2007). This study was focused on assessing the impact of direct forms of 
participation-direct involvement of citizen in planning and budgeting. The decentralized 
planning campaign initiated in 1996 aimed at devolving not only functional 
responsibility but fiscal devolution along with creating mechanisms and institutions for 
direct community engagements in planning and budgeting. The study reported that 
when respondents were asked whether services were ‘improved, deteriorated or no 
change’ during 1996-2001, the majority of the respondents indicated that services are 
improved. Similar findings were found across level of participation in development 
planning, and responsiveness of local representatives to community needs (92% 
indicated that elected people were more responsive to the local needs and their opinion). 
An interesting finding was that the majority of the respondents also reported that the 
campaign benefited the poor people and it was able to overcome the problem of elite 
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capture as less than 4% of the respondents indicated that “powerful interest” exerted 
influence over project selection. Even they indicated that government officials have no 
influence over project selection which was quite surprising given the Kerala’s history of 
political patronage and elite capture prior to the campaign.   
“Participation can improve the quality of governance both by providing better 
inputs (information and ideas) and by holding politicians and bureaucrats 
accountable. Accountability can increase as a result of checks and balances (as 
in constitutional-legal theories of democracy) and as a result of cooperation 
between state and civil society actors (as emphasized in the literature on 
synergy and participatory bodies)” (Heller 2007, p: 638).  
In sum, comparative evidence from Asian regions also supports the assumption that mix 
of favourable socio-political context, institutional arrangements, sufficient political, 
administrative and fiscal capacity of local government determines the decentralization 
outcomes.  Blair (2000) and Azfar et al., (In Kimenyi and Meagher 2004) found mixed 
but positive evidence of effective citizen participation in Philippine. According to Azfar 
et al. NGOs in Philippine were playing an active role at the local planning committees 
and in the local governance of schools and health. Furthermore, Blair (2000) also found 
that in some areas of Philippine, the flow of benefits remained unchanged because of 
the elite capture. However, he found evidence of responsive service delivery in areas 
such as councils of Cochabamba and Honduran, where civil society was strong, local 
councils were effective in allocating resources to marginalized social class.  
2.5.5 Latin American Case Studies 
The evidence from Latin American countries also found mixed outcomes in terms of 
responsive service delivery and enhanced participation. The empirical evidence from 
Latin America, particularly with reference to Colombia supports the proposition that if 
local policy makers can be held accountable to the public through voting, it would force 
them to make policies which are more sensitive to local needs as they know that their 
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performance is assessed by local people and their re-election depends on the fact that 
they have mobilized resources and articulated their concerns in the policy making and 
implementation process. This was further supported by Fiszbein (1997) that 
decentralization has been successful in increasing service coverage, community 
satisfaction with respect to services such as education, health, water and sanitation, 
roads and infrastructure and agriculture extension. The respondents of his study 
reported greater satisfaction with the local government compared to national 
government. Whereas Prawda’s (1993) comparative analysis of four Latin American 
countries - Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico-revealed that democratic 
decentralization was unable to lead to an efficiency or equity gains. Decentralization 
must be treated as a long term process to see any significant outcomes.  
2.5.6 Conclusion 
As depicted in the Figure 2-3, the assumption that a local government will lead to 
responsive service delivery outcomes depends on accountability arrangements, 
adequacy of resources, institutional arrangements and socio-political context. Figure 2-3 
and Table 2-4 present the summarized view of empirical evidence discussed earlier and 
as provided from the evidence of responsive service delivery outcomes in cases 
Botswana, Kerala and Karnataka, these local governments had a combination of all the 
three variables - high level of participation, highly supportive institutional environment, 
and strong political and institutional accountability arrangements, and therefore these 
local governments were able to deliver the promises of responsive service delivery 
outcomes. Some of the studies have assessed performance in term of  the change in 
service delivery and development (assessed by asking respondents their perception of 
quality, accessibility of service), and depth, quality and process of participation through 
survey administered at the political representatives and public officials (Heller 2007), 
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others have assessed it by looking at the public spending and community preference 
through perceptual survey at the grass root level, and process indicators by looking at 
the accountability relationships between community, public officials and political 
representatives at one end and improved participating on the other (Crook and Manor 
1998).  
 
Figure 2-3: Local Government Performance 
Categories: 
   : Participation: Impact: High\Moderate\Low 
: Socio-political context: Very supportive\Moderate\less supportive 
 : Accountability: Strong accountability\weak accountability arrangements 
                                                   Source: Author  
 
The comparative evidence suggests that elite capture can be a potential problem unless 
central government tries to control it through challenging the existing elite groups. From 
the empirical evidence it can be inferred that the problem of elite capture may occur 
when: (1) representative democracy despite its commitment to political equality results 
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in reproducing the same existing social and economic inequities, (2) paradox of 
participation-disadvantaged groups remain disadvantaged as participation reaches only 
to mere representation level, (3) elite capture is also determined by the nature of central-
local relations. The question arises what kind of alliances central government is trying 
to seek from the local elites. What is their strategy; cooptation or avoidance? This 
further emphasizes the need to strengthen the local accountability mechanisms. The 
problem of elite capture and weak accountability is related to factors such as literacy 
rate, social status, wealth, and forms of political participation, availability of 
information to the local community, central government oversight bodies and other 
institutional arrangements (Bardhan 1997; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). It is also 
argued in the literature that decentralization would not lead to responsive service 
provision if it is not supported by strong accountability mechanisms at the national and 
local level (Crook 2003).  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Political decentralization promises to increase participation, improved political 
accountability and responsive service delivery. However, the literature in the previous 
section has argued that representative democracy should be strengthened by 
participatory democracy to transform mere representation of people in councils or 
different committee structures into effective participation. Therefore, it can be inferred 
from the literature that participation is treated not only an input but also an output of 
political decentralization. Empirical evidence regarding political decentralization and 
responsiveness has already suggested that political decentralization alone can neither 
improve participation, nor result in responsive service delivery outcomes. The empirical 
section (2.5) of this chapter has highlighted that the relationship between political 
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decentralization and performance depends on a range of institutional factors, resource 
adequacy and accountability arrangements as depicted in Figure 2-4. Therefore, in order 
to analyse this relationship a framework is proposed in Figure 2-4. As reflected in the 
Figure, decentralization can lead to improved participation or service delivery 
performance, if it has a combination of factors - positive institutional environment, 
adequacy of resources, and better accountability arrangements. The empirical studies in 
this section have mostly assessed local government performance in terms of 
responsiveness, enhanced participation and accountability.   
 
Figure 2-4: Framework for Analysing the Relationship between Decentralization and 
Performance 
This section has explained that in order to assess the impact of political decentralization 
we need to look at the nature of participation in decision making: are political 
representative playing an influential role in local decision making process?; do they 
have sufficient resources to translate policy decisions into service delivery outcomes?; 
Socio-political context
Political 
decentralization
Political commitment 
from upper tiers
Political 
accountability
Performance
Resources
Accountability
Relations between local 
bureaucrats, other governmental 
agencies and executive officials on 
the one hand and political 
representatives on the other hand 
Financial
Capacity 
issues
Administrative/
human
Legal and political 
structure of the 
decentralized units
Community 
participation
Local bureaucracy
Relationship of LG with 
provincial/federal 
government
Active civil society 
Relations between local 
representatives and the 
public
Institutional 
accountability
Elite capture
63 
 
and how institutional environment and accountability arrangements affect local 
government performance in terms of participation and service delivery outcomes? 
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CHAPTER 3  
FISCAL PERSPECTIVE ON DECENTRALIZATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 provided an understanding of the link between democratic decentralization 
and institutional performance in terms of local government responsiveness and 
accountability to the people, and also highlighted factors that may have a significant 
impact on this relationship. It also argued (Section 2.5.6) that local government needs 
adequate fiscal and administrative autonomy to perform its role as an effective service 
provider. Hence, political autonomy should be followed by sufficient fiscal autonomy to 
achieve responsiveness and make local government accountable. This chapter focuses 
on the fiscal autonomy of local government, how it should be structured (Section 3.2) 
and the empirical evidence (Section 3.6) that links fiscal decentralization to improved 
organizational performance.   
3.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Fiscal decentralization lies at the heart of the fiscal federalism perspective which is 
rooted in the theories of public finance. The conceptual framework of fiscal 
decentralization largely draws on the contributions of; Stigler (1953), Musgrave (1965), 
Olson (1969) and Oats (1972).  
This literature implies that decision making should occur at the lowest possible tier in 
accordance with the principle of allocative efficiency (also known as the principle of 
subsidiarity). The main assumption is that decentralized decision making will enlarge 
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local participation and promote accountability by establishing a clear link between 
expenditure and revenue assignment. Fiscal federalism literature argues that spending 
responsibility should precede assignment of taxation powers for better accountability 
arrangements. For the assignment of roles and responsibilities to different tiers of local 
government Stigler (1953) proposed two principles: 
1. A representative government works better when it is closer to the people it 
serves. 
2. People should have the right to vote for the mix of services they need.  
Oats (1972) extended this argument by proposing a decentralization theorem: each 
public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum 
geographical area that would internalize benefits and the cost of each provision (p: 55).  
Broadly speaking, the national government should provide services which benefit the 
whole national population, whereas the state-local government should provide services 
which are divisible geographically. For instance, national defence is the responsibility 
of national government as the benefits of a national army extends to the entire nation 
(also referred to as spill over effect), and local police protection is a local government 
function as the spill over effect in this case extends to the local population only.  
According to Buchanan (1970), an efficient division of responsibility among 
governments depends upon the geographic scope of the spill over effects of the 
collective action. “Each collective good or service is ‘collective’ to only a limited 
group. The extent of the group determines the ‘economic’ size of the governmental units 
which should perform the function”. Buchanan (1970) further argues that some of the 
collective goods such as local education provision and highway construction have spill 
over effects, and that there is: 
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 “Clearly some ‘national interest’ in ensuring that the service levels are at least 
up to some commonly accepted ‘standard’. It may seem desirable to try to 
represent this genuine national interest through grants-in-aid while allowing the 
state-local units to maintain the major responsibility for actually performing the 
public services.” (p: 443)  
Olson and Jr. (1969) extended this argument and proposed the Fiscal equivalency 
principle for determining the optimal jurisdictional boundaries and internalizing spill 
over benefits:  
“---there is a need for a separate governmental institution for every collective 
good
1
 with a unique boundary, so that there can be a match between those who 
receive the benefits of a collective good and those who pay for it. This match we 
define as ‘fiscal equivalence”. This fiscal equivalency principle also explained 
how in case of collective goods, such as education provision, whose benefits 
extends or spill over
2
 to other jurisdictions, central government should provide 
grants to compensate local governments for the external benefits of these 
expenditures, “The grant to the local government must involve the sharing of 
marginal costs of each additional unit of service in the same proportion as the 
benefits of the additional units are shared between the locality and the nation at 
large” (Olson and Jr. 1969, p: 483, 485) 
 
Another contribution came from Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) to address the efficient 
provision of public goods across jurisdictions (Allocation branch), equity in the 
distribution (Distribution branch) and macroeconomic stabilization (Stabilization 
branch). Based on this framework, the design of efficient provision of services suggests 
that services which are of local benefit should be provided by local government, 
however, where the benefits are borne by the regional or national population, and then it 
should be provided by the relevant tier of government. However, it also assumes that 
individuals with similar preferences should be located together in order to enjoy the 
benefits of the commonly wanted service. The assumption is simple: the residents of a 
particular jurisdiction will pay for the benefits they receive and get the choice of service 
                                                 
 1 Collective good is defined as “goods and services which yield certain indivisible benefits----the 
availability  of a collective good becomes equal to all citizen once the good is provided” (Buchanan 
1970, p:  419) 
 2 Spill over effect- spill over is sometimes referred to as externalities are the benefits of some of the 
collective goods which extend to other jurisdictions. Such as benefits from parks, highway, education 
extend beyond a local community to regional or national level (Buchanan 1970) 
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they want. According to this assumption, local provision is best where benefits are local 
such as street lighting, and national provision is best where benefits are nationwide such 
as national defence. However, according to Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) distribution 
is the function of central government and a decentralized redistribution policy can 
operate in a very narrow boundary and can have perverse consequences. For example, 
jurisdictions offer very high benefits or impose very high taxes. This, consequently, will 
result in the migration of people from high taxing jurisdictions to those offering lower 
taxes or higher benefits. “The appropriate design, in short, points to a decentralized 
provision of public goods, to be paid for by those who benefit, combined with a 
centralized policy of redistribution” (Musgrave 1997, p: 68). Based on this justification, 
the federal government should employ progressive taxes because of its nationwide 
coverage, while regional and local government should have regressive taxes. 
Subsequently, the principle of subsidiarity guided how functions should be assigned 
among different tiers of government. The principle of subsidiarity, that is ‘local knows 
best’ and choice of services should be left to them, appeared, for the first time, in the 
European Union (EU) Maastricht treaty (Musgrave 1997, p: 66). This principle
3
 
proposed that functions such as taxing, spending, and regulatory should be performed 
by the lower level of government unless there is a convincing case for the assignment of 
these functions to the central government (Shah and World Bank. 2004).  
3.3 ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES AND CORRESPONDING 
RESOURCES 
The extent to which local governments can exercise autonomy depends on whether they 
have their own revenue sources or are largely dependent upon ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Transfers’ (IGFT). It has already been mentioned that the guiding principle is that 
                                                 
3
 Subsidiarity principle is defined in Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty 
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“finance follows functions” (Boadway and Shah 2007, p: xxvii). Overall, financing 
arrangements of local governments- comprised of own revenue sources (local taxes), 
intergovernmental transfers and user charges- depend on the functions assigned to the 
local government tiers (Dillinger 1994; Shah and World Bank. 2004).  
3.3.1 Tax Assignment 
The Musgrave and Musgrave framework (Musgrave 1965) assigns progressive taxes to 
central governments as they have to perform a wider role in income redistribution and 
macroeconomic management. Other considerations in tax assignment are: efficiency 
(technical and administrative) and accountability. According to the efficiency principle 
local governments should be assigned tax bases which are efficient and easy to 
administer such as land and property. Central governments should be assigned 
progressive taxes such as corporate tax, income tax as they have to play a wider role in 
macroeconomic management and income redistribution. Property and land taxes are the 
best candidate for local government as LG has better information about the market 
assessment of such properties (Shah and World Bank. 2004). On the other hand, the 
accountability principle requires that local government should be able to finance local 
services from their own revenue sources to make them accountable, therefore 
expenditure assignment should be closely matched to revenue assignment. This tension 
between efficiency and accountability persists throughout the fiscal federalism 
literature.  
On the whole, tax assignment is related to the principle of stabilization, income 
redistribution and resource allocation. In practice, local governments have very narrow 
tax bases which create fiscal imbalances both vertically and horizontally. 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and revenue sharing bridge these vertical imbalances 
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and horizontal inequities. Intergovernmental transfers are a dominant source of revenue 
in developing and transitional economies. They constitute 75-95% of total local 
government revenue in Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, and South Africa (Shah 
and World Bank. 2004). Section 3.5 will discuss how the effects of different financing 
arrangements: own revenue, transfers, and user charges, affect the accountability of 
local government. 
3.3.2 Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (IGFTs) 
Besides local taxes, intergovernmental transfers form a significant proportion of local 
government finances. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers form a part of local government 
revenues and create different incentives for local government autonomy and 
accountability. Broadly, these transfers or grants can be categorized as: (1) 
Unconditional or Block grants, and (2) Conditional grants. 
3.3.2.1 Unconditional or Block Grants 
The primary advantage of block grants lies in the amount of freedom it provides to the 
local government in allocating funds for various local expenditures. The local 
government generally has no conditions attached to the choices as well as the amount of 
local expenditure decisions. These are also intended to maintain not only local 
government autonomy but also enhance inter-jurisdictional equity. Much of the 
empirical evidence from developed countries suggests that grants to local governments 
lead to greater public spending than an increase in citizen's income, known as the 
“flypaper effect”: money sticks where it hits (Bird and Smart 2002; Boadway and Shah 
2007, p: 3). However, empirical evidence regarding the flypaper effect comes from high 
income and developed economies with a long tradition of democratic values and 
independent decision making and this may not hold true for the developing countries. 
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Their relevance to developing countries is questionable. The context of developing 
countries with a lack of sufficient fiscal autonomy, weak institutional arrangements and 
considerable reliance on intergovernmental grants leaves them with less autonomy to 
overspend.  
3.3.2.2 Conditional Grants 
The purpose of conditional grants is entirely different from block grants. According to 
Buchanan (1970), the block grant rationale may be to equalize the fiscal capacity among 
various local governments; however, it is not intended to shift local expenditure to a 
particular service or to achieve a desired level of service standard. Conditional grants 
are specifically aimed to induce local governments to provide specific services (out-put 
based) or to undertake specific programs (input-based). The receipt of the grant is 
conditional on being used for a specific purpose. For instance, central governments may 
attach a condition to spend a grant on capital expenditure or stipulate the condition to 
spend it on a specific service such as education. Therefore, the degree of fiscal 
autonomy of the local government with respect to a conditional grant is considerably 
less than with a block grant. By attaching conditions to a grant, central government 
ensures that the local government spends that amount on the provision of that particular 
service, while at the same time leaves implementation or service delivery to the local 
government level. 
Conditional grants are further sub-categorized as: 1) matching conditional grants, and 2) 
non-matching conditional grants. The rationale for matching conditional grants is that 
the amount of the local service has a spill over effect as described earlier. It requires that 
a grant should be spent on a specific purpose and local government should at least 
match these funds to some extent. Alternatively, non-matching conditional grants does 
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not require local governments to match the funds as long as it is spent on the specific 
purpose.  
3.3.3 Design of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (IGFTs) 
The design of IGFTs reflects what the central government intends to achieve. It is 
largely dependent upon the intended objectives of the central government. Such as fiscal 
transfer may intend to: 
1. Bridge a fiscal gap- the imbalance between expenditure assignments and 
revenue assignments,  
2. Reduce regional fiscal disparities or inequalities arising from variances in 
regional fiscal capacities,  
3. Compensate for spill over benefits,  
4. Set minimum national standards and achieve national equity objectives,  
5. Influence sector improvement in areas of high national but low local priorities,  
6. Create macroeconomic stability, and 
7. Consideration of various issues such as local population, urban vs. rural areas, 
and facilitation of responsible credit market access (Shah and World Bank. 
2004).  
An overview of the objectives of fiscal transfers and the corresponding best practices is 
presented in Table 3-1. As exhibited in the Table, if the central government intends to 
fill a vertical fiscal gap, it can employ various strategies ranging from the reassignment 
of expenditure and revenue, revenue sharing to some kind of tax abatement. Each 
strategy depends on what it intends to achieve. For example, if the reason for a fiscal 
gap is a mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignment, then central 
government may try to fill this gap by either reassignment of functions and 
corresponding matching revenues or may employ revenue sharing as a preferred 
approach to fill this fiscal gap. The general practice reveals variations in this regard. For 
instance, Bird and Smart (2002) have provided a comparison of different approaches of 
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transfers. According to them, some of the countries allocate predetermined amounts of 
the total or most of the national revenues to local governments based on a formula (e.g., 
Philippines, Austria, Japan, Brazil and Nigeria). Compared to this, transition and 
Eastern European countries use a “tax-sharing” approach whereby a certain amount of 
taxes- Value Added Tax (VAT) and income tax- are shared among the tiers of 
government. 
Table 3-1: Principles and Better Practices in Grant Design 
Grant objective Grant design Better practices Conditions to avoid 
To bridge fiscal gap  Reassigning 
responsibilities 
 Tax abatement 
 Tax base sharing 
Tax abatement in Canada 
Tax sharing in Canada, 
Brazil and Pakistan 
Deficit grants 
Tax by tax sharing as 
in India 
To reduce regional 
fiscal disparities 
General non matching fiscal 
capacity equalization transfers 
Fiscal equalization 
programs of Australia, 
Canada, and Germany 
General revenue 
sharing with multiple 
factors 
To compensate for 
benefit spill over 
Open ended matching transfers 
with matching rates consistent 
with spill out of benefits 
RSA grant for teaching 
hospitals 
 
Setting national 
minimum standards 
Conditional non matching 
block transfers with conditions 
on standards of service access 
Indonesia primary rod 
and maintenance grant 
Conditional transfers 
with conditions on 
spending alone 
Ad hoc grants 
Influencing local 
priorities in areas of 
high national but low 
local priority 
Open ended matching transfers 
(with preferably matching rate 
to vary inversely with fiscal 
capacity) 
Matching transfers for 
social assistance as in 
Canada 
Ad hoc grants 
Stabilization Capital grant provided 
maintenance possible 
Limit use of capital 
grants and encourage 
private sector 
participation by 
providing political and 
policy risk guarantee 
Stabilization grant 
with no future upkeep 
requirements 
Source: Adapted from Shah (2002); Boadway, Roberts and Shah (1994) 
A vertical fiscal gap may arise because the national government needs more revenues to 
fulfil its broad fiscal responsibilities such as macroeconomic management. To deal with 
this issue, some kind of tax abatement by central government is required to provide 
more tax scope in areas of jointly occupied fields with the lower tiers of government. It 
would, however, assign central government more responsibility in some expenditure 
areas (Shah 2004, Bird & Smart 2001). Likewise, central government may use 
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equalization transfers to reduce inter regional disparities as reflected in Table 3-1, the 
majority of countries have an equalization transfer arrangement which aims to provide 
each local government with sufficient funds to provide a centrally determined level of 
service. Transfers are based on the local government’s potential revenue raising 
capacity and not on actual revenues. Therefore, equalization transfers have two 
rationales: firstly, to equalize the differential fiscal capacity of all local governments 
creating the same incentives for all, and secondly to ensure that each local government 
can provide a certain level of local services (World Bank 1999; Bird and Smart 2001; 
Shah 2004). 
In federations, there is always divergence on sector priorities. In such situations, if a 
federal government intends to influence lower levels to follow the priorities established 
at the federal level, central government employs matching transfers. The argument for 
conditional matching grants is based on the assumption that if a service has a spill over 
effect, then local government will have lower priorities in the provision of such 
services. Likewise, open ended conditional matching grants based upon the 
expenditures which give rise to the spill over are used to overcome such issues. 
However, it is difficult to calculate such spill over benefits accurately. Other issues in 
fiscal transfers are factors like rural urban divide, the size of the population, and the 
level of service provision (Shah and World Bank. 2004).  
The empirical literature also supports the argument that the outcome of fiscal transfers 
depends on how it is designed, for example the method used to determine the amount to 
be transferred, criteria for distributing the distribution pool and conditions attached to it 
(Dillinger 1994). For instance, if the central government has a strong national interest in 
a particular social sector, then it should use the conditional grants system to ensure that 
the money allocated is spent for that specific purpose. In the case of Vietnam, the 
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central government’s attempts to raise education standards and improve basic health 
care have not met the intended outcomes, despite the provision of funds from the central 
government to regional governments. The failure to achieve the desired outcomes is 
attributed to the fact that the provinces were not provided with specification on how to 
allocate these funds. In this scenario, the provision of a conditional matching grant 
could have achieved the desired objectives of the central government (Litvack, Ahmad 
and Bird 1998). 
There is another argument in the literature (Dillinger 1994) that earmarking or matching 
grants are most appropriate for developed economies such as France, the UK, and 
Japan. They provide matching grants for the education sector with no condition attached 
to it. In case of less developed countries, the use of such transfers depends on whether 
the central government has the capacity to determine the level of subsidy required by 
local governments and the capacity to monitor whether these transfers are spent on the 
specified purpose as intended or not.  An overview of the structure of Intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers in some developing and developed countries is provided in Table 3-2. 
According to the Table 3-2, most of the developing countries have a very weak resource 
base and are mainly relying on transfers, mostly on conditional grants. Whereas 
countries like Canada and France, local governments mostly receive block grants, which 
makes them more autonomous fiscal than developing countries. 
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Table 3-2: Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer in Developing and Developed Economies 
Countries  Structure of Taxes and Grants 
Karnataka (state of 
India) 
(Rao, Nath, and Vani, 
2004) 
India has a three tier local government structure - Zila (district), Taluk and Gram 
Panchayat (village level). Only Gram Panchayat has some powers to levy local taxes 
and Zila and Taluk have no power to levy taxes and mainly rely on intergovernmental 
transfers.  
Though gram Panchayat collected significant amount of revenue, it represented only 
10% of its expenditures and accounts for 22% of total revenue. These revenue comes 
from property taxes (48.6%), rents (11.5%), other sources (21.1%). 
 Local government tiers have conditional funding tied to sector like education, health 
etc. overall rural local bodies total expenditures are 1.4% of GDP and 10% of state level 
expenditure, and rest of the 97% comes through transfers, mostly conditional. 
There is no systematic formula to calculate the amount of transfers which takes into 
consideration factors such as fiscal need and fiscal capacity; more funds go to Gram 
Panchayat in better of Zila rather than to significantly disadvantaged areas, it also lack 
transparency and are of ad-hoc basis.  
Indonesia (Smoke and 
Lewis 1996) 
70% of total local expenditure is financed by intergovernmental grants 
10-15% from shared revenue sources 
Minor local taxes and user charges controlled by the central government 
Tanzania (Fjeldstad 
2001a) 
85% of the total operation cost in district councils and 75% in urban councils was 
funded by transfers in 1994 
Local government’s own revenue represents less than 6% of total national revenues. 
Most common sources are: development levy, crop and livestock cess, business license 
and market fees 
110 local authorities and each having a different local government revenue structure 
Ethiopia (Smoke 2001) Single block transfer based on complex formula (40% of total central revenue) 
Relies on shared percentages of central taxes (personal income, business excise and 
sales), few modest independent taxes and non-tax revenues, various kinds of charges 
and fees. 
Kenya (Smoke 2001) Relies on local property taxes, service charges, and other kind of charges 
No transfers except for teacher’s salaries for municipalities and a small grant to needy 
councils 
Uganda (Smoke 2001) 
 
Local revenue source is graduated personal tax and a complex hybrid of PAYE income 
tax, a presumptive income tax and a wealth tax and a poll tax 
Three types of grants: block, equalization and matching-but the system is not fully 
implemented 
Since 1998-2000, conditional grants doubled and make up 80% of total transfer, 
unconditional grants only spent on general management and administration  
 
Argentina (Asensio) Conditional and unconditional grants and tax sharing accounts for 50% of local 
government revenue 
Brazil (Bird and Smart 
2002) 
Grants accounts for more than 70% of the municipal governments revenue and are 
calculated on the basis of formula 
Colombia (Dillinger and 
Webb 1999) 
Grants constitute 50% of local government revenue. It is calculated on a complex 
formula which assigns low weight to population and high value to local poverty. Other 
factors taken into consideration are: urbanization, development, extent of health and 
local infrastructure 
Canada (Kitchen 2004)  Grants constitute only 17% of municipal government revenue. 15% of the grant is 
conditional and rest of the 2% is unconditional.  
France  (Prud’homme 
2006) 
Grants make up 48% of local government revenue and are calculated on a formula. Most 
of the grant is in the form of block grants and only 3% is conditional and come directly 
from various ministries to local government.  
Source: Author 
3.3.3.1 How to Design Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (IGFTs) 
Since the IGFTs account for a large share of local government revenues; their design is 
a critical factor in determining the success of decentralization reforms. The design of 
IGFTs depends upon three main considerations: the amount/size of the distribution 
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pool; the criteria for distribution among jurisdictions; and the conditions attached to the 
transfers such as matching or non-matching grants.  
1. Distribution Pool: It can be calculated based on 1)  the percentage of a fixed 
proportion of the total national revenues e.g. Philippines, Japan, Colombia; or 
some of the central revenues such as VAT and income tax, also referred to as 
“Tax- sharing” e.g. transitional and Eastern European countries; or 2) on an ad-
hoc basis like a budgetary expenditure (e.g., India) 
2. Determining Criteria for Distribution: Once the divisible pool is determined, 
further allocations to local governments are based on a certain formula e.g. 
general characteristics of a local government such as size, population, rural-
urban divide, fiscal capacity etc. 
3. Conditions attached to the Transfers: Depending upon the intended outcomes, 
central government may choose to attach conditions to the transfers e.g., 
matching grants or non-matching grants. It may also choose to allocate funds in 
the form of a block grant with no conditions attached (Bird and Smart 2002). 
Furthermore, the design of transfers and revenue sharing should be based on 
considerations such as: 
 Accountability to control misappropriation of transfers,  
 Openness, simple and transparent ways to determine the transfer formula to 
avoid any politics of interest. This can be ensured by having a quasi-
independent body, or a central local committee for the allocation of 
Intergovernmental transfers,  
 Predictability of transfers to ensure regular and timely provision of financial 
resources,  
 Transparency, a transparent transfer formula based on credible factors such 
as population size, poverty (Bahl 1999; Dillinger 1994; Fjeldstad 2001b; 
Litvack, Ahmad and Bird 1998).   
Whatever the design of the transfers, the literature (Dillinger 1994; Ebel and Yilmaz 
2002; Litvack, Ahmad and Bird 1998) has stressed the need for simplicity, transparency 
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and predictability of IGFTs in order to eliminate the worst problems of uncertainty and 
bargaining that plagues intergovernmental relations. 
4.1.1 User Charges 
Dillinger (1994) argued that the choice of instrument- revenues, transfers and user 
charges, depends on the intended objectives of the central government and varies 
according to the functions assigned to local government. Different kinds of revenue 
arrangements have different kinds of impact e.g. local taxes are appropriate for 
financing those services whose benefits are localized, and are not confined to individual 
consumers, however, benefits do not go beyond the boundaries of local government. 
These local taxes provide a means by which local tax payers can express their demand 
for services that are consumed collectively. On the other hand, user charges are limited 
to individual consumers. User charges can impose costs on the individual and in turn 
ration their behaviour on service consumption. On the other hand, transfers are used to 
achieve various objectives of the central government and in a way enables central 
government to influence local government behaviour.  
However, the central government may impose constraints on increasing the level of user 
charges on a distributional justification. Practice indicates that this justification does not 
hold scrutiny. Where it subsidizes services such as water supply with the objective of 
poverty reduction; it unintentionally subsidizes affluent consumers and encourages over 
consumption. This is a common problem in the water sector of developing countries 
(Dillinger 1994). Nevertheless, there are some reservations against the use of user 
charges based on equity concerns. For instance, it may be difficult to introduce charges 
in social sectors such as education particularly primary education. Therefore, it is 
suggested that services which have an area benefit should be financed through local 
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taxes such as parks and roads; but where large externalities are involved, such as 
primary education IGFTs should be used for financing (Bahl 1999) 
3.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE FISCAL FEDERALISM MODEL 
One of the main themes recurrent in the literature (Bird and Smart 2002; Dillinger 1994; 
Litvack, Ahmad and Bird 1998; Shah and World Bank. 2004) is the focus on 
institutions (such political institutions - government, and fiscal institutions- fiscal 
commission). According to this perspective, the local government’s closer proximity to 
its citizens enables it to respond to their needs more efficiently and responsively 
because of the better local information provision. This further entails that institutions of 
democratic participation and accountability for citizen voice and exit should be present. 
As discussed in the previous section on political decentralization, political 
accountability to constituents ensures that local governments provide services according 
to their community’s needs. If they fail to do so, people can vote out (through election) 
such representatives or vote with their feet (through exit) by moving to other 
jurisdictions or non-government service providers (Tiebout 1956).  In practice, these 
theoretical assumptions are difficult to hold. These assumptions face two problems; in 
developing countries, where markets and land are not well developed and democratic 
traditions are not deeply rooted, it is not easy for people to either migrate across 
jurisdictions or make their voices heard. In Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.2), it was discussed 
that although political participation in enlarged, it is not effective to be translated into 
responsive service provision and in most developing countries the political process is 
captured by.  
The relevance of fiscal theories, developed in countries like the USA, has been 
questioned by researchers in the context of developing countries (Bird and Smart 2002; 
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Prud'Homme 1995; Shah and World Bank. 2004; Smoke 1993). Prude’ Home (1995) 
has criticized the fiscal federalism model and its relevance to developing countries. 
According to Prude’ Home, the problem is not whether to decentralize or not, but rather 
what to decentralize, in which sector and in which regions. However, his assertion that 
decentralization can increase regional disparities and endanger macroeconomic stability 
in developing countries has found mixed empirical support (Smoke 2001).  
3.5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE 
The fiscal federalism perspective is mainly concerned with fiscal issues such as 
allocation of expenditure responsibilities, assignment of taxes to the lower levels, design 
of Intergovernmental transfers, budgeting and monitoring of fiscal flows between the 
different tiers. The assignment of responsibility alters the accountability relationship 
among actors. Correspondence between expenditure and revenue assignment will make 
local government tiers more accountable. If a local government has the right to raise 
their own revenue and adjust tax bases, they will rely more on their own income rather 
than relying on the central transfers or bail outs. This implies that central governments 
should look for tax bases that can be devolved to the local level or at least start a system 
of surcharges.  
Bird and Smart (2002) further argue that a system which relies on matching grants uses 
a hierarchical arrangement as an accountability mechanism, as the central government 
requires local governments to provide detailed budget reports linking grants with the 
specific expense. A system utilizing non-matching grants believes in the political 
accountability of local governments to their constituencies. Therefore the composition 
of revenue assignments determines the extent of local governments’ autonomy and 
accountability arrangements. When local governments are assigned a substantial 
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amount of their own tax bases, their legitimacy over revenue mobilization increases and 
spending decisions reflect local preferences. Contrary to this, local governments’ 
greater reliance on IGFT limits their autonomy and local governments may become 
mere agents of the central government, particularly, if the design of transfers is largely 
conditional matching grants (Mello and Barenstein 2001). However, as discussed 
earlier, in the case of block grants there is much room for local governments to reflect 
local needs in the decision making process regarding service provision.   
Dillinger (1994) elaborated this further by comparing the performance of: (1) the over 
controlled local sector, (2) the under controlled local sector, (3) and the perversely 
regulated local sector. In developing countries (e.g., Kenya, Philippines, Mexico, and 
India) intergovernmental relations demonstrate patterns of an over controlled public 
sector. The ‘over controlled’ local sector has two elements. Firstly, a large proportion of 
public expenditure is made directly by the central government. Secondly, local 
government function as an agent of the central government with central government 
appointing the mayors and controlling public expenditure and revenue decision. This 
scenario leaves local governments with little incentive to provide responsive services, as 
decisions are made directly by the central government. On the other hand, the ‘under 
controlled sector’ represent a situation where multiple levels of government enjoy 
functional and revenue autonomy but without a clear specification of their roles and 
responsibilities. For instance, Brazil enjoys complete political, functional and revenue 
autonomy, but there is no clear demarcation of the functional responsibilities between 
state and municipal governments as the constitution assigns the same functions to 
municipal and state governments concurrently. And without clearly defined 
responsibilities local government cannot be held accountable by their constituents. It 
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can also lead to over-expansion of services of fiscal deficits at the national level 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006).  
On the other hand, Latin America and South Asia represent patterns of perversely 
regulated local sectors. For instance, in Pakistan, every project involving capital 
investment needs to be assessed and approved by the regional or central ministries of 
planning and finance. It results in project which are selected and approved by people 
who have little knowledge of local preferences as they are at a distance from the 
beneficiaries. Though this process results in projects being sound on technical grounds 
and ensures funds’ availability, however as local stakeholders are not part of the 
planning process therefore such centrally planned projects fail to induce local ownership 
of these projects in the long run (Dillinger 1994). It can be inferred from the preceding 
discussion that an optimal combination of grants, user charges and own tax bases will 
lead to more responsive and accountable local governments. In addition to this, the 
functions to be assigned to local governments should be clearly assigned before 
assigning any financing arrangements.  
3.6 FACTORS AFFECTING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
The fiscal decentralization literature has stressed the need for complimentary formal and 
informal institutions for successful decentralization outcomes. Different themes emerge 
in the literature on the building blocks of fiscal decentralization. An overview of all 
these factors which are discussed in this section is presented in Table 3-3.  
 
 
 
82 
 
Table 3-3: Overview of the Factor Required for the Successful Decentralization Outcomes 
Author Focus  Conclusion; Factors Required For Successful Decentralization 
Outcomes 
Smoke (2001) 
 
 
 
 
Smoke and 
Lewis (1996) 
Fiscal decentralization 
in developing 
countries; literature 
review 
 
Fiscal decentralization 
for good governance 
and effective service 
delivery; literature 
review 
 
Fiscal decentralization 
in Indonesia, 
qualitative study  
The elements of good fiscal decentralization strategy depends on 
having en enabling environment; assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities to local government; assignment of appropriate set of 
own revenue sources of local government; adequate intergovernmental 
transfer system. 
 
Prerequisite for decentralization are: developed institutions and 
procedures, capacity of the local government to undertake new roles, 
existence of accountability mechanisms. The critical issue is to balance 
local government autonomy and central control. 
 
 
Obstacles to decentralization are: complex institutional environment 
lacking coordination among tiers of government regarding role clarity, 
weak fiscal autonomy and highly regulated local government, lack of 
central government commitment and poor performance indicators. 
Furthermore, donors are establishing client relationships with agencies 
of interest and it is leading to counterproductive competition among 
agencies for funds.  
 
Dillinger and 
Webb (1999) 
Fiscal decentralization  The outcomes of decentralization depend on the transfer of resources 
and responsibilities, their coordination through intergovernmental 
relationships. Set of coherent rules and procedures prescribing 1) 
division of national and sub national power and political interest 2) 
expenditure and revenue assignment, 3)electoral rules and political 
institutions that bind local politicians to the community 
 
Dillinger (1994) 
 
Fiscal decentralization 
and service delivery 
 
Decentralization reforms require: clarification of functional 
assignment among tiers of government, linking function with the 
revenue sources, institutions of accountability both encompassing 
central regulation and political accountability. 
  
Bahl (1999)  Literature review; 
implementation rules 
for fiscal 
decentralization 
Necessary conditions for fiscal decentralization: elected local councils, 
locally appointed chief officers, significant expenditure responsibilities 
assigned to local government, significant discretion of local 
government to raise revenue, budgetary autonomy, a hard budget 
constraint transparency 
Desirable conditions: freedom from excessive control, expenditure 
mandate, unconditional transfers, borrowing powers 
 
Ahmed and 
World Bank 
(2005) 
Decentralization and 
service delivery ; 
literature review 
Decentralization needs sequencing among fiscal, political and 
administrative decentralization reforms.  
 
Mello and 
Barenstein 
(2001) 
 
Empirical  analysis of 
fiscal decentralization 
and intergovernmental 
fiscal relations 
 
 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations may suffer from coordination failure 
in the absence of institutional clarity and transparency. 
Litvack, Ahmed 
and Bird (1998) 
Decentralization in 
developing countries 
Decentralization needs incentives for accountability and capacity of 
the local government. Political accountability can be improved by 
having transparent budgetary procedures, participatory budgeting 
techniques, publicizing procurement bids and dissemination of 
information to the public; selection of tax instrument which can link 
services to taxes such as user charges, strengthening regulatory 
framework.  
Source: prepared by Author 
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The empirical evidence from World Bank literature (1999) emphasized to take into 
account institutional factors such as clear assignments of functions among different tiers 
of government, a comprehensive regulatory framework which must anticipate that local 
governments sometimes act as agents of central governments in implementing national 
or centrally planned objectives and sometimes as principals acting on their own. In the 
absence of clarity of roles and a regulatory framework, there can be no accountability. 
For example, in the case of South Africa, central and provincial governments had joint 
responsibilities in health and education provision, however, the roles of each tiers were 
not clearly specified. The result of this ambiguity was that provincial governments spent 
central government transfers for purposes other than health and education (World Bank 
1999). These factors are also central in the World Bank report of 1999. It argued that 
how decentralization affects efficiency and responsiveness of service provision largely 
depends upon how it is designed and implemented. It depends on the resources and 
responsibilities assigned to local governments. Even within a particular sector, the mode 
of decentralization makes all the difference (Table 3-3). 
Granting powers to local government is no guarantee that all public interests will be 
represented; rather it may transfer power from national or regional elites to local elites. 
This happened in India where participation depends on class, caste and ethnic groups 
and the poor have very little say or influence in the decision making process (Chapter 1, 
Section 2.4). It also does not necessarily mean that decentralization will improve the 
service provision, as it may decrease. It all requires explicit, stable and self-enforcing 
rules which provide a common ground for all the players engaged in the political 
process. 
As illustrated in Table 3-3, Litvack, Ahmed and Bird (1998) suggested that the fiscal 
design of decentralization further requires the presence of appropriate institutional 
84 
 
arrangement. These institutional arrangements consist of the ability to adjust the 
regulatory framework, the organization of service delivery arrangements, establishing 
an information system, and the synchronization of all these policies. A key issue in 
decentralization is the coordination of intergovernmental fiscal relations, as assignments 
of responsibility and revenue requires transparency and clarity in the institutional 
framework governing such relationships. This issue related to intergovernmental 
coordination is highlighted in various studies (Fjeldstad 2001a; Rodden 2002; Smoke 
1993; Smoke and Lewis 1996) as one of the reasons for the failure of service delivery 
outcomes. For instance, Mello and Barenstein (see Table 3-3) found that coordination 
failures in intergovernmental fiscal relations may worsen a local government’s fiscal 
position in developing countries. Similar findings were provided by Smoke and Lewis 
(1996) in an Indonesian context.  
Decentralization does not mean that the central government has no longer a 
responsibility in those areas. However, it changes the nature of the central government’s 
role from direct provider to creating enabling conditions for a decentralized service 
provision. Litvak, Ahmad and Bird (1998) suggested that decentralization strategies- 
political, administrative and fiscal- need policy synchronization to achieve their 
intended outcomes. For instance, full decentralization of the health sector in the 
Philippines led to the failure of one state to undertake the family planning program 
which was a central government priority; and to the drop of a vaccination program in 
Papua New Guinea.  
Dillinger (1994) has also argued that problem of service delivery cannot be addressed 
by trying to change the behaviour of organizations (municipal governments) alone. It 
can only be addressed by looking at the variety of institutional factors that may affect its 
performance. His framework for assessing service delivery reforms emphasized three 
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main elements: 1) clarity in roles and responsibilities among different tiers of 
government, 2) linking expenditure with revenue assignments and 3) establishing 
institutions of accountability which entail both regulation and incentives for local 
government.  
“The political impetus behind decentralization has prompted central 
governments to make political concessions hastily. But granting election is a 
step that can be taken quickly. What is slow and difficult is the working through 
of new regulatory relationships between central government and local 
government; the conversation about what had been annual budgetary transfers 
within a central government into Intergovernmental transfers that are 
transparent and predictable, and the development of a credible local political 
system. Much of the problems associated with the current wave of 
decentralization arise from the failure to match the pace of political 
decentralization to the pace of regulatory and other organizational reforms.” 
(pp: 3-4) 
However, designing effective intergovernmental structures is not limited to these 
factors. In reality, the degree of fiscal decentralization varies with the context of each 
country. The main challenge posed by decentralization is to devise an appropriate 
structure that provides incentives for local governments to act responsibly and 
accountable for expenditure decisions, and provide an enabling environment by 
developing administrative capacity, supportive bureaucratic and political culture. 
Therefore, the benefits of fiscal decentralization largely depend on the degree of citizen 
participation, community involvement, the regulatory framework governing the rules of 
the game, and administrative capacity of different tiers (Shah and World Bank. 2004; 
Smoke 2001).  
The literature has also raised the issue of using Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
data as the measure of “decentralization”. For instance, Bahl and Wallace (In Alm, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 2002) argued that: 
“Empirical estimations are sensitive to variable selection-----. Once the variable 
is estimated in a different way, the results change significantly, which shows 
how fragile the estimation results are.” (p: 115) 
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Therefore, an analysis of the fiscal decentralization of macroeconomic indicators 
requires not only quantitative measures but also qualitative methods to fully capture the 
impact of different institutional structure. The limitation of the use of GFS data is that 
although it provides a breakdown of expenditure by function and economic type, it does 
not reflect the true degree of local expenditure autonomy. Expenditure mandated by the 
central government also appears as local government expenditure. Therefore, the data 
suffers from an aggregate problem in both expenditure and revenue, as it does not make 
any distinction between sources of revenues- tax revenue, non-tax revenue, IGFTs and 
other grants, and does not provide information whether grants are conditional or non-
conditional. Therefore, to assess the degree of fiscal autonomy, attention should be paid 
to the intergovernmental fiscal arrangements (IGFTs), the range of responsibilities 
assigned to local governments and coordination mechanisms in order to relate fiscal 
autonomy to local government responsiveness and accountability.  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The fiscal perspective stresses three elements of fiscal decentralization: the assignment 
of expenditure responsibilities to the local government tier followed by appropriate 
revenue assignment; designing an Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (IGFTs) and 
creating an enabling environment through appropriate legal structures. In addition to 
this, fiscal decentralization emphasizes political decentralization as a prerequisite - 
empowering people to participate in the local decision making. The institutional 
environment of local government is discernible by the intergovernmental fiscal 
relationship: it entails an appropriate legal and regulatory framework that enshrines 
clear guidelines regarding expenditure and revenue assignments (Figure 3-1). Most 
studies focused on assessing the intergovernmental fiscal system (Bahl and Johannes 
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1994; Boadway and Shah 2007), some studies examined the impact on economic 
growth (Davoodi and Zou 1998), some assessed the impact of decentralization in terms 
of governance quality indicators (Shah 1998), and very few studies have analysed the 
impact of decentralization in terms of responsiveness (Faguet 2004). The studies 
analysing the impact of decentralization in terms of responsiveness examined the level 
of public spending and their correspondence to local needs. For instance, Faguet (2004) 
based his study on fiscal federalism perspective and measured the impact of 
decentralization on responsiveness. He examined the change in resource flow by 
looking at the pattern of public investments at local government level and whether 
indicators of need (level of literacy, access to services) changed these investment 
patterns. He found that investment patterns changed significantly after decentralization 
as local governments invested in sectors like education, water management and urban 
development where they felt the need for these services.  
Based on the empirical studies discussed in this chapter, a framework is proposed to 
assess the link between decentralization and performance outcomes (Figure 3-1).  
According to this framework, in order to assess the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and service delivery performance, attention should be paid to the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer system (IGFTs), the regulatory framework and 
prerequisites of decentralization (political decentralization, enabling environment, 
accountability). It focuses attention on the institutions of coordination among different 
tiers by examining Intergovernmental fiscal relations which address the design of 
transfers, and institutions of accountability to hold local governments accountable for 
what they do with the resources that have been allocated to them. This section has 
linked political decentralization as a prerequisite for the assignment of functions and 
responsibilities to local government to make them responsive and accountable. It has 
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also shown the importance that roles and responsibilities should be clearly specified 
through a system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
 
Figure 3-1: Framework for Analysing the Link Between Fiscal Decentralization and 
Performance 
In conclusion, in order to assess the degree of fiscal autonomy, attention should be paid 
to IGFTs, the range of responsibilities assigned to local governments and coordination 
mechanisms in order to relate fiscal autonomy with local governments’ responsiveness 
and accountability. The key questions that need to be addressed in this chapter are: how 
far local government has financial autonomy, how the institutional environment 
constrains them in exercising their autonomy, is there any change in spending patterns 
of local governments in areas of their priority? 
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CHAPTER 4  
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the decentralized service delivery framework from public 
management perspective. The previous chapters highlighted the local government 
political and financial autonomy. The dominant theory of public management- New 
Public Management provides a management solution to the problems of service 
delivery. The purpose is to identify and discuss various trends taking place in the 
structuring of the public sector and their implications for the newly decentralized public 
sector under the jurisdiction of local government. This aim is achieved by first de-
constructing the concept of decentralization to distinguish different forms of 
decentralization which coexist in the public sector. The next following sections (4.3, 
4.4, & 4.4.2) provide an understanding of the public management perspective on a 
decentralized service delivery framework mainly focusing on management 
decentralization, followed by the technology of NPM to deliver services including 
competition, contracting and collaboration. The discourse on NPM has raised issues 
whether such reforms are applicable to developing countries or not. Section 4.5 
provides an argument of the applicability of public management reforms to developing 
countries. The chapter concludes by arguing that due to the increasing complexity of 
local governance through a plurality of actors involved in service provision, it has 
become pertinent to link the public sector with the external environment and move from 
an intra-organizational focus to the management of inter-organizational relations; the 
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problem of service delivery is not the problem of the public sector alone it is best 
understood in relation to the other actors involved.    
4.2 DE-CONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISATION  
Decentralization is the central theme of public management. It promises speedier and 
more responsive service delivery by letting managers manage or by making managers 
manage (Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998). It seems pertinent to define the concept of 
“decentralisation” before explaining the dominant theories of public management in 
relation to decentralization. Pollitt, Birchall and Putman (1998) defined decentralization 
as “spreading out of formal authority from a smaller to a larger number of actors” (p: 
6), and distinguished different forms of decentralization comprising of three strategic 
choices:  
A. First choice:  
 Political decentralization: transfer of authority to elected representatives, or 
 Administrative decentralization: transfer of authority to managers or 
appointed bodies. 
B. Second choice: 
 Competitive decentralization: competitive tendering or outsourcing to 
provide services. It does not transfer the ownership rights of an organization 
but it does transfers some of the operational authority while remaining in 
framework of contracts, or 
 Non-competitive decentralization: when authority is delegated from a higher 
tier to a lower tier within an existing organization or from a superior 
organization to a subordinate organization. 
C. Third choice involves: 
 Internal decentralization: transfer of authority within an internal organization 
such as empowering the front line workers or 
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 Devolution: transfer of authority to a separate legal authority such as the 
creation of local governments.  
Another way to look at the concept of decentralization is to differentiate vertical 
decentralization and horizontal decentralization (Mintzberg 1980). In vertically 
decentralized organizations the authority is decentralized down the hierarchy while in 
horizontal decentralized organizations, authority is spread along the same level (such as 
outsourcing of activities). Another useful distinction is provided in the form of the 
fourfold typology which has been provided earlier in Chapter 1 (Rondinelli 1989). 
These various forms of decentralization entail a different degree of transfer of authority 
and power from the centre to the periphery and governments structure their public 
services in different combinations of all these forms. These typologies offer a useful 
way to map different forms of decentralization that may co-exist in the public sector.  
4.3 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON DECENTRALIZATION 
In the late 1970s the traditional paradigm of public administration came under criticism. 
The financial crisis, the inflexibility of the administrative system and procedures, and a 
rising dissatisfaction of the public with service provision led to the introduction of a 
new set of reforms, known as ‘New Public Management’ or NPM (Pollitt, Thiel and 
Homburg 2007). The strength of the old public administration was based on its claims 
of: the rule of law, a focus on administration, rules and guidelines, the role of 
bureaucracy in making and administering policy, political neutrality, and accountability 
through hierarchy, meritocracy, stability and predictability (Hood 1999). The new 
public sector model often referred to as ‘managerialism’ (Pollitt 1993), ‘new public 
management’ (Hood 1991), or ‘entrepreneurial government’ (Osborne and Gaebler 
1992), was considered a new “ideology” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), or a “general 
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theory” of how the public sector should be structured (Lane 2000), comprising a set of 
social values and beliefs borrowed from private sector management techniques 
regarding ‘what to manage’, and ‘how to manage’ the public sector.  
Managerialism is different from public administration in four respects. Public 
administration was considered to involve carrying out the instructions of politicians 
with a short term focus on internal organizational goals, while managerialism is 
concerned with linking organizations with their external constituencies, aiming at long 
term goals and making sense of its external environment in strategy formation. The 
second aspect relates to the management of the internal organization such as staffing, 
directing and controlling performance. Traditional public administrators carried out 
staffing and directing functions, however, controlling performance was weak. 
Managerialism gives managers more flexibility in managing staff by devolving 
operational autonomy, having a performance culture, explicit performance standards 
and performance based incentive structures. Clearly, strategy and managing external 
constituencies are pertinent features of NPM (Hughes 2003).  
NPM proposed a decentralized service delivery framework to foster efficiency, 
economy and effectiveness by disaggregating large bureaucratic organizations into lean, 
flat organizational structures operating at arm’s length with devolved financial control, 
use of market type mechanisms such as contracting out to foster competition, hands on 
professional management with an emphasis on output and outcome, performance 
management and letting managers manage (Hood 1991).  
The initial conception of NPM (Hood 1980; 1991) focussed more on internal 
organizational changes. At a more detailed level the content of NPM underwent a shift 
of emphasis over time and the proponents of NPM had competing perspectives on key 
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constituents of NPM. Ferlie (1996) provided a comprehensive overview of the evolution 
of different models of NPM. During the first half of the 1980s in the UK and the USA, 
the thrust of NPM reforms was to achieve efficiency and economy through quasi market 
and market type mechanism which were subsequently replaced by a more balanced 
approach emphasizing quality, “empowerment” of line staff, consumer and consumer 
choice (Pollitt 1993: 188-96). In the latter half of the 1990s, there was an emerging 
discourse emphasizing “joined up government”, “relational” contracts, “new 
managerlisim”, Whole-of-Government (WG)” approach, and “modrenization” which 
emerged as a response to the unintended consequences of NPM referred to as 
“hollowing out” of the state to achieve better coordination. Hollowing out refers to the 
process of increased fragmentation of public sector organizations as a result of a 
purchaser provider split and contracting out. The dominance of a particular NPM model 
also varied from country to country. For instance, market type reforms were more 
ambitiously adopted in the UK than in Germany, the Nordic countries and France 
(Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000).  
In the UK, the mangerialism of the Thatcher government was mostly concerned with 
achieving efficiency and cost savings. However, there was a significant shift in the New 
Labour government policy to the public sector. They adopted a softer and more 
inclusive approach and focused on collaboration, joined up services and partnerships: 
“The government will take its drive for more joined up and responsive services 
further by actively encouraging initiatives to establish partnership delivery by 
all parts of government in ways that fit local circumstances; and establishing 
common targets, financial frameworks, IT links and so on that support such 
arrangements.” (Cabinet Office 1999, Chapter 3) 
Modernization presented a new form of managerialism. It challenged the boundaries 
between policy and management previously drawn by NPM and the negative 
consequences of fragmentation by bringing a shift in the technology of managerialism 
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and emphasizing the role of collaboration in service delivery. The role of the citizens 
and user participation also changed under the new managerialism. NPM governed its 
relations with consumers through limited feedback mechanisms such as consumer 
complaints procedures, market research, while relations with the public are governed 
through representative democracy. New managerialism gave users a more direct role in 
service delivery and relationships with the public were governed through deliberative 
democracy.  
“The discourse positions the public as stakeholders whose views are to 
be sought through various forms of participative and dialogic 
democracy.” (Newman 2000a, p: 59) 
Hence, the focus shifted to various forms of citizen engagement through partnership, 
community governance fostering active citizenship, overcoming the problems of social 
exclusion and promoting public participation in the decision making process. However, 
the discourse on new managerialism also acknowledged the challenges posed by new 
forms of governance to traditional institutional arrangements. According to Newman 
(2000), the focus on join-up government or new managerialism required a new set of 
expectation form political and managerial heads of service delivery organizations. It 
demands new managerial capacity to achieve organizational objectives and for 
managing collaborations. 
Advocates of NPM (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) also argued that NPM is not a set of 
coherent interrelated techniques. Some of these techniques may work in some context 
and may not in others. Nevertheless the fundamental issue is to understand the context 
to know what works, what does not and why? (Flynn In McLaughlin, Osborne and 
Ferlie 2002). It is a commonplace understanding among public management scholars 
(Flynn In McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie 2002; Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg 2007) that 
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the context of an intervention plays significant role in the outcome of public 
management reforms.  
Arguably, the NPM reforms of 1980-1990s introduced competition to the most 
activities of the public sector in advanced countries like UK, USA, and New Zealand 
(Walsh 1995). This had a significant impact on the structure and organization of public 
sector organization and the implications for the cultural values of public sector and 
subsequently on the roles and responsibilities of managers. The use of contractual 
arrangements required that service standards are clearly specified. There has been a 
greater emphasis on accountability particularly accountability for performance. The 
contract culture led to a differentiated mode of service delivery and resulted in a 
“hollowing out” of state. The result was loss of location of authority, responsibility and 
accountability in the public sector (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). Hence, greater 
plurality in terms of service providers required significant implications for the local 
authorities. Subsequently, the focus shifted to how to deal with the unintended 
consequences of reforms and achieve more coordination and integration of public 
services. The outcomes of these were joined up services, partnership and formal or 
informal direct user involvement in service provision.  An overview of NPM conception 
is provided in Figure 4-1.  
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Figure 4-1: Key Themes of NPM 
Source: Author 
 
4.4 MANAGEMENT DECENTRALIZATION 
NPM proposed a decentralized framework for service delivery: corporate core 
responsible for strategy and policy making, the client side for setting and monitoring 
standards, and the service providers directly involved in service delivery. 
Decentralization is the key feature of NPM; disaggregating organizations into 
manageable units and decentralizing operational and financial autonomy to public 
sector organizations and their managers. This has created different forms of 
decentralized organizational arrangements based on the amount of operational and 
financial autonomy transferred down the hierarchy such as the creation of executive 
agencies or semi-autonomous organizations, de-concentration, and corporatization. 
These organizational forms have had varying degree of financial and operational control 
in the decentralized units.  
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The argument for agencification is based on the idea that service providers can be set up 
as independent units using devolved budgets, and strong independent control at the local 
level through the establishment of clear performance based regimes. The role of 
politicians is limited to defining strategic policies and overseeing agency performance 
with limited involvement in the day-to-day operational matters. The agencies acquire 
greater managerial powers and flexibility in the allocation of resources (financial and 
human) and in turn for greater accountability for performance.  Some of the examples of 
devolved financial control in Britain were: the Financial Management Initiative (FMI), 
Resource Management Initiative (RMI), and formula funding of schools with local 
management of school budgets. Devolving financial autonomy and giving managers 
more control required explicit performance targets either at the organizational level of 
individual level or both indeed (Walsh 1997).   
4.4.1 Management Decentralization and Performance 
Walsh has also argued that the development of executive agencies in the UK had a 
limited effect because: 
“In order for there to be a fundamental change to the way that system operates 
there must be fundamental changes in the organizational and institutional 
frameworks. -------it has not been accompanied by significant changes in the 
financial regime that operates within the civil service. The service is still 
dominated by an institutional framework that assumes central control, 
uniformity, and traditional concept of financial control-------the experience of 
other agencies and other countries suggest that without attention to fundamental 
institutional issues traditional approaches will tend to reassert themselves.”  
(Walsh 1995, pp: 181-191) 
He further argues that the shift to devolved budgets through the creation of semi-
autonomous agencies or executive agencies required a break from the traditional 
hierarchal control. It is not enough to devolve budgets without devolving real control 
over resources at the local level. So far the emphasis has been on the creation of 
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independent operational units first, and not so much on the financial devolution and 
control of resources.  
Research in developing countries in comparison found that there is often a reluctance to 
devolve financial budget and control. The agencies had no power over personnel 
management and their compensation partly because of central government’s concerns 
over the size and expenditure of the public sector and partly because of central 
bureaucratic control (Larbi 1998). Russell, Bennett and Mills (1999) noted a similar 
centralized control of devolved units in developing countries which were the main 
barriers to the autonomy of local managers. For the effective implementation of 
management decentralization, organizations needed to break away from the traditional 
command and control system toward a performance orientation.  
The implications of decentralized service delivery arrangements would result in the 
provision of public services in a differentiated pattern of service provision through a 
network of organizations rather than an integrated hierarchical provision as was the 
cases in public administration. This has shifted the focus from one organization to a 
network of organizations working together for service provision. For this change to be 
successful organizations require an effective organizational infrastructure such as 
information management systems, accounting systems, monitoring and control 
procedures to oversee managers are achieving the desired results within a defined 
framework of performance, and the capacity to manage a network of contracts through 
which services are delivered (Walsh 1995).  
The research in developing countries has identified similar constraints on the effective 
performance of decentralized service delivery units. Management decentralization 
requires a monitoring system before control to the lowest level can be devolved, and 
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where such controls were weak, the increased autonomy was linked to an increased 
levels of corruption. According to Larbi (1998), in developing countries, organizations 
have weak planning, budgeting and management system in addition to a lack of 
financial and human resources, which put severe constraints on organizations’ abilities 
to perform their new roles under decentralized arrangements. In addition to this, Larbi 
further argues, that in spite of capacity issues, performance contracting in Ghana 
produced initial positive outcomes. It was a useful intervention as it at least articulated 
performance objectives and gave managers more autonomy to manage day to day 
operations. Yet, these contractual models depended on the separation of the politics 
from management of operations. The findings also suggest that contractual models 
assume that organizations have the capacity to regulate, measure and monitor 
performance. However, developing countries do not have the capacity for corporate 
planning, and monitoring and usually lack information management systems.  
Research in Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, India and Ghana also noted similar findings 
(Russell, Bennett and Mills 1999). The developing countries experiences suggest that 
reforms take place within an existing centralized bureaucratic system where key 
stakeholders such as politicians and senior bureaucrats are reluctant to relinquish their 
control on the justification that they have weak technical capacity and greater 
devolution of financial control may lead to more corruption at the local level. 
Furthermore, centralized financial management and personnel management systems 
hinder the capacity of decentralized units to manage contracting-out processes and the 
flexibility of local managers to manage their personnel performance in an effective 
manner. Hence, the effective implementation of NPM reforms needs a shift from a 
command and control approach to more market based relations, a change not only in 
structural arrangements but also change in organizational values, the capacity of 
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organizations to perform their new roles and the willingness of key stakeholders to 
commit themselves to the implementation of reforms.  
4.4.2 Selected Service Delivery Techniques 
This section explores decentralized service delivery techniques, their appropriateness 
and constraints on their implementation, particularly in a developing country context. 
NPM proposes service delivery options ranging from market and competition to 
collaborative forms. As discussed earlier, in the early period of NPM, efficiency and 
economy were the key focus and contracts and markets were considered the main 
service delivery options. However, during the late 1990s, the focus shifted to more 
collaborative forms of service provision which were seen as a more balanced approach 
to service provision. Therefore, this section will review contracts and competition 
followed by collaborative forms of service provision.  
4.4.2.1 Contracts and Competition 
Contracts represent a move away from hierarchy to competition or market based 
approaches to the provision of public service, in which the roles of principal and agent 
are clearly specified. Public organizations can simply contract out services to the 
private, voluntary or non-profit sector or it may choose to bid internally for the right to 
provide services in competition with the private sector (Walsh 1995). Contracting out is 
the most common type of such reforms used in both advanced and developing countries. 
Contracting out refers to the outsourcing or buying in services or goods from the 
private, voluntary or non-profit sectors (Larbi 1998; Minogue et al. 1998; Walsh 1997). 
The role of the public sector, as a purchaser or principal is to define what is required 
through contracts and to let the contract monitor the performance of the client or 
contractor who is responsible for the delivery of service provision.  
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According to Walsh (1995, p: 112), the case for contracting is based on a ‘make or buy’ 
decision and the main objective of contracting is to “make responsibilities explicit and 
to create an appropriate pattern of incentives” and in doing so removes politics from the 
process of service delivery. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence indicates that politics 
of interests play a significant factor in the way contracts are awarded and the way 
contracts are structured, particularly in developing countries (World Bank 1994). The 
development of markets and competition requires a fundamental change not only in the 
structures of organizations, but also new values of entrepreneurial managerialism. 
Public sector managers have to think and act in a new way as the development of 
contracts involves a blurring of organizational boundaries and the focus of managers 
has to shift from intra-organizational to inter-organizational management. The key 
issues that arise in the development of markets are related to the management of 
information, quality and risk, incentives and trust.  Subsequently, it raises the issue of 
whether a government has an information management system for detailed decision 
making, particularly in cases where the complexity and variation is great and it is 
difficult to anticipate all the possible contingencies in the contractual arrangements. 
Furthermore, if the quality of service is not easy to specify, it becomes more difficult to 
monitor the performance of contractors. In such cases, there is a greater need to have an 
emphasis on developing an inspection and monitoring system. Hence contractual 
arrangements have their associated costs. The cost of developing an information 
management system, monitoring and incentive system, relationship management, 
detailed procedures for inspection and audit where it is difficult to assess levels of 
service quality, detailed understandings of the pattern of risk involved particularly when 
contracts are of long duration and quality is not easy to define.   
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Contracts can be of various types based on the size, degree of formality, detail and 
length of time for the contract (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010; Walsh 1997). The four 
main types of contractual arrangements are: 
 Performance contracting: a performance agreement is negotiated between 
the government and the managers of service delivery organizations. The 
objective is to improve the performance based accountability of managers 
and employees by clarifying their roles and expectations through 
performance contracts (World Bank 1994). The OECD goes further and 
argues that “performance contracting offers a framework for generating 
desired behaviours in the context of devolved management” (OCED 1999, p:  
7) 
 Management contracts: These are broad scope contracts and transfer the 
management and operation of public sector organization to the private sector 
such as water utilities, ports, railways. The main objective is to increase 
managerial autonomy and reduce the risk of politics in day to day operations.  
 Service contracts: Transfer of operation and maintenance of a particular 
aspect of service to the private sector (such as refuse collection, billing and 
fee collection) or buying in of services from the private sector (such as data 
processing, engineering solutions, and consultancy) 
 Lease /concession contracts: These are long term contracts used in case of 
non-public goods and services which have the tendency to become a 
monopoly and the government has a strong interest to retain ownership to 
ensure public interest. Examples of these kinds of contracts include: public 
utilities such as gas, electricity. The contracts transfer managerial and 
financial responsibility to the contractor. However, lease contracts are 
different from concession contracts as the latter involve private sector 
financial investments in the fixed plant, while in lease contracts, contractors 
cover the operation and maintenance costs from the revenue generation 
(World Bank 1994).  
Each contractual arrangement has its associated risks and benefits. Short term contracts 
may be less risky, easily agreeable and easy to monitor. However, the associated 
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management cost is high. They may have the transaction costs of frequent contracting 
and in case of multiple contracting arrangements for various activities, the cost of 
coordination or management of these fragmented contractual relations may be very 
high. The private sector may be less likely to take interest in short term contracts 
because of the uncertainty and periodic nature of work, particularly when particular 
skills and assets need to be developed to carry out these activities. And with the 
uncertainty of getting such contracts, the associated risks become higher. Likewise, long 
term contracts have their own potential risks and gains. A concession or lease has the 
feature of covering up all aspects of a service in one contract for a period of 10-20 years 
while at the same time cutting down the cost of transaction and reducing the 
coordination cost. However, the associated risks are; public sector workers may 
perceive job insecurity, and the government may not have the capacity to design such 
contracts because of the increased complexity involved since it requires a great amount 
of anticipation and information to deal with potential uncertainties, these contractual 
relations are likely to depend on trust between the public and private sectors (Batley and 
Larbi 2004).  
The extensive use of contracting out services may have serious implication on the 
organizations of public sector as the organization itself may become a ‘nexus of 
contracts’ (Walsh 1995, p: 116). Hence, Walsh argues “the management of contracts is 
then a management of networks of contracts” (p: 117) and the move is to inter-
organizational networks rather than having an intra-organizational focus. Contracting 
out is mostly recommended in cases where complete privatization is not possible as it 
allows for managed competition. It asserts to bring the benefits of flexibility, cost 
savings, and improved efficiency as a result of increased competition and choice. It also 
provides public sector organizations with private sector expertise which otherwise 
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would be too expensive to retain on organizations payroll (Larbi 1998; Minogue et al. 
1998; Walsh 1995). One argument by McPak and Hongor (1995 In Batley and Larbi 
2004) is that developing countries employ contracting out not to achieve efficiency but 
because of the lack of expertise and technical capacity. This idea is contestable. Batley 
and Larbi (2004) highlighted that developing countries undertake contracting out for 
managed competition and improved efficiency of the public sector. The selection of the 
right type of institutional arrangements depends on the following factors:   
  The technical capacity of the government to undertake new roles under 
contractual arrangements such as contract design, specification, monitoring 
and evaluation;  
 The capacity of the government to enforce contracts and the presence of an 
adequate regulatory framework to enforce contracts 
 The availability of many private sector providers with adequate capacity to 
undertake new roles (Batley and Larbi 2004; World Bank 1994). 
In addition to this, contracting is most likely of benefit if contracts increase 
transparency and accountability by specifying the contract details and the way contracts 
are awarded. A comparison of concession contracts between Buenos Aires and Caracas 
for example, identified that concession contracts for water and sewerage in Buenos 
Aires were a success story because of the strong support of the government. This had 
fewer risks to investors, attractive tariffs and better technical and financial capacities 
(World Bank 1994). 
4.4.2.1.1 Contracting out and Service Delivery Outcomes 
The question is whether contracting will lead to more efficient, responsive and 
improved service quality. The empirical evidence for this claim of efficiency and 
responsiveness is mixed (Boyne 1998). Walsh (1995) provided a comprehensive 
assessment of this practice in advanced countries and concluded: 
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“It is well to be sceptical about the data on the efficiency impact of the 
introduction of market mechanisms. The information is difficult to gather, and, 
in many cases, studies rely on assertions or on surveys of manager’s 
perceptions” (p: 231).  
Minogue et al. (1998), after assessing different studies on contracting in the UK, 
concluded that the outcomes of contracting remain contested and uneven throughout the 
empirical literature.  A similar conclusion is drawn by Kirkpatrick and Mart nez Lucio 
(1996). The literature from advanced countries suggests rather negative outcomes of 
contracting, such as trust deficit (Walsh 1995), and reduced workers' morale (Cutler 
1994). Kirkpatrick and Mart nez Lucio (1996) argued that new problems and 
contradictions are emerging as a consequence of managing public services through 
contracts. According to them, the use of contracts is creating new issues of coordination 
and control for the public sector.  
Research in India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Ghana and Zimbabwe (Russell, Bennett and 
Mills 1999) found limited application of NPM type reforms (unbundling, contracting 
out) and noted that the adoption of such reforms requires new management skills and a 
strong system of accounting, information management and human resource 
management, which were lacking in all the countries studied. In addition to the capacity 
constraints, the existing organizational culture was another main constraint. The 
organizational culture was not performance oriented and all the countries studied had a 
command and control system in place with little motivation for the staff to show an 
innovative approach to tasks. There were no efficiency gains reported in this study. 
“Many elements of the NPM type agenda require not only changes in 
organizational structure but also organizational culture. For effective 
implementation of contracting out or autonomous hospitals, there needs to be a 
shift away from patronage and hierarchical command and control towards more 
market-based relations. Such a transformation of organizational culture (and 
the social relations upon which it is based) cannot be quickly achieved, and 
those who did well under the previous system of relationships are unlikely to be 
willing to give up their influence. Nor change can be effected through formal 
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training alone: the new skills necessary need to be learnt through hands on 
practice.”  (Russell, Bennett and Mills 1999, p: 773) 
Batley and Larbi’s (2004) comparative research from South Asian and Sub-Saharan 
African countries compared contracting out in four sectors: health care, agriculture 
marketing, urban water supply and business development. They concluded that besides 
capacity constraints both at the institutional level and internal to the service delivery 
organization, there was evidence of advantages to be gained from contracting out:  
“Almost all the cases---show gains in managerial efficiency by comparison with 
direct public provision. They also showed that there were widespread reported 
gains in service performance to customers.” (p: 178)  
Larbi (1998) highlighted that contracting out faces problems of organizational capacity 
and resistance from various stakeholders. According to him, Ghana is using contracting 
out, particularly service contracts in the health and water sectors for feasibility studies 
by external experts, construction work, supply, installation and maintenance work, 
recurrent supplies etc. However, the research identified various constraints: a lack of 
clear policy or guidelines for contracting out, the central agencies were playing the 
leading role in the awarding of contracts and the implementation agency had no role in 
the decision making process at all. Regulatory mechanisms were also found to be weak. 
There were multiple agencies involved in contracting out process - contract designs, 
awards, monitoring and evaluations - but there was no coordination system among them 
to share information. The enforcement of contracts was based on a punitive approach. 
This was rarely used as the public sector has a list of “trusted” contractors and resorting 
to punitive measure may expose the hidden “deals”. Besides these macro level 
institutional constraints, reforms were also resisted by stakeholders both internal to the 
organizations and at institutional levels. For instance, reforms to contract out was 
opposed because of a fear of job losses, uncertainties about the benefits, poor 
coordination of how these reforms were going to effect in the long run. Therefore, the 
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research concluded; “Contracting out may not be a panacea for the problems of public 
services in Ghana unless the right organizational and institutional conditions exist” 
(Larbi 1998, p: 162).    
According to Batley (1996) the assumption that contracting out will lead to better 
performance has met with partial support. For instance, clear positive evidence for 
contracting out was found in the case of refuse collection in Recife (Brazil). On the 
other hand, this study found negative outcomes of contracting out solid waste 
management in Malaysia. Likewise, the public water supply system was found to be 
more efficient, provided they had sufficient autonomy, in Porto Alegre (Brazil), 
Hermosillo (Mexico), and in Bulawayo and Mutare (Zimbabwe). Batley concluded that 
factors like the existence of competition, operational autonomy, political support for 
management, the local politico-institutional environment, and the nature of the services, 
play a significant role in determining performance outcomes. The introduction of 
market type mechanisms such as contracting result in new transaction costs such as the 
costs of drawing up contracts, monitoring, enforcing and demands on the government to 
perform new roles of regulating and coordinating these new arrangements of service 
delivery. However, the results of these studies are not very rigorous as the performance 
data found are very limited “there is no before and after comparison, except what is 
based on the subjective impression of those interviewees” (Batley 1996, p: 725).  An 
overview of the factors affecting contracting arrangements is presented in Table 4-1.  
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Table 4-1: Factors Affecting NPM Reforms in Developing Countries 
Author Study Focus Factors Affecting Contracting out Reforms 
Batley and Larbi (2004) Sector: Water 
Countries: Asian 
countries: Sri-lank, India 
African countries: Ghana, 
Zimbabwe,  
Internal factors: limited experience of complex 
contracting, weak information on service operation, weak 
revenue raising for payments to contractors, weak 
regulatory skills or autonomy staff resistance and lack of 
incentive 
Inter-organizational factors: absence of pressure for 
change in organizational arrangements, weak ‘contract 
culture’ 
External factors: weak adaptive capacity, socio-political 
opposition to privatization, economic and financial 
instability, weak legal framework, private sector risk, weak 
indigenous firms.  
Russell, Bennett and Mills 
(1999) 
Sector: Health 
Countries: Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, Sri-Lanka 
External factors: Resistance from politician and 
bureaucrats to reforms, economic factors (economic crisis 
in Ghana), small private sector, Kickback promised to 
politicians, political patronage in capital investment 
projects 
Internal factors: shortage of skilled staff, main 
weaknesses were found in HR, Finance, and accounting 
system, organizational culture (lack of a performance based 
reward system, poor salary structure limiting staff's ability 
to learn new skills), lack of ownerships of reforms. 
 
World Bank (1994) Country: Developing 
countries 
Sector: 
Infrastructure (Water, 
Electricity, 
Telecommunication etc.) 
The technical capacity of government to undertake new 
roles-contract design, specification, monitoring, and 
evaluation), lack of regulatory framework to enforce 
contracts, weak private sector, local contingency factors. 
Larbi (1999) Country: Ghana,  
Sector: Water 
Eternal institutional factor: Lack of clear policy or 
guidelines for contracting, central agency’s main role in 
awarding the contract without consulting the implementing 
agency, Inter-organizational factors: coordination issues 
because of multiple agencies involvement in contracting 
out process, resistance form stakeholder-internal to 
organization and other institutional level 
Batley (1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
Samaratunge (2008) 
Country: Brazil, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Zimbabwe 
Sector: 
Education, Water, Refuse 
collection 
 
Country: Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Malaysia and 
Singapore 
Factors like existence of competition, operational 
autonomy, and political support for management, local-
political institutional environment, visibility and nature of 
the service. 
 
 
Political context, macroeconomic conditions, state 
traditions and role of International development agencies 
and civil society 
Source: Author 
Overall, the claims of efficiency and effectiveness through market type reforms from 
developing countries also remained thin (Batley 1996; World Bank 1994). There are 
very few comprehensive assessments of the outcomes of market type reforms from 
developing countries. The most detailed performance assessments of such reforms 
known to the researcher and referred to earlier were carried out by the World Bank and 
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Patrinos et al.  (2009; 1994), Batley and Larbi (2004), and Batley (1996). Otherwise, 
studies seem to provide assumptions which claim that competition leads to greater 
efficiency and effectiveness, but very few studies actually have supported these 
arguments with empirical evidence. The limitation of data (pre-post data) availability is 
reported as the main constraint on the evaluation of reforms not only in developing 
countries but also in advanced countries (Pollitt 1995; Walsh 1995). 
4.4.2.2 Collaborative Service Delivery Arrangements 
Collaborative forms of service provision- formal or informal are becoming as important 
as hierarchical intra-organizational relationships. This section intends to review the 
collaborative forms of service provision with the focus on identifying the nature and 
type of collaborative forms: informal user or community involvement, and highly 
formal collaborative forms such as partnerships. In addition to this, this section attempts 
to understand the constraints that may affect the performance of such collaborative 
forms.  
One way to understand the nature of collaborations is to use typologies to organize the 
literature on some common grounds for comparison. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) 
provided a useful typology to distinguish highly informal relationships among partners 
to highly formal forms of collaboration which is presented in Table 4-2. According to 
the Table, at one end of the continuum are highly informal collaborative arrangements 
known as networks, and at the other highly formal or structured relationships termed as 
partnerships, and the extreme form of collaboration - integration.  
A partnership is differentiated from contracts because of its requirements for joint 
decision making on a long term basis and it is differentiated from networks as they 
require the formal articulation of a purpose and plan which bind the partners together. 
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Networks are constituted on an informal basis and are regulated on the basis of trust and 
reciprocity. They characterize more fluid relationships among the actors in that 
particular network.  
Table 4-2: Forms of Collaboration and Rules of Governance 
Forms of 
Collaboration 
Loose 
networks of 
informal  
ad hoc 
relationships 
Limited 
agreement to 
share 
information 
Agreement 
to 
undertake 
activities 
jointly 
Agreement to 
constitute 
formal 
governing 
body 
Creation of federal 
structure in which 
participating bodies 
agree devolve 
powers upwards 
some of their 
autonomy 
Merger of 
participating 
bodies into 
single 
organization 
Rules of 
governance 
Self-
government 
through mutual 
norms and 
obligation and 
shared values 
and trust 
 External government 
through overarching 
constitution 
Hierarchy 
Organizational 
and policy 
terminology 
Network Partnerships Federation Integration 
Source: Adapted from Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) 
Formal collaborative arrangements known as partnerships suffer from “methodological 
anarchy and definitional chaos” (Ling 2000, p: 82). A difference between partnership 
and contracting is provided by Klijn and Teisman (2003): 
“Contracting out is characterized as principal agent relationship in which 
public sector defines the problems and provides the specifications of the 
solution---partnership, on the other hand, is based on joint decision making and 
production in order to achieve effectiveness for both partners. Relational 
transparency, or in other words, trust is crucial.” (pp: 85-6) 
Klijn and Teisman (2003) defined a partnership as “joint decision making and 
production” (p: 1). The academic literature on partnerships stresses three key elements: 
long term commitment and mutual dependency, collaborative advantage (Huxham 
2003), and the creation of formal partnership arrangements (Sullivan and Skelcher 
2002). An ideal type of partnership (Brinkerhoff 2002b; Brinkerhoff 2002a) can be 
defined as:  
“A dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed 
objectives, pursued through shared understanding of the most rational division 
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of labour based on the respective comparative advantages of each partner.” 
(Brinkerhoff 2002a, p: 21) 
However, this definition presents an ideal form of partnership, which in reality may not 
be either fully operational or universally applicable. Nevertheless, ideal forms are 
helpful to establish some comparison with what exists in reality. A broader and more 
operational definition is provided by Bovaird (2004, p: 200):  
“Working arrangements based on mutual commitment (over and above that 
implied in any contract) between a public sector organization with any 
organization outside of the public sector.”  
This is a broad definition in the sense that it encapsulates the key features of a 
partnership ‘mutual commitment and relationship beyond contractual arrangements’. It 
also incorporates all kinds of public sector partnerships with both private and third 
sector organizations. Third sector organizations include: Civil Society Organizations 
(CSO), Community Based Organization (CBOs), the voluntary sector/Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO). Another form of partnership which involves direct 
users or community in service delivery and/or third sector or local community 
organizations has been termed as co-production. In the UK ‘co-production’ has been 
used to analyse the role of voluntary and community organization (VCO) in service 
provision. An example of such a partnership includes: Local Strategic Partnerships in 
area regeneration (Osborne and McLaughlin 2004), while the term co-production is 
used to refer to the growing involvement of direct users in service provision in 
continental Europe (Brandsen and Pestoff 2006). However, the common notion is co-
production refers to the involvement of the third sector- whether voluntary 
organizations, NGOs or community- in the local management of services. The focus of 
developing countries’ literature is also on the government and third sector 
collaborations.  
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Depending on the level of involvement of third sector and public organizations in the 
decision making process, financing and delivery of services, such collaborations can 
take three modes: co-determination, co-financing, co-production. In the process of co-
determination, both parties decide jointly about the type of social services to be 
produced and how. Mostly, in this form parties work through the consultation process to 
discuss the utilization of resources, and co-financing involves decisions regarding the 
financing of a project such as how much the local community can raise to finance the 
project. The co-production process determines that both parties will provide the 
resources and labour in the actual delivery of services (White and Robinson 1998). 
Ostrom (1993) argued that co-production involves multiple parties including the public 
sector, private and/or third sector and even the recipients of the services- the local 
community in the production of services. 
Hence, collaborations are more flexible and all inclusive institutional arrangements for 
efficient and responsive service provision and may range from highly informal 
arrangements to a highly formal partnership. A significant dimension of all these 
collaborative forms is an attention to the organizational relationship (also known as 
Inter-Organizational Relationship - IORs) among partners which are managed through 
“engagement, feedback, adjustment and re-engagement” (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 
2002, p: 12). Inter organizational dynamics are a process of “negotiation, commitment 
and implementation” (Batley and Rose 2011, p: 234) and are the key to sustain such 
collaborative forms over time (Thomson and Perry 2006).  
4.4.2.2.1 Factors Required for Successful Collaborative Service Delivery 
Arrangements 
Rosenau (2000) emphasized that key decisions need to be set out at the beginning of the 
partnership and stated in a concrete plan. Partners should have role clarity in the roles 
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and responsibilities of each partner. Goals should be achievable and identified and 
partners should have some incentives to carry out such plans. The entire process needs 
systematic monitoring. Huxham & Vangen (2005) further argue for a need of clarity 
about the aims of working jointly if partners are to work together in order to implement 
the policies. A clear set of goals provides the starting point for collaboration. In 
collaborations, besides the goals for collaboration, there are organizational goals of each 
partner, as well as the individuals’ own goals. Some of them may be explicit, and some 
of them may be implicit.  The bottom line is that an agreement can be formed over key 
issues which can further foster trust among the partners. However, this whole process 
should be treated as an interactive process in which the goals of collaboration, roles of 
partners and methods of working jointly should be revised over time (Hulme 2001).  
Trust is the key element for managing and sustaining collaborations. Trust is a product 
of prior working relationships and is an essential pre-condition for building mutual trust 
between partners. Figure 4-2, depicts the process of trust development in collaborations 
(Huxham and Vangen 2005; Lowndes 1998; Skelcher 2005). Trust building depends 
upon two factors:  
 Firstly, the formation of expectation among the partners about the 
partnerships which is an outcome of past behaviour or reputation and, 
 Secondly, risk taking; to what extent the partners are willing to take a risk in 
the initiation of collaboration (Huxham 2003). 
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Figure 4-2: Trust Building Loop  
Source: Adapted from Huxham (2003) 
One of the strategies presented in the cyclic loop offered by Huxham is to take some 
risks, in case there is no prior history of working relationships, to initiate collaborations 
and aim for realistic outcomes. Huxham (2003, p: 26) argued that the key to the 
successful management of trust lies in the ability to “cope in situations where trust is 
lacking and ability to build trust in situations where this is possible.” However, there is 
no general consensus on how to build trust. The management of trust remains 
problematic (Entwistle and Martin 2005). 
The literature has also stressed the significance of the roles key individuals play in 
managing collaborations. The skills and capacity of individual’s leaders are very 
significant in achieving the competitive advantage of a partnership. On the 
organizational side, the adaptive character of a public official is a crucial factor in 
managing collaborative relationships. On the civic side, the drive and skills of the 
community leaders, NGOs or other private sector partners provide positive impetus. 
This has been coined as a new term - the ‘social entrepreneur’ (Robinson and White 
1997). Williams (2002) argued for the role of boundary spanners - individuals who 
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manage inter organizational relationships, increase the likelihood of success of 
collaborative arrangements. His empirical research in policy areas-environment, crime 
and community safety and health promotion, identified four competencies for the role of 
boundary spanners - the ability to build and sustain relationships, ability to negotiate 
and influence through the power structure of collaboration, ability to manage 
complexity and interdependencies, and the ability to manage roles, accountability and 
motivation. These competencies require skills such as effective communication to create 
a shared purpose, understanding, empathy, networking, conflict resolution, creativity 
and innovation and the ability to build trust among partners (McGuire 2006). It is clear 
from these arguments that key individuals from both the public domain and from the 
private or civic domain are very significant in building up trust. 
According to Huxham (2003) structures and processes for leading collaboration are as 
important as the participants involved in the collaboration. Structures determine key 
factors as they determine the power structure. They determine who has influence in 
shaping partnerships, the power to act and resources to be tapped, the line of control and 
accountability. On the other hand, processes consist of formal and informal 
arrangements such as committees, workshops, medium of communication. They 
provide the members of partnerships with access to the partnership agenda and are 
instruments for effective communication. In order to build and sustain trust it is 
necessary to pay attention to the issues of management of communication, power 
imbalances, credit recognition, joint working, and various levels of commitment on a 
continuous basis. 
At the macro level, institutional context plays a significant role in determining 
government-private sector collaborative arrangements. The institutional environment 
consists of: a socio-political context, the history of government-private sector 
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relationships, and legal and policy framework which may restrict or be facilitative of 
government-private collaboration. Hulme (2001) argued that state-civic organization 
relationship are complex and vary according to the context. If the prior history of a 
particular context suggests a legacy of private sector collaboration with the government 
in service provisions such as in the case of India, the national leadership may be highly 
supportive of such initiatives and this will be reflected in favorable policy outcomes.  
The literature from third world country experiences with public and private sector 
partnership has also suggested institutional environment as a very significant variable as 
the institutional environment provides the context where partnerships collaborate and 
employ different strategies for the intended outcomes (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010).  
4.4.2.3 Partnerships and Service Delivery Performance  
One of the methodological problems with assessing the outcomes of collaborative 
arrangements is that the empirical literature defines success using two main approaches; 
process criteria and outcome criteria. The process indicators consist of commitment and 
engagement of partners, high level of trust, reciprocity, favorable environment, 
accountability arrangements. Outcome measures consist of efficiency and effectiveness 
of partnerships. In the preceding section the discussion centred on the nature of 
collaborative arrangements, and the key factors required for their effectiveness. This 
section intends to look at the empirical evidence relating to the successful performance 
outcomes of such collaborative forms. 
One of the research assessments in a US context was provided by Rosenau (2000). She 
based her concluding chapter on the assessment of 11 chapters regarding public private 
partnership experiences in sectors like technology research, nuclear power, 
transportation, environmental policy, education and health, welfare and prison. Rosenau 
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reduced her analysis to the issues such as the impact of partnership on improving 
performance, equity, access, citizen participation, democracy and accountability. 
According to her, partnerships were driven by politics and discourse. The effects of the 
partnerships on the cost and quality were mixed. In most of the cases cost did not 
increase, and there was evidence of improved quality, however, sometimes quality 
improvements in one area were at the cost of loss of accountability or equity goals. 
Overall, she concluded that the impacts of partnerships on equity, access, citizen 
participation, accountability and democracy were hard to be generalized and her 
findings were mixed.  
One of the main assumptions of collaboration was an emphasis on achieving synergy 
and joint working. However, Klijn and Teismen  (2003), assessing Dutch cases of 
partnerships argued that ‘synergy’ and ‘joint development’ do not exist in current 
partnership arrangements and partners very often revert to the traditional ways of 
control such as using contracts. All stakeholders were occupied with their own internal 
issues and procedures rather than to act as partners alone. The explanation for the 
inability to develop partnerships lies in three interrelated factors: complexity of actors, 
institutional factors and strategic choices of partners involved.  
Robinson and White (1997) also advocated that complementary or synergy in relation 
management depends on the political context, the extent of structural inequality, the 
legal framework governing the relationships among the partners and the institutional 
capacity of public and civic organizations. To support their argument, the urban 
sewerage system in Brazil was used as an example. According to them, the state-civil 
society interacted in the design and coordination of the project. In the design phase, the 
project was divided into two components; internal and external infrastructure. The 
internal infrastructure was developed and financed by the local community and the 
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external infrastructure was constructed by the public agency. The local community was 
also involved in the very outset in the coordination of all aspects of the design, 
construction and maintenance issues (Robinson and White 1997). This case study is 
well documented in the World Bank report (1994) as a successful example of 
community and third sector involvement. They advanced the idea of organizing 
‘synergy’ among the partners to achieve performance outcomes. 
Another set of literature (Bano 2008; Bano 2011; Batley 2011; Mcloughlin 2011; Rose 
2009; Rose 2011) relating to South Asian countries (India, Bangladesh and Pakistan) 
assessed the collaborative engagement of the government with the third sector in areas 
including sanitation, education and health. This literature focused mainly on assessing 
factors which affected such collaborations (Mcloughlin 2011), the strategies adopted by 
the partners in  the formation of such collaboration (Bano 2011; Batley and Rose 2011; 
Rose 2011), and proposing a framework for analyzing inter-organizational relationships 
(Batley and Mcloughlin 2010; Batley and Rose 2011). The key themes proposed in this 
literature are: a third sector engagement with the government is based on the technical 
credibility and prior networking of the third sector-elite connections, professional 
connections, connections with the international donor organization and networking 
within the government. According to Bano (2011) a comparison of the government-
NGO collaborations in the education and sanitation sectors of Pakistan identified that 
collaborations are more likely to succeed if the third sector offers technically sound 
solutions for efficient service provision and NGOs have strong political and 
professional connections to promote such collaborations in the future.  
In addition to this, inter-organizational relationships (IORs) are influenced by the 
institutional and sector level policy environment which can be facilitative of or inhibit 
collaboration. The literature has widely called attention to the national and historical 
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context to understand the state-NGO relationship in service delivery, the significance of 
funding arrangements on partnership sustainability and the nature of influence the third 
sector can exert over such collaborative models. The empirical research supports that 
NGOs which have access to only one funding base such as projects are funded by the 
international organizations, then it is more likely that the project's life cycle is only 
limited until funds are available. On the other hand, a third sector which has a more 
diverse resource base is more able to exert an influential role and act as equal partner in 
collaboration and projects have more chances of meeting the targets. The research also 
found that the formalization of relationships in the form of mutual agreements also 
helps in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the partners (Batley and Mcloughlin 
2010; Mcloughlin 2011).  
Drawing on donor funded partnership experiences from India and Pakistan, Brinkerhoff 
(2004), made a comparative analysis of how donor funded partnerships can be used to 
improve service delivery by analysing two cases: the India Population Project 8 in the 
health sector and the Barani Area Development Project (BADP) in Pakistan in the 
agriculture sector. In the case of BADP, community ownership was sought through a 
participatory planning approach at all stages of project development: planning, design, 
implementation, and evaluation to ensure transparency and accountability. To further 
clarify the roles regarding the partners, standard operating procedures were developed 
in a participatory manner. In the initial two years, the performance was modest in terms 
of quantifiable indicators, however, the community organizations were established to 
overcome this issue and the project reached 90% of its performance targets.  She 
attributed the positive outcome of such partnerships to the willingness of partners to 
change, the pre-existence of an effective public service and depth of social mobilization 
and the extent of social capital sought during this process. She also indicated the 
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importance of standard operating procedures (SOPs), behavioral norms and 
organizational culture to address partnership challenges. 
Following initiatives such as BADP in Pakistan and the community sewerage system in 
Brazil, the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Pakistan recognized the importance of this 
process and were based on a participatory approach for resolving conflicts and 
managing inter organizational relationships (IORs) through negotiation and engagement 
throughout the project life cycle. 
“Major challenges lie in making sense of the politics which underlie rather 
cuddly notion of cooperation, the real conflicts of interest and agenda which 
persist in all areas and the process through which self-interest or short-
sightedness, as well as genuine conflict over values are constantly being 
managed” (Robinson 2000, p: 2). 
 The organic nature of these projects is summed up as follows:  
“The lesson is that there is no right way to approach projects, but that each 
project design, implementation strategy and management arrangements evolve 
during the course of give-and-take negotiation between the project team and 
residents” (Watson 1995, p: 23). 
The focus of collaborative forms of service provision is on understanding the inter-
organizational dynamics. The literature identified a range of factors which are 
significant for successful partnership outcomes and are summarized in Table 4-3. The 
empirical evidence on collaborative service delivery forms consisted of case studies and 
was mostly focused on descriptive accounts of collaborative arrangements and 
identifying what preconditions were needed to make them successful. However, there 
was a lack of data on the outcomes of such partnerships and managing inter-
organizational relationships. One clear theme reflected in all these articles was an 
emphasis that managing inter-organizational relationships relies on how politics is 
managed throughout this process, conflict acknowledgment and negotiation for a 
strategic purpose. The main emphasis was on paying attention to the institutional 
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environment, collaborative arrangements and how actors interact with these 
organizational arrangements. 
Table 4-3: Conditions for Successful Partnerships 
 
Author Factors Focus of study & conclusion 
Brinkerhoff 
(2002a) 
Trust; contractual arrangement, standard operating 
procedure, degree of formality; senior management 
support; capacity of the partners; goal clarity; degree 
of conflict; existence of partnership champions 
The framework presents 4 
dimensions; 1) The preconditions of 
partnerships, 2) success factors, 3) 
degree of partnership based on two 
factors degree of mutuality and 
organizational identity, 4) measuring 
performance in terms of outcome of 
partnership relationship and partners 
performance 
Rosenau (2000) Key decisions need to be set out in a concrete plan; 
clear line of responsibility; achievable goals identified 
and clearly stated; incentives for the partners to 
pursue the goals; systematic monitoring of the whole 
process 
This is a book presenting findings 
from an American context. Overall 
book concludes that overall PPP 
models presents some degree of 
cooperation and may be regarded de 
facto privatization 
Thomson and 
Perry (2006) 
Attention should be given to the processes and 
organizational structures of the partnership. 
This article argues that the public 
managers should look inside the black 
box of collaboration which has five 
dimensions: governance, 
administration, organizational 
autonomy, mutuality and norms in 
order to manage the collaboration 
more effectively. 
Greer (2001) Development of an institutional framework for 
managing partnership 
This study is a survey of literature 
from Northern Ireland context and 
concludes that ‘there is no one model 
for success’ 
Sullivan and 
Skelcher (2002) 
Imperatives for collaboration include a context 
(multilevel, political, scope and complexity of the 
task); Resources or partners; vision 
(supporting/resisting) mainly based on the leadership. 
Collaborative capacity depends on individual and 
organizational factors; strategy, relationship skill, 
leadership, risk, trusts. Collaborative performance can 
be measured by; outcomes (targets, policies etc.), 
stakeholder perception (communities, users, 
agencies), collaborative governance (efficient, 
accountable and democratic) 
This book provides a theoretical 
understanding of the collaborative 
organizational arrangements deriving 
empirical evidences form the UK 
context.   
Ross and  Osborne 
(1999) 
 
The extent to which partnership arrangement meets 
their expectations depend upon the interaction 
between national policy frameworks and its 
implementation at the local level. Other factors are the 
centrality of organizational values and trust among the 
partners 
 
Batley and Rose 
(2011) 
The analysis of collaboration among state and NGO 
service provider can be explained as the interplay of 
historical and institutional context, organizational 
factors and the strategies of engagement. 
Providing  a research framework for 
assessing collaboration from an 
institutional perspective/  
Source: Author 
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4.5 APPLICABILITY OF NPM REFORMS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
One of the issues that has been raised in the literature researching the application of 
NPM to developing countries (McCourt and Martin 2001) is that we need to apply a 
public management model to developing countries appropriately and critically [My 
emphasis added]. Evidence on the impact of NPM type reforms in developing countries 
is more anecdotal than in the developed countries. Manning (2001, p: 305) noted: 
“If there is relatively little NPM to be found in developing countries compared 
to an earlier prediction, then there is an even less evaluation.....in fact there has 
been not a systematic evaluation of outcomes”  
Even Batley and Larbi (2004, p: 221) in their study of the impact of managerial reforms 
on the changing role of the government have noted that these reforms “were inherently 
more complex and taxing of government capacity than previous arrangements”. This 
raises the issue of the radical application of NPM type reforms to developing countries 
in the wake of weak administrative capacity. The weak state capacity makes the 
implementation of the complex new roles of contracting, monitoring, and regulation 
which are the important features of NPM type reforms, problematic. The weak 
administrative capacity is the underlying reason that instead of improving public 
management performance, NPM type reforms threaten to increase the core problems of 
administrative coordination and corruption. Therefore there is a need for a sequenced 
approach to the application of NPM type reforms in developing countries which 
Nickson (2008) characterized as: 1) first the creation of an old public administration, 
and 2) then a move to New Public Management approach. Pollitt (2007) also noted that 
the negative consequences of NPM reforms: “when injected into situations where the 
civil service is highly politicized, a ‘public service ethics’ is unknown, budgets are 
unstable and accountability is weak. The paradox, then, is that NPM needs its enemy- 
traditional bureaucracy- in order to succeed” (p: 6). Schick (1998) further elaborated: 
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“Politicians and officials must concentrate on the basic process of public 
management. They must control input before they are called upon to control 
output; they must be able to account for cash before they are asked to account 
for the cost; they must abide by uniform rules before they are authorized to 
make their own rules; they must operate in integrated, centralized departments 
before being authorized to go to alone in autonomous agencies (p: 130). 
Polidano (1999) provides an opposite viewpoint. He argues there is an abundance of 
rules and procedures in developing countries which have not given any fruitful 
outcomes so far. Rather they have resulted in delays, nepotism, duplication, and rigidity. 
Therefore, centralization is not a solution to the problems for governments in 
developing countries and even adding new rules may foster more corruption and abuse 
of power. In addition to this the orientation of the centre plays a significant contingent 
factor (whether it is reformist or passive) in determining the centralization vs 
decentralization thesis.  
For decentralization to be successful, it needs firstly the commitment of the political and 
administrative leadership to overcome the hurdles of the implementation phase and 
secondly, significant attention should be paid to local contingency factors. Batley 
(1999) provided a similar argument that reforms should be tailored to local conditions 
and should have local political ownership. Reforms need a long term commitment. 
There are champions of reforms and those who are the losers in this process. Difficult 
macro-economic conditions may mask the outcomes of reforms e.g., water sector 
efficiency where gains may be because of resource cuts rather than better management. 
The successful implementation of reforms requires an adequate infrastructure at the 
decentralized units; in human resource management, information management and 
financial management systems. Empirical evidence indicates centralized control over 
these organizational resources and less devolution to the decentralized units.  
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Mostly, reforms in developing countries such as Asia are promoted by authoritarian and 
non-democratic regimes under weak administrative capacity, a gradually rising civil 
society and a subservient private economy. Considering these contextual factors, 
Cheung (2005) argued that if the economic and social problems of Asian countries are 
an outcome of the Asian governance system, then an externally imposed reform 
program would not entail successful outcomes. It needs an internally generated ‘will’ to 
the reform process. Reforms are designed and implemented by the reform elites- 
politician and bureaucrats- usually in a top down decision making process (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000). There is always room for manoeuvring or rent seeking for those who 
do not consider such changes suitable for them. Hence, reforms cannot work well if 
they are devoid of a wider context of policy and state capacity (Cheung 2005). In this 
context political and bureaucratic factors who consider themselves as the targets of 
reforms become very critical as they are the most likely to resist the process of reforms. 
In conclusion, the literature from developing countries put forward the thesis of 
examining the contingencies which lead to differential outcomes related to New Public 
Management reforms. Less is known about the nature of the public sector in developing 
countries. The interpretation of the results depends on ‘what’ is being measured, and 
‘how’ it is measured. This study intends to contribute to fill this gap in knowledge by 
assessing decentralized service delivery frameworks in a developing country such as 
Pakistan.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter identified and explored the main themes of a decentralized service delivery 
framework as proposed under the NPM model. In doing so, a range of issues has been 
recognized related to internal organizational restructuring which emphasizes increased 
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autonomy through decentralized organizational structures, a performance focus and a 
NPM accountability model along with appropriateness of different institutional 
arrangements for service provision. This chapter also provided various emerging ideas 
on the public management landscape such as ‘JUG’ or the ‘modernization’ agenda. The 
value of these approaches is that they stress the need for shifting the focus away from 
intra-organizational to inter organizational governance to fully comprehend the 
complexity of public sector management and the complexity of local governance in 
service provision.  
Borrowing from Walsh (1995) the contracting culture in NPM has initiated a shift of 
focus from intra-organizational management to inter-organizational networks for public 
service provision. This has shifted the focus on the management of inter-organizational 
relationships (IORs). Drawing on the literature review, Figure 4-3 proposes a 
framework for analysing the link between management decentralization and public 
sector performance. This framework suggests that the introduction of NPM reforms 
such as structural decentralization, performance based accountability models and the 
adoption of a mix of competition and collaborative service delivery arrangements 
depend on the institutional environment; internal and external.  
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Figure 4-3: A Framework for Assessing Management Decentralization and Its Impact on 
Public Sector Performance 
According to Rhodes (1997), the internal institutional environment relates to four types 
of resources - human, financial, technical and information technology (IT). In addition 
to this organizational culture- the incentive structure and value system of the public 
sector, these are significant factors which may influence the implementation of public 
sector reforms. However, as public sector organizations operate in a wider institutional 
environment, therefore the institutional environment significantly influences the reform 
process such as the commitment of politicians and bureaucracy, the socio-demographic 
profile of the community (local contingency factors), and the socio-economic 
environment of a country. The performance of the public sector is assessed in terms of 
manager’s perception of decentralization reforms. The key questions that need to be 
addressed from this chapter are; to what extent has decentralization been able to provide 
managers with autonomy in terms of operational and financial management; how does 
the institutional environment constrain them in exercising their managerial autonomy?; 
what kind of accountability systems exists in public sector organizations: is there any 
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shift from process to output models as emphasized under NPM?; and have 
decentralization reforms been able to improve the institutional performance of public 
sector organizations?                                                  
4.7 REFINING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: INTEGRATING THE 
PERSPECTIVES 
The conceptual framework (Part 2) was organized into three main academic streams of 
thought (Political, Fiscal and New Public Management) in an effort to understand the 
main ways of academic thinking about decentralization and its impact on service 
delivery outcomes, in this way it provided a way to organize knowledge while exploring 
conceptual exploration of the core themes of decentralization and its impact on 
performance. Each perspective or approach asserts why decentralization strategies are 
different in different countries or within different sectors, and why some reform 
experiences are more successful than others, though, generally each perspective deals 
with one of the issue at one time. In this way, the conceptual framework helped in 
capturing the similar and divergent conceptions of decentralization phenomenon and 
helped to encompass the literature on multiple level of analysis. Furthermore, it 
informed the design and analysis of empirical research. 
In some ways, these approaches provide normative theories of decentralization and 
offer a self-contained belief to understand the decentralization process. Indeed, it is 
possible to use an integrative approach to investigate the relationship between 
decentralization and service delivery outcomes, particularly, since only an integrated 
approach, one that employs important insights from all the approaches, can fully explain 
the complexity and diversity inherent in the design and implementation of 
decentralization reforms. These approaches are not contrary to each other; they 
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complement each other and provide an overall explanation of the impact of 
decentralized service delivery reforms on service delivery outcomes.  
The ‘Political Perspective’ on decentralization (Chapter 2) provided normative theories 
of local government (Mill 1912; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999; Sharpe 1970). It 
provided the political theory of local government, and the relationships between 
‘participation’, ‘accountability’ and ‘responsiveness’. Then, later it assessed how far 
these normative theories can provide a possible explanation of the practical discourse by 
reviewing the empirical literature. It was found that empirical findings substantiate the 
proposition that participation needs to be effective if it is to be articulated into the 
decision making process as stressed by Arnstein (1969) and Burns, Hambleton and 
Hoggett (1994). However, participation alone cannot result in responsive service 
delivery outcomes. It once again brings in the issues of: participation in what, by whom, 
and to what effect. Then subsequently, as discerned in Table 2-4 (Chapter 2), it 
highlighted some trends and generalizations; decentralization needs effective 
participation, strong accountability arrangements, and significant fiscal and 
administrative autonomy to realize service delivery outcomes. However, practical 
discourse and normative theories mainly provide explanations about the institutions of 
participation, and their link with accountability and performance.  
Alternatively, the ‘Fiscal perspective’ on decentralization (Chapter 3) presents a case 
for local government from the view point of normative theories of fiscal federalism 
(Stigler 1953, Musgrave 1965, Oats 1999). Their main assumption is that decentralized 
decision making will enlarge participation and promote accountability by establishing a 
clear link between expenditure and revenue assignment. Therefore, the focus of this 
perspective is on the allocation of function and resources; the intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. The proposition is that local government cannot be accountable if it is not 
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assigned sufficient resources to match the functions assigned to them. The ‘New Public 
Management perspective’ provides a managerial view of local government and how the 
public sector should be organized for the management of service provision (Chapter 4). 
It focuses on three main elements of change: structural choices, change in the 
management culture by having an orientation towards accountability for performance, 
and techniques for service provision: contracting out, partnership, joined up 
government.  
The level of analysis moves from a macro-to more organizational level and actor level; 
organizational structures and processes of service delivery organization under the 
domain of local government and how actors working within their new decentralized 
organizational set up interact with them. There is an emphasis on linking organizations 
to their external environment, i.e., move from an intra-organizational to an inter-
organizational focus. Public sector organizations work in a highly complex 
environment. In order to understand their complexity it is pertinent to analyse how 
organizations are engaged with their external constituencies to deliver services in a 
more efficient and responsive manner. The integration of perspectives in this way will 
synthesize all the normative strands as by doing so we can fully grasp the problem of 
service delivery. Borrowing from Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) it is argued that though 
our focus is on public management, “we cannot understand public management without 
also paying attention to political structures and processes.” (p: 4) 
All these perspectives have their own explanatory power and no one approach is better 
than the other, rather all three of them are intertwined. However, it is argued that in 
order to seek a better explanation about the link between decentralization and 
institutional performance, this research proposes an integrative framework of analysis 
which explicitly seeks to integrate the core ideas of the dominant perspective. This 
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framework of analysis is based on three levels: political, fiscal and managerial analysis 
of local government. The political analysis of local government will assess ‘how far 
local government is able to articulate participation in local decision making processes’ 
and test the assumption that ‘a local government closer to the people can provide locally 
responsive services. Local councillors, because of their closer proximity to the local 
community, will be able to translate community preference into responsive service 
delivery outcomes’. The fiscal analysis of local government will explore ‘how 
autonomous a local government is’ and ‘is there any relationship between fiscal 
autonomy and its relevant impact on service delivery outcomes’. The focus will be on 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, which subsequently, will also provide an explanation 
of central-local politics. The empirical section of the ‘Political perspective’ and the 
‘Fiscal perspective’ provided a general consensus that the way local government is 
assigned resources considerably affect its decision making and its ability to provide 
locally responsive services. The ‘New Public Management’ approach will further 
explore the management of local government by situating the level of analysis at the 
organizational structures, processes level of local government and how actors are 
interacting with this decentralized structure. This will further contribute to our 
understanding of the management of local service delivery. Integrating perspectives in 
this way will help making sense of the complexity inherent in decentralized service 
delivery arrangements. The political, fiscal and managerial analysis of local government 
will provide us with a plausible explanation of the relationship between decentralization 
and institutional performance. A brief overview of level of analysis, as discussed above, 
is presented in Figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-4: Integrating Perspectives 
4.8 OPERATIONALIZING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
According to Blumer (1986) conceptual framework sets the context for the research, 
explore the literature, determines the data that will be collected, and is essential in 
analysing the findings “with clear concepts theoretical statements can be brought into 
close and self-correcting relations with the empirical world” (Blumer 1986: p. 143). A 
perspective based conceptual framework is used not only as a device to explore 
literature on decentralization in an attempt to explain and understand the phenomenon 
of decentralization and how decentralization can lead to improved service delivery 
outcomes, it also informed empirical research in that it formed the structure of the 
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questionnaire used in surveys and the structure of interview schedule used in conducting 
case study. However, primacy is given to use the conceptual framework as an 
explanatory device because it is impossible to explain relationships between 
decentralization and institutional performance without first conceptually exploring the 
features of the decentralization strategies and their subsequent impact on performance 
and in this way in the course of the research, this conceptual framework will be used as 
an analytical device for the analysis of the empirical research.  
In each perspective, a general overview of the key theoretical and empirical 
contribution, conceptual models and arguments is presented about decentralization and 
its impact on performance. This section seeks to operationalize the conceptual 
framework. Firstly, it will define the key concept performance (4.8.1) and then it will 
provide a summary table of how decentralization and performance is being 
conceptualized from different perspectives in Table 4-4 as discussed earlier in the 
conceptual framework (Part 2).  
4.8.1 Defining Performance 
4.8.1.1 Introduction 
The study is focused on assessing decentralized service delivery arrangements. The 
previous section conceptualized decentralization from three different perspectives - 
Political, Fiscal and NPM. Moving on from the construct of decentralization, the next 
issue is how to assess that ‘decentralization has been able to improve the performance 
of local government’. This section will try to understand the complexity of defining 
performance, the limitation of data availability and set the criteria of how this study 
measured the relationship between decentralization and performance.  
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4.8.2 Defining Performance 
Performance is a multidimensional construct (Walker 2006). Pollitt, Birchall and 
Putman (1998) have also made a distinction between efficiency, effectiveness and 
quality. Efficiency (technical efficiency) is defined as the ratio between input and 
output, how cost efficiently the resources are employed, while effectiveness is the 
extent an organization is able to achieve its objectives of a policy, program or project. 
User quality is defined as the degree to which users are satisfied with the services. This 
concept is closely related to responsiveness. Responsiveness is defined as the 
“congruence between public preferences and institutional policies and outputs” (Crook 
and Manor 1998, p: 319). Pollitt, Birchall and Putman (1998) also highlighted that 
improved performance in one area may be at the expense of another: “…….gain in 
effectiveness may have been accompanied by decreased economy and reduced 
efficiency” (p: 11). Therefore a combination of these criteria may give a better picture 
of performance.   
Walker and Boyne (2006) used both external and internal measures of performance. 
External measures of performance relate to the perceptions of stakeholders such as 
consumers and voters. These may also include archival data such as efficiency and 
effectiveness indicators used by organizations to assess their performance. On the other 
hand internal measures of performance include perceptions of internal stakeholders of 
the organization- managers, and front line staff, and may also consist of archival data of 
internal performance information that an organization collects for itself. According to 
Walker and Boyne (2006), a mix of internal and external measures can overcome the 
deficiencies of using a single approach in isolation.  
From a public management perspective, decentralizing authority down to front line 
managers leads to the assumption that new organizational structures will make a 
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difference to performance outcomes, and decentralized organizations will achieve better 
service outcomes (Walker 2006). Boyne and Walker surveyed multiple informants in 
their study to assess the perception of organizations on different dimensions of reforms. 
The World Bank has assessed the impact of institutional change in performance by 
looking at three dimensions of performance: result focus (whether the organizations 
were geared to its objectives, whether organizations had a merit based, reward and 
punishment system), accountability (record management, project evaluation, internal 
audit, performance appraisal, public at large) and employee morale (Manning, 
Mukherjee and Gökçekuş 2000). Different perspectives measured performance 
differently. For instance, the political perspective focuses on measuring responsiveness, 
defining as the congruence between community preferences and services provided 
(Crook and Manor 1998). The fiscal perspective focused on the macro level and 
anecdotal evidence of measuring performance at the local level. One way to examine 
the link between decentralization and responsiveness is to study the change in 
investment patterns after decentralization (Faguet 2004). 
Pollitt (2003) also argued that one way to assess programs/reforms is by asking key 
stakeholders about their perceptions of the program. This can be achieved through an 
opinion survey of key stakeholders such as managers, citizen, and politicians. However, 
this alone will not give sufficient insight into the reasoning or interpretation of the 
opinion sought through the survey, therefore interviews can probe further into the 
interpretation and reasoning of individuals. Some of the studies (Batley and Larbi 2004; 
Batley 1996) assessed NPM reforms and highlighted the problem of performance 
measurement, “there is no before and after comparison, except what is based on the 
subjective impression of those interviews” (Batley 1996, p: 747). Other studies also 
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acknowledged that data below the provincial level is often very scarce, making 
evaluation even harder (Bardhan 2002).  
This research is not about evaluating the conceptual validity or empirical accuracy of 
measures of performance, rather it focuses on assessing the link between 
decentralization and performance. Whether decentralization leads to better service 
delivery outcomes remains empirically questionable. Therefore this study focused on 
assessing this relationship. Considering the data limitations particularly at the local 
government level, the study will rely on measuring the performance of the Local 
Government by assessing perceptions of multiple constituencies - politicians, managers 
of service delivery organizations, consumers and NGOs. Each of these evaluates 
performance differently. For instance, in political perspective studies examined the link 
between participation and improved performance. 
Performance is disaggregated into: responsiveness, user quality and effectiveness as 
presented in Table 4-4. Responsiveness is defined as the congruence between 
community preference and services provided (Fried and Rabinovitz 1980).  It was 
measured by asking respondents to rank their community problems followed by the 
question whether local government was able to solve their issues. The term user quality 
is equated to responsiveness and (Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998) and effectiveness 
(Ball 1998). It is defined as the “user satisfaction with local services” (Ball 1998, p: 
59). User quality will be assessed by asking respondents to indicate improvements in 
the level of access, such as access to school, and water and sanitation coverage, ranking 
their level of satisfaction with the quality of service, grievance procedures, and pre-post 
comparisons of the service delivery framework. Another dimension of effectiveness in 
this study was by making a comparison between the objectives of reforms set earlier, 
and actual outcomes of these reforms (Pollitt 2003). The decentralization reforms in 
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Pakistan had three main objectives: improve user involvement in service provision, 
achieve better accountability arrangements and increase responsive service delivery. 
Therefore, local communities will be asked to indicate the extent decentralization was 
able to improve community participation, accountability (reduced level of corruption, 
transparency etc.) and overall service provision. In addition to this, another aspect is to 
look at how performance is defined by different stakeholders (Pollitt, Birchall and 
Putman 1998).  
One of the key focuses, as mentioned earlier, is to explore how performance is actually 
defined by the public sector itself, what criteria they look for in terms of performance, 
meaning attached to performance indicators, how this information is actually used 
within the organization and what they consider how and in what ways decentralizations 
reforms led to better performance outcomes. This is partly an attempt to assess the 
performance management model within the public sector and compare it with the NPM 
model of performance.  To conclude this study will assess performance through: 
 Internal measures of performance consisting of perceptions of political heads of 
the local government and managers of service delivery organizations regarding 
the impact of decentralization on institutional performance.  
 In addition to this, archival data on the performance of each sector will be 
collected using indicators of efficiency, effectiveness and equity as defined and 
collected by those organizations.  
 External perceptual measures will consist of assessing community perceptions of 
how they valued Local Government service delivery performance in terms of 
improved participation, accountability and responsiveness. Internal perceptions 
of the managers of service delivery will be assessed through a survey 
instrument. However, in order to have an in depth perception of the key 
stakeholders regarding decentralization and performance improvements, 
interviews will be conducted with politicians, managers, and other key 
stakeholders involved in service delivery.  
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A combination of internal and external perceptual measures and the use of archival data 
will also help in achieving triangulation of data. For instance, in the Water and 
Sanitation sectors if archival data show a decrease in customer complaints, managers 
see this as an indicator of effectiveness and the community survey validates that 
complaint procedures are more efficient and their complaints are heard. It will indicate 
user quality. Likewise, an increased number of schools or increased coverage in water 
and sanitation provision also means an increase of access to services. According to Ball 
(1998) these are equality indicators - (p: 59) and in some studies access to services is 
treated as equity indicators (Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998). If the community 
perception is that under decentralization their access to school has increased, then again 
it represents the effectiveness of decentralization reforms. Details of these measures are 
provided in Table 4-4. This research employs three perspectives to understand 
decentralization as explained earlier, which not only defines decentralization from 
different perspectives, it also provides three levels of analysis. These levels of analysis 
are illustrated in Figure 4-4 (Integrative perspectives). Table 4-4 provides the 
conceptualization of the main variables, their dimensions and relevance based on the 
literature review.  
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TABLE 4-4: OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS 
Main Research Questions 
 
 
Main Research questions: 1) What has been decentralized and has decentralization really taken place? Has decentralization been able to improve the institutional 
performance of local government? How do accountability mechanisms affect the institutional performance of local government? What are the institutional factors that 
affect the link between decentralization and the institutional performance of local government? 
 
Research Questions Measures/Dimensions/Relevance Data Collection Instruments Studies Using 
Similar/Related 
Indicators 
Political analysis of LG reforms 
Has decentralization been able to 
improve institutional performance of 
local government? How does 
accountability arrangements and 
institutional environment of local 
government affect this relationship? 
Mainly the questions aimed to look at ‘how far local 
government is able to articulate participation in local decision 
making and can influence local decision making process’ 
Participation: Participation is both an input to the building 
of accountability and articulation of their preferences and 
outcomes of improved responsiveness and sense of 
empowerment. There is a feedback mechanism at work in 
which once effective participation is established and 
produces good results, a self-reinforcing process is started 
which further increases the level and scope of participation. 
Participation is defined as a set of activities aimed at 
engaging with or influencing public institutions: voting, 
electoral campaigns, contacting and pressurizing either 
individually or through groups or associational activities. 
 At the gross root level a Community 
Survey  assessed user/community 
perception of decentralization and local 
government performance 
 At the institutional level Qualitative 
interviews with Political elites to 
determine the influence in policy making 
and implementation, accountability 
relationships with local bureaucrats and 
public officials on one hand and their 
constituents on the other hand such as how 
well do elected representatives ‘listen to 
their constituents,  and How genuinely 
democratic or  inclusive are local 
government institutions, participatory 
decision making bodies 
 Institutional factors that are a constraint on 
their capacity to perform their role 
effectively, Perception regarding change in 
performance outcomes 
 
Crook and Manor (1995); 
Ng’ethe and Barkan (1998); 
Munkandala (1998); Wunsch 
(1998); Blair (2000); Crook and 
Sverrisson (2001); Frnacis and 
James (2003); Olowu (2003); 
Heller, Harilal and Chaudhuri 
(2007); Bardhan et al. (2008). 
 
 
 1. Measures of participation:  
 At the grass root level: election results, level of citizen participation in local associations and meetings, quality and quantity of contacts 
between the public, elected representatives and the officials of decentralized institutions 
 At the institutional level effective participation is determined by measuring the extent to which local representatives are able to exert their 
influence on the policy making process. 
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Accountability: defined as  
 Political accountability: requirement of political representatives to render their account to their electorates 
 Institutional accountability: relationship between public officials and political representative 
Measurement: the main proposition in literature ‘accountability is both a prerequisite and an outcome of decentralization’. 
As an input it is measured by looking at Public accountability procedures by which an institution deals with members of public and according 
to which it reaches decisions 
Measured through quality of contact between political representatives and public representatives, complaints procedures of local government, 
information dissemination by the local authorities etc.  
An  outcome of decentralization, improved accountability results in transparent local government, reduced level of corruption, access to and 
redress of complaints, improved level of attendance  
Performance:  
 Effectiveness: defined as a comparison of objectives set at some earlier time and the actual outcome of impact of an activity or set of activities.  
 Measured as the extent to which pattern of resource allocation and quantities of tangible outputs corresponds to targets or policy objectives of 
local governments (the extent policies objectives are actually met).  
 Responsiveness: measured as 1) Degree of congruence between public preferences and institutional policies and outputs and 2) User quality: 
degree to which user expectations. of a services are satisfied or exceeded 
Process dimensions of performance: Measured as improved accountability arrangements as mentioned earlier 
  
How does institutional environment of 
local government affect the impact of 
decentralization? 
 
Institutional factors: Political and social context: 
Formal administrative, legal and political structures of decentralized structures and their relationships with higher levels of the political system, 
resources, administrative capacity and funding system (stability of funding and assuring stability of financing, autonomy in access to and 
management of funds) 
Fiscal Analysis of LG Reforms Measures/Dimensions/Relevance Data Collection Instruments Studies Using 
Similar/Related Indicators  
 
How far local government has financial 
autonomy? What kind of 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations exists 
between local government and provincial 
government? 
 
Mainly the focus of this question was to determine ‘how fiscally 
autonomous a local government is’ and ‘is there any relationship 
between fiscal autonomy and its relevant impact on service 
delivery outcomes?’ 
 
It was proposed in the literature review section that design of 
Inter-governmental Fiscal Transfers (IGFT) reflects the fiscal 
autonomy of local government.  
Measures: analysis of Intergovernmental fiscal transfers, 
predictability and transparency of resources  
 
Documents analysis of local government 
budget, Finance Commission award, Legal  
Framework governing fiscal mechanisms.  
Perception of local representatives and 
managers of service delivery organizations 
regarding adequacy of resources, 
expenditure autonomy etc. and how it is 
affecting their performance 
 
Bird (1993); Bahl (1994); 
Dillinger (1994): Faguet (2004); 
Boadway and Shah. (2007) 
 
 
 
How does Institutional Environment 
affect fiscal autonomy of local 
government? 
Regulatory framework governing fiscal transfers, political decentralization as a prerequisite, accountability mechanisms 
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Managerial Analysis of 
Reforms 
Measures/Dimensions/Relevance Data collection instruments Studies Using 
Similar/Related Indicators 
Has management decentralization 
been able to improve performance 
of public sector? And how does 
institutional environment affect the 
performance of service delivery 
organizations? 
To answer this question, the study 
mapped: 
1) Firstly, the extent to which 
decentralization has been able 
to provide managers 
autonomy in terms of 
operational and financial 
management, the nature 
accountability system that 
exists in public sector 
organizations and to determine 
if there is any shift from 
process to output model as 
emphasized by NPM 
perspective.  
2) Secondly, the study looked at 
the contractual/collaborative 
modes of service delivery that 
are employed by the public 
sector organizations, and how 
does it has contributed to their 
organizational performance.  
3) Thirdly, examine the role of 
institutional environment on 
public sector performance. 
 
Management decentralization assessed focusing on three type of 
reforms: 
 Organizational restructuring 
 Service delivery techniques (use of contracting and 
collaborative forms of service provision) 
 Performance based incentive structure 
Managerial autonomy is measured as the measure of the operational 
and financial autonomy of an organization. Two sub-dimensions were 
measured 
 Autonomy over:  
 Personnel management 
 Financial management 
Participation was measured by 
1) At the institutional level, community participation was 
assessed by looking at how local government institutions 
engaged citizens in helping solve local problem through 
partnerships, co-production and other community 
involvement strategies 
Institutional environment measured as: 
 Internal institutional environment-related to personnel 
management, financial management system, performance 
management system 
 External institutional environment-related to policy 
coordination, political and bureaucratic interference, other 
institutional factors such as regime legitimacy, political and 
economic instability, political and bureaucratic commitment, 
and local context.  
Accountability: performance focus, budgetary transparency, audit 
system, public access to information, complaint procedures, reliability 
of information management system.  
Performance:  
Perception of Internal stakeholder’s of reforms and has it contributed to 
improved service delivery outcomes. 
Perception of external stakeholders of decentralization reforms on 
service improvements (community survey) 
Archival internal and external measures of performance (efficiency, 
effectiveness indicators as used by organization and other external 
organizations) 
Organization survey measuring perception 
of change after decentralization reforms on 
managerial autonomy, extent of user 
involvement, accountability model, 
institutional environment consisting of 
internal organizational factors and external 
institutional factors. Survey instrument also 
assessed mangers perception how far 
decentralization is able to improve 
performance of public sector.  
 
Qualitative interviews and document 
analysis also aimed at:   
1) Assessing How far 
decentralization reforms were 
able to decentralize real 
autonomy down the hierarchy or 
more autonomy is followed by 
more central or provincial 
control?  
2) Determining community 
involvement in design, 
development and implementation 
of service delivery (community 
led initiative and the 
incorporation of a wide range of 
civil and citizen groups in service 
provision, grievance or complaint 
systems, access to information, 
consumer surveys) 
 
 
 
 
Manning, Mukherjee and 
Gökçekuş (2000); Girishanker 
(2001)Larbi and Batley (2004); 
Verhoest (2004);  
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PART 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research methodology builds on a set of philosophical assumptions which guide the 
research design underpinning the strategy of academic inquiry. This part of the thesis is 
comprised of two chapters and will discuss the research methodology of this study. 
Chapter 5 presents epistemological and ontological positions and how they influence the 
perspective of a researcher to ‘see’ things around her. It explains how a researcher can 
make informed choices about the methods to be utilized to gain knowledge. Chapter 5 
covers the philosophical assumptions or normative aspects of research and 
methodological issues influencing the design of the research process. Subsequently, 
Chapter 6 narrows down the discussion to the actual field work carried out for this 
study. The overview of this part is presented in Figure 4-5. 
 
Figure 4-5: Overview of Research Methodology 
Source: Author 
Introduction
Philosophical 
assumptions of Research, 
and design issues of 
research
Methodological issues of 
research
Designing research 
strategy of the study
Selection of case study as 
a research strategy, 
quality in case study 
methods, comparative 
selection of case study 
research design
Designing case study 
Research strategy (3 
stage model)
Stage 1: Development of 
research questions, 
selection of cases and 
field sites, ensuring 
reliability of the  case 
studies
Stage2: designing data 
collection techniques
Stage 3; designing data 
analysis 
Conducting Research
Development of case 
study protocol, 
preliminary  research
Developing and 
administering  survey 
questionnaire
Developing and 
conducting interviews
Conclusion
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CHAPTER 5  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Research methodology sets the explicit rules and procedures upon which research is 
based and claims of knowledge are evaluated (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
2007). In essence the research methodology relates to the theory of how research should 
be undertaken based on the philosophical assumptions related to epistemology and 
ontology of knowledge. It further informs the methods to be adopted for collecting and 
analysing empirical data. Therefore, this chapter provides an overview of the 
philosophical assumptions of research that guided the researcher to make informed 
choices regarding ontology and epistemology of the research and the methodological 
issues of the research. This chapter concludes by outlining the research strategy of this 
study (Section 5.5).  
5.2 OVERVIEW OF PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF RESEARCH 
The research philosophy is the central part of a research project as it contains the basic 
assumptions about the way the world is perceived. The research philosophy which a 
researcher adopts contains significant assumptions regarding the choice of research 
strategy. Research philosophy refers to the “development of knowledge and the nature 
of that knowledge” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003, p: 101).  Research philosophy 
is based on different assumptions related to ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology and underpins the choice of research strategy. There are three main 
interrelated elements of research philosophy: 1) Ontological assumptions regarding the 
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nature of reality, 2) Epistemological assumption - how this knowledge is researched and 
3) Axiology - the role of values in research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003).   
Ontological assumptions are concerned with the nature of reality, whether it is external 
to an individual or a product of individual consciousness; whether it is of an objective 
nature; hard facts, ‘out there’ or subjective in nature; the product of the human mind. 
Epistemological assumptions, on the other hand, are concerned with the view of the 
nature of knowledge itself, how knowledge should be developed; whether knowledge 
can be found as hard, tangible facts or whether it is softer in nature and based on 
experiences, personal and unique in nature. It has two extreme positions on a 
continuum: knowledge can be acquired or knowledge can be personally experienced. 
These assumptions regarding human nature are concerned with the view of human 
beings and their interaction with the external environment; deterministic view of the 
environment, i.e., human beings respond to the external environment in a deterministic 
way or voluntaristic nature of the human being and their environment, creator of the 
environment (Burrell and Morgan 2011). 
According to Burrell and Morgan (2011) the assumptions related to ontology, 
epistemology and human nature in turn determine the methodology of social research; a 
nomothetic approach (Positivism) or an ideographic choice (Interpretivism). A 
nomothetic approach treats reality as hard, external to individual and uses a scientific 
approach. The issues of concepts, their measurement and identification of underlying 
themes become very important, and the focus is on analyzing the relationships and 
regularities. The ideographic approach treats social reality as the product of the 
individual's mind, and focuses on understanding their subjective experiences. It analyses 
how individuals are able to modify, create and interpret the world around them.                       
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Another way to conceptualize research philosophy is through the concept of a paradigm. 
On the basis of this subjective and objective divide, social researchers have offered 
different contributions in identifying research paradigms. According to Patton: 
“A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the 
complexity of the real world. As such paradigms are deeply embedded in the 
socialization of the adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is 
important, legitimate and reasonable. Paradigms are also normative, telling 
[the] practitioner what to do without the necessity of long existential or 
epistemological consideration. But it is this aspect of paradigm that constitutes 
both their strengths and weakness-their strength in that it makes actions 
possible, their weakness in that the very reason for action is hidden in the 
unquestioned assumptions of the paradigm.” (Patton 1978, p: 203) 
Paradigms provide a system of thinking and perceiving the world, and techniques and 
methods to do so. The Positivism paradigm seeks rational explanations of human 
behavior and provides an objective view of the world. It is rooted in sociological 
positivism. Its approach to the social science is realism, positivism, deterministic and 
nomothetic. On the other hand, the interpretive paradigm is concerned with a subjective 
view of the world and seeks explanations in terms of human consciousness and 
subjectivity. Its approach to the social sciences is nominalist, anti-positivism, 
voluntarism and ideographic. The focus is on inter-subjective social meaning, social 
order, and status quo. Since positivism tries to seek a rational explanation of human 
behaviour, it treats reality as a single ‘out there’, which can be studied objectively. The 
interpretive paradigm considers the way human beings see the world around them and 
make sense of it through the social construction of reality (Burrell and Morgan 1979).  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) have distinguished between positivism and a post positivism 
paradigm. They have referred to the post positivism paradigm as a ‘naturalistic 
paradigm’ (p: 36). Denzin and Lincoln (1994) argued that a paradigm is a systematic set 
of beliefs which guides the researcher’s inquiry. They claimed that the question of 
research methods is of secondary importance to the question of which research 
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paradigm is applicable to the research: 
“Both qualitative and quantitative methods may be used appropriately with any 
research paradigm. Questions of methods are secondary to question of 
paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or world view that guides 
the investigation, not only in the choice of methods but in ontological and 
epistemologically fundamental ways” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, p: 105).   
They also acknowledged that “while paradigms are thus enabling, they are also 
constraining” (Lincoln and Guba 1985, p: 15). Lincoln and Guba (1985) compared 
positivism and a naturalistic paradigm against five sets of assumptions presented in 
Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1: Philosophical Assumptions of Positivism and Interpretive Paradigm  
Source: Adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
Another development in social research is that choosing either between positivism or 
interpretivism research philosophies is highly unrealistic. The research philosophy is 
guided by the research question and it is possible to work with both philosophies. This 
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is referred to as ‘Pragmatism’ research philosophy. This approach argues that the most 
important element of a research philosophy is the research question. Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (1998) suggested to think about the research philosophy as a continuum, ‘at 
some points knower and the known must be interactive, while at others, one may more 
easily stand apart from what one is studying’ (as cited in Saunders Lewis and Thornhill 
2007, p: 110). Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) also suggested that in reality 
research seldom falls into one particular philosophical position, the research approach to 
business and management is mostly a combination of positivism and interpretivism. 
Everything depends on the type of ‘research questions’ a researcher seeks to answer. 
These philosophical dispositions provide us with different views of measuring and 
understanding social reality. This research has a subjectivist view and considers that 
realities are multiple and socially constructed. The focus of this study is on the nature 
and extent of service delivery reforms under decentralization; to find out how 
organizational arrangements under decentralization have been able to perform better and 
the contextual factors that affect their performance and how. Therefore, the focus is not 
only on the actor’s perception but also on studying interactions and relationships 
between these structural arrangements and the actors, where multiple realities co-exist 
and where realities are socially constructed in interaction with external environmental 
factors. In order to understand the social construction of realities it is pertinent to 
understand the existing structural arrangements (decentralized service delivery 
arrangements) in order to understand how the social context affects human agency. As 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) assert: the phenomenon in question can only be understood 
within its environment or setting; both cannot be separated, the real world is too 
complex, diverse and interdependent. Remenyi (1998) also stressed the need to study 
the details of a situation in order to understand the reality or the working reality behind 
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it. Therefore, the research philosophy adopted for this research is an ‘interpretive or 
naturalistic inquiry’. The next section will highlight the design issues of this research 
and how the researcher intends to achieve the goals of objectivity and trustworthiness of 
the research process.   
5.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH METHODS, APPROACH TO 
RESEARCH, STRUCTURED VS UNSTRUCTURED DESIGN OF 
RESEARCH 
Based on the subjective-objective divide the two dominant research designs employed 
are: the quantitative and qualitative research design (Gray 2009). Social science 
researchers (Denzin and Lincoln 1994) have advocated that it can be more appropriate 
to combine qualitative and qualitative methods which at times are referred to as a mixed 
methods approach in order to overcome the shortcomings of each method and to 
provide a more holistic picture of the phenomenon being studied. The idea of a mixed 
methods approach dates back to Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) concept of multiple 
operationalism. In this, more than one method is deployed to ensure that the explained 
variance is the result of the underlying phenomenon and not the result of the methods 
and to “enhance our beliefs that results are valid and not a methodological artifact” 
(Bouchard 1976, p: 268). Guba and Lincoln (1994) asserted that “both qualitative and 
quantitative methods may be used appropriately with any research paradigm” (Denzin 
and Lincoln 1994, p: 105) and further reiterated that “within each paradigm, mixed 
methodologies may make perfectly good sense” (2005, p: 200). 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques, a mixed 
method approach, is suggested on the basis of three main rationales: to provide 
confirmation or corroboration via triangulation; to elaborate data analysis and provide a 
rich account of the context and to develop new lines of inquiry so ‘turning ideas around’ 
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by providing a fresh insight (Rossman and Wilson as cited in Miles and Humberman 
1994). Mixed method approaches enable us to achieve trustworthiness of a research 
study by enabling triangulation; synthesizing qualitative and quantitative research and 
providing multiple viewpoints and perspectives of the phenomenon being studied. 
Denzin (1978) argues that triangulation has four different strategies: the use of multiple 
and different sources (data triangulation); methodological triangulation (use of different 
data collection techniques); investigators; and theories. He also distinguished between 
‘within methods’ and ‘between methods’ triangulation. However, he contended that 
within methods (qualitative or quantitative methods) offered limited value and 
advocated to use between methods triangulation (qualitative and quantitative) as “the 
bias inherent in any particular data source, investigators, and particularly methods will 
be canceled out when used in conjunction with other data sources, investigators and 
methods” (p: 14). Considering all these design issues, the researcher intends to employ 
a mixed method approach to improve the trustworthiness of the research and to develop 
a synthesis of perspectives from different data sources. The researcher in this study will 
employ the use of multiple and different sources (different managerial levels of service 
delivery organizations, political representatives, NGOs representatives and community) 
and triangulation of methods (interviews, questionnaires, observations, and document 
analysis). 
Another factor is the approach to research such as inductive vs. deductive. A deductive 
approach to science entails the construction of a conceptual framework prior to its 
testing through empirical observation-theory testing, whilst an inductive approach 
involves the construction of explanations of what has been observed- the theory is the 
outcome of induction (Gill and Johnson 2002). The deductive approach is close to the 
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objective paradigm; testing theory. It is the dominant research approach in the natural 
sciences; laws present the basis of explanation, allow the application of the 
phenomenon, predict their occurrence and permit them to be controlled (Collis et al. 
2003). However, one constraint of adopting a deductive logic is that it is guided by 
theories which may lead to bias and consequently shape the results. To overcome this 
constraint, an alternate strategy is to employ an inductive approach; building theory. It 
is particularly concerned with the context within which events are happening. It requires 
the researcher to suspend belief and let the context emerge through the process. 
Therefore it allows the study of a small number of subjects as opposed to a deductive 
approach which requires a large sample in order to make generalizations. According to 
Stutely (2003 in Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2003) the minimum number of 30 is 
required for statistical analysis.  
However, as Bryman (2012) has contended, both deductive and inductive strategies can 
be treated as tendencies rather than hard and fast distinctions and the two can be 
combined within an overall research project. Even, qualitative research applies 
deductive logic, at least as a background to qualitative research. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) and Yin (2009), both from a qualitative tradition, advocate the need for a 
conceptual framework, a set of propositions, research questions, defining the sample, 
instrumentation at the outset of research, in particular for multiple case studies. The 
researcher has employed both approaches in this study as research questions were 
produced based on a conceptual framework and this conceptual framework was 
developed combining perspectives on decentralization and then refining these 
perspectives by adopting an integrative approach to this study. The role of a conceptual 
framework and the research questions is also to set research boundaries, as data 
collection and the data analysis process will itself lead to emergent patterns from the in-
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depth interviews.  
In the conventional view of field work, researchers try to keep the pre-structured 
research design to a minimum with a ‘loosely structured, emergent, inductively 
‘grounded’ approach to gather data: the conceptual framework should emerge from the 
field in the course of the study; the important research questions will become clear only 
gradually; meaningful settings and actors cannot be selected prior to field work (Miles 
and Huberman 1994). Glaser and Strauss (1970) emphasized an inductive approach - 
grounded theory. Therefore, one design issue of a qualitative research design is to what 
extent the design should be pre-structured [my emphasis added] at the outset. In this 
regard, Lincoln and Guba (1985) have suggested that it depends on the availability of 1) 
time, 2) how much the researcher knows about the phenomenon, 3) the availability of 
research instruments and 4) the data analysis methods. On the other hand, Miles and 
Huberman (1994) suggested that the research should be well structured, starting with a 
1) conceptual framework, 2) a set of general questions, 3) sampling plans and 4) data 
collection techniques.  
The researcher is of the opinion that starting with a conceptual framework and building 
up new patterns from the field work will both complement each other and provide a 
better explanation of the phenomenon being studied. It will also guide the research 
process by providing a focus for the research to be conducted; what to study, how and 
from whom to get information and why. Another factor is the time limitation of the 
study. This study has to be finished within a specified time limit. It is therefore 
appropriate to have a well-structured research design for the field work.  
Another design issue is the unit of analysis. This study aims to assess the relationship 
between decentralization and the institutional performance of Local Government. 
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Considerable attention should therefore be given to the entire system involved in the 
provision of services. The analysis should not only be based on actors alone, but also to 
locate actors in the context within which they are acting. Therefore, this research is 
focused on assessment of decentralized service delivery arrangements in the context of 
the Pakistan Devolution Plan 2000. Multiple units of analysis need to be assessed to 
understand the service delivery reforms and their relationship with performance. So far 
this section has elaborated on the technical and methodological issues in the design of 
the research process.  
There are however, other factors which influence the research process, such as political 
and practical issues, the student- supervisor relationship, and the researcher’s 
preferences which may shape various choices of research methods (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill 2003). First of all, there are political issues such as organizational 
managers obstructing access if they consider that the research may be harmful to their 
organization or may carry a negative image of the organization to outsiders. It raises 
ethical consideration for the researcher as well, for example, how to deal with this 
misperception of organizational respondents to gain access to organizational data. 
Secondly, there are practical considerations, such as the time scale of the study, the 
research has to be completed within three years as this was one of the limitations of the 
researcher’s funding organization (University of Punjab, Lahore). This constrains the 
extent to which the researcher can investigate the phenomenon in depth. This is one of 
the reasons that the researcher has tried to use a very structured research design 
approach. Thirdly, the student - supervisor relationship plays a significant role in 
shaping the research design. The role of the supervisor becomes very important during 
the design of the methodology as he/she poses challenging questions, provides 
alternative viewpoints and tries to keep the research design relevant to all parts of the 
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PhD dissertation (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003). 
Another important factor is the topic of the research itself. In this research, the 
researcher is studying the phenomenon of decentralization which according to the 
literature is hard to separate from its context. Therefore, an investigation of the 
contextual issues seems important to fully grasp the phenomenon of decentralization. 
This research aims to explore and explain how decentralized organizational forms can 
bring the fruit of improved service delivery, the factors that contribute to the enabling 
environment and to identify constraints on decentralized organizations. The level of 
analysis is not only individuals, but institutions, the institutional environment and the 
different players within this environment. Therefore, the focus is not only on the actor’s 
perception but also on structural arrangements and the interaction between actors and 
those structural arrangements. Philosophical assumptions have guided the researcher to 
adopt a naturalistic inquiry, a range of other methodologies and other factors such as 
political and practical issues and the choice of the research topic played a significant 
role in the research design of this study.  
5.4 DESIGNING THE RESEARCH STRATEGY OF THE STUDY  
The choice of a research strategy is guided by philosophical assumptions, the research 
topic, research questions, and the amount of existing knowledge, time and other 
constraints. Some research strategies are based on a deductive logic such as surveys and 
experiments and others are based on an inductive approach, such as naturalistic 
inquiries, and grounded approach. For Yin (2009) the appropriateness of a research 
strategy depends on three conditions: a) the type of research question, b) the extent of 
control the investigator has over behavioral events and c) the degree of focus on 
contemporary rather than historical events. The most common research strategies in 
154 
 
management research are: experimental, survey, action research and case study 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003). These strategies are briefly discussed in this 
section and the selected research strategy of this research is discussed in more detail in 
Section 5.5. Experimental research is usually used to discover a causal link between 
dependent and independent variables to determine whether a change in independent 
variable can lead to a change in the dependent variables. These are mostly used for 
exploratory and explanatory research to answer the questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’. The 
case study research strategy is preferred when, “A ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being 
asked about a contemporary event over which the investigator has little or no control” 
(Yin 2009, p: 13). According to Yin, the difference between experiment and case study 
research methods is that experiments are undertaken when the “investigator can 
manipulate behavior directly, precisely and systematically” (Yin 2009, p: 11).  
Survey research, associated with a deductive approach, is used to answer questions like 
‘who, what, where, how many, how much’, and is used for descriptive and exploratory 
research. It helps to collect a large amount of information in an economical manner.  
The data collection methods in a survey are not limited to questionnaires alone, it also 
includes structured interviews and observation techniques (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill 2003). Action research differs from other research strategies as it starts with a 
clear focus and a specific context, and attempts to study the implication of changes in an 
organizational setting. Usually an academic and practitioner collaborate together to 
study a change process occurring in an organization: the research is part of the 
organization within which the change process is taking place (Coghlan and Brannick as 
cited In Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003).  
Considering all the theoretical perspectives and methodological issues related to the 
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design of the research process, and constraints on research strategy, the researcher 
considered it appropriate that a case study would provide a rich methodology to 
understand the in depth nature of the phenomenon under study. The choice of research 
strategy was based on firstly, the purpose of this research to explain the link between 
decentralization and institutional performance. Secondly, as the research questions of 
this study are focused on exploring and explaining the link between decentralization and 
institutional performance and are assumed to be far too complex for survey research. 
Finally, as it has been proposed that decentralization is a context specific phenomenon, 
therefore, the case study strategy will prove an in depth analysis of the context within 
which reforms are taking place and how contextual variables play a significant role in 
affecting the link between decentralization and institutional performance. 
5.5  SELECTION OF A CASE STUDY AS RESEARCH STRATEGY  
A case study is not a data collection method, it is considered as a comprehensive 
research strategy in its own right (Yin 2009). Robson (In Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2003, p: 178) has defined the case study as “a strategy for doing research which 
involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context using multiple sources of evidence”. Yin (2009, p: 18) defines case 
study as: “An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident.”  
Woodside (2003) provided a wider definition of the case study approach. For 
Woodside, the case study research strategy focuses on understanding the process within 
its context (this study has a similar purpose). A case study research methodology has 
also been adopted by various studies on decentralization and organizational 
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performance (Batley and Larbi 2004; Crook and Manor 1998; Pollitt, Birchall and 
Putman 1998). The case study strategy will enable the researcher to gain an 
understanding of the context within which service delivery organizations are operating 
and how it influences their performance.   
Case studies, in particular, can combine data collection techniques of archives, 
interviews and questionnaires (Eisenhardt 1989). They also help in combining deductive 
and inductive logic. According to Yin (2009) the use of a case study emphasizes the 
importance of the context; he further argues that a case study is the most appropriate 
research strategy where it is difficult to draw the boundaries between the phenomenon 
being studied and the context within which it is being studied. Therefore, the researcher 
intends to use a mixed method approach for a more holistic view of the phenomenon 
under study, and a case study research strategy will let the researcher combine both 
deductive and inductive approaches and allow the triangulation of data collection 
methods and data collection sources to ensure the trustworthiness of the research 
process.  
As referred earlier, the research will employ triangulation of methodologies (data 
collection techniques) and triangulation of data sources (multiple sources of evidence) 
in order to achieve the goals of objectivity and trustworthiness. The study intends to use 
a survey questionnaire in order to assess the impact of decentralization at two levels: the 
organizational level and the community level. The organizational survey will explore 
the perception of internal stakeholders (the managers) regarding the impact of 
decentralization reforms and the internal and external institutional factors affecting 
public sector performance. On the other hand, the community survey is aimed to assess 
the community perception of decentralization reforms and service delivery 
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improvements. This will help to establish the credibility of the information collected 
from all stakeholders. Another data collection technique that this study intends to 
employ is the use of semi-structured interviews with the organizational respondents 
(middle-senior management levels), political representatives, and NGOs 
representatives. Triangulation of multiple data sources and data collection techniques 
will help establish the objectivity and trustworthiness of the research process. 
5.6 QUALITY IN CASE STUDY METHODS: SIGNIFICANCE OF VALIDITY 
AND RELIABILITY 
One of the main objectives of the research is to maintain the rigour, validity and 
reliability of the research process. To assess the quality of a research design, four main 
tests have been applied in the social sciences; construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity and reliability. Construct validity ensures that correct operational 
measures for the concepts are being studied; internal validity establishes a causal link 
between the variables under study to show that certain conditions lead to other 
conditions. It tends to be used more often in explanatory studies rather than exploratory 
studies; external validity establishes the domain to which the study’s findings can be 
generalized; reliability is related to the operation of a study, such as the data collection 
procedures can be repeated with the same results (Kidder and Judd, 1986 as cited in Yin 
2003). Yin (2009) discussed a number of tactics to improve the quality of case study 
research designs and these are summarized in Table 5-1. All these data collection 
techniques are complementary and are to be used in combination to improve case study 
research design. 
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Table 5-1: Criteria for Judging the Research Design and Tactics used to Handle 
Validity and Reliability Issues 
Tests Tactics Phase of research in which 
tactics occur 
Construct validity   Use multiple sources of evidence 
 Establish a chain of evidence 
 Have key informant review draft 
case study report 
Data collection 
Data collection 
              Composition 
Internal validity  Do pattern matching 
 Do explanation building 
 Address rival explanations 
 Use logic models 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
External validity  Use replication logic in multiple 
case studies 
    Research Design 
Reliability  Use case study protocol 
 Develop case study database 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2009) 
5.6.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity ensures that instruments measure what they are intended to measure 
and requires a definition with clearly outlined conceptual boundaries (Newman 1991). 
According to Yin (2009) the problems of construct validity can be ignored if the 
researcher: 
1. Operationally defines the constructs at the outset, 
2. Selects the appropriate data collection tools for the defined concept, 
3. Uses multiple sources of data that encourage divergent lines of inquiry, 
4. Establishes a chain of evidence during the data collection process, and 
5. Evaluates the draft case study through feedback from key informers. 
To ensure construct validity, this research has developed a conceptual framework which 
provides operational definitions of the construct and also the relationship between 
variables. Although, the conceptual framework is based on the literature review, the 
study also intends to conduct preliminary semi-structured interviews with the different 
stakeholders to ensure that the instrument developed for the case study measures what it 
intends to measure. As already mentioned, the case study will use a triangulation 
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strategy to further improve its internal validity. Another strategy is to employ multiple 
sources of information, such as collecting information from senior-middle management 
of service delivery organization, political representatives involved in service delivery, 
NGOs representatives and the community itself. This will validate the information 
sought from different sources and help improve the validity of the study.  
5.6.2 Internal Validity 
The issue of internal validity becomes more significant when the researcher tries to 
explain a causal relationship between variables and tries to make inferences from the 
data when it is not possible to observe the event. Yin (2003) addressed this question in a 
number of ways; pattern matching, explanation building, and time series analysis in 
order to improve the confidence of making inferences. The question of internal validity 
becomes significant during the data analysis stage. To overcome this issue the study 
intends to use pattern matching, and explanation building (6.7.3). The study will use 
matrix analysis and NVivo software so that the analysis process is objective. These data 
analysis techniques are discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.6.3 External Validity 
The most problematic issue is whether the research findings can be generalized beyond 
the study itself.  In this regard, Gomm, Hammersley and Foster (2000) proposed that 
generalization can be improved by a systematic selection of cases for the case study to 
ensure that cases are typical of the population. Yin (2009) suggested that generalization 
can be improved by replicating the study three or four times in different circumstances. 
In survey research, researchers are more concerned with statistical generalization, 
whereas with a case study more focus is placed on analytical generalization as the 
researcher is trying to generalize a particular set of results to a broader theory. To 
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achieve external validity, this study intends to use replication logic as proposed by Yin 
(2009) by having a comparative case study approach and using two case study 
governments (Lahore and Faisalabad), and within those two governments focusing on 
two sectors (Education and Water and Sanitation) for in-depth analysis. 
5.6.4 Reliability 
The issue of reliability can only be addressed if the researcher conscientiously 
documents procedures. Lincoln and Guba (1985) also suggested that before doing the 
research, the researcher needs to ensure that he has: an overall plan of the research; a 
hypothesis to be investigated; variables to be studied, their interrelationships, the 
methods for data collection and data analysis, which Yin (2009) referred to as the case 
study protocol and case study database. A research protocol was developed for this 
study to provide an overview of the research which is attached in the appendix 
(Appendix 2). The case study protocol has the following main sections: 
1. An overview of the case study project summarizing key research objectives. 
2. A field procedure consisting of access to cases study sites, people, general 
sources of information and a contingency plan if interviewees decided not to 
cooperate or because of their personal engagements, the interview is cancelled, 
allowing respondents flexibility. 
3. An interview schedule consisting of opening main questions along with probing 
questions to manage conversations with the respondents, research diary, table 
template for collecting data and the potential sources of information for 
answering each question. 
5.7 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is the logical sequence, an action plan, connecting the empirical 
data to initial research questions and ultimately to its conclusion (Yin 2003). Nachmias 
and Nachmias (1992 as cited in Yin, 2003) have defined the research design as a plan 
that: ‘guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting 
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observation. It is logical proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning 
causal relations among the variables under investigation.’(pp: 19-20) 
The research design deals with the issues related to the research question, the type of 
data to be collected, the strategy to collect it, and how to analyse the results. Yin (2009) 
has distinguished four main case study research designs: single case (holistic); single 
case (embedded); multiple-case (holistic); multiple-case (embedded). The first 
distinction is based on single vs multiple-case study research design. The rationale for a 
single case study is based on the following situation; a single case represents a critical 
case for testing a well-defined theory; a single case is unique or rare; or a case is of 
revelatory nature. A multiple case study design uses a different methodology than a 
single case design. For Yin (2009) multiple case studies are selected to follow a 
replication logic: each case study should be selected to establish either similar results 
(literal prediction); or contrasting results (theoretical replication).  
The second distinction is based on the unit of analysis: holistic vs. embedded case study 
designs. An embedded case study is the one in which attention is given to the sub-units 
and usually embedded units are selected on the basis of sampling or cluster sampling. 
On the other hand, holistic sub-units examine the holistic nature of the phenomenon. 
One of the disadvantages of using a holistic strategy is that the entire case study is 
conducted at an abstract level and operational details are not examined which further 
poses the problems of measuring data. Likewise, embedded research designs also have 
their associated advantages and disadvantages. For instance, if a researcher, while 
investigating the sub-units, fails to return to the larger unit of analysis, it will reduce a 
case study to an extensive detail of the subunits and will lose the holistic aspect of the 
phenomenon under study. Similarly, multiple cases can be holistic or embedded in 
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nature. Embedded case studies can conduct a survey at each case study site. However, 
the results of the survey will not be pooled across the cases, but will be part of the 
findings for each case study. However, in the case study at hand, the researcher is 
applying a multiple case study approach to the comparative case study design of this 
study and the results of these two case studies will be pooled across in order to contrast 
results (theoretical replication). This will also be helpful in achieving the goals of 
objectivity and rigor of the research design (Yin 2009). 
Miles and Huberman (1994) further discussed the issues of sampling strategies and 
whether to use within case sampling or multiple case sampling. Sampling in qualitative 
research is mostly either ‘theory driven’ or ‘purposive’ (Miles and Huberman 1994) or 
it emerges from the data in a progressive manner (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In the case 
of theory driven sampling, the choices of cases are driven by the conceptual questions. 
In the case of multiple cases sampling the replication logic is proposed by Yin (2009). 
Using this logic, if we get the same findings from multiple cases or other settings, then 
these findings are more robust, valid and improve the overall quality and reliability of 
the case study research. Whether an individual case or multiple cases are used, sampling 
decisions are led by the conceptual framework and research questions. Moreover, 
during the fieldwork new patterns and information, gained from the initial samples will 
help to find more interesting cases to study whether similar or contrasting ones. Denzin 
and Lincoln (1985) suggested that “many qualitative researchers employ purposive and 
not random sampling methods. They seek out groups, settings, and individuals where 
the processes being studied are most likely to occur.” (p: 370)  
The logic for purposive sampling is to select information rich cases; samples are 
selected on the bases of the researcher’s judgement that they can provide an 
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understanding of the key themes of the research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003). 
It is argued that theoretical sampling and purposive sampling work together, as the 
former leads to the latter (Bryman 2012). Therefore, this research has adopted a 
purposive sampling approach to have an “information rich” sample. The purpose of this 
research is to study decentralized local authorities, with a particular focus on the 
education and water and sanitation sectors, which were devolved to the City District 
Governments (CDGs) in Pakistan. To achieve this objective, the researcher has 
purposively sampled the key stakeholders at senior to middle management level to 
understand the institutional context of local government and service delivery 
organizations. Political representatives were also sampled to understand the extent to 
which policy makers were able to influence the policy process at the local level. NGOs 
representatives were also sampled to understand their role in their collaboration with the 
public sector. The community was also surveyed in order to assess their perception of 
the decentralization reforms.   
Another issue is related to the number of responders to be sampled for qualitative 
interviews. Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommended that interviews should be conducted 
till the researcher reaches the point of data saturation in the sense that collecting further 
data would add no new insights from the interviews. Others have argued that it depends 
on the objectives of the research, the availability of time and resources on the part of the 
researcher (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003). Based on these arguments, the 
researcher conducted 45 interviews from the two case study districts with diverse 
numbers of stakeholders in order to have an in depth insight related to their experiences, 
perceptions and understanding of the decentralization reforms and how it has been able 
to improve service delivery performance of the local government as a whole.  
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5.7.1 Overview of the Research Design of the study 
The research design provides a general orientation to conduct research. The research 
design of this study comprised of 4 interlinked stages: 1) Development of a conceptual 
framework, 2) Designing the research strategy of the study, 3) Designing case study 
research strategy of the study, and 5) Conducting the research. These stages are 
summarized in Figure 5-2. These stages were not in a sequential form, but rather these 
were iterative in nature.   
 
Figure 5-2: Overview of the Research Design 
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5.8 IDENTIFYING CASES AND FIELD SITES  
After the research questions the next important step was to identify the units of analysis.  
The basic units of analysis were the legally constituted decentralized authorities in 
Pakistan. The two field sites chosen for the case study were: City District Government 
Lahore (CDGL) and City District Government Faisalabad (CDGF). The choice of these 
City District Government (CDGs) was based on establishing a comparison between two 
local government systems. Two sectors were selected for in-depth study of service 
delivery arrangements: Education and Water and Sanitation Sector (WSS). The reasons 
for selecting these two sectors were: 
 Firstly, the sectors presented different institutional and decentralized 
arrangements; education is a devolved department under the CDGs and the WSS 
is under the control of Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) which is a semi-
autonomous organization under the control of CDG. This will help to identify 
any coordination problems and performance differences across sectors and 
identify the issues related to their manageability. It will also help to indirectly 
assess the performance of these two CDGs in their respective domains of 
responsibilities. 
 Secondly, the use of multiple cases will improve the external validity of the case 
study research through replication logic. In this case, the use of two different 
field sites and the selection of two sectors will improve the external validity of 
the research. It will also identify the role of the context in affecting 
organizational performance. 
5.9 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CHOICE OF CASE STUDIES AND 
SAMPLE 
The choice of CDGs and sub sectors for the case study were also influenced by various 
other factors; such as how to access field sites for the research which are safe under the 
current political situation in Pakistan. The current situation of political unrest in 
Pakistan, strikes and various suicide bombing attacks restricted the researcher to select 
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CDGs sites which were easy and safe to access. In addition, the researcher had personal 
contacts in these two CDGs to facilitate access to the case study organizations.   
5.9.1 Ensuring Quality in Case Study Research 
In order to meet the criteria of construct validity, attempts were made to triangulate 
methods and data sources. Firstly, as already discussed, the level of analysis considered 
is not only the actors but also the different institutional levels. Triangulation occurs by 
using multiple sources of data. Therefore case study respondents consisted of: 
 Policy makers: These respondents provided an overview of the macro environment 
of policy making at Local Government (LG) level and their perception of how 
decentralization has altered the service delivery of LG. They identified various 
constraints that limited the autonomy of local government to achieve significant 
outcomes. Local government respondents consisted of locally elected 
representatives from the three tiers of LG; Union Council, Tehsil Council, and 
District Council. 
 Organizational respondents: The managers of service delivery organizations 
provided information about the difficulties faced during the implementation of 
decentralization reforms. They provided their perception of how far decentralization 
had been able to improve the service delivery framework and pointed out significant 
internal and external institutional factors that affected performance. Data were 
collected from middle to senior management levels of service delivery organizations 
(Education Departments and Water and Sanitation Agencies) 
 Third sector or NGOs involved in service delivery: the third sector was actively 
engaged at local government level in the selected sector acting in collaboration with 
the LG to improve service delivery in the selected sector. Therefore, their 
perceptions contributed to the understanding of how CDGs were engaging with 
them and the impact it had on improving performance in the education and water 
and sanitation sectors. 
 Community: the end users of services. The perception of the community was very 
significant in evaluating the overall service delivery improvement. A comparison of 
before and after the Devolution plan contributed to understanding the change in 
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performance outcomes as a result of decentralization reforms. 
A triangulation strategy for data collection will provide not only a holistic picture of the 
social phenomenon but also increases the construct validity, as multiple sources of 
evidence provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon. As referred earlier, 
according to Yin (2009) the strength of using multiple sources of data or a triangulation 
strategy is the development of convergent lines of inquiry. Secondly, for the 
triangulation of methods, qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques were 
applied as follows: 
 Qualitative data collection techniques included document analysis; archival 
records, and semi structured interview with the elites (politicians, 
bureaucrats and other actors directly involved in service delivery).  
 For the quantitative data collection technique, a survey questionnaire was 
used. 
The research questions of the study were a combination of what, how and why. Some of 
the questions were answered by looking at archival records, document analysis. 
Document analysis such as policy documents issued by central or provincial 
government, letters, memorandum, internal administrative documents, formal studies or 
evaluation of the phenomenon under study helped the researcher to answer questions 
like the nature of the extent of service delivery reforms, the mix of different 
organizational arrangement under decentralization at the sub national level (delegation, 
devolution, contracting out and user fees charges), and formal organizational structures 
and processes before and after reforms. For instance, the legal environment of the 
decentralization reforms can be analysed by looking at various policy documents, and 
legal framework order 2000.  This identified the resource availability, clarity of roles 
and responsibilities, accountability arrangements and the incentive structure under 
decentralization. However, relying on document analysis alone does not give the in-
depth insight of the phenomenon in question. Semi structured interviews with senior to 
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middle managers of service delivery organizations (Education Departments and 
WASAs) were conducted to assess their perception regarding managerial autonomy 
being decentralized down the hierarchy; their external institutional environment and 
service delivery improvements. Based on the information provided by the initial 
respondents, semi structured interviews were also conducted with actors at the political 
level, actively engaged in service delivery, NGO representatives involved in the service 
provision to assess the institutional constraints and service delivery improvement. A 
community survey questionnaire was designed to assess the perception of direct 
consumers with respect to service delivery improvements. The focus was on assessing 
the improvements in terms of participation level, accountability of personnel, and 
quality improvement in service provision.  A second survey questionnaire was designed 
for the managers of service delivery organizations to get their perception of the internal 
organizational factors, external environmental factors and performance improvements. 
The issues of reliability of the research were addressed by using a comparative case 
study approach, a structured case study research design, and having a case study 
protocol to document the data collection process. 
5.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology of this thesis. The chapter began by 
considering philosophical assumptions and methodological issues and their role in 
shaping the design of this research.  The research design developed for this thesis and 
adopted a comparative case study approach and incorporated a mix of methods to 
improve the quality and rigour of the research. The next chapter will demonstrate how 
the actual field work was carried out.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONDUCTING RESEARCH 
6.1 SELECTION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
6.1.1 Case Study 1- City District Government Faisalabad (CDGF) 
City District Government Faisalabad (CDGF) is in the province of Punjab, previously 
known as Lyallpur. It is the third largest city of Pakistan and the second largest city in 
the Province Punjab. CDGF is comprised of 6 towns: Faisalabad (city) Town; 
Faisalabda (Sadar) Town; Samundri Town; Tandianwala Town; Jaranwala Town; Chak 
Jhumra Town. The total population of the district is 5,429,547 according to the 1998 
census
4
. The membership of the district council consists of 412 members, of which 95 
are reserved for females, 14 seats for peasants and workers, and 14 seats for minorities 
(Table 6-1). In the 2005 elections, the number of returning candidates for the reserved 
seats was 123 out of 124. District Nazim was also re-elected. It also demonstrates the 
confidence of people in their elected representatives. However separate data were not 
available for the rest of the 289 seats
5. 
Table 6-1: Membership of District Council Faisalabad 
Tehsil/Town Membership 
  Union Councils Reserved Seats Total 
W P&W M 
Town Chak Jhumra 15 5 1 1 22 
Town Jaranwala 57 19 3 3 82 
Town Tandianwala 28 9 1 1 39 
Town Samundri 28 9 1 1 39 
Town Faisalabad [Saddar] 48 16 2 2 68 
Town Faisalabad [City] 113 37 6 6 162 
Total  289 95 14 14 412 
Source: Adopted from Election Commission of Pakistan (2006)                                                                  
                                                 
4 In 1998, the last census was carried out in Pakistan. 
5 see Election Commission of Pakistan: www.ecp.gov.pk 
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6.1.2 Case Study 2: City District Government Lahore (CDGL) 
The City District Government Lahore is the second largest city of Pakistan and the 30th 
largest city of the world. It is also the capital of Punjab province. It is comprised of nine 
towns: Ravi Town, Wahga Town, Shalimar Town, Datagunj Bux Town, Aziz Bhatti 
Town, Gulberg Town, Iqbal Town, Samanabad Town, Nishter Town. The City District 
Council had a total of 216 seats consisting of 50 seats reserved for women, 8 for 
peasants and workers, and 8 for minorities (Table 6-2). The total number of returning 
candidates was 59 out of 66 reserved seats. According to the Election Commission of 
Pakistan Report (2005) District Nazim was also re-elected in the election of 2005. 
Table 6-2: Membership of the City District Council Lahore 
Tehsil/Town Membership 
 Union Councils Reserved Seats Total 
W P&W M 
Ravi Town 30 10 2 2 44 
Shalimar Town 23 8 1 1 33 
Aziz Bhatti Town 13 4 1 1 19 
Data Ganj Bux.Town 33 11 2 2 48 
Iqbal Town 26 9 1 1 37 
Nishtar Town 25 8 1 1 35 
Total 150 50 8 8 216 
 
Source: Adopted from Election Commission of Pakistan (2006)                                                                  
6.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
Before entering the field work, the researcher developed a case study protocol to set 
research objectives and a comprehensive record of research procedures. The case study 
protocol consisted of the following 3 main sections: 
 An overview of research activities,  
 An overview of the field procedures (credentials, how to gain access, the 
name of the sites to be visited, respondents to be interviewed, contact sheet 
summary, keeping a research diary etc.) 
 Interview schedule (list of questions to be asked and probing questions) 
(Appendix 2) 
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6.3 PRELIMINARY RESEARCH 
The background research activities other than a relevant literature review on 
decentralization and organizational performance consisted of preliminary visits to the 
field sites, conducting unstructured interviews with respondents in order to further 
refine the survey questionnaire and the semi structured interview schedule. After 
refining the instruments, a pilot case study was conducted to further ensure the 
reliability and validity of the instruments used for the study. 
6.3.1 Documents Reviewed for Background Research 
The researcher collected a range of policy documents issued by the National 
Reconstruction Bureau on the Devolution Plan and Local Governments (LGs). Policy 
documents related to the decentralization in education such as National Education 
Policies (1956-2009) from the Education Ministry of Pakistan; and national and 
provincial policies regarding the water and sanitation sector such as National Water and 
Sanitation policies (2007-2010), Provincial Water and Sanitation policies (2007- 2009), 
policy documents regarding the partnership in service provision (PDSSP 2008). A 
number of documents were issued by the LGs such as CDGF policy initiative on PPP; 
Terms of Reference (TOR) for establishing a PPP cell at the Education Department; a 
project report on Strengthening Decentralized Local Government (DFID 2005); a 
performance report of Local Governments (DFID 2008). Additionally, a range of 
documents were collected from selected organizations regarding their organizational 
restructuring, devolution of powers, performance data. A complete list of all the 
documents is provided in Appendix 2. 
6.3.2 Initial Visits to the Field Sites and Unstructured Interviews 
The researcher visited the field sites; the Education Department (EDs) and Water and 
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Sanitation Agency (WASA), and the Town Halls in both CDGs. During these visits the 
researcher discussed the topics of research with practitioners (managers of the service 
delivery organizations), and policy makers (local politicians). In these interviews, the 
researcher assured respondents that these interviews were part of her PhD dissertation 
and that confidentiality would be maintained. During the visits to the town halls of 
CDGs, a brief presentation was provided by the Tehsil Municipal Officers (TMO), 
Executive District officers (EDO Finance) who highlighted the local government 
performance in the WSS and Education sector and provided their perception of 
decentralization, various decentralized strategies such as school management councils 
and their effectiveness, Citizen Community Boards (CCBs), the relationship between 
politicians and bureaucrats. These interviews were unstructured, and written notes were 
taken. Then unstructured interviews were conducted with respondents from the 
education and water and sanitation sectors.  
During the initial visits to the Education Department, the researcher interviewed District 
Education Officers, and Head of institutions who were present and willing to talk about 
decentralization. Field notes were taken during these interviews. During the initial visits 
to the WASAs, a brief presentation was provided by the WASA (Lahore and 
Faisalabad). During these presentations a group of directors, and managing directors 
were present and provided the researcher with an unstructured focus group interview. 
These initial discussions were helpful in clarifying the research issues, the relevance of 
the research topic, procedural issues such as identifying the issues of access to the 
respondents, sampling strategies, targeting the most appropriate person, and how to 
administer the instruments. It also sensitized the researcher to various socio-cultural 
issues that may be faced by the researcher while administering the instruments. This 
process provided insight to further refine the survey instruments for the organizations 
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and the community. 
6.4 CONSTRUCTING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
Social science researchers (De Vaus 1996; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003) have 
suggested several methods to choose for survey research but the most commonly used 
are: mail / internet questionnaires, personal interviews and telephonic interviews. The 
choice of method depends on various considerations, such as budget constraints, 
availability of staff, and response rate. Based on these considerations, the researchers 
needed to identify the techniques which best elicit responses from the sample of 
respondents who have experienced the phenomenon of interest (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias 2007). The selection of survey methods ranges from self-administered 
questionnaire (postal survey and delivery and collection of the questionnaire, online 
questionnaire) to interview administered questionnaire (structured interview, telephone 
questionnaire and focus group). Every survey method has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. For instance, postal surveys are considered best when the sample is 
geographically dispersed and questions are relatively close ended; however, it can have 
a low return rate and therefore is advised to be used with other techniques. Delivery and 
collection questionnaires are usually delivered by hand and collected later. However, it 
suffers from the time and effort involved in delivering and collecting the survey. Online 
questionnaires are relatively new, however the main sampling error is that some of the 
respondents may not have access to internet facilities. The interview administered 
questionnaire has a high response rate compared to self-administered questionnaires and 
can permit a long questionnaire (De Vaus 1996; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
2007; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003).  
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The ‘Interview structured questionnaire’ can be a ‘Face To Face’ structured interview 
which is very time consuming and is only effective with an open ended questionnaire. 
Focus group interviews allow varieties to emerge and allow group dynamics to provide 
another explanation of the phenomenon. Telephone surveys have high response rates in 
contrast to postal surveys. However, the questions need to be short and simple 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2007; Gray 2009). The methods of administering 
the questionnaire also affect the length of the questionnaire. In face to face interviews; 
questionnaire can be much longer depending on the nature of the topic under 
investigation and type of sample. Usually the more specialized the population is and the 
more relevant the topic, the longer the questionnaire can be (Dillman 2000). 
Considering all these options and based on the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
each method, the researcher chose to adopt a survey interview questionnaire to improve 
the response rate though it proved costly and time consuming. However, where 
possible, it was intended that the survey interview questionnaire would be delivered and 
collected later if respondents agreed to this. In addition to the above considerations, the 
initial visits to the field and pilot testing of the survey instrument revealed that if the 
researcher left questionnaire to be collected later, the probability that these 
questionnaires were filled in by subordinates of the senior level management was high. 
Therefore, it was decided that in order to be certain that questionnaires were completed 
by the respective respondents, they needed to be administered in an interview format, 
particularly at senior management level.  The reasons for adopting an interview 
questionnaire for the general community were the geographical dispersion and the high 
security risks of visiting these communities. In addition, considering the literacy level of 
the respondents, it seemed more appropriate that the community questionnaire should 
be administered in interview format.  
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The main considerations involved while designing the questionnaire were to develop 
questions which could yield meaningful and accurate information, and to identify 
themes for further in-depth investigation. Other considerations included the overall 
layout of the questionnaire, including the sequence of the questionnaire, the mix of 
open-ended and closed-ended questions and the wording of the questions, their drafting, 
clear instructions, and coding. In general, the questionnaire had some factual questions 
followed by detailed questions asking about opinions and perceptions. Another 
consideration was the length of the entire questionnaire so as to improve the response 
rate. Generally it is advisable that the length of the questionnaire should be 4-8 pages of 
A4 size (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003). The organizational survey questionnaire 
was divided into 5 main sections and each section had no more than 12 questions. It was 
designed to be completed within 15 minutes. The final questionnaire covered six sides 
of the A4 paper (see Appendix 1). The community survey questionnaire was also 
divided into three parts and was designed to be completed within 15 minutes. The final 
version of the questionnaire is in the Appendix (1).  
6.4.1 Developing the Survey Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed following a thorough review of the literature, followed 
by developing the analytical framework of the study. In addition to this, the researcher 
also conducted several unstructured interviews with the respondents ranging from 
middle to senior level management, political representatives, and council officers. 
During the initial visits to the WASAs (Lahore and Faisalabad), the researcher was 
given a brief presentation about the organization which helped her to amend the 
questionnaire and improve its content validity. In the Education Departments (Lahore 
and Faisalabad), the researcher conducted unstructured interviews with middle and 
senior management, head teachers, and members of school management committees. 
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Initial visits to the town hall also helped the researcher to refine the community and 
organizational survey questionnaires. 
After the preliminary analysis of those interviews, the questionnaire was revised. In this 
way a first draft of the questionnaire was developed, which was reviewed by academics 
from the Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of the Punjab, and further 
tested in the field. In the pilot testing of the questionnaire, the researcher sought help 
from the same respondents who were included in the unstructured interviews. This 
ensured that respondents understood the questions and that there were no problem with 
respect to the wording, clarity and layout. After the second draft of the questionnaire 
was developed, it was tested again using a pilot. During this pre-testing, the method of 
administration was also reviewed. In the design phase, the researcher considered various 
survey methods ranging from self-administration, focus group, structured interviews 
and postal survey. During the field visits and interviews it became evident that 
structured interviews and a postal survey would be better strategies to ensure a high 
response rate and establish a rapport with the respondents which could be helpful for the 
further in-depth investigation particularly the semi-structured interviews. Structured 
interviews with key respondents also provided the researcher with the opportunity to 
probe into issues of significance and provide a better understanding of the phenomenon 
by eliciting more in-depth information on key issues. Another advantage was to explore 
the field notes in detailed semi-structured interviews while being unbiased at the same 
time. The final draft of the questionnaire included a cover letter explaining to the 
respondents the overall objectives of the study; seeking their cooperation and ensuring 
them that the information collected will be used for the academic purposes alone. In the 
case of the postal survey, the questionnaire also included the pre-paid postal envelope 
with the mailing address attached to it. A list of respondents was generated during field 
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visits who were willing to participate in structured interviews and those who wished to 
have a postal survey instead.  
6.4.2 Pilot Testing and Assessing the Validity of the Questionnaire 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) pilot testing not only refines the 
questionnaire by letting the researcher know that respondents do not have a problem in 
understanding the questionnaire, it also enables the researcher to overcome the problem 
of validity and reliability. This can be achieved in a number of ways. One is through a 
thorough review of the literature. Another is by asking a group of colleagues and 
experts to comment on the representativeness and the suitability of the questions and 
making necessary adjustment accordingly. It helps to improve the content validity of the 
questionnaire.  The survey instruments of this study were developed after a thorough 
review of the literature, operationally defining each variable by looking at the relevant 
measures used in other studies, asking colleagues and practitioners involved in LGs for 
their input on the relevance of the questions, and by conducting pilot tests.  
One main consideration in the community survey was to translate the questionnaire into 
the national language, Urdu. Initially an English draft was developed, which was 
translated into Urdu. Considering the literacy rate of Pakistan (159
th
 among the 
developing countries), the researcher considered it significant not to take it for granted 
that respondents would be able to understand the entire questionnaire in English. 
Therefore, an Urdu version was developed for the community survey. However, it also 
raised the question of validity and consistency in both versions of the questionnaire.  In 
order to improve the consistency of both languages, it was first given for review to 
colleagues in the Punjab University, Lahore, Pakistan, and then discussed with 
community representatives who were fluent in both languages to check their 
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understanding of the questionnaire.  
Furthermore, the Urdu version of the questionnaire was pilot tested in order to ensure 
that the questions were measuring the exact same contents that they were measuring in 
the English version. This procedure was undertaken with the help of a group of experts 
from Academia, local councillors and key informants of the community who were able 
to provide feedback on the comprehensiveness and appropriateness of the questions 
comparing both versions. Then the final draft was amended accordingly. After making 
the necessary amendments (such as reorganizing the questionnaire into parts - 1, 2, 3, 4 
and creating a coding structure, see for example pilot survey questionnaire and final 
versions attached in Appendix 1), it was further pilot tested in order to ensure that 
respondents were able to comprehend the questionnaire and if needed questions could 
be rephrased to improve the validity of the instrument. The respondents were given a 
brief introduction of the research background, and were requested to provide their input 
on the nature of the questions, the layout, and content and suggestions or 
recommendations for the researcher’s guidance. The feedback was processed and some 
adjustments in the layout of the questionnaire were made accordingly. However, 
interestingly it was revealed that respondents were more willing to give their input when 
it was carried out in the form of a structured interview. It was also identified during the 
pilot testing that it was very costly to go back to the community for the collection of 
questionnaires. Though it was a time consuming process, it saved the cost of going back 
into those communities which were not easy to approach due to the political unrest of 
the country. 
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6.4.3 Administering the Organizational Survey 
The questionnaire was organized according to the themes informed by the conceptual 
framework. The objectives of the organizational survey were to assess the perception of 
managers regarding the impact of decentralization reforms on public sector 
organizations by assessing five key themes: 1) managerial autonomy, 2) community 
participation, 3) internal and external institutional environment, 4) performance 
management model, 5) and accountability arrangements. The main variables of the 
management reforms and their measurement are provided in Table 6-3. The purpose of 
the first part was to establish the extent of managerial autonomy after decentralization 
reforms over personnel and financial management dimensions. The purpose of part 2 
was to identify the level of user/community involvement in service provision and if it 
has improved organizational performance. Part 3 measured the institutional 
environment of public sector organization both in terms of the internal institutional 
environment (personnel management, financial management systems and resource 
adequacy) and external institutional environment (policy coordination, political and 
bureaucratic commitment, and other institutional factors). Part 4 was to assess the 
performance model of service delivery organizations. Part 5 of the survey measured the 
manager’s perception regarding accountability mechanisms (accountability in record 
management, grievance procedures, reporting system etc.). The survey concluded by 
asking respondents to compare their organizational performance before and after 
decentralization and to suggest the main weaknesses of their organizations and what 
should be done to address these weaknesses. The key features of the survey were: 
 The survey instrument was constructed between September - October 2009, and 
pre-tested in November 2009. A total of 20 questionnaires were pilot tested.  
 The survey was administered in the form of structured interviews and postal 
survey. 
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 The researcher identified respondents (respective managerial levels) through 
organizational charts, and contacted them prior to administer the questionnaire 
to ensure their willingness to participate in the study. 
 The survey was administered at senior and middle management level. As the 
number of mangers was small, therefore, the sample consisted of the total 
census. 
 During the field visits, it was decided that the questionnaire would be 
administered to the respondents in the form of structured interviews. However, it 
could also be administered as a postal survey in the case where respondents 
preferred to send it through the post. In the case of a structured interview, prior 
appointments were sought by approaching first the head of the selected 
organizations and then by meeting the individuals concerned.  
 Before each visit, the meeting was confirmed and in case of cancellation another 
appointment was sought. This process also helped to establish a rapport with the 
respondents for further detailed semi-structured interviews.  
 In the case of the Education Departments, all of the respondents showed their 
willingness to take part in the structured interview form of the survey. The total 
number of respondents was 32. Only in the case of WASAs, a postal survey was 
done at the middle management level (39 Directors/Deputy Directors) by getting 
assurance from their respective heads that it would be completed in an unbiased 
way and only by the respondents. Furthermore, the researcher followed up the 
questionnaire through telephone reminders.  
 A purposive sampling technique (as explained earlier in Section 5.7) targeted the 
managerial levels directly involved in service provision as they were more 
‘information rich’ sources.   
 A precise questionnaire covering 6 sides of A4 paper, with cover letter, 
instructions, and self-return envelope, which was pre-coded, pilot tested and 
telephonic follow up were made (Appendix 1). 
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TABLE 6-3: OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
Reform themes and measures (internal assessment of public sector through survey instrument) 
Decentralized authority 
 
The extent managers were free to manage assessed by measuring their autonomy along 10 items related to the personnel management and financial management 
Community participation 
Organizations view of the role of users in service delivery, how closely they work together and how far it has been instrumental in improving performance. 
1. The extent of community involvement in service delivery (very significant, significant, not significant, no change) 
2. Any example of user involvement 
3. Impact on organizational performance (very significant, significant, not significant, no change) 
 
Performance Model: 
a) Performance targets:  
1. Organizations have documented performance standards (yes/no) 
2. Setting of performance targets: are performance targets agreed to between employees and supervisors at the beginning of each year (yes/no) 
3. Performance standards are communicated to all across the organization (Yes/No/Partially) 
4. The extent performance standards are generally achieved (yes/no/partially) 
5. The importance placed on the achievement of organizational objectives (very significant/significant/somewhat significant/not significant at all) 
6. The extent organizational mission and objectives are achieved (0-25%/26-50%/51-75%/76-100%) 
b) Incentive structure 
1. Does organization has a performance based appraisal system (yes/no) 
2. Are individuals in your organizations rewarded on the basis of performance (yes/no) 
3. Sanctions or penalties based on poor performance (dismissal/demotion/salary decrease/suspension/warnings) 
4. Rewards for performance based on (outstanding services/improved qualification/excellent attendance record/no recognition) 
Institutional environment 
Internal organizational processes: 
a) Personnel management system 
1. Merit based recruitment 
2. Do organizations have Human Resource Information Management System (yes/no) 
3. Personnel management rules are (four point likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree): 
a) Simple to implement  
b) Flexible in implementation 
c) Effective in managing personnel 
b) Financial management system 
1. Organizations have a system of evaluating projects of programs (yes/no) 
2. Organizations perform internal audit system (yes/no) 
3. To what extent financial management function (budget preparation, procurement, Budget execution, internal audit, preparation of end of year accounts) 
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are performed by organizations (not all/partially/fully) 
4. Factors related to resource leakage (unclear rules for financial accounting, lack of capacity to account for budgeting resources, weak auditing practices, 
and weak sanctions against corrupt practices) measured in 5-point Likert scale ranging from not at all significant to highly significant 
 
External institutional factors 
a) Policy coordination 
1. How far policies are consistent (very consistent/more consistent/ more inconsistent/very inconsistent) 
2. Does lack of consistency in policies affect organizational performance (not at all/not significant/to some extent significant/very significant?) 
3. The extent lack of coordination among tiers of government affects organizational performance (to a great extent/to some extent/ not at all) 
b) Political and bureaucratic interference 
1. How would you rate the incidence of political interference in your organizations (very frequent/frequent/infrequent/almost never) 
2. How would you rate the incidence of bureaucratic interference in your organizations (very frequent/frequent/infrequent/almost never) 
c) Other institutional factors 
1. To what extent factors like political instability, regime legitimacy, economic instability, lack of political support, lack of bureaucratic support, lack of 
supportive local context affect organizational performance (assessed on 5-poitn likert scale ranging from not at all significant to highly significant)  
2. Resource adequacy in terms of financial, human, technical, and infrastructure (assessed on 4-point likert scale ranging from completely inadequate to fully 
adequate) 
 
Accountability 
3. Reporting of corruption incidence to public authorities 
4. Clear guidelines regarding budget preparation exist in organizations (yes/no) 
5. Are these generally followed? 
6. Access to information (extremely difficult/difficult/easy/very easy) 
7. Provision of information to end users (yes/no) 
8. Efficient customer complaint or grievance procedures (yes/no) 
9. Information management system for budget preparation (yes/no) 
10. How reliable is the information in your information management system (Highly Reliable/moderately reliable/partially reliable/not reliable) 
11. Is the audit report presented to the local council (yes/no) 
12. How effective is the internal audit system (ineffective/partially effective/effective very effective) 
13. The extent monitoring committees are playing an effective role in improving performance (very significant/significant/not significant at all) 
Pre-post performance comparison 
How would you compare performance improvements before and after decentralization reforms (much better/a little better/no change/a little worse/much worse) 
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6.4.3.1 Total Response Rate 
The survey was administered in City District Governments - CDGL and CDGF - across 
two sectors: Education and WSS. Data was collected from the Education Department of 
the CDGL, and CDGF. Likewise, the survey was administered in Water and Sanitation 
Agencies (WASAs) of both CGDs. Of the total 105 questionnaires, the researcher 
received 91 replies (questionnaires), a response rate of 86.66%. The total response rate 
was estimated by applying the formula as given by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
(2003), De Vaus (1996) and Newman (2000b) to calculate the response rate: 
 
Respondents who do not meet the research requirements are known as ‘ineligible’ and 
those who despite the researcher’s repeated attempts remained unreachable are known 
as ‘unreachable’. Of the total sample size (129), 22 respondents were unreachable in 
CDGL and only 2 respondents were unreachable in CDGF, leaving a total sample size 
of 105. Overall, a response rate of 86.66% is exceptionally high for a survey. Looking at 
the returns in more detail, as depicted in Table 6-5, also highlights that both survey 
delivery organizations’ middle (Pay scale Grade 18) to senior managerial levels (Pay 
scale Grade 19) were well represented in the sample. 
Table 6-4: Response Rate by City District Government 
City District Governments  
(CDGs) 
Total surveyed 
(N=105) 
Response rate 
(N=91) 
LAHORE(CDGL) 78 66 
FAISALABAD (CDGF) 27 25 
 
 
Total response rate     = 
Total number of responses 
Total number in sample- (ineligible + unreachable) 
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6.4.3.2 How Representative is the Response Rate 
The survey was administered at the managerial level (middle to senior management 
level) directly responsible for service delivery. The distribution of response rate by 
managerial level is presented in Table 6-5. The Education Department was mainly 
organized according to: (1) Elementary Education (Grades 1-8), (2) Secondary 
Education (Grades 9-2). Furthermore, girls’ and boys’ schools were managed separately 
by male and female managers respectively as shown in Table 6-5. The Education sector 
had three managerial levels: (1) Executive District Officer (EDO) - Head of the 
Education Department, (2) District Education Officers (DEOs) - Heads of their 
respective town schools and, (3) Deputy District Education Officers (DDEOs) - Deputy 
Heads of Town schools.  
On the other hand, in the Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs), there were no 
female managers and all the managerial levels had an engineering background. At the 
top of the organizational hierarchy of WASA, was: (1) Managing Director (MD), 
followed by (2) Deputy Managing Directors (DMDs) responsible for different functions 
of WASA and (3) Directors.  The entire population was sampled for the survey firstly 
because of the small sample size and secondly, to ensure that statistically significant 
generalization can be drawn for further investigations. The distribution of sample is 
provided in Table 6-5. 
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Table 6-5: Distribution of Returns 
No. Type of Service Delivery Organization Total Sample & Returns  
 Education 
 
Lahore Faisalabad 
 Designation/Responsibility Managerial level  Grade Sample Returns Sample Returns 
1. Executive district officer Top management/  19 5 4 4 3 
2. District education 
officer(Male/Elementary 
education) 
Senior Management 19 
3 District education 
officer(Female/Elementary 
education) 
19 
4 District education 
officer(Male/Secondary 
education) 
19 
5 District education 
officer(female/Secondary 
education) 
19 
1 Deputy District Education 
Officer (male/elementary) 
Middle 
Management 
18 18 17 8 8 
2 Deputy District Education 
Officer (female/elementary) 
18 
3 Deputy District Education 
Officer (male/secondary) 
18 
4 Deputy District Education 
Officer (female /Secondary) 
18 
 Water and sanitation agency (WASA) 
1 Deputy managing director 
 
Senior 
Management 
 
19 15 15 6 5 
2 Director Middle 
management 
18 40 30 9 9 
3 Deputy director 
  
Total Sample= (78 WASA +27 EDUCATION)= 105,  
Return = (66 WASA+25 EDUCATION)=91 
 
T=78 
 
R=66 
 
T=27 
 
R=25 
 
6.4.4 Construction of the Community Survey  
In order to assess the improvements in service delivery performance of LGs after the 
Devolution Plan 2000, a community survey was conducted. The word community is 
adopted here as the basic unit of analysis were two communities (referred as Union 
Councils which was the lowest tier of LG) from each district selected on the basis of 
rural urban divide. The focus of the community survey was to assess the effectiveness 
and responsiveness of the LG system in service delivery from the viewpoint of local 
communities. This survey at ‘grassroots level’ was an effort to supplement and provide 
additional insight to the perception of public and political officials of the LG regarding 
decentralization and service delivery outcomes. The key features of the community 
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survey were: 
 The questionnaire was targeted at the user level - community and administered 
in the form of structured interviews between November 2009 - January 2010. 
 The sampling strategy utilized was purposive sampling techniques for both 
surveys; organizational and community. The selection of this sampling 
technique was based on the assumption that it will enable the researcher to select 
cases which will best answer the research questions and will capture the 
maximum variation surrounding the key themes of research. Patton (2002) has 
emphasized that a researcher using purposive sampling should select 
information rich cases. Therefore, in the case of the community survey, the 
researcher selected communities on the basis of two considerations: urban and 
rural union councils; and ease of access. Another consideration was the time 
limitation and cost involved. Two towns were selected from each district 
government, and then one community was selected in each town for the survey. 
The selection of towns and union councils was based on ease of access and the 
rural urban divide as discussed before in the methodology section of the 
selection of cases.  
 The sample size consisted of 50 households in each community. 
 The questionnaire consisted of 7-8 sides of A4 with a cover letter. 
 The questionnaire was translated into the national Urdu language. 
 The questionnaire was pre-coded using SPSS software.  
 The questionnaire was pilot tested (30 questionnaires administered at the 
community level, 4 were administered at the political representatives). 
 During the design process of the research, the researcher considered the self-
administration of the questionnaire as a data collection technique. However, 
during the pilot testing of the community questionnaire it was found that many 
respondents were illiterate and that it was better to deliver the questionnaire in 
the form of structured interviews. It was also helpful in improving the response 
rate. The structured interview duration was 15 minutes. Field notes were taken 
in cases where respondents were willing to share detailed responses to the open 
ended questions. Another constraint was that it was not feasible to collect the 
self-administered questionnaires later as accessibility to the communities was 
not easy. The overview of the community survey is provided in Table 6-6.  
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Table 6-6: Overview of Community Survey Questionnaire Design 
Variables Dimensions measured 
Participation 1. Indirect participation: Knowledge of the different committees (citizen 
community Board, school management committee, water and sewerage 
committee);  
2. Direct participation: For instance direct participation in any of the monitoring 
committees; participation in development projects; and  
3. Contact with the councillors: Community relationships with the public 
representatives by assessing how frequently councillors meet them in any local 
meeting, take their input in the development project; whether community 
contact the public and political representatives for bringing any community 
issue in their knowledge. 
Accountability 1. Change in the attitude of the public and political representatives towards 
community issues by measuring the satisfaction level of the respondents of 
their meeting with the councillors and government officials;  
2. Dissemination of information by the council and councillors relating to the 
development projects, and access to information published by city district 
government, 
3. Reporting of corruption and whether the complaints are heard or not 
4. Change in government employee’s attendance and the reasons behind this 
change 
Performance  
1. Sewerage System 2. To what extent the community has a sewerage system, the nature of the 
sewerage system, and community involvement in service provision,  
3. To what extent the local government system has been able to improve access to 
the sewerage facilities, improvement in the attendance of government 
employees, the quality of the sewerage system, satisfaction with the complaint 
procedure, reasons for satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the service 
provision; comparison before and after the local government system in the 
system provision, presences of any monitoring committee and its effectiveness.  
2. Water supply 
System 
1. To what extent the community has a water supply system, the nature of the 
sewerage system, any development project, community involvement in service 
provision, charges for the service provision 
2. To what extent the local government system has been able to improve access to 
the water, improvement in the attendance of government employees, the quality 
of the water supply system, satisfaction with the complaint procedure, reasons 
for satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the service provision; comparison 
before and after the local government system in the system provision, and the 
presences of any monitoring committee and its effectiveness.  
3. Education 
Provision 
1. To what extent the community has access to schools, type of schools attended 
by their kids, reasons for attending, role of NGO/CCB/CBO, tuition fees 
2. Change in the attendance of teachers, improvement in the access to education 
after local government system, satisfaction with the complaint procedure, 
reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government schools, 
comparison before and after the local government system in the education 
system, knowledge of school management committee and its role.  
3. Overall 
performance of 
LGs 
1. To what extent the local government system has been able to mobilize 
community participation, asking respondents to provide an example of 
community participation.  
2. Then to measure the responsiveness of the local government system we asked 
respondents to indicate the most important issue of the community and has the 
local government system been able to solve these issues; has local government 
been able to improve service delivery compared to the previous system and 
how it has improved service delivery. 
3. The researcher also tried to assess to what extent local government system been 
able to improve the accountability by asking respondents  is there any change in 
the attendance of the government employees, has the local government system 
been able to improve complaint procedure, reduce corruption, and whether the 
new local government system is more transparent than the previous system.   
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6.4.4.1 Distribution of Sample 
The sample for the community survey was collected from two union councils of LGs: 
City District Government Lahore (CDGL) and City District Government Faisalabad 
(CDGF) as depicted in Table 6-7. As explained in the research methodology chapter, 
the researcher adopted a purposive sampling technique and the selection of these 
communities was based on the rural/urban divide. Though in each CDG, all union 
councils were characterized as urban, however, communities like the Union Council 
(UC): UC-74 of CDGL and UC-165 of CDGF were located at the outward regions and 
prior to LG reforms were considered rural union councils and only after the demarcation 
of local government became part of the CDGL and CDGF respectively. It was done to 
ensure the variation of demographics of local government communities. 
Table 6-7: Distribution of the Sample 
Local Government (LG) Union Council (UC) Total Structured Interviews 
City District Government Lahore 
(CDGL) 
 UC – 74 
 UC- 53 
50 
50 
City District Government 
Faisalabad(CDGL) 
 UC- 216 
 UC 165 
50 
50 
Total   200 
 
6.4.4.2 Profile of the Respondents 
Table 6-8 depicts the demographic profile of the respondents. From each CDG, 100 
respondents were surveyed. From the CDGL, the sample consisted of 60% male and 
40% female compared to 54% male and 46% female from CDGF. Of the total 
respondents surveyed from CDGL, 7% were illiterate, 32% had an academic 
background of only primary to 8
th
 grade; 38% had a high school qualification and the 
rest of the respondents had a Bachelor or higher degree. Likewise, from CDGF, 13% of 
the respondents were illiterate, 40% had primary to 8
th
 grade education, 38% had high 
school qualification, and 9% had a Bachelor or higher degree. In the CDGL sample all 
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the age groups were well represented whereas in the case of CDGF, 50% were below 30 
and 38% were from the middle age group (31-39). As depicted in the table, the majority 
of the respondents only had a high school degree which is an indication that they could 
not well understand the English version of the questionnaire and it was very significant 
to have the Urdu version for data collection. However, there is some variation regarding 
the age group of Faisalabad district. The reasons for this variation might be due to the 
fact that the researcher was commuting daily to Faisalabad to do the community survey 
between 11am till 7pm. As the researcher was residing in the city of Lahore, therefore, 
it was possible for her to visit the community at late hours.  
Table 6-8: Demographic Profile of the Respondents 
 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE: CDGL  
(N) 
CDGF 
(N) 
1 Gender:    
 1) Male 60 54 
 2) Female 40 46 
2 Age   
 1) Below 30 24 50 
 2) 30-39 37 38 
 3) 40-49 24 6 
 4) 50 and above 25 6 
3 Academic qualification   
5)  1) Illiterate 7 13 
2)  3) Primary-middle (5th-8th grade) 32 40 
4)  5) Matric-FA (high Scholl) 38 38 
6)  7) Bachelor and others 23 9 
 
 
6.5 DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WHILE CONDUCTING THE 
SURVEYS 
The researcher encountered various issues during the process of data collection. First of 
all, the main difficulty encountered was little information about the target population. 
The researcher could not get access to contact details as this information was not 
updated in organizational records. This issue was resolved through site visits and 
unstructured interviews. The researcher tried to get the organizational charts from the 
service delivery organizations to narrow down the respondents who had managerial 
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autonomy and were the key respondents in managing service delivery organizations. 
Field visits and unstructured interviews also helped to identify the managerial level with 
considerable autonomy in service delivery organizations.  
6.5.1 Gaining Access to the Field Work 
The second issue was gaining access to respondents. This was achieved through getting 
a personal reference for the top management level and subsequently the researcher 
negotiated access with the top management level and was able to access other 
respondents. Another factor that the researcher encountered was that in WASA, Lahore, 
a joint development project was under-development and most of the key respondents 
were not available as they were busy in meetings with foreign delegates. This process 
was time consuming and difficult. Thirdly, the political unrest and suicide bombings in 
Pakistan put limitations on the researcher’s decisions regarding the selection of the field 
sites and accessing the respondents. Because of these situations, the researcher was 
often denied access to the field sites without having proof of prior meetings or proper 
credentials in the initial field visits. Subsequently, the researcher, during data collection, 
always ensured that meetings were confirmed before the interview and that she had 
personal identifications (National and Organizational IDs) with her. 
The main problem during fieldwork for the community survey was how to access the 
respondents considering the geographic dispersion, security issues and the community’s 
lack of trust to give any information to a stranger. To overcome the problem of access, 
the researcher contacted the Union councillor/Town Nazim of the respective UC/town. 
These were the respondents who participated in the semi-structured interviews and the 
researcher had already sought their willingness to help with the fieldwork. They 
identified the key persons of the community who further identified the households for 
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further interviews and introduced the researcher to those households. This may lead to a 
certain bias as the selection of household was based on the key individual choice, 
however, to reduce this bias, the researcher tried (1) to approach not more than 5 houses 
from one street so that more variations can be reflected in the survey, (2) during the 
survey administration process, it was ensured that the key individual was not present in 
order to reduce his/her influence on survey responses. There was another cultural 
barrier. When the researcher interviewed men, the cultural context required the presence 
of a male assistant in the field. Therefore, throughout the process of interviewing males, 
the researcher had the help of an assistant to accompany her during the field visits and 
particularly to approach male respondents. However, male assistant had no role or 
influence in the conduct of the survey administration process. 
6.6 ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Quantitative data analysis techniques were used to explore, present and examine the 
relationships among variables and identify trends within the data. For instance, 
frequency tables were used to explore and present data in a summarized way. 
Contingency table or cross tabulation compared variables and examined any 
interdependence among them. Then significance tests were performed to assess any 
significant association between the variables. The significance tests ruled out the 
possibility that the results could be due to any random variation in the sample.  It is 
essential to establish the level of statistical significance acceptable for the research. The 
standard in social science research is that the maximum level of significance that is 
acceptable is; p < .05. It implies that the results are unlikely to have occurred by chance 
(Bryman 2012). The two main categories of statistical significance tests were: non-
parametric and parametric. Non parametric tests are employed when the data are not 
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normally distributed and this is more often the case when categorical variables are used. 
On the other hand, parametric tests are used with numerical data (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill 2003). The main tests applied were descriptive statistics (Contingency tables); 
the tests of significance including Mann-Whitney U test for scaled/ranked variables and 
the Chi-square tests for categorical variables (both nominal and ordinal) in order to 
identify significant differences across types of LGs (also referred to as CDGs) and types 
of service delivery organizations (referred to as Sectors in the analysis section).  
6.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics analyse trends using cross tabulation and percentages. For this 
purpose contingency tables were prepared to show trend across LGs and service 
delivery organizations. 
6.6.2 Exploring Relationships by Comparing Groups 
6.6.2.1 Mann-Whitney U 
The Mann-Whitney U test compares differences among groups on a continuous measure 
such as; do respondents from CDGL and CDGF differ in terms of the managerial 
autonomy they can exercise over administrative and financial management decisions? 
Mainly, the researcher compared differences across type of LG and type of service 
delivery organization. It is a non-parametric statistics and is an alternative to t-test for 
independent samples. It compares medians and converts the scores on a continuous 
scale into ranks. Then it evaluates ranks for measuring how significant the differences 
across two independent groups are. The main value which needs to be examined in the 
SPSS output is: the value of Z and the significance level p. Then the Mean Rank table is 
examined in order to determine the direction of the difference to see which group has 
scored higher. However, it is advised to report median values, therefore median values 
193 
 
for each test were calculated and reported in the Mann-Whitney summary test tables for 
comparison (Pallant 2010).   
6.6.2.2 Chi-square tests 
A Chi-square test for independence was applied to explore the relationship between two 
categorical variables. The Chi-square test evaluates the extent to which the difference 
between observed frequencies and expected frequencies under a set of theoretical 
assumptions is statistically significant. Mainly, Chi-square tests are applied to 
categorical variables (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2007). This test compared the 
proportion of cases that occurred in each category. The two grouping variables were 
type of service delivery organizations (Sectors) and type of LG (CDGs) as used in the 
Mann-Whitney U test. The output is presented in a cross tabulation table and the main 
value which needed to be considered in Chi-square tests was the Yates’ correction for 
continuity value. This value corrects the overestimation of the Chi-square value (Pallant 
2010). The maximum level of significance (p) should be less than or equal to .05 in 
order to be significant- this value is present in the column labelled Asymp. sig. (2-
tailed). The summary statistics of the Chi-square tests are presented in the statistical 
analysis section, and the detailed tables are attached in the appendix (Appendix 3 & 4). 
This is a standard approach for data presentation and analysis.  
6.7 INTERVIEWS 
Interviews are a way of providing empirical data about the social world around us by 
asking people about their life experience. The interviewer’s main aim is to generate data 
which provide deep insight into people’s experiences (Silverman 2009).  According to 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) interviews can be classified as structured or unstructured 
based on their degree of structure. In the structured interviews, the researcher knows 
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what he or she does not know and therefore tries to find out through appropriate 
questions. On the other hand, unstructured interviews are used when the interviewer 
does not know what he or she wants to know and therefore both questions and answers 
are given by the respondents. The researcher preferred the semi structured approach as it 
offered a structured approach while at the same time being flexible and more adaptable 
to investigate the phenomenon under study. The most important aspect of an interview 
is how it is planned and managed. Generally, before interviews the researcher needs to 
address the following issues: 
 The respondents to be interviewed. 
 Interview preparation (research questions, their appropriate sequence, the 
level of formality, appointment confirmation from the respondents). 
 Managing the interview conversation (presenting the overview of the study, 
ensuring the confidentiality of the respondents, seeking permission to record 
the interview, warm up questions/general questions and then leading to more 
specific questions maintaining flexibility and keeping probing questions to 
follow up for clarification or more in depth information, closure or 
termination of the interview by briefly summarizing the key points asking 
for suggestions and appreciating their help and time). 
In order to develop an interview guide, a list of topics was identified before entering the 
field. Then the guide was further refined after preliminary visits to the field sites. The 
preliminary visits to field sites also helped in exploring the relevance of the research 
questions and identified the respondents who were more knowledgeable and informed. 
The interview schedule consisted of general questions to have a more relaxed interview 
environment, followed by more specific questions along with a list of probing issues to 
explore the in depth knowledge of the phenomenon. The detailed interview schedule is 
attached in the Appendix (2). Before interviewing the respondents, the researcher tried 
to be clear of the general responsibilities of that particular designation in order to 
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generate a more in depth conversation with the respondent and check the meeting time 
before the time of the interview, as most of the respondents were at times in the field to 
deal with some emergent issues, the interviewer had to be flexible in adjusting to these 
contingencies.  
The other issues related to the interviews were: interviewer bias, the way the questions 
were asked, the rapport between the interviewer and interviewee, the place where the 
interview was carried out and ethical considerations such as confidentiality of the 
respondents (Silverman 2009). The use of the interview guide helped the researcher to 
deal with the issues of the use of appropriate language for the questions being posed, 
and the way each question was approached. The semi structured interviews helped the 
researcher to achieve flexibility and investigate the topic of study. Initial questions were 
of a general type such as asking respondents some background information in order to 
establish rapport and help ease the tension during the conversation. At this time the 
researcher assured respondents that their confidentiality would be maintained and 
sought their permission to record the interviews and if they considered anything 
uncomfortable, the researcher ensured the recording would be stopped. The interview 
was closed by summarizing the key points, asking for further suggestion and 
appreciating their help and time for the research. The researcher also sought their 
permission for any follow up interview in case further clarification was needed before 
the closure of the interview. This proved helpful as the researcher conducted 5 follow 
up interviews [with MD (WASA, CDGF), Director WASA (CDGL), Head of ITA, 
Head of ASB, and another interviewee
6
 from an NGO].  
                                                 
6
 On the request of the interview, designation and affiliation is kept confidential and in the analysis 
section the Interviewee is referred to (Interviewee NGO [A])-Anonymous. 
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6.7.1 The Profile of Respondents / Interviewees  
A purposive sampling approach was adopted as the research topic required the 
researcher to interview those respondents who were directly involved in service 
provision ranging from managers of public organization, political heads of local 
government, to NGO representatives who were working as partners of service delivery 
organizations. The researcher tried to include all the stakeholders from the public sector, 
private sector and political representatives who were directly responsible for service 
delivery. The purpose was to assess the perception of multiple sources of data to 
validate how far decentralization was able to improve the service delivery framework 
and what were the internal and external institutional factors that affected their 
performance.  
6.7.1.1 Political Elites 
The profile of respondents interviewed is presented in Table 6-9. The researcher tried to 
ensure that the political heads of the three tiers of local governments - Union 
Administration, Town Administration and CDGs were interviewed. In addition to this, 
the researcher was also able to interview two female councillors belonging to the City 
District Council and Town Council respectively. The inclusion of women participants 
was based on two rationales: firstly, women were given a 33% representation in local 
councils under the Devolution Plan 2000 and the researcher intended to know how far 
their inclusion in local councils has given them an effective role in local policy making. 
Secondly, the Political perspective literature suggested that giving minorities such as 
women, representation in local councils fails to give them empowerment. Therefore, the 
researcher tried to interview female councillors to gain their perception of the LG and 
the nature of their participation in the decision making process.  
197 
 
Again, while selecting from among them, the researcher tried to get access to those 
respondents who were also members of the local council committees. One of the female 
politicians was directly elected on general seats and was the Head of the District 
Education Monitoring Committee and the other politician was indirectly elected on 
seats reserved for women in Tehsil Council and was also a member of the School 
Council (SC). Besides this, both of these female councillors - District and Tehsil 
councillor - were also part of the District Education Monitoring Committee and School 
council respectively. However, the researcher was unable to gain access to any female 
councillors from the CDGF, though the researcher tried to seek a prior appointment 
with them and had secured their commitment.  
Table 6-9: Profile of the Political Elites Interviewed for the Study 
S.NO Political Elites CDGF CDGL 
1.  District Nazim (Head of the City District Government) 1 x 
2.  Town Nazim 1 2 
3.  Union Nazim 1 1 
4.  District councillor x 1 
5.  Tehsil Councillor x 1 
6.  Teshil Municipal officer (assisting town Nazim and District Nazim 
in coordination of towns) 
1 1 
Total  4 6 
           X=No 
 
6.7.2 Service Delivery Organizations 
6.7.2.1 Education Department  
In the education sector, the researcher interviewed the Executive District Officers 
(EDO), the heads of the Education Department, the District Education Officers (DEOs) 
and the Deputy District Education Officers (DDEOs). The education sector was 
managed according to: 
1 Elementary Education (Primary Education) 
2 Secondary Education (High Schools from grade 6 to 10)  
3 Higher Secondary Schools as they were having classes up to 12th grade.  
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Further, institutions were managed as girls and boys schools by male and female 
officers of the Education Department as presented in Table 6-10. Overall, the researcher 
interviewed 19 respondents from the Education Departments. The detail of their 
designation is presented in Table 6-10.  
Table 6-10: Profile of the Respondents of Education sector 
Designation Managerial level  Grade Responsibilities City District 
Governments 
    CDGL  
(N) 
CDGF 
(N) 
1 Executive District Officer 
(EDO) 
Top Management 19 Head of the Education 
Department 
1 1 
2 District Education Officer 
(DEO) 
Senior Management 19 Female Elementary 
Education 
1 x 
3 District Education Officer 
(DEO) 
Senior Management 19 Female Secondary 
Education 
1 x 
4 District Education Officer 
(DEO) 
Senior Management 19 Male Elementary 
Education 
1 1 
5 District Education Officer 
(DEO) 
Senior Management 19 Male Secondary 
Education 
1 1 
6 Deputy District Education 
Officer (DYDEO) 
Middle Management 18 Male Elementary 
Education 
4 1 
7 Deputy District Education 
Officer (DYDEO) 
Middle Management 18 Female Elementary 
Education 
2 3 
8 Deputy District Education 
Officer (DYDEO) 
Middle Management 18 Female Secondary 
Education 
1 x 
Total  12 7 
 
 
6.7.2.2 Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA)  
From the WSS, the researcher was able to interview the Managing Directors (MD), the 
Deputy Managing Directors (DMDs) and the Directors of the agency (total 8 interviews 
were conducted, distribution of these is provided in Table 6-11). The basic logic in the 
selection of respondents was to target the most respondents with ‘formal authority’. For 
this purpose, as explained in the methodology section, first of all, the researcher 
interviewed heads of the agency then asked them to be referred to the Deputy Managing 
Directors (DMDs). The Managing Directors (MDs) were asked to refer the researcher to 
individuals who were more involved in the planning and research side of the agency. 
The researcher interviewed ‘Directors’ directly involved in projects such as Public 
Private Partnerships. Table 6-11 depicts the overall respondents being interviewed. 
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Table 6-11: Profile of the Respondents from Water and Sanitation Agency 
CDGs DESIGNATION Managerial Level  Grade Responsibilities 
CDGL Managing Director (MD) Top management  19 Head of the Water and 
Sanitation agency 
 Deputy Managing Director 
(DMD) 
Senior management  19 Finance 
 Deputy Managing Director 
(DMD) 
Senior management  19 Operation and Maintenance 
 Director  Middle management 19 Planning and evaluation 
CDGF Chairman FDA/Managing 
Director (MD) 
Top management  19 Head of Faisalabad 
Development Authority and 
head of Water and Sanitation 
agency 
Deputy Managing Director 
(DMD) 
Senior management  19 Finance and operations 
Director  Middle management 18 Water and distribution 
Director  Middle management 18 Administration 
 
 
6.7.2.3 Respondents from the Third Sector/Non-governmental Organization (NGOs) 
The researcher interviewed representatives of NGOs who were directly involved in 
Education and WSS provision. Once again the criterion for selection was based on 
selecting those NGOs who were the major partners in both City District Governments 
(CDGs). The researcher was able to interview the two most actively involved NGOs in 
Education and WSS delivery: Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aghai (ITA) actively engaged in 
education service delivery and Anjuman Samaji Bebhobood (ASB) engaged in WSS 
provision. The researcher interviewed the heads of ITA and ASB. In addition to this, the 
researcher also interviewed two other respondents from NGOs which were actively 
involved in the education sector however for the purpose of anonymity their details such 
as designation and affiliations are not disclosed here. Overall, the researcher 
interviewed four representatives from NGOs. 
6.7.2.4 Managing Access  
In order to manage access to the respondents, the researcher interviewed the head of the 
Education Department (Executive District Officer), and subsequently contacted the 
middle management level based on the recommendations suggested by the head of the 
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organization and others in this process. Likewise the researcher approached the 
Managing Director of WASA who recommended that the researcher interview the 
Deputy Managing Director and the Director.  
6.7.3 Qualitative Data Analysis 
The key features of qualitative data analysis are: “defining, categorizing, theorizing, 
explaining, exploring, and mapping” the nature of phenomena, finding associations, 
seeking explanations and developing new theories or strategies (Ritchie and Spencer 
2002: p. 176). Ritchie (2002) provided a general ‘Framework’ for analysing qualitative 
data. The Framework approach, also referred to as thematic analysis, is a matrix-based 
method for arranging and synthesizing data (Bryman 2012). It consists of six key 
stages: 
1. Familiarization 
2. Identifying a thematic framework,  
3. Indexing,  
4. Charting,  
5. Mapping and  
6. Interpretation.  
The process of familiarization actually involves immersion into data, listening to the 
audio tapes and reading field notes. During this process the researcher reads through the 
transcripts, and field notes to identify recurrent themes, issues and concepts. The next 
step is to identify a thematic framework within which issues can be organized. It 
provides a mechanism for organizing data into manageable units. Indexing involves 
making judgements as to the meaning and significance of data. By annotating the 
textual data, the process is made accessible to others and they can see how data are 
sifted and organized. It also helps the researcher to “check out” the basis of his or her 
assumptions. The next step is to develop a chart. Data are lifted from the transcripts and 
are rearranged according to different themes, a process very similar to ‘Matrix Analysis’ 
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developed by Miles and Huberman (1994). The charts may be drawn from the thematic 
framework, research questions or according to the consideration of how the researcher 
wants to write up his or her study. Mainly, charts can be thematic (for each theme 
across all respondents) or by case basis (for each respondent across all themes). Then 
analysis returns to mapping and interpretation of data, which brings the researcher back 
to the key features of qualitative data analysis mentioned earlier. The researcher reviews 
the charts and research notes, compares and contrasts the perceptions, accounts, or 
experiences; searches for patterns and connections and seeks explanations for these 
within the data.  
The researcher in this study adopted this general ‘Framework’ for analysing data. 
However, in addition to the Framework approach, the researcher developed a contact 
sheet summary to capture and reflect on each contact immediately after each interview. 
This approach is recommended by Miles and Huberman for a rapid retrieval and 
synthesis of what the contact was all about. This also helped in planning the next field 
interview by suggesting new themes or new points to be covered in subsequent analysis. 
During the field work, the researcher sought permission from the interviewees to audio 
record the interviews which were further transcribed. The data analysis process 
consisted of three main stages: data preparation, data management and data analysis as 
presented in Figure 6-1. During the data preparation stage, the researcher familiarized 
herself with the field notes, memos, interview transcriptions, and contact sheet 
summaries. The next stage was data management which mainly consisted of reducing 
data to meaningful categories, identifying relationships between categories and putting 
them into matrix forms. The main coding strategy adopted was pattern coding, also 
known as thematic coding (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
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Figure 6-1: General Process of Data Analysis 
The researcher developed a conceptually constructed matrix which had rows and 
columns arranged according to the concepts developed in the conceptual chapter (Part 
2) in order to bring together relevant themes under their construct (see Appendix 6). 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994) such a conceptually constructed matrix helps 
in clustering the questions belonging to one central theme or construct. First of all, a 
matrix was generated for all the respondents separately, and then the results of one 
managerial level were cross tabulated to identify similar or divergent trends. One of the 
limitations of applying a Framework method on its own is the inability to provide a 
more specific procedure for analysis (Bryman 2012). To overcome this deficiency, the 
researcher applied analytical technique pattern matching for further analysis.  
Pattern matching is one of the most commonly used strategies for qualitative data 
analysis (Yin 2009). This compares an “empirically based pattern with a predicted 
one” (p: 136). If the patterns are similar then the results will help a case study to 
strengthen its internal validity as well. For this purpose, a conceptual framework (Part 
2) was constructed and used to develop the thematic analysis and pattern matching. The 
development of a conceptual framework and the research questions guided the 
•Developing field notes, 
memos, research diaries, 
transcription of 
interviews, developing 
contact sheet
Data preparation
•Developing coding 
structure, categorizing 
data, identifying 
relationship by putting 
data into matrix form
Managing data
•defining, categorizing, 
theorizing, explaining, 
exploring, and mapping 
through Pattern 
matching
Data analysis-developing 
or testing hypothesis
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researcher throughout the data analysis process. The analytical approach of cross case 
synthesis was adopted to report research findings. Yin (2009) has recommended to 
adopt this approach, particularly in case of multiple case study design. Additionally, the 
researcher used qualitative data analysis software, NVivo, to analyse the qualitative 
data. With this software, the researcher brought together all the transcripts, created 
coding strategies, memos generated during the research process, created a research 
diary, and conducted document analysis (please see Appendix 7 for detail). All the 
documents were coded and linked together with the transcript coding. This entire 
process helped to improve the rigour of the data analysis. 
6.8 DOCUMENTS 
Documents and records are considered to be a low cost, stable, non-reactive and rich 
source of information (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Archival records provided the 
researcher with both qualitative and quantitative information. Budget records for 
example, revealed the spending patterns of CDGs including the breakdown of 
development and non-developmental expenditure (a significant variable to assess the 
impact of fiscal decentralization) and helped to understand the real amount of autonomy 
being decentralized. A complete breakdown of documents is provided in appendix 
(Appendix 2). From the town hall, the researcher collected information on the numbers 
of Tehsil Councils and Union Councils, contact details of the councillors, maps, mission 
and action plans of local governments to see the priorities placed on different sectors 
such as education, water and sanitation and health etc. Their annual development plans 
further revealed the spending patterns covering the period of 2005/6-2008/9.  
From the Education Departments, information about the delegation of powers, 
organizational charts, incentive structure, and structure of School Councils was also 
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collected. During the interviews with the NGOs, information about the PPP projects in 
the Education and WSS was collected as well. From the water and sanitation sector, the 
researcher was able to get a copy of the organizational chart, the structure of the Board 
of Governors, the delegation of powers, WASA Finances and operations and 
management details. These documents were collected and a preliminary analysis was 
carried out prior to the finalization of the interview and survey construction in order to 
develop the data collection instruments in a more meaningful way. It also maintained 
the objectivity and rigor of the research process. Performance data (discussed in Part 5) 
for example revealed the performance level of service delivery. The performance data 
were collected internally by service delivery organizations against benchmark standards 
used by the World Bank. A brief summary of these indicators is provided in Table 6-12. 
The performance data covered two tenures of the CDGs (1
st
 tenure ending 2005 - 2
nd
 
tenure ending 2009).  
Table 6-12: Performance Indicators 
Types of Service Delivery 
Organization 
Effectiveness Indicators Efficiency Indicators 
Water and Sanitation Agency 
(WASA) 
Water Coverage 
 % of population with domestic 
piped water connection 
 The existence or non-existence 
of water rationing/continuity of 
service  
 Filtration plant 
 Water connection per/000  
staff 
 The % of billed water which 
is paid for by the consumer 
 Unaccounted for water 
 Non-Revenue Water (NRW) 
 Working ratio 
 Sanitation Coverage 
 % of population with piped 
sewerage  
 Quality of sewerage treatment 
 
Education Department  Teacher qualification 
 No. of institutions to improve 
access to education 
 Pupil/teacher ratio 
 Student enrolment 
Source: Adapted from Batley (1996) 
6.8.1 Documents Analysis 
All the documents were coded into NVivo software after the initial preliminary analysis. 
For instance, a matrix analysis was carried out on the policy documents (see Appendix 
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6). Overall, the triangulation of methods helped the researcher to validate information 
collected from different sources. For instance, the gap between the delegation of power 
under the Devolution Plan 2000 and the actual implementation or the authority 
exercised by service delivery organizations, and institutional constraints was identified 
by comparing data obtained from different sources such as documents, surveys and 
interviews. Likewise, the community survey helped to identify the level of community 
satisfaction with the decentralized service delivery arrangements and identified the 
reasons for their dissatisfaction through an open ended questionnaire.  
6.9 ATTENDING CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS FOR THE REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 
The researcher also took the opportunity to get critical feedback from peers, 
practitioners and academics through presenting the research topic in various seminars 
and conferences. The researcher presented her work at the internal departmental 
seminars at Stirling University and Stirling Graduate Research Conferences (SGRS) to 
get feedback from academics. The researcher also had the opportunity to present her 
papers at Scottish Doctoral conferences, and International Research Symposium for 
Public Management (IRSPM conferences 2011, 2012). These seminars, particularly the 
question and answer sessions were helpful to get feedback from academics and other 
research students. The researcher also benefited from the Stirling University’s research 
seminars on Research Skills and the training provided by the supervisors. All these post 
graduate seminars, conferences, and supervision were a great source of insight for every 
stage of the research particularly the methodological issues of research.  
Conclusion 
Chapter 5 and 6 provided an overview of how the researcher ensured the rigour and 
robustness of the research process during the design of the research and putting the 
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research process into practice. It discussed the research philosophy, and methodological 
issues (Section 5.2) while designing a case study research strategy (Section 5.4), and 
construction of the case study research strategy (Section 5.7), sampling decisions, 
interviews and survey instruments, together with qualitative and quantitative analysis 
decisions (Section 5.7.1) in order to ensure that during the administration of the research 
every step has taken to maintain the objectivity of the research process. The next part 
will now present empirical findings from organizational and community surveys. 
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CHAPTER 7  
ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY: THE EVIDENCE FROM 
ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
Decentralization reforms under the Devolution Plan 2000 aimed to decentralize 
managerial, financial, and political authority from the regional to local government, 
known as City District Governments in five big cities of Pakistan. However, to date 
little empirical evidence is found to capture the impact of these wide range 
decentralization reforms on service delivery organizations, and whether it is able to 
improve the service delivery outcomes of efficiency and responsiveness as stated in the 
Devolution Plan 2000. This part of the research presents the organizational survey 
findings from both Education and Water and Sanitation sectors. This chapter has two 
main sections. Section 7.2 presents survey findings in the form of contingency tables. 
These contingency tables present data according to the Sector and Local Government 
(referred to as LG). Section 7.3 presents statistical analysis. The main purpose of 
Section 7.2 is to identify the extent managers can exercise their autonomy (Section 
7.2.1.1), the level of user involvement in service provision and its impact of 
organizational performance (Section 7.2.2), accountability arrangements (Section 7.2.6) 
and institutional factors (Sections 7.2.3 & 7.2.5) that may affect performance of service 
delivery organizations. Statistical analysis attempts to highlight how significantly the 
variables are associated together and the amount of confidence one can have in the 
research findings. The last section (Section 7.4) concludes this chapter. 
209 
 
7.2 SURVEY FINDINGS 
7.2.1 The Extent of Managerial Autonomy / Discretion Over Personnel 
Management and Financial Management 
Survey findings regarding the extent of managerial discretion over personnel and 
financial management are derived from Part 1 of the survey questionnaire (Appendix 1). 
Respondents were asked to specify the extent they could exercise managerial autonomy 
over personnel and financial decision making after decentralization reforms. To 
measure the managerial autonomy, a 5-point Likert scale of 10 items was developed 
which is presented in Table 7-2, and discussed in the methodology chapter (Section 
6.4). This section intends to capture how far decentralized organizational structures such 
as Education Department and WASA are more autonomous than before.  
Reliability of Scale 
The reliability of the Likert scale was calculated by the Reliability Scale Analysis and 
using the value of Cronbach alpha. According to Pallant (2007), if the value of 
Cronbach alpha is 0.7, it is considered acceptable and a value of 0.8 is considered 
preferable. According to the reliability statistics presented in Table 7-1, the value of 
Cronbach alpha was very strong, indicating high internal consistency of the scale of 
managerial autonomy.  
Table 7-1: Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach alpha Items 
.891 
10 
 
 
7.2.1.1 Extent of Managerial Autonomy  
The survey findings regarding the extent of managerial autonomy over personnel and 
financial management are presented in Table 7-2.  
210 
 
Table 7-2: Managerial Autonomy 
Managerial 
Autonomy 
Education Departments (EDs) Water & Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total (N+32) 
CDGL &  
CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total (N+59) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Personnel Management 
1. Hiring of personnel 
No/not significant 12 57.14 7 63.64 19 59.38 25 55.55 4 28.57 29 49.15 
Significant 4 19.95 1 9.06 5 15.63 9 20.00 1 7.14 10 16.94 
Very significant/full  5 23.81 3 27.27 8 25 11 24.44 9 64.29 20 33.89 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
2. Firing of personnel 
No/not significant 12 57.14 8 72.73 20 62.5 15 33.33 5 35.71 20 33.9 
Significant 5 23.81 2 18.18 7 21.88 20 44.44 0 0.00 20 33.9 
Very significant/full  4 19.05 1 9.09 5 15.63 10 22.22 9 64.29 19 32.2 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
3. Promotion of personnel 
No/not significant 12 57.14 9 81.82 21 65.63 28 62.22 4 28.57 32 54.24 
Significant 3 14.29 1 9.09 4 12.5 7 15.56 2 14.29 9 15.25 
Very significant/full  6 28.57 1 9.09 7 21.88 10 22.22 8 57.14 18 30.51 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
4. Transfer of personnel 
No/not significant 16 76.19 10 90.91 26 81.3 13 28.89 4 28.57 17 28.81 
Significant 2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 21 46.67 3 21.43 24 40.68 
Very significant/full  3 14.29 1 9.09 4 12.5 11 24.44 7 50.00 18 30.51 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
5. Setting compensation 
No/not significant 14 66.67 10 90.91 24 75.00 39 86.67 7 50.00 46 77.97 
Significant 2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 4 8.89 4 28.57 8 13.56 
Very significant/full  5 23.81 1 9.09 6 18.8 2 4.44 3 21.43 5 8.47 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
6. Career development 
No/not significant 9 42.86 6 54.55 15 46.88 32 71.11 4 28.57 36 61.02 
Significant 9 42.86 3 27.27 12 37.5 8 17.78 2 14.29 10 16.95 
Very significant/full  3 14.29 2 18.18 5 15.63 5 11.11 8 57.14 13 22.03 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Financial Management 
7. Resource allocation 
No/not significant 12 57.14 6 54.55 18 56.3 25 55.56 4 28.57 29 49.15 
Significant 2 9.52 2 18.18 4 12.5 9 20.00 2 14.29 11 18.64 
Very significant/full  7 33.33 3 27.27 10 31.3 11 24.44 8 57.14 19 32.2 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
7. Procurement 
No/not significant 7 33.33 5 45.45 12 37.5 21 46.67 4 28.57 25 42.37 
Significant 8 38.1 5 45.45 13 40.6 15 33.33 5 35.71 20 33.9 
Very significant/full  6 28.57 1 9.09 7 21.9 9 20 5 35.71 14 23.73 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
8. Budget execution 
No/not significant 6 28.57 6 54.55 12 37.5 28 62.22 3 21.43 31 52.54 
Significant 4 19.05 2 18.18 6 18.8 7 15.56 0 0.00 7 11.86 
Very significant/full  11 52.38 3 27.27 14 43.8 10 22.22 11 78.57 21 35.59 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
9. Resource mobilization 
No/not significant 7 33.33 5 45.45 12 37.5 27 60 3 21.43 30 50.85 
Significant 4 19.05 3 27.27 7 21.9 9 20 5 35.71 14 23.73 
Very significant/full  10 47.62 3 27.27 13 40.6 9 20 6 42.86 15 25.42 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
According to the distribution of percentages, the results indicated that the Education 
Departments had less administrative autonomy compared to WASA. Water And 
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Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) reported ‘significant’ to ‘very significant/full’ autonomy 
over hiring of personnel (50.8%), firing of personnel (66.1%), and transfer of personnel 
(71.2%). On the other hand, Education Department (ED) reported more autonomy over 
career development of teachers (53.1%). The EDs reported more autonomy over 
financial management compared to the respondents from WASAs decision such as 
procurement (62.5%) budget execution (65.6%), and resource mobilization (62.5%). 
Respondents form WASA reported ‘not at all/not significant’ autonomy over resource 
allocation (55.9%), budget execution (66.1%), and resource mobilization (64.4%).  
The results were compared within service delivery organizations - within the Education 
Departments (EDs) and within Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) across City 
District Governments (CDGs) to discern the differences in the exercise of managerial 
autonomy within type of service delivery organization. The results indicated that 71.4% 
respondents from WASA (CDGF) indicated ‘significant’ to ‘very significant/full’ 
autonomy over hiring and promotion of personnel. On the contrary, the 75.5% of 
respondents from WASA (CDGL) reported ‘no/not significant’ autonomy over this 
aspect. For the firing of personnel, more than 60% respondents from WASAs of both 
CDGs reported significant to ‘very significant/full autonomy’. With respect to career 
development, 71.42% of the respondents from WASA (CDGF) reported ‘significant’ to 
‘very significant/full autonomy’ over promotion and career development of staff, while 
71.1% of the respondents from CDGL reported ‘No/Not significant’ autonomy over 
career development and 62.2% indicated ‘no/not significant’ autonomy over promotion 
of staff. A similar pattern was found when comparing results of financial autonomy of 
WASAs across CDGs. Respondents from CDGF reported ‘significant to very/full 
autonomy’ over resource allocation (71.4%), procurement (71.4%), and budget 
execution (78.6%). Whereas, respondents from CDGL reported ‘no/not significant’ 
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autonomy over resource allocation (71.1%), budget execution (62.2%), and resource 
mobilization (60.0%). Respondents from CDGL only indicated autonomy over 
procurement decisions.  
A comparison of the Education Departments (EDs) across CDGs revealed that although 
the overall EDs had less autonomy over personnel management decision, the 
percentages of respondents indicating ‘no/not significant’ were higher in the Education 
Department of CDGF compared to the CDGL. However, the Education Department 
(CDGL) enjoyed considerable autonomy over career development decisions of teachers. 
57.1% respondents from the Education Department (CDGL) indicated ‘significant’ to 
‘very significant/full’ autonomy over career management decisions. Once assessed 
against financial management autonomy, the survey results indicated that 71.4% of 
respondents from the Education Department (CDGL) indicated ‘significant’ to ‘very 
significant/full’ autonomy, while 54.5% of the respondents from CDGF indicated 
‘no/not significant’ autonomy over budget execution. However, the majority of 
respondents from both EDs indicated financial autonomy over resource mobilization 
(62.5%) and procurement decision (62.5%). These percentages were higher for CDGL. 
7.2.2 Participation and Organization Performance 
The evidence regarding significance of community participation in improving 
organizational performance is derived from Part 2 of the survey questionnaire. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent decentralization has been able to improve 
the community or user involvement in service provision and provide any example of 
user involvement in service provision. The respondents were also asked to indicate the 
impact of community involvement on organizational performance. Table 7-3 presents 
the results of survey findings regarding community participation. 
213 
 
Table 7-3: Community Participation in Service Provision and Organizational 
Performance 
Participation Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF TOTAL 
(N=32) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=59) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Increase in level of participation 
1. No change 3 14.29 0 0.00 3 9.38 0 0.00 2 14.29 2 3.39 
2. Not significant 2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 0 0.00 5 35.71 5 8.47 
3. Significant 13 61.90 8 72.73 21 65.63 44 97.78 6 42.86 50 84.75 
4. Very significant 3 14.29 3 27.27 6 18.75 1 2.22 1 7.14 2 3.39 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Example of user involvement 
1. Service provision 1 4.76 2 18.18 3 9.38 16 35.56 4 28.57 20 33.90 
2. Monitoring 8 38.10 1 9.09 9 28.13 15 33.33 3 21.43 18 30.51 
3. Financing 1 4.76 4 36.36 5 15.63 12 26.67 3 21.43 15 25.42 
4. All of the above 11 52.38 4 36.36 15 46.88 2 4.44 4 28.57 6 10.17 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Impact on performance 
1. No change 3 14.29 0 0.00 3 9.38 0 0.00 1 7.14 1 1.69 
2. Not significant 4 19.05 1 9.09 5 15.63 1 2.22 7 50.00 8 13.56 
3. Significant 14 66.67 6 54.55 20 62.50 40 88.89 4 28.57 44 74.58 
4. Very significant 0 0.00 4 36.36 4 12.50 4 8.89 2 14.29 6 10.17 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
7.2.2.1 User Involvement / Participation  
The majority of respondents from both CDGs indicated that the user 
involvement/community participation in service provision has significantly increased 
after decentralization reforms. However, community involvement in water and 
sanitation sector was more significant than the Education Departments (EDs). Overall, 
65.6% respondents from EDs of both districts and 84.7% respondents from WASAs 
reported ‘significant’ increase in the community involvement after decentralization 
reforms.  
7.2.2.2 Examples of User Involvement in Service Delivery 
It was also revealed that the community was involved in financing, monitoring, and 
service provision. This was an open-ended question. For the purpose of analysis, main 
themes, as reported by the respondents, were coded in SPSS around three categories – 
214 
 
financing, monitoring, service provision or all the above. The results indicated that in 
the EDs, the community was actively participating in school council affairs, helping in 
resource mobilization, and NGOs were involved in service provision. 36.36% of the 
respondents from the Education Department of CDGF indicated that community is 
providing financial assistance, while 38.10% of the respondents from CDGL indicated 
that the community was actively involved in monitoring of education quality in their 
communities. 46.88% of the total respondents from the EDs of both CDGs indicated 
that the community was involved in ‘above all’ forms of participation (service 
provision, monitoring, financing). On the other hand, respondents from WASA 
indicated that the community was involved in service provision (33.90%), monitoring 
(30.51%), and financing (25.42%) respectively. Organizational respondents from both 
service delivery organizations emphasized the role of NGOs in service provision and 
monitoring government sector in their open-ended responses.    
7.2.2.3 Impact of Community Participation on Organizational Performance 
Respondents from both service delivery organizations indicated that community 
participation in service provision has ‘significantly’ improved their organizational 
performance. 62.5% of the respondents from EDs and 74.6% from WASAs were of the 
view that it has been ‘very significant’ in improving organizational performance. 
However, these percentages remained higher for CDGL. 66.67% of the respondents 
from the ED (CDGL), and 88.89% of WASA (CDGL) indicated ‘significant’ impact on 
performance than CDGF.  
7.2.3 Institutional Environment: Internal Factors 
Part 3 of the organizational survey questionnaire assessed the institutional environment 
which was further categorized into:  1) Internal organizational factors (Part 3, Sections 
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A &B), and 2) External Institutional factors (Part 3, Section C). This section presents 
findings related to the internal organizational factors such as human/personnel 
management system, and performance management systems. It was intended to provide 
an insight into the internal organizational environment of service delivery organizations 
and indicate the constraints that may affect their organizational performance.  
7.2.3.1 Human Resource/Personnel Management System 
Personnel Management Rule 
This part also assessed the overall effectiveness of personnel management rules: rules 
simplicity, rules flexibility, and effectiveness in administration.  
Reliability of the Scale 
A 4-point Likert scale was used for measuring personnel or human resource 
management system along three dimensions: rules simplicity, flexibility, and 
effectiveness in human resource management. Reliability statistics Table 7-4 indicate 
that the value of Cronbach alpha is in the acceptable range of O.65.  
Table 7-4: Reliability Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Research findings are presented in Table 7-5. According to the results of the survey 
presented in Table 7-5, the majority of the respondents from EDs of both CDGs 
‘agreed/strongly agreed’ that personnel management rules were simple in 
implementation (62.5%), provided them flexibility (56.2%), and let them manage the 
personnel effectively (68.7%). On the other hand, WASAs respondents indicated that 
they ‘disagree/strongly disagree’ with the statements that personnel management rules 
were simple in implementation (64.4%), however they ‘agree/strongly agree’ that those 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Items 
0.658 3 
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rules provided them flexibility (74.5%) and were effective in managing personnel 
(54.2%). 
Table 7-5: Personnel/Human Resource Management System  
 
Personnel Management 
System 
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies 
(WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF TOTAL 
(N=32) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
CDGL CDGF TOTAL 
(N=59) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Recruitment process 
1. Merit based 14 66.67 7 63.64 21 65.63 36 80.00 7 50.00 43 72.88 
2. Personal 
connection 
2 27.27 3 27.27 5 15.63 2 4.44 3 21.43 5 8.47 
3. Political patronage 5 9.09 1 9.09 6 18.75 7 15.56 4 28.57 11 18.64 
4. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Existence of HRMIS (Human Resource Information Management System) 
1. Yes 17 80.95 8 72.73 25 78.13 37 82.22 5 35.71 42 71.19 
2. No 4 19.05 3 27.27 7 21.88 8 17.78 9 64.29 17 28.81 
Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
To what extent personnel management rules are:  
Simple in implementation 
1. Strongly disagree 5 23.81 2 18.18 7 21.88 5 11.11 4 28.57 9 15.25 
2. Disagree 3 14.29 2 18.18 5 15.63 27 60.00 2 14.29 29 49.15 
3. Agree 5 23.81 2 18.18 7 21.88 9 20.00 4 28.57 13 22.03 
4. Strongly agree 8 38.10 5 45.45 13 40.63 4 8.89 4 28.57 8 13.56 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Provide flexibility in implementation 
1. Strongly disagree 4 19.05 2 18.18 6 18.75 5 11.11 2 14.29 7 11.86 
2. Disagree 6 28.57 2 18.18 8 25.00 6 13.33 2 14.29 8 13.56 
3. Agree 6 28.57 5 45.45 11 34.37 27 60.00 5 35.71 32 54.24 
4. Strongly agree 5 28.57 2 18.18 7 21.88 7 15.56 5 35.71 13 20.34 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Effective in managing personnel 
1. Strongly disagree 3 14.29 0 0.00 3 9.38 6 13.33 2 14.29 8 13.56 
2. Disagree 3 14.29 4 36.36 7 21.88 16 35.56 3 21.43 19 32.20 
3. Agree 8 38.10 4 36.36 12 37.50 17 37.50 4 28.57 21 35.59 
4. Strongly agree 7 33.33 3 27.27 10 31.25 6 31.25 5 35.71 11 18.64 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
Merit based recruitment 
Respondents were asked to identify whether the recruitment process is a “merit based” 
or based on ‘political patronage’ or ‘personal connection’. The results in Table 7-5 
indicated that more than 65% respondents from the EDs and 72% from WASAs were of 
the view that recruitment was based on merit. It was also found that organizations were 
having Human Resource Information Management System (HRMIS) for personnel 
planning and management.  
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7.2.4 Performance Management System 
This part of the survey findings are derived from Part 3 (B) of the survey questionnaire. 
The purpose was to assess the overall performance model that exists in service delivery 
organizations. The results of the survey are presented in Table 7-6. The focus was on 
assessing the existence of performance standards, reward/incentive structure, and the 
importance placed on achievement of performance targets in service delivery 
organizations.  
7.2.4.1 Performance Standards/Indicators (PIs) 
According to the results presented in Table 7-6, it was found that the majority of 
respondents (81.8%) from the EDs (CDGL & CDGF) indicated that they had 
documented work performance standards in their organization compared to WASAs of 
both CDGs (71.2%). However, within the service delivery organization it was found 
that respondents from the Education Department (CDGL) were of the view that they 
had documented work performance standards compared to CDGF. Quite contrary to 
this, 71.4% of the respondents from WASA (CDGF) indicated that they did not have 
documented work performance standards while 71.2% of the respondents from WASA 
(CDGL) indicated the presence of documented work performance standards. Once 
respondents were asked to indicate whether the ‘performance standards are agreed upon 
by the supervisors and the employees at the start of every year’, a majority of the 
respondents (63.6%) from the EDs indicated ‘partially’, while a majority of the 
respondents (54.2%) of WASAs reported ‘no’. 
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Table 7-6: Performance Management System 
Performance 
Management 
System 
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total (N=32) 
CDGL&CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total (N=59) 
CDGL&CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Do you have documented work performance standards? 
1. Yes 19 90.48 9 81.82 28 87.0 38 84.4 4 28.7 42 71.19 
2. No 2 9.52 2 18.18 4 12.50 7 15.6 10 71.43 17 28.81 
3. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Performance targets are et between supervisor and employees at the start of every year: 
1. Yes 10 47.62 4 36.36 14 43.75 8 17.8 1 7.14 9 15.25 
2. No 4 19.05 0 0.00 4 12.50 25 55.56 7 50.00 32 54.24 
3. Partially 7 33.33 7 63.64 14 43.75 12 26.67 6 42.86 18 30.51 
4. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Are the objectives of performance clearly communicated to you? 
1. Yes 7 33.33 4 36.36 11 34.8 7 15.56 3 21.43 10 16.95 
2. No 2 9.52 1 9.09 3 9.38 2 4.4 3 21.43 5 8.47 
3. Partially 12 57.14 6 54.55 18 56.25 36 80.00 8 57.14 44 74.58 
4. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
How much importance is placed on achievement of performance objectives? 
1. Not at all 1 4..76 0 0.00 1 3.13 0 0.00 1 7.14 1 1.69 
2. Somewhat 
significant 
7 33.33 2 18.18 9 28.13 9 20.00 8 57.14 17 28.81 
3. Significant 7 33.33 9 81.82 16 50.00 33 73.33 4 28.57 37 62.71 
4. Very 
significant 
6 28.57 0 0.00 6 18.75 3 6.67 1 7.14 4 6.78 
5. Toal 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Are performance standards achieved as (achievement of performance targets A) 
1. Fully 9 42.86 2 18.18 11 34.38 25 55.56 2 14.29 27 45.76 
2. Partially 11 52.38 9 81.82 20 62.50 18 40.00 5 35.71 23 38.9 
3. Not at all 1 4.76 0 0.00 1 3.13 2 4.44 7 50.00 9 15.25 
4. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
To what extent your organization has achieved its mission or objectives? 
1. Less than 
25% 
1 4.76 2 18.28 3 9.38 0 0.00 1 7.14 1 1.69 
2. 25-50% 8 38.10 3 27.27 11 34.38 8 17.78 8 57.24 16 27.12 
3. 51-75% 12 57.14 5 45.45 17 53.13 34 75.56 4 28.57 38 64.41 
4. 76-100% 0 0.00 1 9.09 1 3.13 3 6.67 14 7.14 4 6.78 
5. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Do you have a performance based reward system? 
1. Yes 14 66.67 4 36.36 18 56.3 13 28.89 3 21.43 16 27.12 
2. No 7 33.33 7 63.64 14 43.8 32 71.11 11 78.57 43 72.88 
3. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
In your opinion, are individuals across all departments rewarded on the basis of performance? 
1. Yes 15 71.43 7 63.64 22 68.75 7 15.56 2 14.29 9 15.25 
2. No 6 28.57 4 36.36 10 31.25 38 84.44 12 85.71 50 84.75 
3. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
Regarding communication of performance targets, it was found that 74.6% of the 
respondents from WASAs reported that these standards were ‘partially’ communicated 
to them. While 63.6% of the respondents from the EDs of both CDGs indicated that, 
these standards were ‘partially’ communicated to them. Overall, WASA (CDGL) had 
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higher percentages (80.0%) for indicating ‘partial’ communication of performance 
standards across departments.  
Regarding the achievement of PIs, firstly respondents were asked to indicate the 
importance placed on the achievement of PIs. It was found that 61.9% of the 
respondents from the Education Department (CDGL) reported ‘significant’ to ‘very 
significant’, while 81.8% respondents from the Education Department (CDGF) 
indicated ‘significant’ to ‘very significant’. Quite opposite to this, WASA (CDGL) 
indicated higher percentages (80.0%) compared to the WASA (CDGF) (35.7%). The 
second part of this assessment was asking respondents to indicate the extent their 
organizations were able to achieve their objectives. 55.6% of the respondents from 
WASA (CDGL) indicated that they had ‘fully’ achieved their objectives, while 50% of 
the respondents from WASA (CDGF)  indicated they had ‘not at all’ achieved their 
objectives and 35.7% of them indicated their organization had ‘partially’ achieved their 
objectives. 
However, for the EDs of both CDGs more than 50% of the respondents were of the 
view that their organizations had ‘partially’ achieved their objectives, though these 
percentages were slightly better in CDGL. As besides 52.4% of the respondents from 
CDGL indicating partial achievement of targets, 42.9% also reported that these were 
‘fully’ achieved. Once respondents were asked to identify the extent of achievement in 
terms of ‘less than 50%’ or ‘above 50%’, it was found that the majority of the 
respondents from the Education Department, CDGL (61.9%) and CDGF (63.6%) 
indicated less than 50% achievement of targets. On the other hand, 64.3% of the 
respondents from WASA (CDGF) indicated ‘above 50%’, while 75.3% from WASA 
(CDGL) indicated ‘less than 50%’ achievement of targets.  
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7.2.4.2 Incentive Structure  
The next questions were related to the incentive structure in order to determine whether 
reward is linked with performance or not in both sectors (performance based incentive 
structure). The results indicated interesting differences across organizational 
respondents as only 66.7% of the respondents from the Education Department (CDGL) 
indicated that they had a performance based reward structure, and individuals across all 
departments were rewarded based on performance. Another variation was that, although 
the majority of respondents (63.6%) from the Education Department (CDGF) indicated 
the lack of a performance based reward system, the majority of them also indicated that 
individuals were rewarded on the basis of performance. This will be further explored in 
the qualitative data analysis section.  
Overall, the analysis suggested that although organizations had documented work PIs, 
which were partially communicated across the organizational members, and less 
attention was paid to get the input from the organizational members in the setting of 
performance standards. However, CDGL presented slightly better percentages in this 
regard. Even the Education Department (CDGL) was an exception in this scenario.  
7.2.4.3 Factors Responsible for Resource Leakage 
This section was also part of the internal organizational issues and was designed to 
assess the factors which might be responsible for resource leakage and was related to 
the Financial Management System. For this purpose, a 5- point Likert scale was 
developed in Part 3 (A) of the survey questionnaire, and respondents were asked to rank 
factors which they perceive responsible for resource leakage such as ‘unclear financial 
accounting rules’, ‘lack of capacity to account for resources, ‘weak auditing practices’, 
and ‘weak sanctions’. The results are presented in Table 7-7.  
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Table 7-7: Factors Responsible For Resource Leakage 
Factors responsible for 
resource leakage 
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=32) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=59) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
To what extent following Factors are responsible for resource leakage? 
1. Unclear rules or financial accounting 
1. Not at all 4 19.05 4 36.36 8 25.00 10 22.22 4 28.57 14 23.73 
2. Not significant 5 23.81 2 18.18 7 21.88 22 48.89 2 14.2 24 40.68 
3. Significant 4 19.05 1 9.09 5 15.63 9 20.00 3 21.43 12 20.34 
4. Very significant  4 19.05 6 54.55 10 31.25 2 4.44 3 21.43 5 8.47 
5. Highly significant 4 19.05 0 0.00 4 12.50 2 4.44 2 14.29 4 6.78 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
2. Lack of capacity to account for resources 
1. Not at all 5 9.52 2 18.18 7 21.88 14 31.11 2 14.29 16 27.12 
2. Not significant 1 4.76 4 36.36 5 15.63 8 7.78 3 21.43 11 18.64 
3. Significant 10 42.86 3 27.27 13 40.63 18 40.00 0 0.00 18 30.51 
4. Very significant  4 23.81 0 0.00 4 12.50 2 4.44 6 49.99 8 13.55 
5. Highly significant 1 19.05 2 18.18 3 9.38 3 6.67 3 21.43 6 10.17 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
3. Weak auditing practices 
1. Not at all 2 9.52 3 27.27 5 15.63 10 22.22 4 28.57 14 23.73 
2. Not significant 1 4.76 0 0.00 1 3.13 15 33.33 1 7.14 16 27.12 
3. Significant 9 42.76 3 27.27 12 37.50 13 28.89 4 28.57 17 28.81 
4. Very significant  5 23.81 1 9.09 6 18.75 2 4.44 3 21.43 5 8.47 
5. Highly significant 4 19.05 4 36.36 8 25.00 5 11.11 2 14.29 7 11.86 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
4. Weak sanctions against corrupt practices 
1. Not at all 4 19.05 3 27.27 7 21.88 17 37.78 1 7.14 18 30.51 
2. Not significant 2 9.52 1 9.09 3 9.38 13 28.89 1 7.14 14 23.73 
3. Significant 7 33.33 2 18.18 9 28.13 4 8.89 6 42.86 10 16.95 
4. Very significant  6 28.57 2 18.18 8 25.00 7 15.56 3 21.43 10 16.95 
5. Highly significant 2 9.52 3 27.27 5 15.63 4 8.89 3 21.43 7 11.86 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
Reliability Test  
The reliability statistics as presented in Table 7-8 indicated that the value of alpha was 
more than the acceptable level of 0.65 indicating that the scale measuring factors for 
resource leakage were internally consistent.  
Table 7-8: Reliability Statistics 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Items 
.797 4 
According to the contingency Table 7-7, the respondents from the EDs ranked weak 
auditing practices as the major issue responsible for resource leakage. 81.3% of the total 
respondents from the EDs indicated weak auditing practices as ‘significant’ to 
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‘very/highly significant factor’, followed by weak sanctions against practices (68.7%), 
lack of capacity to account for resources (65.6%) and the last priority was given to the 
rule clarity of financial management (59.3%). These findings were in contradiction to 
the findings from WASA. 54.2% of respondents from WASAs indicated that auditing 
practices were ‘not a significant’ factor, and 64.4% of respondents indicated that 
financial management rules were very clear to them. However, the majority of the 
respondents from both WASAs (54.2%) reported a lack of capacity as a ‘significant’ to 
‘very/highly significant’ factor responsible for resource leakage. 
7.2.4.4 Resource Adequacy 
Part 3 (D) of the survey questionnaire was related to identify the adequacy of resources 
regarding financial, human, and technical and infrastructure as presented in Table 7-10.  
Reliability Test 
For this purpose, a 4 point Likert scale was developed with categories ranging from 
‘completely inadequate’ to ‘fully adequate’ resources. The reliability statistics, as 
presented in Table 7-9, indicated a value of Cronbach alpha more than the acceptable 
range of 0.65.  
Table 7-9: Reliability Statistics 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Items 
.775 4 
 
According to the results presented in Table 7-10, the EDs of both districts indicated that 
they had ‘adequate/fully adequate’ financial (87.5%), human (75%), infrastructure 
(71.8%), and technical resources (68.7%). On the other hand, respondents (54.2%) from 
WASAs of both CDGs indicated lack of financial resources as their major constraint. 
 
223 
 
Table 7-10: Resource Adequacy 
Adequacy of resources Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=32) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=59) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
To what extent resources your organization has adequate resources? 
1. Adequacy of financial resources 
1. Completely 
inadequate 
1 4.76 1 9.09 2 6.25 7 15.56 5 37.51 12 20.34 
2. Inadequate 2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 28 62.22 4 28.57 32 54.24 
3. Adequate 7 33.33 6 54.5 13 40.63 7 5.56 3 21.43 10 16.95 
4. Fully adequate 11 52.38 4 36.36 15 46.88 3 6.67 2 14.29 5 8.47 
5. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
             
2. Adequacy of human resources 
1. Completely 
inadequate 
1 4.76 1 9.09 2 6.25 1 2.22 6 42.86  7 11.86 
2. Inadequate 6 28.57 0 0.00 6 18.75 10 22.22 2 14.29 12 20.34 
3. Adequate 8 38.10 6 54.55 14 43.75 22 48.89 5 35.7 27 45.76 
4. Fully adequate 6 28.57 4 36.36 10 31.25 12 26.67 1 7.14 13 22.03 
5. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
3. Adequacy of technical resources 
1. Completely 
inadequate 
0 0.00 3 27.27 3 9.38 2 4.44 4 28.57 6 10.17 
2. Inadequate 7 33.33 0 0.00 7 21.88 0 0.00 4 28.57 4 6.78 
3. Adequate 8 38.10 5 45.45 13 40.63 6 13.33 2 14.29 8 13.56 
4. Fully adequate 6 28.57 3 27.27 9 28.13 37 82.22 4 28.57 41 69.49 
5. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 00 
4. Weak sanctions against corrupt practices 
1. Completely 
inadequate 
0 0.00 2 18.18 2 6.25 3 6.67 7 50.00 10 16.95 
2. Inadequate 5 23.81 2 18.18 7 21.88 1 2.22 1 7.14 2 3.39 
3. Adequate 8 38.10 5 45.45 13 40.63 7 15.56 3 21.43 10 16.95 
4. Fully adequate 8 38.10 2 18.18 10 31.25 34 75.56 3 21.43 37 62.71 
5. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
7.2.5 External Institutional Factors 
Part 3 (C) of the survey questionnaire intended to assess the external institutional 
factors, which may affect organizational performance. These factors were categorized 
as: policy coordination, policy consistency in implementation, coordination among tiers 
of government, political and bureaucratic interference (C1 & C2 of the questionnaire). 
Then a matrix was used to assess the issues such as political instability, economic 
instability, regime legitimacy, political and bureaucratic support, local context (C3).  
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7.2.5.1 Policy Coordination  
Policy coordination was assessed by focusing on how consistent are policies in 
formulation, implementation and coordination among tiers of government. Table 7-11 
highlights these factors. According to the results (Table 7-11), it was found that policies 
were consistent across all service delivery organizations and CDGs, however, policies 
lacked consistency in implementation and it significantly affected organizational 
performance. 71.8% of the total respondents from EDs and 83.0% of respondents from 
WASAs indicated that policies were ‘very/more inconsistent’ in implementation and it 
had a ‘significant/very significant’ effect on their organizational performance. Likewise, 
respondents were of the view that lack of coordination among tiers affected their 
performance ‘to some extent’.  
Table 7-11: Policy Coordination 
External Institutional 
factors 
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=32) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=59) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
To what extent policies are consistent? 
1. Very inconsistent 1 4.76 1 9.09 2 6.25 7 15.56 5 37.51 12 20.34 
2. More inconsistent 2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 28 62.22 4 28.57 32 54.24 
3. More consistent 7 33.33 6 54.5 13 40.63 7 5.56 3 21.43 10 16.95 
4. Very consistent 11 52.38 4 36.36 15 46.88 3 6.67 2 14.29 5 8.47 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
5. In your opinion, are policies consistent in implementation? 
5. Very inconsistent 1 4.76 1 9.09 2 6.25 1 2.22 6 42.86 7 11.86 
6. More inconsistent 6 28.57 0 0.00 6 18.75 10 22.22 2 14.29 12 20.34 
7. More consistent 8 38.10 6 54.55 14 43.75 22 48.89 5 35.7 27 45.76 
8. Very consistent 6 28.57 4 36.36 10 31.25 12 26.67 1 7.14 13 22.03 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
6. To what extent lack o consistency in policy implementation affect your organizational performance? 
6. Not at all 0 0.00 3 27.27 3 9.38 2 4.44 4 28.57 6 10.17 
7. Not significant 7 33.33 0 0.00 7 21.88 0 0.00 4 28.57 4 6.78 
8. Significant 8 38.10 5 45.45 13 40.63 6 13.33 2 14.29 8 13.56 
9. Very significant 6 28.57 3 27.27 9 28.13 37 82.22 4 28.57 41 69.49 
10. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
7. To what extent lack of coordination among different tiers of government affects your organizational 
performance? 
6. Not at all 2 9.52 1 9.09 3 9.38 1 2.22 0 0.00 1 1.69 
7. To some extent 13 61.90 10 90.91 23 71.8 38 84.44 9 62.29 47 79.66 
8. To a great extent 6 28.57 0 0.00 6 18.75 6 13.33 5 35.71 11 18.64 
9. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
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7.2.5.2 Political and Bureaucratic Interference 
The respondents were also asked to rate the political and bureaucratic interference. The 
survey results found that although political interference was significant across both 
sectors and CDGs, the respondents from WASAs encountered less bureaucratic 
interference (Table 7-12). While the majority (59.3%) of respondents from EDs 
indicated ‘frequent/very frequent’ bureaucratic interference, 30.5% of the respondents 
from WASAs reported that bureaucratic interference was ‘frequent/very frequent’. 
However, a majority of the respondents (76.2%) from WASAs and EDs (75.0%) 
indicated political interference as ‘significant/very significant’ factor in affecting their 
organizational performance.  
Table 7-12: Political and Bureaucratic Interference 
External 
Institutional factors 
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=32) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=59) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
How do you rate the incidence of: 
Political interference 
1. Almost never 0 0.00 1 9.09 1 3.13 2 4.44 0 0.00 2 3.39 
2. Infrequent 2 9.52 5 45.45 7 21.88 11 24.4 1 7.14 12 20.34 
3. Frequent 8 38.10 4 36.36 12 37.50 30 66.67 5 35.71 35 59.32 
4. Very frequent 11 52.38 1 9.09 12 37.50 2 4.44 8 57.14 10 16.95 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
8. Bureaucratic interference 
1. Almost never 2 9.52 2 18.18 4 12.50 10 22.22 3 21.43 13 22.03 
2. Infrequent 4 19.05 5 45.45 9 28.13 25 55.6 3 21.43 28 47.46 
3. Frequent 9 42.86 4 36.36 13 40.63 8 17.78 7 50.00 15 25.42 
4. Very frequent 6 28.57 0 0.00 6 18.75 2 4.44 1 7.14 3 5.08 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
7.2.5.3 Other Institutional Factors and Organizational Performance 
In this part of the external institutional factors, respondents were asked to indicate the 
potential impact of the governance issues, which might affect the organizational 
performance of service delivery organizations. For this purpose, a 5 point-Likert scale 
was developed to assess 6 factors; political instability, regime legitimacy, economic 
instability, political and bureaucratic support, local context, presented in Table 7-13.  
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Table 7-13: Other Institutional Factors and Organizational Performance 
Governance issues Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=32) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total 
(N=59) 
CDGL & 
CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Please rank to what extent following factors are critical for your organizational performance: 
1. Political instability 
1. Not at all/ Not 
significant 
3 14.29 2 18.18 5 15.63 30 66.67 1 7.14 31 52.54 
2. Very significant/ 
Highly significant  
18 85.71 9 81.82 27 84.38 15 33.33 13 92.86 28 7.46 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
2. Regime legitimacy 
1. Not at all/ Not 
significant 
3 14.29 2 18.18 5 15.63 25 55.56 3 21.43 28 47.46 
2. Very significant/ 
Highly significant  
18 85.71 9 81.82 27 84.38 20 44.44 11 78.57 31 52.54 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
3. Economic instability 
1. Not at all/ Not 
significant 
3 14.29 0 0.00 3 9.38 20 44.44 2 14.29 22 37.29 
2. Very significant/ 
Highly significant  
18 85.71 11 100.0 29 90.63 25 55.56 12 85.71 37 62.71 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
4. Lack of political support 
1. Not at all/ Not 
significant 
6 28.57 3 27.27 9 28.13 21 46.67 2 14.29 23 38.98 
2. Very significant/ 
Highly significant  
15 71.43 8 72.73 23 71.88 24 53.33 12 85.71 36 61.02 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
5. Lack of bureaucratic support 
1. Not at all/ Not 
significant 
3 14.29 2 18.18 5 15.63 12 26.67 3 21.43 15 25.42 
2. Very significant/ 
Highly significant  
18 85.71 9 81.8 27 84.38 33 73.33 11 78.57 44 74.58 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
3. Lack of supportive local context 
1. Not at all/ Not 
significant 
4 19.05  0.00 4 12.50 32 71.11 1 7.14 33 55.93 
2. Very significant/ 
Highly significant  
17 80.95  100.0 28 87.50 13 28.89 13 92.86 26 44.07 
Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
Reliability Test 
The overall reliability statistics of this part are presented in Table 7-14. The value of 
Cronbach alpha is .88, the preferable range.  
Table 7-14: Reliability Statistics 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Items 
.883 6 
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According to the result presented in Table 7-13, respondents from the EDs ranked all 
these factors as ‘significant’ to ‘highly significant’ compared to the WASAs. It was also 
found that although these factors were significant in both CDGs and affect 
organizational performance, yet they remained more crucial in CDGL than CDGF. 
Overall, the EDs of both CDGs ranked economic instability (90.6%) as ‘significant’ to 
‘very/highly significant’ factors followed by local context (87.5%), political instability 
(84.4%), regime legitimacy (84.4%), and bureaucratic support (84.4%). Compared to 
this, WASAs of both CDGs ranked bureaucratic support (74.6%) as ‘significant’ to 
‘very/highly significant’ factors followed by economic instability (62.7%), political 
support (61.0%), and regime legitimacy (52.2%). For factors like political instability 
(52.5%) and local context (55.9%), respondents from WASA ranked them as ‘not at 
all/not significant’. On comparing across CDGs, it was found that respondents from 
WASA (CDGL) ranked all these governance issues as ‘significant’ to ‘very/highly 
significant’, for WASA (CDGF), more than 90% of the respondents ranked local 
context and political instability as ‘significant’ to ‘very/highly significant’ followed by 
economic instability (85.7%), political support (85.7%), regime legitimacy (78.6%), 
bureaucratic support (78.6%). While, respondents from WASA (CDGL) ranked local 
context (71.1%), political instability (66.7%), and regime legitimacy (55.6%) as ‘not at 
all/not significant’ factors and bureaucratic support more significant (73.3%) followed 
by economic instability (55.6%) and political support (53.3%). 
7.2.6 Accountability 
This part of the survey findings were derived from Part 4 (A) of the organizational 
survey questionnaire. The results of this part are presented in four tables (Table 7-15 to 
7-18) in order to present data in a more meaningful way. For instance, Part 4-A of the 
survey questionnaire starts with some general questions regarding perceptions of public 
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officials, whether they considered corruption as a serious problem of the public sector 
or of their organization and whether incidents of corruption are reported to the service 
delivery organizations, which is an indication of the grievance procedures of the service 
delivery organization. The results of these survey findings are presented in Table 7-15. 
The later part of this section assessed the traditional accountability arrangements such 
as financial management reporting system (Table 7-16), and record/information 
management system (Table 7-17). Then the results of survey findings with respect to 
other accountability channels such as internal auditing system, the effectiveness of the 
grievance procedures and monitoring committees (as formulated under decentralization 
reforms) are presented in Table 7-18. The last part of this section particularly asked the 
respondents if they considered that the accountability arrangements were overlapping, 
and if it affected their organizational performance.  
7.2.6.1 Incidence of Corruption and its Reporting to Public Officials 
Overall the patterns as discernible from the Table 7-15 suggested that although 65.6% 
of the respondents from the EDs of both CDGs and 71.2 % of the respondents from 
WASAs of both CDGs indicated that corruption was a serious problem of the public 
sector as a whole and perceived that it was ‘to some extent’ a serious problem of their 
organization (53.1% of EDs and 72.9% of WASAs). However, reporting of corruption 
incidents to the public officials was not very frequent. 75% of the respondents from the 
EDs and 84.7% of the WASAs indicated that the incidences of corruption were 
‘occasionally’ reported to the public sector organizations. The extent to which 
communities reported incidents of corruption to the public officials or some other 
channels such as local councillors, media, courts etc. will be further explored through 
the community survey.  
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Table 7-15: Accountability-Corruption Incidence and their Reporting (A) 
Corruption and its 
reporting 
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total (N=32) 
CDGL&CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total (N=59) 
CDGL&CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
To what extent corruption is: 
1. A serious problem of the public sector as a whole? 
1. Not significant  2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
2. Somewhat 
significant 
4 19.05 5 45.45 9 28.13 13 28.89 4 28.57 17 28.81 
3. Significant 4 19.05 4 36.36 8 25.00 28 62.22 4 28.57 32 54.24 
4. Very 
significant 
11 52.38 2 18.18 13 40.63 4 8.89 6 42.86 10 16.9 
5. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
1. Corruption is a problem of your organization? 
1. Not significant  3 14.29 3 27.27 6 18.75 3 6.67 1 7.14 4 6.78 
2. Somewhat 
significant 
8 38.10 3 27.27 11 34.38 33 73.33 6 42.86 39 66.10 
3. Significant 5 23.81 3 27.27 8 25.00 6 13.33 4 28.57 10 16.95 
4. Very 
significant 
5 23.81 2 18.18 7 21.88 3 6.67 3 21.43 6 10.17 
5. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
Are incidents f corruption reported to the public authorities? 
1. Almost never 2 9.52 1 9.09 3 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
2. Occasionally 16 76.19 8 72.73 24 75.00 38 84.44 12 85.71 50 84.75 
3. Frequently 2 9.52 2 18.18 4 12.50 5 11.11 1 7.14 6 10.17 
4. Almost always 1 4.76 0 0.00 1 3.13 2 4.44 1 7.14 3 5.08 
5. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
7.2.6.2 Guidelines for Budget Preparation 
The accountability of the organization also lies in the extent to which financial 
management rules are fully observed by the organizations in budget preparation, and it 
is clear from the Table 7-16 that besides a majority of the respondents were of the view 
that they had clear guidelines for budget preparation, 65.6% of the respondents from the 
EDs indicated that they followed these rules ‘fully’, compared to this majority of the 
respondents from WASAs (54.2%) indicating that these guidelines were ‘partially’ 
followed.  
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Table 7-16: Accountability - Guidelines for Budget Preparation (B) 
Financial 
Management 
Reporting System 
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total (N=32) 
CDGL&CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total (N=59) 
CDGL&CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Guidelines for budget preparation 
1. Do you have clear guidelines for budget preparation 
1. Yes  18 85.7 10 90.91 28 87.50 38 84.44 4 28.57 42 71.19 
2. Not at all/not 
significant 
3 14.29 1 9.09 4 12.50 7 15.56 10 71.43 17 28.81 
3. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
2. Are these guidelines followed? 
6. Not at all  2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 4 8.89 7 50.00 11 18.64 
7. Partially 5 23.81 4 36.36 9 28.13 29 64.44 3 21.43 32 54.24 
8. Fully 14 66.67 7 63.64 21 65.63 12 26.67 4 28.57 16 27.12 
9. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
7.2.6.3 Maintenance of Records / Information Management 
This comprised of the existence of information management system, reliability of 
information in the organization, access to records, and provision of information to the 
end users (Table 7-17). The majority of the respondents from both sectors indicated that 
they had an information management system and it was ‘moderately’ reliable. They also 
reported that information was disseminated to the public. As far as the dissemination of 
information to the public is concerned, the community was also asked to indicate ease 
of access to information from the service delivery organizations. Therefore, in the 
discussion chapter information provided by the organizational respondents and 
community can be triangulated to better understand the availability of information to the 
public.  
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Table 7-17: Accountability - Record Management (C) 
Record 
Management  
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total (N=32) 
CDGL&CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total (N=59) 
CDGL&CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Record management: 
1. Existence o a Management Information System (MS/HRMMIS) 
1. Yes  17 80.95 11 100.00 28 87.50 39 86.67 5 35.71 44 74.5 
2. No 4 19.05 0 0.00 4 12.50 6 13.33 9 64.29 15 25.42 
3. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
2. How reliable is the information? 
1. Not reliable 
at all  
1 4.76 0 0.00 1 3.13 0 0.00 1 7.14 1 1.69 
2. Partially 
reliable 
4 19.05 5 45.45 9 28.13 11 24.44 5 35.71 16 27.12 
3. Moderately 
reliable  
13 61.90 4 36.36 17 53.13 31 68.89 7 50.00 38 64.41 
4. Fully reliable 3 14.29 2 18.18 5 15.63 3 6.67 1 7.14 4 6.78 
5. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
3. How easy is to access records? 
1. Extremely 
difficult 
1 4.76 0 0.00 1 3.13 0 0.00 1 7.14 1 1.69 
2. Difficult 9 42.86 3 27.27 12 37.57 5 11.11 4 28.57 9 15.25 
3. Easy 10 47.62 8 72.73 18 56.25 40 88.89 7 50.00 47 79.66 
4. Very easy 1 4.76 0 0.00 1 3.13 0 0.00 2 14.29 2 3.39 
5. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
4. Dissemination f information to the public 
1. Yes 19 90.48 11 100.00 30 93.75 44 97.78 10 71.43 54 91.53 
2. No 2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 1 2.22 4 28.57 5 8.47 
3. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
7.2.6.4 Other Accountability Channels 
The results of these survey findings are presented in Table 7-18 . This part presents 
findings related to the effectiveness of grievance procedures, internal audit system, and 
impact of monitoring committees on organization performance. It was found that the 
majority of respondents of both CDGs considered that grievance procedures were very 
efficient except for WASA (CDGL) as 50% of the respondents from WASA (CDGL) 
indicated their grievance procedure as ‘inefficient’, and 50% as ‘efficient’. With respect 
to the internal audit system, the majority of respondents were of the opinion that it was 
‘effective’ in ensuring compliance to procedures, and monitoring committees were 
playing an effective role in improving organizational performance. Comparing sectors 
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across CDGs, it was found that more than 70% of the respondents from the EDs of both 
CDGs indicated that internal audit was ‘effective/very effective’. From WASA 
(CDGF), 81.8% of the respondents indicated these procedures as ‘effective/very 
effective’, while only 42.9% of the respondents from WASA (CDGL) indicated internal 
audit as ‘effective /very effective’.   
Table 7-18: Accountability (D) 
Accountability   Education Departments  
(EDs) 
Water and Sanitation Agencies 
(WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total (N=32) 
CDGL&CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total (N=59) 
CDGL&CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
1. Do you have efficient grievance/complaint procedures? 
4. Yes  18 85.71 9 81.82 27 84.38 41 91.11 7 50.00 48 81.36 
5. No 
3 14.29 2 18.18 5 15.63 4 8.89 7 50.00 11 18.64 
6. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
2. How effective is the internal audit in ensuring compliance to internal control system? 
6. Ineffective  4 19.05 0 0.00 4 12.50 2 4.44 1 7.14 3 5.08 
7. Partially 
effective  
6 28.57 5 45.45 11 34.38 2 4.44 8 57.1 10 16.95 
8. Effective   9 42.86 5 45.45 14 43.75 34 75.56 5 35.71 39 66.10 
9. Very effective 3 14.29 1 9.09 4 12.50 7 15.56 0 0.00 7 11.86 
10. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
3. To what extent monitoring committees are playing an effective role in improving organizational 
performance? 
11. Ineffective  4 19.05 0 0.00 4 12.50 2 4.44 1 7.14 0 5.08 
12. Partially 
effective  
5 23.81 5 45.45 10 31.25 2 4.44 8 57.14 10 16.95 
13. Effective   9 42.86 5 45.45 14 43.75 34 75.56 5 35.71 39 66.10 
14. Very effective 3 14.29 1 9.09 4 12.50 7 15.56 0 0.00 7 11.86 
6. Total 21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
4. To what extent multiple accountability arrangements affect your performance? 
4. Not significant 
at all 
2 9.52 0 0.00 2 6.25 2 4.44 3 21.43 5 8.47 
5. Significant 17 80.95 10 90.91 27 84.38 40 88.89 8 57.14 48 81.36 
6. Very 
significant 
2 9.52 1 9.09 3 9.38 3 6.67 3 21.43 6 10.17 
7. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
In sum, findings related to the accountability arrangements reflected that CDGs had 
better accountability channels such as efficient complaints cell/grievance procedures, 
internal audit system, and effective monitoring committees.  
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7.2.7 Comparison of Organizational Performance Before and After 
Decentralization 
At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to compare performance 
improvement before and after decentralization (Table 7-19). The overall percentages 
remained higher for CDGL than CDGF with the exception of the Education Department 
(CDGF). 90.9% of the respondents from CDGF indicated that organizational 
performance was ‘a little better/ much better’ than before compared to the Education 
Department (71.4%), CDGL. 
Table 7-19: Comparison of Organizational Performance Pre and Post Devolution 
Pre-post 
performance 
Education Departments (EDs) Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total (N=32) 
CDGL&CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total (N=59) 
CDGL&CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
How would you compare your organizational performance before and after decentralization? 
1. Much worse 2 9.52 1 9.09 3 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
2. No change  4 19.05 0 0.00 4 12.50 4 42.86 6 42.86 10 16.95 
3. A little 
better/much 
better 
15 71.43 10 90.91 25 78.13 41 57.14 8 57.14 49 83.05 
4. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
7.2.7.1 Main Issues of Service Delivery Organization 
At the end of the survey questionnaire, respondents were asked an open-ended question 
to rank their main organizational issues. These were coded for SPSS analysis and 
detailed themes are presented in Tables 7-21 & 7-22. According to Table 7-20, the 
Education Department, CDGL (47.6%) indicated political interference as their main 
concern. While Education Department, CDGF, (54.5%) reported insufficient resources 
as their main issue. WASA, CDGL (55.5%) indicated poor incentive structure as their 
main issues, while WASA, CDGF (64.2%) reported that their main issue was 
insufficient resources. 
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Table 7-20: Main Issues of Service Delivery Organizations 
Main issues Education Departments  
(EDs) 
Water and Sanitation Agencies  
(WASAs) 
 CDGL CDGF Total (N=32) 
CDGL&CDGF 
CDGL CDGF Total (N=59) 
CDGL&CDGF 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
What are the main issues of your organization? 
1. Information 
management 
1 4.76 0 0.00 1 3.13 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
2. Less 
autonomy 
1 4.76 1 9.09 2 6.25 2 4.44 0 0.00 2 3.39 
3. Insufficient 
resources 
4 19.05 6 54.55 10 31.25 7 15.56 9 64.29 16 27.12 
4. Political 
interference 
10 47.62 0 0.00 10 31.25 7 15.56 1 7.14 8 13.56 
5. Lack of 
implementatio
n   of policies  
2 9.52 1 9.09 3 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
6. Lack of 
professional 
training 
2 9.52 1 9.09 3 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
7. Incentive 
structure 
0 0.00 1 9.09 1 3.13 25 55.6 2 14.29 27 45.76 
8. Illiterate 
community 
1 4.76 0 0.00 1 3.13 1 2.22 1 7.14 2 3.39 
9. Lack of 
coordination 
0 0.00 1 9.09 1 3.13 1 2.22 1 7.14 2 3.39 
10. Employees 
union   
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 4.44 0 0.00 2 3.39 
11. None  0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.22 0 0.00 1 1.69 
12. Total  21 100 11 100 32 100 45 100 14 100 59 100 
 
7.2.7.2 Key Themes from Open-Ended Questions 
Some of the key themes and quotations of the respondent in response to the open-ended 
question (Part 3-E) are presented in Table 7-21. 
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Table 7-21: Key Themes from the Managers of Education Departments 
Education Departments (EDs)  
City District Government Lahore (CDGL) City District Government Faislabad 
(CDGF) 
 “…the main issue is that maximum time is spent 
on collecting information form schools and the 
original work which is monitoring of schools 
performance is ignored. If we want to improve the 
system, we should concentrate on inspection of the 
service delivery”. DEO, SE 
 “DEOs should be fully empowered to exercise 
their powers of transfers, making budgets, 
empowered to facilitate their supervisory staff and 
monitoring the building and construction projects 
of schools under supervision”  
 “We have issues like compromising behaviour on 
critical issues, corruption, unprofessional attitude, 
lack of professional training in main dimensions. 
Pre service and in-service training can play an 
important role to minimize the above issues”  
 “….Corruption, following superior’s orders is the 
most important requirement of this job. This post 
is assumed to be a corrupt post”.  
 “The main issues are political interference, lack of 
uniformity in education system, lack of basic 
facilities in rural areas”.  
 “Political interference should be eliminated from 
educational institutions, performance should be 
linked with merit and political patronage in 
employment should be eradicated”. 
 “We do not have vehicle to monitor schools, I can 
not monitor all the schools as I do not have 
transportation facility and have to use a public 
transport. Monitoring teams from the provincial 
government also interfere in our work”. 
 
 “Political pressures, lack of enough funds. More 
finances should be provided to improve the 
situation”  
 “Political involvement at the upper level 
 We need to eradicate the misuse of resources for 
the betterment of national interest”. 
 The reforms are made but the way of 
implementation is not proper. 
 
 “Faulty implementation of policies, capacity 
building efforts is needed. We need to have a 
proper system of check and balance and every 
person should be accountable”.  
 “Performance should not be related to 
seniority of a person, it should be linked with 
how well a person is performing”. 
 “Political pressures, missing facilities” 
 “Adequate resources should be provided”  
 “Missing facilities in rural areas, teacher 
attendance in rural areas is poor”.  
 “Lack of coordination among staff and higher 
authorities” 
  
 
 
Some of the quotations from the Water and Sanitation Agency of CDGL and CDGF are 
illustrated in Table 7-22.  
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Table 7-22: Key Themes from the Managers of WASAs 
Water And Sanitation Agecnies (WASAs) 
City District Government Lahore 
(CDGL)   
City District Government Faislabad (CDGF) 
 
 Political interference, labour union, financial 
instability”. 
 “Shortage of training staff, lack of training. 
Performance of staff can be improved by 
providing training to the staff”.  
 “Performance of our organization is highly 
affected due to centralized powers, unrealistic 
salary structure, political interference and 
economic instability. Powers should be 
decentralized and service rules should be 
improved, political interference should be 
minimized”. 
 “Political interference and economic instability 
 Merit based system, no favouritism”. 
 “Lack of key performance indicators, reward 
must be linked with performance of the 
officers”. 
 “Poor incentive structure, reward and 
promotions should be linked with performance. 
Powers are centralized. We need a market 
based salary to improve employee’s motivation 
and performance”.  
 “Rationalization of tariff to make WASA as a 
sustainable organization. “ 
 “Shortage of workers, slow promotions of 
staff, hindrance of staff transfers due to internal 
and external sectors, no staff training 
opportunities. 
 We need fresh induction of qualified staff, 
promotion of deserving staff, and resolution of 
financial crises by revising tariff structure as a 
long term policy”.  
 “Lack of autonomy. The organization should 
have its independent board of directors, a 
regulatory framework, and tariff revision 
mechanisms and avoid multi-layering reporting 
lines and decision making process”. 
 “Lack of coordination between different 
agencies responsible for city development,--- 
proper coordination mechanisms should be 
devised to avoid duplication of work and 
improve the process of problem solving”. 
 
 “Public awareness campaigns regarding usage 
of water supply, sewage and drainage system 
in Lahore”.  
 “Financial sustainability is the main issue of 
WASA which has immense effects on WAS’s 
capabilities to manage its system and liquidate 
liabilities of electricity bills. We need to have 
100% metering, tariff revision to avoid adverse 
financial crises of WASA on urgent basis.”  
  
 
 “Interference of elected representatives, lack of 
capacity building measure, adhocism, dual 
charge arrangements (one person performing the 
role of two jobs), computer illiteracy. 
 Poor promotion structure”. 
 
 “Lack of public awareness” 
 “Financial constraints, lack of promotions 
opportunities, we need to have performance 
based promotions system” 
 “we are facing issues like lack of technical staff, 
lack of resources, undue delay in promotions, no 
autonomy in tariff revision, political interference 
in postings and transfers. And no recovery of 
service charges” 
 “we lack performance based incentive structure, 
frequent political interference in development 
schemes, lack of technical staff on key posts, 
delay in promotions, unwillingness of staff to 
work in field as there are no bonuses attached to 
it, low recovery of WASA charges. We should 
hire technical staff on merit based competitive 
salaries, outsourcing of revenue recovery of 
service charges, incentives for operation and 
maintenance and recovery staff, salaries of staff 
should be increased”. 
 “Scarcity of resources, low pay scale, procedural 
complications, non coordination of community, 
shortage of staff and transportation for field 
officials. We need to provide training of 
employees of most advanced techniques, human 
and financial resources”.  
 “Illiterate community, no training of the 
employees”. 
 Inadequate human and financial resources, 
complicated procedures, less community 
assistance, lack of training. We need to initiate 
community awareness campaigns and improve 
financial and human resources”.  
 We do not have merit, accountability of staff, 
and discipline. Influence of corrupt practices. 
We need to make rules, policy procedures to 
perform different functions and ensure simple 
implementation, initiatives to start 
accountability process”. 
 “Third validation is not available, rewards and 
punishment system is not in place, contractual 
and temporary assignments. Performance based 
rewards system should be introduced”. 
 “Obsolete machinery and defective sewerage 
lines”. 
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7.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Statistical tests were performed in order to rule out the possibility that test results were 
due to random variation in the study sample. For this purpose, as explained in the 
methodology chapter, non-parametric tests – Mann-Whitney U tests and Chi-square 
tests for independence were performed. In this section, the results of significance tests 
are presented in the form of ‘Summary Statistics Table’ format, providing the value p, 
and detailed tables are attached in the appendix (Appendix 3). However, while 
interpreting the results of this section, one needs to be cautious as the total sample size 
consisted of only 105 managers, which in turn may have some impact on the statistical 
analysis performed. According to Bryman (2012) the maximum level of significance (p) 
should be less than or equal to .05 in order to be significant. Therefore, the researcher 
has used p value equal to or less than .05 in order to report more robust findings, and in 
the case of Chi-square tests, the researcher has reported ‘Yates continuity correction 
value’ as this value corrects the overestimation of the Chi-square value (Pallant 2010).  
7.3.1 Extent of Managerial Autonomy 
The researcher’s main interest was to determine ‘are the differences in the exercise of 
managerial autonomy statistically significant?’, therefore based on the researchers' 
interest, a Mann-Whitney U test was performed. The main sample variable was type of 
Local Government (referred to as LGs or CDGs) and type of service delivery 
organizations (referred to as Sectors in this section). Therefore, indicators of managerial 
autonomy are compared across these two variables and are discussed in the next section.  
238 
 
Comparing managerial autonomy across sectors and local governments 
Table 7-2 has highlighted some significant trends in the previous sections. However, to 
find out whether these differences in managerial autonomy were statistically significant 
across Sectors or Local Government (LG), a non-parametric test - Mann-Whitney U test 
was employed. This will determine if there is any statistical significant variation 
regarding managerial autonomy or discretion across CDGL or Sectors.  In order to have 
a meaningful presentation of Mann-Whitney U tests, the results of these tests are 
presented in a summarized form in Table 7-23 & Table 7-24. Analysis of the data, 
applying the Mann-Whitney test, revealed that there were no statistically significant 
differences across type of CDG regarding the exercise of managerial autonomy as 
indicated by the summary Table 7-23 and Mean Rank table (Appendix 3, Table 3-1). 
The test statistics Table 7-23 also indicated that the value of ‘Z’ and significance level 
‘p’ is not significant for all the variables of managerial autonomy across CDGs.  
Table 7-23: Mann-Whitney U Test Statistics Summary for Managerial Autonomy
a 
Managerial autonomy over: Median 
(CDGL) 
Median 
(CDGF) 
Z Mann Whitney 
p value 
1 Hiring of personnel 2 3 -0.48  0.62 
2 Firing of personnel 3 2 -0.02 0.97 
3 Promotion 2 2 -0.41 0.68 
4 Transfers 3 1 -0.89 0.37 
5 Setting compensation 2 1 -0.33 0.73 
6 Career development 2 3 -1.59 0.11 
7 Resource allocation 2 3 -1.25 0.20 
8 Procurement 3 3 -0.069 0.94 
9 Budget execution 2 4 -1.28 0.20 
10 Resource mobilization 2 3 -1.45 0.14 
a. Grouping variable: city district government; 2=not significant; 3=significant; F=Faisalabad; 
L=Lahore  
A Mann-Whitney U test (Table 7-23) revealed no significant differences in the level of 
financial autonomy across Sectors as the significance level ‘p’ is not less than or equal 
to 5% level of significance. The results of Mann-Whitney tests comparing sectors are 
presented in table 7-24.  
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Table 7-24: Mann-Whitney U Test Summary Statistics for Managerial Autonomy
a 
Managerial autonomy over: Median (EDs) Median(WASAs) Z Mann Whitney    
p value 
Hiring of personnel 2 3 -1.54 0.12 
Firing of personnel 2 3 -2.47 0.01* 
Promotion 2 2 -2.17 0.03* 
Transfers 1 3 -4.57 0.00** 
Setting compensation 1 2 -1.61 0.10 
Career development 3 2 -0.15 0.88 
Resource allocation 2 3 -0.16 0.87 
Procurement  3 3 -0.21 0.83 
Budget execution 3 2 -1.12 0.25 
Resource mobilization 3 2 -1.45 0.14 
       a.Grouping variable: service delivery organizations; 1=not at all 2=not significant; 3=significant 
         p** 1% significance level; p* 5% significance level 
 
According to the Mann Whitney U test (Table 7-24) there were significant differences 
across sectors with respect to the managerial autonomy over firing of personnel (p = 
.01), promotion (p = .03), and transfers of personnel (p = .00). For these variables, 
WASA had a median ‘3’ (indicating ‘significant’) for managerial autonomy over firing, 
promotion and transfer. The Mean Ranks table (Appendix 3, Table 3-3) also indicated 
that Mean Ranks values were higher for WASA compared to EDs. 
7.3.2 Chi- square Test for Independence to Explore the Association Between 
Participation and Type of City District Governments (CDGs) or Sectors 
In order to explore the association between participation and CDGs/Sectors, a Chi-
square test was performed. For the statistical analysis, the response categories were re-
coded by reducing their four categorical responses into two. The categories ‘no change’ 
and ‘not significant’ were reduced and recoded to category ‘1’. And likewise, categories 
‘significant’ and ‘very significant’ were reduced and recoded as ‘2’. The results of Chi-
square tests for independence are displayed in Table 7-25.  
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Table 7-25: Summary statistics of Chi-Square test for independence 
Indicators of participation comparing groups N Yates continuity 
correction value 
Significance value 
p  
Comparing CDGs and level of participation 91 4.94                =.01* 
Comparing Sectors and level of participation 91                 =0.741 
Comparing CDGs and the impact of participation on 
performance improvements 
91 5.32                =.02* 
Comparing Sectors and the impact of participation on 
performance improvements 
91 0.73                =.39 
   1
As the chi square assumption is violated, therefore, a Fisher Exact Probability Test is used (Pallant, 
2007). 
   p* 5% significance level 
Level of Participation 
According to the summary statistics Table 7-25 (for detail see Appendix 3, Table 3-5 & 
3-6), no significant differences were found across Sectors with respect to the level of 
participation. The value of the Fisher exact test was higher than .05 indicating no 
association between the level of participation and type of service delivery organizations. 
Overall, cross tabulation (Appendix 3, Table 3-5) also revealed that both organizations 
indicated ‘significant/very significant’ level of community participation, however, 
WASAs (88.1%) had a slightly higher percentage compared to the Education 
Departments (84.4%). This suggested that both Sectors had significant participation of 
the community in service provision. However, the Chi-square test results revealed that 
there was an association between level of participation and type of CDG at 5% 
significance level. According to the cross tabulation (Appendix 3, Table 3-7), the 
CDGL had a significantly higher proportion of respondents (92.4%) than CDGF (72.0 
%) indicating a ‘significant/very significant’ level of participation. 
Impact of Community Participation on Organizational Performance  
According to Table 7-25, the Chi-square value (with Yates Continuity Correction) 
indicated that there was a statistically significant association between type of CDGs and 
impact of participation on organizational performance at 5% significance level. 
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According to the cross tabulation, (Appendix- Table 3-9), a significantly higher 
proportion of respondents (87.9%) from CDGL indicated ‘significant/very significant’ 
impact on performance compared to the respondents from CDGF (64%). While, the 
Chi-square test (for detail see appendix 3, Table 3-12) was not significant between 
‘Impact on the performance’ and ‘Sectors’, as the significance level was not less than or 
equal to .05. This section has indicated that there was a statistically significant 
association between ‘participation’ and ‘type of CDG’, which seems higher for CDGL 
compared to CDGF. Therefore, it indicates that community is more actively engaged in 
service delivery in CDGL. 
7.3.3 Exploring the Association Between Performance Management System and 
Type of City District Governments (CDGs) or Sectors  
In order to investigate the association between variables of performance management 
system and the type of CDGs/Sectors, the Chi-square tests for independence were 
employed. Table 7-26 presents the summarized overview of the test statistics (for detail 
see Appendix 3, Table 3-17- Table 3-34). 
Table 7-26: Summary Statistics of Chi-square Test for Independence 
Indicators for performance management system N Yates continuity 
correction value 
Significanc
e value p 
Comparing CDGs and documented work performance standards 91 10.20 =.001** 
Comparing sectors and documented work performance standards 91 2.25 =.13 
Comparing CDGs and setting of performance targets 91 1.31 =.25 
Comparing sectors and setting of performance targets 91 13.42 =.000** 
Comparing CDGs and the importance placed on achievement of performance 
standards (a) 
91 
7.94 =.005** 
Comparing sectors and achievement of performance standards (a) 91  =.091 
Comparing CDGs and achievement of performance standards(b) 91 3.32 = .06 
Comparing sectors and achievement of performance standards (b) 91 0.01 =.90 
Comparing CDGs and presence of performance based incentive structure 91 
0.79 = .37 
Comparing sectors and presence of performance based incentive structure 91 6.33 =.01* 
Comparing CDGs and are individuals rewarded on performance 91 0.00 =1 .00 
Comparing sectors and are individuals rewarded on performance 91 24.10 = .000** 
1
As the chi square assumption is violated, therefore, a Fisher Exact Probability Test is used instead. 
P** 1% significance level; p* 5% significance level 
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Documented Work Performance Standards  
A Chi-square test (with Yates continuity correction), as presented in Table 7-26, 
indicated a statistically significant association between type of CDGs and document 
work performance standards at 1% significance level. Table 7-6 indicated that 86.4% of 
respondents from CDGL reported that they had clear documented work performance 
standards compared to 52% of CDGF. A Chi-square test to identify an association 
between documented work performance standards and Sectors did not find any 
statistical significant association between the two categorical variables.  
Setting of Performance Targets 
For the statistical analysis categories ‘fully’ to ‘partially’ (3 & 1) were re-coded into ‘1- 
(fully/partially)’. A Chi-square test (with Yeats continuity correction) as indicated in 
Table 7-26 found a strong statistical association between Sectors and the setting of 
performance at 1% significance level. This means that the proportion of respondents 
indicating the setting of performance standards at the start of every year as either ‘fully’ 
or ‘partially’ is significantly different across Sectors. The cross tabulation (see 
Appendix 3, Table 3-20) indicated that 87.5% respondents from the Education 
Departments said that they had a system where performance standards were set between 
supervisors and employees at the start of every year compared to 45.8% from WASAs. 
Whereas only 12.5% respondents from the Education Departments said that, they did 
not have such a system in place for the setting of performance standards compared to 
54.2% from WASA. However, a Chi-square test for independence comparing CDG and 
the setting of performance standards showed no significant association between the two 
variables. 
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The Importance Placed on the Achievement of Performance Standards (a) 
For the statistical purpose, the researcher reduced the categories 1 & 2
7
 to 1 
(fully/partially). According to Table 7-26, a Chi-square test (with Yates Continuity 
Correction) comparing CDGs and achievement of performance standards showed 
significant association between the two variables at 1% significance level. According to 
the cross tabulation (see Appendix 3, Table 3-26) 95.5% of respondents from CDGL 
district indicated ‘full/partial’ achievement of targets and 72.0% of the respondents 
from CDGF indicated that targets were “fully/partially” achieved. However, there were 
no significant differences across Sectors as the value of Fisher Exact Test was not less 
than .05. 
Achievement of Performance Standards (b) 
For the statistical purpose, the researcher reduced the categories from 4 to 2
8
 . However, 
a Chi-square test (with Yates Continuity Correction) examining the potential significant 
differences in the proportion of respondents across CDGs and Sectors regarding the 
achievement of performance standards (Table 7-26), indicated no significant association 
between the two variables (for detail see Appendix 3, Table 3-24 & Table 3-25). 
However, according to the cross tabulation (Appendix 3, Table 3-23) there were 
differences in respondents (52.0% of CDGF) indicating achievement of standards 
‘above 50%’ to those indicating ‘less than 50.0%’ (71.2% of CDGL).  
Incentive Structure 
A Chi-square test (with Yates Continuity Correction) examined the likelihood of the 
existence of a performance based reward system across Sectors/CDGs. The Chi-square 
                                                 
7 1=fully, 2= partially to 1 (fully/partially) 
8 Categories ; less than 25% -25%-50%=1 & 51%-75%- 76%-100%=2 
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test (Table 7-26) indicated a significant association between the two variables at 1% 
significance level (for details see Appendix 3, Table 3-33). The cross tabulation 
(Appendix 3, Table 3-29) indicated the Education Departments (56.3%) had 
performance based incentive structure, while 72.9% of the total respondents from 
WASAs indicated the lack of performance based incentive structure. While the Chi-
square test (with Yates Continuity Correction) between CDGs and existence of 
performance based reward systems as shown in Table 7-26 showed no significant 
association between the two variables (for details see Appendix 3, Table 3-31).  
The association between the ‘individuals are rewarded on the basis of performance’ and 
‘Sectors’ was also investigated through a Chi-square test for independence (Table 7-26). 
Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) comparing 
‘Sectors’ and ‘performance based incentive’ indicated a significant association between 
the two variables at 1% significance level as indicated in Table 7-26. A cross tabulation 
(Appendix 3, Table 3-32) also showed significant differences across sectors. A 
significant majority of respondents from the Education Departments (68.8%) indicated 
that individuals were rewarded based on performance, while 84.7% of the total 
respondents from WASAs indicated that individuals were not rewarded on performance. 
However, there was no statistical significant association between CDG and rewarding 
individuals on performance (Appendix 3, Table 3-34).  
Comparing factors of Resource Leakage across City District Governments and 
Sectors 
 A Mann-Whitney test was employed to assess differences across CDGs and Sectors. 
According to the test results Table 7-27, a Mann-Whitney U test revealed significant 
differences with respect to weak sanctions against corrupt practices and resource 
leakage at 5% significance level across CDGs. The summary of the Mean Ranks (see 
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for detail Appendix 3, 3-38) indicated that this factor was more significant in CDGF 
compared to CDGL. Across Sectors, significant differences were revealed with respect 
to unclear rules for financial accounting and weak internal and external practices of 
auditing at 5% and 1% significance level respectively. The Mean Ranks (Appendix 3, 
Table 3-40) and Median values in Table 7-27 indicated that these factors were more 
significant in the Education Departments compared to WASAs. 
Table 7-27: Summary Statistics for Mann-Whitney Test
a 
FACTORS FOR RESOURCE LEAKAGE Median 
(EDs) 
Median 
(WASAs) 
Z Mann 
Whitne
y  
p value 
1. Unclear rules for financial accounting are a significant factor for 
resource leakage 
3 2 -2.00 0.04* 
2. Lack of capacity to account for budgeting resources for resource 
leakage 
3 3 -.44 0.65 
3. Weak internal and external auditing practices are a significant 
factor for resource leakage 
3 2 -2.70 
0.00*
* 
4. Weak sanctions against corrupt practices are significant factors 
for resource leakage 
3 2 -1.53 0.12 
a. Grouping variable type of city district governments; 3=significant; 2=not significant 
p** 1% significance level; p* 5% significance level 
 
7.3.4 Comparing Differences Across CDGs and Sectors Regarding Adequacy of 
Resources 
To find out the differences, a Mann-Whitney test was performed across CDGs and 
Sectors. According to the test results, a Mann-Whitney U test (Table 7-28) revealed 
there were significant differences with respect to the adequacy of ‘technical resources’ 
and ‘infrastructure’ across CDGs at 1% significance level. The summary of the Mean 
Ranks (Appendix 3, Table 3-41) and Median values in Table 7-28 indicated that these 
factors were more significant in CDGL compared to CDGF.  
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Table 7-28: Mann Whitney Test Statistics for Adequacy of Resources
a 
RESOURCE ADEQUACY Median 
(CDGL) 
Median 
(CDGF) 
Z Mann Whitney    
p value 
Financial Resources 3 2 -.46 0.64 
Human Resources 3 3 -1.41 0.15 
Technical Resources 3 4 -3.65 0.00** 
Infrastructure 3 4 -4.22 0.00** 
     a.  Grouping variable: type of City District governments 
    p** 1% significance level; p* 5% significance level 
 
Across Sectors, significant differences were revealed with respect to the adequacy of 
‘financial resources’, ‘technical resources’ and ‘infrastructure’ at 1%, 1%, and 5% 
significance level respectively. The Mean Ranks (Appendix 3, Table 3-43) indicated 
that Mean ranks for adequacy of financial resources was higher in Education 
Departments while WASAs had higher Mean Ranks for technical and infrastructure. 
This is also shown by the Median values as displayed in Table 7-29 . 
Table 7-29: Mann-Whitney Test Statistics Summary
a 
RESOURCE ADEQUACY Median 
(EDs) 
Median 
(WASAs) 
Z Mann Whitney    
p value 
1. To what extent your organization have adequate 
financial resources 
2 3 -5.28 0.00** 
2. To what extent your organization has adequate 
human resources 
3 3 -1.07 0.28 
3. To what extent your organization has adequate 
technical resources 
4 3 -3.21 0.00** 
4. To what extent your organization has adequate 
infrastructure 
4 3 -2.09 0.03* 
a. Grouping variable: type of service delivery organizations; 2=inadequate; 3=adequate; 4=completely adequate 
p** 1% significance level; p* 5% significance level 
7.3.5 Chi- square Test for Independence for Policy Consistency and Political and 
Bureaucratic Interference 
Consistency in Policy Formulation and Implementation and Coordination among 
Tiers of Government 
In order to explore differences across CDGs and Sectors, Chi-square tests were 
performed (Appendix 3, Tables 3-48, 3-49, 3-50). However, the Chi-square results 
indicated no statistical difference regarding policy consistency, policy implementation, 
and coordination among tiers. 
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Political and Bureaucratic Interference  
The association between the ‘Political and bureaucratic interference’ and CDGs/ Sectors 
was investigated through the Chi-square test for independence. A Chi-square test (with 
Yates Continuity Correction) comparing CDGs and political interference found no 
statistically significant association between the two variables (Appendix 3, 3-47). 
However, there was a significant association between ‘bureaucratic interference’ and 
‘Sectors’ at the 1% significance level (Appendix 3, Table 3-46). The cross tabulation 
(Appendix 3, Table 3-45) also highlighted that 59.4% of respondents from the 
Education Department indicated ‘frequent/very frequent’ bureaucratic interference, 
while 76.3% of the total respondents from WASAs indicated that there was 
‘infrequent/not at all’ bureaucratic interference.  
7.3.6 Comparing Differences Across City District Governments (CDGs) and 
Sectors regarding Institutional Factors 
In order to examine the potential differences regarding institutional factors CDGs and 
Sectors, Mann-Whitney U tests were performed. A Mann-Whitney U test (Table 7-30) 
revealed that there were no significant differences across Sectors regarding lack of 
political support and local context. However, test statistics revealed that there were 
significant differences regarding political instability (1% significance level), regime 
legitimacy (1% significance level), and economic instability (5% significance level) 
across Sectors. Mean Rank Table (Appendix 3, Table 3-51) and Median values, as 
displayed in Table 7-30, revealed that Mean rank values were higher for the Education 
Departments than WASA.  
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Table 7-30: Mann-Whitney test statistics
a 
Institutional Factors Median 
(EDs) 
Median 
(WASAs) 
Z Mann-
Whitney  p 
value 
To what extent political instability affects your 
organizational performance 
4 2 -3.33 0.00** 
To what extent regime legitimacy affects your 
organizational performance 
4 3 -3.59 0.00** 
To what extent economic instability affects your 
organizational performance 
4 3 -2.21 0.02* 
To what extent lack of political support affects your 
organizational performance 
3 3 -1.34 0.17 
To what extent lack of bureaucratic support affects your 
organizational performance 
3 3 -1.78 .07 
To what extent lack of supportive local context affects 
your organizational performance 
4 2 -4.02 .00** 
a.Grouping variable: type of service delivery organization; 4=very significant; 3=significant; 2=not 
significant 
p** 1% significance level; p* 5% significance level 
 
A Mann-Whitney U test (Table 7-31) comparing CDGs revealed that there were 
significant differences in the level of institutional factors affecting CDGs. The Mann-
Whitney U test statistic indicated that differences were for political instability (1% 
significance level), regime legitimacy (5% significance level), economic instability (1% 
significance level), lack of political support (1% significance level), bureaucratic 
support (5% significance level), lack of supportive local context (1% significance level). 
However, Median values (Table 7-31) and Mean Ranks (Appendix 3, Table 3-53) 
indicated that Means were higher for CDGF compared to CDGL.  
Table 7-31:  Mann-Whitney Test Statistics
a 
Institutional Factors Median 
(CDGL) 
Median 
(CDGF) 
Z Mann 
Whitney  p 
value 
To what extent political instability affects your organizational 
performance 
2 4 -2.44 0.01* 
To what extent regime legitimacy affects your organizational 
performance 
3 3 -2.44 0.02* 
To what extent economic instability affects your organizational 
performance 
3 4 -3.28 0.00** 
To what extent lack of political support affects your 
organizational performance 
3 4 -2.82 0.00** 
To what extent lack of bureaucratic support affects your 
organizational performance 
3 4 -2.19 .02* 
To what extent lack of supportive local context affects your 
organizational performance 
2 4 -3.77 .00** 
a.Grouping variable: type of local governments; 4=very significant; 3=significant; 2=not significant 
p** 1% significance level; p* 5% significance level 
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7.3.7 Exploring Associations Among Variables of Accountability Arrangements 
Across Local Government and Sectors 
 Financial guidelines and their practice: a Chi-square test was performed to find 
out any statistical difference across type of CDGs and type of Sectors for 
financial management rules and their practices, there were no differences across 
both variables (Appendix 3, Tables 3-61 & 3-62).  
 Reliability of information: a Chi-square test was employed to determine 
whether there was any significant association between Sectors and the type of 
CDG regarding reliability of the information. The results indicated no significant 
difference across CDGs and Sectors (Appendix 3, Tables 3-58 & 3-60).  
 Access to information: a Chi-square test to assess the association between 
‘access to information’ across Sectors and CDGs (Appendix 3, Table 3-56) 
found significant differences across Sectors at 5% significance level. The cross 
tabulation indicated that WASA (83.1%) had an easy access to information than 
Education Departments (59.4%). There were no differences across CDGs.  
 Monitoring committees and organizational performance: a Chi-square test 
(Appendix 3, Table 3-63 & 3-64) was applied to measure the association 
between monitoring committees and organizational performance across Sectors 
and CDGs. The results indicated no statistically significant association between 
the variables.  
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This section sums up the research findings as discussed in quantitative data analysis 
section from the survey. In summary, the main findings of this section are:  
7.4.1 Change in Managerial Discretion/Managerial Autonomy 
Since the decentralization reforms, managers of service delivery organizations, 
particularly Education Departments, were given more administrative and financial 
autonomy. The Education Department was a devolved department, and WASA was a 
semi-autonomous organization under the direct control of CDGs. The survey findings 
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presented in section 7.2.1.1 indicated that across the two Sectors, managers of WASAs 
enjoyed more discretion over promotion, firing and transfer of personnel than the 
Education Departments. Within the Education Departments, less discretion was reported 
by respondents of CDGF. This part did not provide answers to the question of ‘why’ 
managers of the Education Department besides having more discretion, particularly 
with regard to the financial autonomy, reported that they could not exercise these 
powers. This will be further explored in the qualitative part of the Education Sector 
analysis.  
7.4.2 Participation and Organizational Performance 
With respect to the improvement in community participation in service provision, it was 
found that participation has been significantly improved after decentralization reforms. 
However, respondents from CDGL indicated a higher level of user involvement 
compared to CDGF across both sectors. Significant differences were found with respect 
to the impact of community participation on organizational performance across both 
CDGs. Respondents from CDGL were of the view that it had a significant impact on 
their organizational performance compared to CDGF. Indeed, across two sectors no 
statistically significant differences were identified. However, respondents from WASA 
(CDGF) indicated less significant impact compared to WASA (CDGL).  
7.4.3 Institutional Environment - Internal Organizational Factors 
7.4.3.1 Personnel Management System 
 Across both CDGs, respondents reported that they had a merit based recruitment 
process. However, WASA (CDGF) indicated a lack of HRMIS for human resource 
management. Respondents overall indicated that personnel management rules provide 
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them flexibility and were effective in managing human resources, and no significant 
differences were found across either CDG or Sectors, except for the simplicity of 
personnel management rules. Respondents from CDGL disagreed that the rules were 
simple in implementation.  
7.4.3.2 Performance Management System 
Significant differences were found across both CDGs with respect to the existence of 
documented work performance standards. The majority of the respondents from CDGL 
indicated that their organizations had clearly documented work performance standards. 
Within the Sectors, the Education Department seemed to report the existence of clear 
performance standards but within WASA, respondents from CDGF indicated lack of 
clear performance standards. Likewise, a strong statistically significant difference was 
found across the service delivery organization with respect to whether performance 
standards were set between employees and supervisors at the start of every year or not. 
The Education Departments reported that they had a system where performance 
standards were set between employees and supervisors at the start of every year 
compared to WASAs. The majority of the respondents from both Sectors reported that 
performance targets were partially communicated to them. With respect to the 
achievement of organizational objectives, across CDGs, respondents from CDGL 
indicated that they had achieved more than 50% of their organizational objectives 
compared to CDGF. Respondents from both city district governments reported that they 
had a performance based incentive structure. However, it was found that there was 
statically significant difference across both sectors with respect to whether individuals 
in their organizations are rewarded on the basis of performance or not. Respondents 
from WASA indicated that individuals in their organizations were not rewarded on the 
basis of performance.  
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7.4.3.3 Financial Management  
In response to the extent of financial management functions performed by the 
organization, statistically significant differences were found across both sectors - 
WASA and Education. The majority of the respondents from the Education 
Departments indicated that they fully performed the functions of budget preparation, 
budget execution, resource allocation, internal audit and end of year account statements 
at the local level compared to WASA who indicated that these functions were partially 
performed by their organization. 
7.4.3.4 Factors Responsible for Resource Leakage 
The main differences across CDGs were found with respect to the weak sanctions as a 
significant factor responsible for resource leakage. The majority of the respondents 
from CDGF identified it as a significant factor compared to the CDGL. Across both 
sectors, a significant difference was found regarding lack of clarity in financial rules 
and weak auditing practice as significant factors for resource leakage. The Education 
Departments indicated that these factors were more significant compared to WASAs. 
7.4.4 Institutional Environment - External Factors  
The majority of the respondents from both governments indicated that policies were 
more consistent in the formulation. However, they lacked consistency in 
implementation. Likewise respondents also indicated that the lack of coordination 
among tiers significantly impacted their organizational performance. In response to 
political and bureaucratic interference, the Education Department (CDGL) indicated 
frequent political and bureaucratic interference compared to the Education Department 
(CDGF). A statistically significant difference was found with respect to bureaucratic 
interference across the service delivery organizations. WASAs reported less 
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bureaucratic interference compared to the Education Departments across both 
governments. Significant differences were found while measuring external institutional 
factors (such as political instability, regime legitimacy, economic instability, political 
and bureaucratic interference and local context) that affected organizational 
performance across local governments and across sectors.  Across the CDGs, 
respondents from CDGF indicated a higher level of significance with respect to these 
factors. Across service delivery organizations factors like political instability, regime 
legitimacy, economic instability and lack of supportive local context seemed to affect 
the education department more than the WASA.   
7.4.4.1 Resource Adequacy 
With respect to technical resources and infrastructure, a significant difference was 
found across local government. CDGL indicated that they have adequate technical and 
infrastructure resources compared to CDGF. Likewise, a statistically significant 
difference was found across type of service delivery organization with respect to 
adequacy of human resources, technical resources and infrastructure. Respondents from 
WASAs indicated adequacy of these resources compared to the Education Departments.  
7.4.5 Accountability 
Respondents from the Education Departments indicated that they fully follow financial 
guidelines compared to WASA whose majority said they partially follow these 
guidelines. However, the Education Department (CDGF) and WASA (CDGF) reported 
that they had no clear financial guidelines. With respect to the maintenance of 
records/information management, the majority of respondents from both sectors 
indicated that they had an information management system. Respondents from CDGL 
seemed to be more satisfied with the reliability of information in the information 
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management system compared to CDGF, who seemed to indicate that information is 
partially reliable. Regarding information access, a significant difference was found 
across type of service delivery organization as WASA indicated that access to 
information is easy compared to the Education sector. With respect to efficient 
grievance procedures, significant differences were found across the CDGs. According 
to CDGL they had an efficient grievance procedure compared to the CDGF. Likewise, a 
significant difference was found across CDGs regarding the impact of the monitoring 
committee on organizational performance. Respondents from CDGL reported a 
significant impact of monitoring committees on their performance compared to CDGF. 
In response to the multiple overlapping accountabilities and organizational 
performance, Education Departments across both CDGs indicated that it significantly 
impacted their organizational performance. Compared to this, WASA (CDGL) seemed 
to be affected more than the WASA (CDGF). 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented significant insight into the institutional context of service 
delivery organizations. It has provided an overview of the context within which the 
public sector works. However, in order to establish a clear link between the amount of 
managerial autonomy, participation, accountability, institutional environment and 
performance, a detailed analysis of the context is needed. This is provided through case 
studies of local governments and subsequently the selected sectors in order to draw 
causal links and a more in-depth understanding of the link between decentralization and 
the institutional performance of local governments (see Chapters 8 & 9). The next 
chapter presents findings from a community survey. It will explore the community 
perspective regarding local government performance.  
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CHAPTER 8  
COMMUNITY SURVEY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
The focus of the community survey was to assess the effectiveness and responsiveness 
of the local government system in service delivery from the viewpoint of local 
communities. This survey at the grass roots level was an effort to supplement and 
provide additional insight into the perceptions of local communities and how they 
perceived local government performance. This survey revealed how far the local 
government system has been able to improve participation, accountability relationships, 
and institutional performance of local government compared to the pre devolution 
arrangement.  
 Broadly the community questionnaire was divided into 5 parts. Part 1 of the community 
survey was to have a demographic profile of the respondents. Part 2 measured ‘citizen 
participation’. Part 3 assessed the change in ‘accountability’ patterns. Part 4 assessed 
the ‘service delivery performance of local government in water and sanitation and 
education’ and Part 4 was further divided into three parts headed as: sewerage service, 
water supply, education. Part 5 assessed the overall perception of the community 
regarding ‘local government performance in service delivery’. In the research 
methodology an overview of how these indicators were actually measured has been 
provided. The focus of the performance was on the effectiveness and responsiveness of 
service delivery. This survey aimed at assessing the satisfaction of community with 
local government service delivery performance.   
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8.2 SURVEY FINDINGS 
8.2.1 Community Participation 
The measurement of participation was based on a set of criteria derived from the 
evidence provided in the literature on the political decentralization perspective (as 
provided in Table 4-4) relating to direct and indirect forms of participation and the 
effectiveness of participation being measured as the quality and frequency of contact 
between public officials and political representatives (Table 8-3 & Table 8-4). The 
community participation was assessed in Part 1 of the Community survey questionnaire: 
indirect participation - knowledge of different committees or forums of community 
participation (Questions coded as B1-B3, see also Table 8-1) and their direct 
participation was measured (Questions coded as B4-B6). Effectiveness of participation 
defined as the quality and frequency of contact between the community and public and 
political representatives (Questions coded as B10-B21) measured process dimension of 
performance-improved accountability relationship-how well public and political 
representatives listen to the problems of their community (Table 8-2, Table 8-3 & Table 
8-4).  
8.2.1.1 Direct and Indirect Forms of Participation 
The results of the survey presented in Table 8-1 indicated that as far as the indirect 
participation was concerned, the majority of the respondents indicated that they had 
very little knowledge of the community forums.  For example, in response to the 
knowledge of different committees, it appeared that 70.0% of the respondents from 
CDGL and 79.0% from CDGF did not have any knowledge of the Citizen Community 
Board (CCB). Only 30.0% of the respondents from CDGL and 21.0% from CDGF said 
they had the knowledge of CCB; 29.0% of the respondents from CDGL and 23.0% 
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respondents from CDGF had the knowledge of School Management Committee (SMC) 
compared to 48.0% of CDGL and 40.0% of CDGF who said they know about water and 
sanitation monitoring committee.  
TABLE 8-1: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
Indicators f direct and 
indirect forms of 
participation 
City District Governments/CDGF CDGL & 
DGF 
 
 Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
 N % N % N % 
Do you have knowledge of community citizen boards (CCBs) 
1. Yes 30 30.00 21 21.00 51 25.50 
2. No 70 70.00 79 79.00 149 74.50 
Total  100 100 100  200 100 
Do you have knowledge of School Management Committee 
1. Yes 29 29.0 23 23.00 52 26.00 
2. No 70 70.00 77 77.00 48 74.00 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
Do you have knowledge of water and sanitation committee? 
1. Yes 48 48.0 40 40.00 88 44.00 
2. No 52 52.00 60 60.00 112 56.00 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
Are you art f citizen community board? 
1. Yes 13 13.00 0 0.00 13 6.50 
2. No 87 87.00 100 100.00 185 92.50 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
Are you part of the school management committee 
1. Yes 17 17.00 2 2.00 19 9.50 
2. No 83 83.00 98 98.00 181 90.50 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
Have you taken part in any development scheme/project since last 2 months 
1. Yes 22 22.00 0 0.00 22 11.00 
2. No 78 78.00 100 100.00 178 89.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
 
As far as the direct participation in different committees was concerned, none of the 
respondents from CDGF said that they are part of CCB; only 2.0% of the total from 
CDGF said that they were part of the SMC. Compared to this, 13.0% from CDGL said 
that they were part of CCB and 17.0% of the total said that they were part of the SMC. 
In response to the question whether they were actively involved in any development 
project, 22.0% of the total respondents from CDGL said that they had taken part in 
some kind of development project since last 12 months. As referred to in chapter 1, one 
of the main objectives of decentralization reforms in Pakistan was to improve 
community participation and for this purpose different committees for direct community 
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involvement in service delivery were constituted. For instance, the community was 
given direct representation in School Management Council (SMC) and was responsible 
for the utilization of school funds, and monitored school performance. Likewise CCB 
gave the community an opportunity to solve local community issues. Similarly, local 
monitoring committees were constituted in every sector such as education, water and 
sanitation. However, as the survey findings indicated, little evidence was found 
regarding awareness of the existence of these committees and communities direct 
involvement in either SMC or CCB.  
8.2.1.2 The Frequency of Contact Between Councillors and the Community 
The results of the survey regarding effectiveness of participation, however, (Table 8-2) 
suggested improvements in the quantity of contact and quality of relationships between 
community and local representatives.  
Table 8-2: Contact with the Councillors 
Indicators  Of Participation City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
 
  
Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad(CDGF) Total 
N % N % N % 
Have you contacted your councillor since last 12months? 
1. Yes 65 65.00 72 72.00 137 68.50 
2. No 35 35.00 28 28.00 63 31.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Have your councillor met you in any local meeting since last 12 months? 
1. Yes  55 55.00 62 62.00 117 58.50 
2. No 45 45.00 38 38.00 83 41.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Do the councillors take your input on a community development project? 
1. Mostly 47 47.00 28 28.00 75 37.50 
2. Depends on the situation 41 41.00 68 68.00 109 54.50 
3. Not at all 12 12.00 4 4.00 16 8.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Whom would you contact for your local issues or problems? 
1. Union councillor 67 67.00 77 77.00 144 72.00 
2. Tehsil councillor 4 4.00 2 2.00 6 3.00 
3. District councillor 2 2.00 0 0.00 2 1.00 
4. MPA/MNA* 4 4.00 0 0.00 4 2.00 
5. Public officials 2 2.00 2 2.00 4 2.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
         *MPA-Member of Provincial Assembly; MNA-Member of National Assembly 
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The frequency of the contact between councillors and community has shown significant 
improvement as respondents agreed that councillors met them in local meetings and 
they also highlighted that local councillors, depending on the situation, take their input 
in development projects. In response to the contact with local councillor, 65.0% 
respondents from CDGL, and 72.0% from CDGF said that they had contacted their 
local councillors since the last 12 months, 55.0% from CDGL and 62.0% from CDGF 
reported that their councillors had met them at a local meeting since last 12 months. 
This indicates a high level of contact between the community and their elected 
representatives. 
On the other hand, in response to the question about ‘whether their input was taken in 
the development projects’, the majority of them (96.0%) from both City District 
Governments (CDGs) indicated that it ‘mostly/depends on the situation’ compared to 
only 16.0% of the total respondents mentioning ‘not at all’.  Interestingly, the 
community seemed to contact more often their Union councillors for the community 
problems. This might be due to the fact that union councillors live in those 
communities, have close social ties with them and interact with them more frequently 
than district or town councillors. In response to the question ‘whom would they report 
for their problems?’, 67.0% respondents from CDGL and 77.0% respondents from 
CDGF reported they would contact their Union councillors. The survey findings of this 
section have indicated that overall local councillors are able to maintain a high 
frequency of contact with their community and consult them for any development 
schemes of their area. 
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8.2.1.3 Quality of the Contact Between Community and Political Representatives 
and Public Officials 
Another indicator of the effectiveness of participation was to assess the quality of 
relationships of community between public officials and political representatives. 
Respondents seemed satisfied with the quality of the relationship between their 
councillors and public officials. In response to the question about whether ‘they have 
brought any local issue in the knowledge of their councillor since last 12 months’, 68% 
respondents from CDGL and 76% from CDGF said ‘yes’ with the main issue being 
sewerage and refuse collection in CDGL and sewerage and health in CDGF. The 
majority of the respondents (74%) from both CDGs indicated that they were able to 
meet the concerned person and were satisfied with their meetings. They also indicated 
that they found the person honest and fair in their dealings.   
Table 8-3: Quality of Contact Between Political representatives (A) 
Indicators  of Participation City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
  Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
N % N % N % 
Have you brought any issue in the knowledge of your councillors since last 12 months? 
1. Yes 68 68.00 76 76. 00 144 72.00 
2. No 32 32.00 24 24.00 56 28.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
What was the nature of the problem? 
1. Water supply 12 12.00 0 0.00 12 6.00 
2. Sewerage 19 19.00 22 22.00 41 20.50 
3. Refuse collection 17 17.00 3 3.00 20 10.00 
4. Health 0 0.00 23 23.00 23 11.50 
5. Education 0 0.00 12 12.00 12 6.00 
6. Other 25 25.00 19 19.00 44 22.00 
7. NA (Not Applicable) 27 27.00 21 21.00 48 24.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Were you able to meet the concerned person 
1. Yes 69 69.00 79 79.00 148 74.00 
2. No 4 4.00 0 0.00 4 2.00 
3. NA 27 27.00 21 21.00 48 24.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Did you find the person fair and honest? 
1. Yes 54 54.00 79 79.00 133 66.50 
2. No 17 17.00 0 0.00 17 8.50 
3. NA (Not Applicable) 29 29.00 21 21.00 50 25.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Were you satisfied with your meeting? 
1. Very satisfied 25 25.00 2 2.00 27 13.50 
2. Satisfied 38 38.00 77 77.00 115 57.50 
3. Dissatisfied 9 9.00 0 0.00 9 4.50 
4. Very dissatisfied 3 3.00 0 0.00 3 1.50 
5. NA (Not Applicable) 25 25 21 21.00 46 23.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
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The respondents also seemed to contact city district government public officials for 
their problems. However, the ratio of contacting district government officers for the 
problems solving was higher in CDGF (70.0%) compared to CDGL (29.0%). In CDGF, 
70.0% of the respondents indicated that they had tried to contact district government 
officers mainly for education, health, and water supply. As far a the honesty and 
fairness was concerned, of the total respondents who met public officials, 21 out of 29 
respondents from CDGL and 67 out of 69 from CDGF reported that they found the 
person to be honest and fair in their dealings, and the majority of the respondents were 
satisfied with the their meeting (19 respondents out of 29 from CDGL and 67 
respondents out of 70 from CDGF who met them).  
Table 8-4: Quality of contact between community and local government officer (B) 
Indicators  Of Participation City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
 
  
Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad  (CDGF) Total 
N % N % N % 
Have you ever contacted any district officer since last 12 months? 
1. Yes 29 29.00 70 70.00 99 49.50 
2. No 71 71.00 30 30.00 101 50.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
What was the nature of the problem 
1. Water supply 6 6.00 11 11.00 17 8.50 
2. Sewerage 8 8.00 7 7.00 15 7.50 
3. Refuse collection 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
4. Health 0 0.00 11 11.00 11 5.50 
5. Education 7 7.00 17 17.00 24 12.00 
6. Other 10 10.00 24 24.00 34 17.00 
7. NA (Not Applicable) 71 71.00 30 30.00 98 49.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Did you find the person fair and honest? 
1. Yes 21 21.00 67 67.00 88 44.00 
2. No 8 8.00 3 3.00 11 5.00 
3. NA (Not Applicable) 71 71.00 29 30.00 100 51.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Were you satisfied with your meeting? 
1. Very satisfied 3 5.00 5 5.00 8 4.00 
2. Satisfied 19 19.00 61 61.00 80 40.00 
3. Dissatisfied 6 6.00 2 2.00 8 4.00 
4. Very dissatisfied 1 1.00 2 2.00 3 1.50 
5. NA (Not Applicable) 71 71.00 30 30.00 101 50.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
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The results suggested that the community seemed to approach their union councillors 
more frequently than other member such as Tehsil councillors or District councillors. 
One of the reasons behind this trend might be that Union councillors lived in close 
proximity to the community than Tehsil or District councillors and the community had 
an easy access to them.  
8.2.2 Accountability 
Part 3 of the Community Questionnaire assessed the accountability (Question coded as 
C1-C9). The results are presented in Table 8-5. 
8.2.2.1 Dissemination of Information 
According to the result presented in Table 8-5, in response to the question regarding 
“whether councillors share information regarding Council meetings with the community 
members”, 70.0% respondents from the CDGL and 85.0% from CDGF reported that 
they did not share such information. The majority of the respondents from CDGF 
(70.0%) indicated that councillors did not inform them about development projects 
being undertaken in the community. However, 24.0% from CDGL said ‘yes’ and 41.0% 
said ‘at sometimes’ they shared information about development projects. This trend was 
repeated when the question was asked about whether councillors share information 
about development expenditures. The majority of the respondents from CDGF (94.0%) 
said “no”, compared to this 57.0% of the respondents from CDGL reported ‘no’ and 
28.0% said ‘sometimes’ they shared such information. Regarding dissemination of 
information to the public, 65.0% of the respondents from CDGL agreed that the Tehsil 
and District government publish information for public disclosure compared to CDGF 
(70.0%). 
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Table 8-5: Accountability 
Indicators  Of Accountability City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
Accountability Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
  N % N % N % 
Do councillors share information regarding Council meetings with local community? 
1. Yes 9 9.00 13 13.00 33 16.50 
2. No 70 70.00 85 85.00 155 77.50 
3. Sometimes 21 21.00 2 2.00 23 11.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Do councillors inform you about development projects of your community? 
1. Yes 24 24.00 24 24.00 48 24.00 
2. No 35 35.00 70 70.00 105 52.50 
3. Sometimes 41 41.00 6 6.00 47 23.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Do councillors inform you about the amount spent on development schemes in your community? 
1. YES 15 15.00 4 4.00 19 9.5 
2. NO 57 57.00 94 94.00 151 75.5 
3. Sometimes 28 28.00 2 2.00 30 15 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Does Tehsil municipal administration/District government publish information for the general public? 
1. Yes 52 52.00 61 61.00 113 56.50 
2. No 48 48.00 39 39.00 87 43.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Can you access local government office for the public information? 
1. Yes 45 45.00 78 78.00 123 61.50 
2. No 18 18.00 22 22.00 40 20.00 
3. To some extent 37 37.00 0 0.00 37 18.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
To whom would you report for any incident of corruption? 
1. Union councillor 54 54.00 88 88.00 142 71.00 
2. Tehsil councillor 1 1.00 0 0.00 1 0.50 
3. District councillor 2 2.00 0 0.00 2 1.00 
4. Media 12 12.00 12 12.00 24 12.00 
5. Will not report 31 31 0 0.00 31 15.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
In your opinion, are your complaints heard? 
1. Yes 67 67.00 79 79.00 146 73.00 
2. No 33 33.00 21 21.00 54 27.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Have you noticed any change in the attendance of local government employees? 
1. Yes 52 53.00 77 77.00 129 64.50 
2. No 48 48.00 23 23.00 71 35.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
What is the nature of change? 
1. Attendance is improved 52 52.00 77 77.00 129 64.50 
2. No change 47 47.00 23 23.00 70 35.00 
3. Attendance is reduced 1 1.00 0 0.00 1 0.50 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
 
 
8.2.2.2 Access to Information 
The majority of the respondents from CDGF said that they had access to public 
information from the local government offices. The overall majority of respondents 
from both local governments indicated that they had access to information. Of the total 
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respondents, 45.0% from CDGL and 78.0% from CDGF reported that they could access 
local government offices for public information.  
8.2.2.3 Reporting of Corruption Incidents 
Respondents also indicated that they would like to report incidents of corruption to the 
union councillors. 54.0% from CDGL and 88.0% from CDGF indicated that they would 
bring this incident to the knowledge of union councillors.  
8.2.2.4 Improvements in Complaints Procedures and Employees Attendance 
Respondents also indicated that there was a change in the complaints procedure and 
agreed that complaints were heard. Of the total respondents, 79.0% from CDGF and 
67.0% from CDGL indicated that their complaints were heard. Respondents also agreed 
that there was some change in employees’ attendance. The majority of the respondents 
said that the attendance of government employees had improved as a result of checks 
and balances like surprise checking. Of the total respondents, 52.0% from CDGL and 
77.0% from CDGF indicated that their attendance is improved. The survey findings, 
presented in the Section 8.2.2, indicated that respondents reported that councillors did 
not share information regarding council meetings or development projects undertaken in 
their community. However, respondents agreed that their access to government offices 
for public information increased, though this trend was more visible in CDGF than 
Lahore. It also seems that there is improvement in complaint procedures under the local 
government system and there is a visible change in the improvement of the employee’s 
attendance. Answers to open-ended questions attributed this change to the improvement 
of better checks and balance (Section 8.2.7).  
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8.2.3 Performance of the Sewerage System 
The Part 4-D of the community survey questionnaire was focused on measuring the 
performance of the sewerage system (see also Table 8-6).  
Table 8-6: Sewerage Provision (A) 
Water and Sewerage Service provision 
(WSS) 
City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
Sewerage service provision 
  
Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
N % N % N % 
Do you have a sewerage system in your community? 
1. Yes 97 97.00 95 95.00 192 96.00 
2. No 3 3.00 5 5.00 8 4.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Please identify the nature of service provision? 
1. Public (WASA) 97 97.00 51 51.00 148 74.00 
2. Private 3 3.00 49 49.00 52 26.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Do you pay for the service provision? 
1. Yes 93 93.00 99 99.00 192 96 
2. No 7 7.00 1 1.00 6 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Are you satisfied with the user charges? 
1. Highly satisfied 2 2.00 16 16.00 18 9.00 
2. Satisfied 79 79.00 63 63.00 142 71.00 
3. Dissatisfies 13 13.00 19 19.00 32 16.00 
4. Highly dissatisfied 6 6.00 2 2.00 8 4.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any development scheme regarding sewerage system in your community? 
1. None 40 40.00 49 49.00 89 44.50 
2. Under progress 4 4.00 50 50.00 54 27.00 
3. Abandoned 1 1.00 1 1.00 2 1.00 
4. Has been completed 55 55.00 0 .00 55 27.50 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
 
Mainly this part was divided into two sections; the first three questions (Questions 
coded as D1-D3) were of a general nature to determine whether the community had 
access to the sewerage system and in the terms of the nature of service provision, 
whether it was provided by public organization (WASA) or managed privately or by the 
community itself, and whether they pay user charges. Questions D4-D13 of the survey 
assessed the satisfaction of the community with respect to improved access, 
accountability and quality of service provision. Some of the questions such as D5, D6 
were of a general nature to know if there were any development projects or involvement 
of the private sector in improving sewerage provision. As the survey part had many 
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questions, in order to present data in a more meaningful manner, the results of the 
survey are presented in two separate tables, Table 8-6 and Table 8-7. 
 
8.2.3.1 Nature of Service Provision 
The results (Table 8-6) suggested that in CDGL, it was mainly provided by a public 
sector organization (WASA) which was under the control of the City District 
Government (CDG). On the other hand, in some areas of CDGF, it was maintained by 
the community itself. Of the total respondents, 97.0% of the CDGL said that sewerage 
system was provided by Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) and 51.0% of CDGF 
said that it was provided by WASA. The rest of them said it is a community 
arrangement. The majority of the respondents from both CDGS indicated limited 
involvement of Non-Governmental organizations (NGO)/Community Based 
organizations (CBOs) involvement in service provision. Almost more than 90.0% of 
respondents from both CDGS said that they pay for the services and more than 60.0% 
indicated their level of satisfaction with respect to the charges they pay for the service 
provision. 
8.2.3.2 Access to Sewerage Coverage 
According to Table 8-6, 97.0% respondents from CDGL and 95.0% respondents from 
CDGF reported that they had a sewerage system in their community. 47.0% from 
CDGL and 48.0% from CDGF reported that the sewerage coverage was improved after 
the local government system (Table 8-7) and the rest of the respondents said there was 
no change. Only 10.0% from CDGL indicated that it was rather deteriorated. 
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8.2.3.3 Quality of the Service Provision 
According to the survey results presented in Table 8-7, in response to the question of 
change in employee’s attendance, 73.0% from CDGL and 50.0% from CDGF reported 
that there was no change in their attendance. Likewise, 55.0% from CDGL and 50.0% 
from CDGF indicated their dissatisfaction with the complaint procedures. The majority 
of the respondents also showed their dissatisfaction with the quality of sewerage 
provision.  
Table 8-7: Sewerage Provision (B) 
Water and Sewerage Service provision 
(WSS) 
City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
Sewerage service provision 
  
Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
N % N % N % 
Has the attendance of sewerage & sanitation staff improved after local government system? 
1. Yes 27 27.00 50 50.00 77 38.50 
2. No 73 73.00 50 50.00 123 61.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any monitoring committee? 
1. Yes 52 52.00 76 76.00 128 64.00 
2. No 48 48.00 24 24.00 72 36.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
If yes, then does it play an effective role? 
1. Effective 8 8.00 25 25.00 33 16.50 
2. Not effective 66 66.00 53 53.00 119 59.50 
3. Partially effective 26 26.00 22 22.00 48 24.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any improvement in the sewerage coverage after local government? 
1. Improved access 47 47.00 48 48.00 95 47.50 
2. No change 43 43.00 52 52.00 95 47.50 
3. Deteriorated 10 10.00 0 0.00 10 5.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Are you satisfied with the sewerage facilities of your community? 
1. Highly satisfied 2 2.00 3 3.00 5 2.50 
2. Satisfied 27 27.00 47 47.00 74 37.00 
3. Dissatisfied 64 64.00 50 50.00 114 57.00 
4. Highly dissatisfied 7 7.00 0 0.00 7 3.50 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
How would you compare sewerage provision before and after local government? 
1. Much better 8 8.00 1 1.00 9 4.50 
2. A little better 61 61.00 49 49.00 110 55.00 
3. No change 21 21.00 50 50.00 71 35.50 
4. A little worse 9 9.00 0 0.00 9 4.50 
5. Much worse 1 1.00 0 0.00 1 0.50 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
 
Of the total respondents, 27.0% from CDGL and 47.0% from CDGF indicated their 
satisfaction with the sewerage system. In response to the open-ended questionnaire 
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(which was coded for the data analysis), 50.0% of the respondents from both CDGs 
explained that despite their complaints being heard, no further action was taken.  
In response to the question of ‘how do they compare sewerage system before and after 
the local government system’, 61.0% from CDGL and 49.0% from CDGF reported that 
it had become ‘a little better’ than the previous system of government. However, 50.0% 
from CDGF indicated that there was ‘no change’, and 9.0% from CDGL said it had 
become ‘worse than before’. The majority of the respondents from both CDGs indicated 
that they had a monitoring committee for sewerage. 52.0% from CDGL and 76.0% from 
CDGF reported the presence of a sewerage monitoring committee however, the 
majority of the respondents from both government said it was not playing any effective 
role.  
The results presented in this section 8.2.3 suggested that overall respondents were not 
satisfied with the sewerage system, however, the majority of the respondents in CDGL 
agreed that sewerage system was improved ‘to some extent’ after local government 
system compared to Faisalabad. One of the reasons may be that most of the 
development work regarding sewerage improvements was completed in Lahore 
communities. 55.0% of the respondents from Lahore indicated that sewerage schemes 
were “completed” while the majority of the respondents (50.0%) from Faisalabad 
indicated it was ‘in progress’. Mostly, respondents were found dissatisfied with the 
complaint procedures as the open ended questions about ‘reasons for satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the sewerage system’ revealed that though community indicated 
that they were having a new sewerage system in their communities but it was not 
properly being maintained by the sewerage staff.  
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8.2.4 Service Delivery Performance in Water Supply 
Part 4-E of the community survey questionnaire measured performance of water supply 
system. This section presents community satisfaction with respect to the water supply 
system. In order to present data in a more meaningful form, the results are presented in 
two tables: Table 8-8 and Table 8-9. 
8.2.4.1 Nature of the Service Provision 
The survey results are presented in Table 8-8. The majority of the respondents reported 
that they had a water supply system in their area. 98.0% respondents from CDGL and 
100.0% of respondents from CDGF indicated that had a water supply system in their 
community and it was provided by the public organization WASA. 
Table 8-8: Service Delivery Performance in Water Supply (A) 
Water and Sewerage Service provision City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
Water supply system Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
  N % N % N % 
Do You have access to water supply in your community? 
1. Yes 98 98.00 100 100.00 198 99.00 
2. No 2 2.00 0 0.00 2 1.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Please identify the nature of service provision. 
1. Public (WASA) 98 98.00 100 100.00 198 99.00 
2. Community 2 2.00 0 0.00 2 1.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any development scheme regarding water supply system in your community? 
1. None 7 7.00 19 19.00 26 13.00 
2. Under progress 8 8.00 49 49.00 57 28.50 
3. Abandoned 13 13.00 1 1.00 14 70.00 
4. Has been completed 72 72.00 31 31.00 103 51.50 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any involvement of any NGO/CBO in service provision? 
1. Yes 15 15.00 0 0.00 15 7.50 
2. No 85 85.00 100 100.00 185 92.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Do you pay for the service provision? 
1. Yes 98 98.00 99 99.00 197 98.50 
2. No 2 2.00 1 1.00 3 1.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Are you satisfied with the user charges? 
1. Highly satisfied 3 3 0 0.00 3 1.50 
2. Satisfied 74 74 74 74.00 148 74.00 
3. Dissatisfied 17 17 5 5.00 22 11.00 
4. Highly dissatisfied 6 6 21 21.00 27 13.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
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They also indicated that they paid user charges for the service provision. 74.0% 
respondents from both the CDGs indicated that they were satisfied with the user 
charges. The results also indicated that there was little involvement of the NGO/private 
sector in the water supply provision in CDGL, while results indicated no evidence of 
NGO involvement in CDGF. 
Table 8-9: Service Delivery Performance in Water Supply (B) 
Water and Sewerage Service provision City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
Water supply system Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
  N % N % N % 
Are you satisfied with the complaint procedures of water supply system? 
1. Highly satisfied 4 4.00 3 3.00 7 3.50 
2. Satisfied 31 31.00 72 72.00 103 51.50 
3. Dissatisfied 54 54.00 25 25.00 79 39.50 
4. Highly dissatisfied 11 11.00 0 0.00 11 5.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any monitoring committee? 
1. Yes 5 5.00 2 2.00 7 3.50 
2. No 95 95.00 98 98.00 193 96.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
If yes, then does it play an effective role? 
1. Effective 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
2. Not effective 100 100.00 99 99.00 199 99.50 
3. Partially effective 0 0.00 1 1.00 1 0.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any improvement in access to water coverage after the local government? 
1. Improved access 75 75.00 54 54.00 129 64.50 
2. No change 22 22.00 46 46.00 68 34.00 
3. Deteriorated 3 3.00 0 0.00 3 1.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Are you satisfied with the quality of water supply system? 
1. Highly satisfied 2 2.00 1 1.00 3 1.50 
2. Satisfied 60 60.00 74 74.00 134 67.00 
3. Dissatisfied 35 35.00 25 25.00 60 30.00 
4. Highly dissatisfied 3 3.00 0 0.00 3 1.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
How would you compare water provision before and after local government? 
1. Much better 5 5.00 2 2.00 7 3.50 
2. A little better 76 76.00 63 63.00 139 69.50 
3. No change 17 17.00 35 35.00 52 26.00 
4. A little worse 2 2.00 0 0.00 2 1.00 
5. Much worse 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
 
 
8.2.4.2 Access to Water Supply 
The survey results (Table 8-8 & Table 8-9) indicated that there had been improvement 
in water coverage following the local government system across both district 
governments. Of the total respondents, 75% of the respondents from CDGL and 54% 
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respondents from CDGF said that their access to the water supply had improved, 22% 
from CDGL and 46% from CDGF said there was no change, and only 3% from CDGL 
said it had become worse.  
 
8.2.4.3 Quality of Service Provision 
Respondents indicated their satisfaction with the quality of service provision across both 
CDGs (Table 8-9). Of the total respondents, 60.0% from CDGL and 74.0% from CDGF 
said they were satisfied with the quality of service provision. Only, 35.0% from CDGL 
and 25.0% from CDGF said they were not satisfied with the quality of service 
provision. In response to the question of pre and post-devolution comparison of 
performance, 76.0% from CDGL and 63.0% from CDGF indicated that it had become a 
little better than before. When respondents were asked about the presence of any 
monitoring committee, more than 90.0% said there was no monitoring committee. The 
majority of the respondents from CDGF were satisfied with respect to the complaint 
procedure compared to CDGL. 72.0% of the respondents from CDGF showed their 
satisfaction compared to 5% who showed their dissatisfaction with complaints 
procedures. The survey results presented in this section of the chapter suggested the 
satisfaction of the community with respect to the water supply system in terms of 
improved access, quality of provision, and an improved system compared to the pre-
devolution arrangements.  
8.2.5 Education Service delivery 
This section of the survey is derived from Part4-E of the community survey 
questionnaire. To facilitate the presentation of survey results, the results from part E1-
E4 of the survey questionnaire are presented in Table 8-10 and questions E5-13 are 
presented in Table 8-11.  
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8.2.5.1 Nature of Schooling 
According to Table 8-10, questions related to the type of school attended by children 
indicated that 70.0% of the respondents from the CDGL and 91.0% from CDGF said 
that their children attended public school compared to 30% from CDGL and 9.0% from 
CDGF who said their children attended a private school. Respondents were also asked 
the reasons why their kids attend those schools and 70.0% of the respondents from 
CDGF indicated the high tuition fees of private schools as one of the main reasons to 
send children to a public school.  
Table 8-10: Service Delivery Performance in Education Provision (A) 
Education provision City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
 Lahore 
(CDGL) 
Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
  N %           N % N % 
Do you have access to public school? 
1. Yes 97 97.00 97 97.00 194 97.00 
2. No 3 3.00 3 3.00 6 3.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Please identify the type of school attended by your kids 
1. Public 70 70.00 91 91.00 161 80.50 
2. Private 30 30.00 9 9.00 39 19.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
What are the reasons for attending this school? 
1. High tuition fees of private schools 28 28.00 70 70.00 98 49.00 
2. Quality of education 47 47.00 30 30.00 77 38.50 
3. Ease of access 13 13.00 0 0.00 13 6.50 
4. Better facilities 12 12.00 0 0.00 12 6.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any involvement of NGOs/CBOs in education provision 
1. Yes 23 23.00 9 9.00 32 16.00 
2. No 77 77.00 91 91.00 168 84.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
       
Is there any development scheme regarding water supply system in your community? 
1. None 75 75.00 85 85.00 160 80.00 
2. Under progress 3 3.00 4 4.00 7 3.500 
3. Abandoned 6 6.00 1 1.00 7 3.500 
4. Has been completed 16 16.00 10 10.00 26 13.00 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
Do you pay tuition for schooling? 
1. Yes  96 96.00 98 98.00 194 97.00 
2. No 4 4.00 2 2.00 6 3.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Are you satisfied with the tuition fees? 
1. Highly satisfied 8 8.00 4 4.00 12 6.00 
2. Satisfied 75 75.00 96 96.00 171 85.50 
3. Dissatisfied 17 17.00 0 0.00 17 8.50 
4. Highly dissatisfied 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
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While the majority of the respondents (47.0%) from CDGL stated ‘quality of education’ 
as the main reasons for sending their kids to public schools, 28.0% of respondents from 
CDGL highlighted high tuition fees of private schools as the second main factor for 
sending kids to public schools. Respondents also indicated that they paid tuition fees for 
the schooling. However, 75.0% respondents from both CDGL and 96.0% respondents 
from CDGF indicated that they were satisfied with the tuition fees. Of the total 
respondents 77.0% from CDGL and 91.0% from CDGF indicated that Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) were not involved in service provision. Over 
70.0% of the respondents from both CDGs reported that there was no school 
development project in their community.  
8.2.5.2 Access to Public Schools 
The majority of the respondents reported that they had access to public school in their 
community. 97.0% respondents from CDGL and CDGF indicated that there was  a 
school in their community. The majority of the respondents indicated that their access to 
school was improved after local government system. 69.0% respondents from CDGL 
and 98.0% respondents from CDGF said that access to the school was improved, 26.0% 
from CDGL and 2.0% from CDGF said that there was no change, and only 5.0% from 
CDGL said it had become worse.  
8.2.5.3 Service Delivery Performance in Education 
The survey findings (Table 8-11) are presented in this section regarding community 
satisfaction with the quality of education service provision, grievance procedures, 
access to schools and pre-post performance comparison.  According to the figures,  the 
majority of the respondents was satisfied with the quality of service provision. 60.0% 
respondents from CDGL and 74.0% respondents from CDGF indicated their satisfaction 
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with the quality of education provision and only 35.0% of the respondents from CDGL 
and 25.0% of the respondents from CDGF indicated they were dissatisfied with the 
quality of education provision.  
Table 8-11: Education Service Delivery Performance (B) 
Education City District Governments/CDGs CDGF&CDGL 
 Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
 N % N % N % 
Are you satisfied with the complaint procedure of the education system? 
1. Highly satisfied 4 4.00 8 8.00 12 6.00 
2. Satisfied 65 65.00 90 90.00 155 77.50 
3. Dissatisfied 31 31.00 2 2.00 33 16.50 
4. Highly dissatisfied 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any education monitoring committee? 
1. Yes 37 37.00 42 42.00 79 39.50 
2. No 63 63.00 58 58.00 121 60.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
If yes, then does it play an effective role? 
1. Effective 19 19.00 35 35.00 54 27.00 
2. Not effective 66 66.00 58 58.00 124 62.00 
3. Partially effective 15 15.00 7 7.00 22 11.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Has access to education improved after local government? 
1. Improved access 69 69.00 98 98.00 167 83.50 
2. No change 26 26.00 2 2.00 28 14.00 
3. Deteriorated 5 5.00 0 0.00 5 2.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Are you satisfied with the quality of service provision? 
1. Highly satisfied 2 2.00 1 1.00 3 1.50 
2. Satisfied 60 60.00 74 74.00 134 67.00 
3. Dissatisfied 35 35.00 25 25.00 60 30.00 
4. Highly dissatisfied 3 3.00 0 0.00 3 1.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Is there any improvement in the attendance of teachers at schools after local government system? 
1. Much better 69 69.00 96 96.00 165 82.50 
2. No change 29 29.00 4 4.00 33 16.50 
3. More absenteeism 2 2.00 0 0.00 2 1.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
What are the reasons for satisfaction/dissatisfaction with government schools 
1. Education standard 27 27.00 38 38.00 65 32.50 
2. Good facilities 30 30.00 6 6.00 36 18.00 
3. Access 24 24.00 2 2.00 26 13.00 
4. No other school 8 8.00 50 50.00 58 29.00 
5. Poor quality 11 11.00 4 4.00 15 7.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
How would you compare education provision before and after local government 
1. Much better 10 10.00 2 2.00 12 6.00 
2. A little better 76 76.00 93 93.00 169 84.50 
3. No change 14 14.00 4 4.00 18 9.00 
4. A little worse 0 0.00 1 1.00 1 0.50 
5. Much worse 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total  100 100 100 100 200 100 
 
 
Respondents also indicated that teacher absenteeism reduced after implementation LG 
system. 69.0% of the respondents from CDGL and 96.0% of the respondents from 
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CDGF indicated that teacher attendance was improved after the LG system reforms. 
When respondents were asked whether they were satisfied with the complaint 
procedures, 65.0% from CDGL and 90.0% from CDGF indicated their satisfaction with 
the complaint procedures. When asked about the presence of any monitoring committee, 
more than 60.0% reported absence of monitoring committees. Only 37.0% from the 
CDGL and 42.0% from the CDGF reported the presence of a school monitoring 
committee and 19.0% of the respondents from CDGL and 35.0% of the respondents 
from CDGF said that monitoring committees were playing an effective role compared 
to 66.0% from CDGL and 58.0% from CDGF, who indicated that its role was 
ineffective.  
According to the community, education provision has overall become much better 
compared to the pre-devolution period. Once respondents were asked to compare 
education provision before and after the LG system, 76.0% of the respondents from 
CDGL and 93.0% of the respondents from CDGF indicated that it had become a little 
better than before. According to the respondents from CDGL, the main reasons for 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction were: good facilities (30.0%), education standards (27.0%), 
and ease of access (24.0%). However, respondents from CDGF, stated that education 
standards (38.0%) and lack of any other school (50.0%) in their area as the main reason 
for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The overall results presented in this section 
indicate that education service delivery has improved as respondents identified that their 
access to schools is improved, teachers’ absenteeism is reduced, and quality of 
education is better after the LG system compared to the previous arrangement. 
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8.2.6 Local Government Performance (Pre-Post Devolution Comparison) 
The overall results of the survey are presented in Table 8-12. This section presents an 
overall assessment of local government performance in terms of community 
participation, responsiveness, and improved accountability derived from Part 5 of the 
community questionnaire. 
8.2.6.1 Improvement in Community Participation in Service Delivery 
One of the main objectives of decentralization was to improve community participation 
in service delivery. Therefore, it was one of the indicators to assess effectiveness of 
local government performance in terms of their ability to improve community 
participation in service provision. Respondents from both CDGs indicated that the local 
government system had been able to improve community participation in service 
provision. 45.0% of the respondents from CDGL and 78.0% of the respondents from 
CDGF said that the local government system has been able to improve community 
participation to a great extent, 24.0% from CDGL and 63.0% from CDGF said it had 
improved participation to some extent, and the rest of the respondents indicated that 
community participation was not improved at all. When respondents were asked to 
specify in what ways the local government system had improved community 
participation, 77.0% from CDGL and 91.0% from CDGF highlighted that the 
community was able to solve their issues at the local level through contact with the 
councillors. They also highlighted that the councillors considered community input and 
councillors did listen to their problems (see Section 8.2.7 for the open-ended responses). 
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Table 8-12: Local Government Performance 
Service delivery performance City District Governments/CDGs CDGL&CDGF 
 Lahore (CDGL) Faisalabad (CDGF) Total 
N % N % N % 
To what extent LG system has been able to improve community participation in service delivery? 
1. To a great extent 45 45.00 78 78.00 123 61.50 
2. To some extent 31 31.00 16 16.00 47 23.50 
3. Not at all 24 24.00 6 6.00 30 15.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
How it has improved community participation? 
1. Problems are solved at the local levels 77 77 91 91 168 84 
2. Community is not involved 9 9 2 2 11 5.5 
3. Others 14 14 7 7 21 10.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Please identify the important issues of your community?  
1. Water  76 76.00 13 13.00 89 44.50 
2. Education 4 4.00 50 50.00 54 27.00 
3. Sewerage system 2 2.00 0 0.00 2 1.00 
4. Water and sewerage 18 18.00 37 37.00 55 27.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Has local government been able to solve these issues? 
1. To a great extent 5 5.00 0 0.00 5 2.50 
2. To some extent 85 85.00 96 96.00 181 90.50 
3. Not at all 10 10.00 4 4.00 14 7.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
How would you compare that new local government system is more transparent than the previous system? 
1. Much better 2 2.00 20 20.00 22 11.00 
2. A little better 78 78.00 78 78.00 156 78.00 
3. No change 20 20.00 2 2.00 22 11.00 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Has the local government system been able to improve the attendance of local government employees? 
1. Much better 57 57.00 79 79.00 136 68.00 
2. No change 40 40.00 21 21.00 61 30.50 
3. More absentees 3 3.00 0 0.00 3 1.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Has the local government system been able to reduce corruption? 
1. To some extent 79 79.00 100 100.00 179 89.50 
2. Not at all 21 21.00 0 0.00 21 10.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
In your opinion, has the local government system been able to improve service delivery compared to the 
previous system? 
1. Much better 14 14.00 21 21.00 35 17.50 
2. A little better 77 77.00 77 77.00 154 77.00 
3. No change 9 9.00 2 2.00 11 5.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
Any example how it has improved service delivery? 
1. Problems are solved at the local level 53 53.00 87 87.00 140 70.00 
2. Complaints are heard 19 19.00 4 4.00 23 11.50 
3. More contact between public and 
government 
8 8 0 0 8 4.00 
4. Others 20 20 9 9 29 14.50 
Total 100 100 100 100 200 100 
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8.2.6.2 Effectiveness of the Local Government  
In this section, the overall effectiveness of the local government was assessed by 
focusing on how far the LG system was able to solve the community issue and improve 
service delivery outcomes, improved accountability, and user satisfaction with the 
service delivery before and after the LG system. The results of the survey are presented 
in Table 8-12. 
Responsiveness of the Local Government 
Responsiveness is the congruence between community preferences and the service they 
receive. To assess responsiveness, respondents were asked to identify the most 
important community issue, 76% from CDGL and 13% from CDGF said that clean 
drinking water was their most important issue, 50% from CDGF indicated access to 
school (college) as their most important issue, and 18% from CDGL and 37% from 
CDGF indicated water and sewerage were their most important issues. 85% from 
CDGL and 96% from CDGF indicated that the LG had been able to solve their 
community issues to some extent.  
User satisfaction with Service Delivery  
The majority of the respondents said that the LG system had been able to improve 
service delivery compared to the previous system. 77% of the respondents from both of 
the CDGs indicated that this system had been able to improve service delivery 
compared to the previous system. In an open ended question, the respondents were 
asked to provide examples of how they considered the service delivery system to have 
improved under LG system compared to the previous arrangements. The majority of the 
respondents indicated that the example of improved service delivery was that problems 
were solved at the community level. 53% respondents from CDGL and 87% 
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respondents from CDGF indicated that this system has been able to solve problems at 
the community level (Section 8.2.7 for more detail).  
8.2.6.3 Changes in Accountability 
Improved Attendance of Local Government Employees 
Of the total respondents 57% from CDGL and 79% from CDGF said it has become 
much better, 40% from CDGL and 21% from CDGL said there was no change at all. 
However, respondents’ main concern was the attendance of sanitary workers, which had 
not changed much as we discussed earlier in the sewerage section 8.2.3.  
Transparency of the System 
The majority of the respondents indicated that the LG system was more transparent 
compared to the previous system. Of the total respondents, 78% form both CDG 
indicated that this system was ‘a little better’ than before. 20% from CDGF indicated 
that it was ‘much better’ than before. Likewise, the majority of the respondents 
indicated that this system was able to reduce corruption to some extent. 100% of the 
respondents from CDGF and 79% from CDGL reported that to some extent this system 
was able to reduce corruption.  
8.2.6.4 Pre and Post Devolution Comparison of Service Delivery Performance 
Respondents also indicated that the overall system had improved in terms of service 
delivery compared to the pre-devolution arrangements. 77% of the respondents from 
both CDGs indicated that the LG system had been able to improve service delivery 
compared to the previous system. Moreover, they attributed this to the fact that 
problems were solved at the local level (53% respondents from CDGL and 87% from 
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CDGF). Overall, the survey findings presented in this section have indicated that the LG 
system has been able to improve community participation in service provision. It also 
revealed that the LG is more responsive to the community issues and tries to deliver 
services according to the needs of the community. The community indicated that 
councillors contact them for identification of development works and has indicated that 
they are able to solve their problems to some extent. The community also have indicated 
satisfaction with the service delivery compared to the pre devolution arrangement and in 
their open-ended themes (presented in 8.2.7) have identified that as community can 
access their councillors easily, therefore the community is able to exert influence on 
them for their local issues. They have also identified that councillors need their vote for 
the next election; therefore, they find themselves under constant pressure of community 
demands. Respondents have also agreed that the system is much more transparent than 
before.  
8.2.7 Key Themes from the Open Ended Questions  
Table 8-13 presents some of the main themes from the open-ended questionnaire about 
how the local government system is able to improve service delivery. An analysis of 
these revealed that councillors were in close contact with their constituency and 
consulted them in order to get an insight into their issues and attempt to solve them to 
some extent. The examples provided by the respondents were different development 
projects in those communities. It also emerged that there is a change in accountability 
arrangements with public representatives, now finding themselves under community 
pressure as they need those votes for re-election. In addition to this, public officials are 
under the pressure of political representatives because of their leverage in the system. 
Therefore, it is discernible from the respondents’ views that overall LG was more 
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responsive to community needs because local councillors were aware of the community 
needs and tried to address issues.  
Table 8-13: key Themes 
CDGL 
 UC 53 
 We have been able to complete our development 
projects because of community participation. 
 Community participation is able to solve 
community issues. 
 We have new tube well and sewerage system 
because of the community and councillors efforts. 
 We have development work in our community 
because of community participation. 
 It is easy to access political representatives and 
community participation in different committees 
has positive outcomes. We have new sewerage and 
tube well because of community participation.  
 Now councillors present community views and 
their issues to the concerned authorities. 
 We can access councillors for our problems. 
Community participation has improved service 
delivery.  
 Now problems are easily solved because of 
community participation. New Sewerage and tube 
well are examples of this. 
 We have different community participation 
committees and it has been able to solve 
community issues to some extent. 
 Community committees are able to pressurize 
public representatives and government officials as 
well. Councillors meet people, consult them for 
different community needs, and try to solve those 
issues to some extent.  
 The new local government system has created 
awareness among people and now they contact 
their councillors for their problems. It has been 
able to do development work in the community. 
 There is improvement in the relationship between 
community and government offices. 
 Community participation exerts influence on local 
councillors and in turn, they try to influence 
government officials for the community problems. 
 UC 74 
 Political representatives keep contact with 
the political representatives because 
political representative needs their vote for 
re-election. 
 Because people have access to their 
political representatives 
 Different committees for community 
participation. 
 Because of political representatives, there 
is some development work in the 
community. 
 Neither councillors nor government 
officials listen to us. 
 We have been able to have a new sewerage 
system and a tube well because of the joint 
effort of community and councillors. 
 Now if people raise their issues and 
pressurize their councillors, they are able 
to solve their community needs.  
 Local representative presents community 
issues to the concerned authorities under 
the community pressure. 
 The community is able to influence 
councillors and to some extent, their issues 
are solved.  
 Councillors are from the community and 
we can contact them for our problems. 
 The community can easily access their 
political representatives; they listen to 
them and try to solve their issues as they 
need their votes for the next election. 
CDGF 
 UC 216 
 Community issues are solved at the local level. 
 Development works are undertaken. 
 Councillors consult community for the 
identification of their problems. 
 Councillors at least listen to our problems and try 
to solve them. 
 The community has the awareness that they can 
contact their local councillors for their problems 
 We an easily access councillors for our problems 
 The public can easily access their councillors and 
in turn can approach government offices for their 
problems. 
 Union councillors live in the community and are 
easily accessible. 
 UC 165 
 Now councillors present community views 
and their issues to the concerned 
authorities. 
 Community issues are solved at the local 
level. 
 They need our votes; therefore councillors 
are under the community pressure and try 
to solve them. 
 Local councillors live in the community 
and we can easily access them. 
 Representation of community in different 
committees has improved their influence 
over councillors and officers. 
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8.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSING THE ASSOCIATION 
AMONG VARIABLES (SIGNIFICANCE TESTS - CHI SQUARE TEST 
FOR ASSOCIATION) 
In the previous section, the survey findings were presented in contingency tables format 
comparing frequencies across the type of Local government: CDGF & CDGL. This 
section presents a statistical analysis to illustrate how significantly variables of 
participation, accountability, and performance are associated with the type of Local 
Government (LG) (referred to as CDG/LG in this section) by applying a non-parametric 
test: Chi-square test. This test is usually applied to explore relationships and comparing 
groups. In this section, the main variable - participation, performance, and 
accountability are compared with the type of LGs to determine if these variables are 
associated with the type of LG. The value of significance should be either .05 or less 
than .05. There was also a difference in the outlook of the table for a more than two 
categories. In such cases, the focus would be on Pearson Chi-square value. However, in 
case of violation of the assumption of Chi-square test - more than 20% of the cells have 
an expected frequency less than 5, the categories are reduced to provide meaningful 
statistical test (Pallant 2010). The survey questionnaire had many indicators to assess 
the research variables, and Chi-square tests were performed on each of them separately, 
comparing them across CDGs. However, in this section the summary statistics of the 
Chi-square tests of each variable are presented and detail Chi-square tests are attached 
in Appendix 4. This is done to present data in a more meaningful manner. The focus 
was on presenting the significance level. This has already been explained in the 
methodology chapter. 
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8.3.1.1 Participation - Direct Participation in Committees 
 A Chi square test was employed to assess the association among the categorical 
variables of participation, comparing them with Local Governments (CDGs). The 
results are presented in Table 8-14. The association between community participation in 
monitoring committees, CCB and SMC with the type of LG was found significant at 1% 
significance level. The cross tabulation (Appendix 4, Table 4, 6 & 8) indicated that the 
proportion of respondents indicating “no” was higher for CDGF compared to CDGL. 
While the results as displayed in Table 8-14, indicated that there was no statistically 
significant relationship between types of CDGs with respect to the knowledge of 
different committees. Likewise, there was no statistically significant relationship 
regarding contact with councillors, and a councillor’s consultation with the community 
for development projects. Results also indicated that there was no significant 
association between ‘have you brought any local issue in the knowledge of local 
councillors’, whether community ‘have contacted any LG officer for any of their 
problem’ and ‘type of LG. The Chi-square test results for these indicators of 
participation found no significant association with the type of CDG, as the value of p is 
not equal to or less than .05.    
The quality of contact indicators (10-13 as presented in Table 8-14) between the 
community and their local councillors and community and district officers were found 
strongly associated with type of CDGs at 1% significance level. According to the cross 
tabulation (Appendix-Table 14 & 16), the quality of contact between the community 
and local councillors (see Table 8-14, Q. 10-12) was higher for CDGF compared to 
CDGL. Likewise, the majority of respondents (70%) from CDGF contacted local 
government officers for their problems compared to CDGL (29.0%). 67.0% of the 
respondents from CDGF who met LG officers found these officers honest and fair 
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(compared to 21.0% of CDGL).  Out of the total respondents, who contacted LG 
officers. 65.0% from CDGF were also found to be satisfied with their meetings 
compared to 24.0% of the CDGL respondents.  
As depicted in the cross tabulation (Appendix 4, Table 14, 16, 20 & 22) and the Chi-
square test results Table 8-14, the Chi-square statistics were analysed only for those 
respondents who actually met either local government officers or their local councillors, 
and those cases which did not contact officers or local councillors, were excluded from 
the statistical tests. In case of 13 & 14 questions as listed in the table, the main 
assumption of Chi-square test that ‘0 cells (0.0%) have an expected count less than 5’ is 
violated, therefore the value of Fisher Exact test is reported in the Table 8-14.  
Table 8-14: Chi-square Test for Indicators of Participation and LG 
Indicators of participation comparing groups N Yates continuity 
correction value 
Significance 
value p  
1. Do you have the knowledge of CCB? 200 1.68 =.19 
2. Do you have the knowledge of SMC? 200 .65 =.42 
3. Do you have the knowledge of water and sanitation 
committee? 
200 .99 =.31 
4. Are you part of monitoring committees? 200 15.28     <.001** 
5. Are you part of the SMC? 200 11.39     <.001** 
6. Are you part of CCB? 200 11.84  <.01** 
7. Have you contacted any local councillors since last 12 
months? 
200 0.834 =.36 
8. Do councillors take your opinion in the development 
schemes? 
200 0.741 =.38 
9. Have you brought any local issue in the knowledge of your 
councillors? 
200 3.32 =.06 
10. Did you find the person (local councillors) honest and fair in 
his dealings? 
150 19.01   <.01** 
11. Were you satisfied with your meeting? 154 11.57    <.001** 
12. Have you ever contacted any local government officer for 
any of your problems? 
200 32.00    <.001** 
13. Did you find the person (local government officer) honest 
and fair in his dealings? 
100    <.001** 
14. Were you satisfied with your meeting? 100  =.01* 
** 1% significance level; * 5% significance level 
8.3.1.2 Accountability  
The association between indicators of accountability and CDG was assessed by the Chi-
square test for independence. The test results presented in Table 8-15 indicated a 
significant association between councillors informing the community about the 
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development project and the amount spent on them at 1% significance level. For the 
statistical purpose, categories ‘yes’ and ‘sometime’ were reduced to 1 category 
‘yes/sometime’ in order to fulfil the Chi-square test assumption. According to the cross 
tabulation (Appendix 4, Table 28 & 30) the proportion of respondents indicating 
‘yes/sometimes’ for providing information about development projects was higher in 
CDGL (65%) compared to CDGF (30.0%) and for providing information for the 
amount spent on these projects was also found higher for CDGL (43.0%)  than CDGF 
(6.0%). However, the association between community access to LG offices for 
information and type of LG was not found significant (Appendix 4, Table 32). 
Likewise, there was no significant association between complaints are heard and type of 
CDG, as the level of significance was not equal to or less than .05 (Appendix 4, Table 
33). However, there was a significant association between improvement in the 
attendance of local government employees and the type of CDG at 1% significance 
level. The results of cross tabulation (Appendix 4, Table 34 & 36) indicated a higher 
proportion of respondents from CDGF reporting ‘yes’ and ‘improved’ compared to 
CDGL.  
Table 8-15: Chi-square Test for Comparing Accountability and LG 
Comparing local governments and Indicators of  
accountability 
N Yates continuity 
correction value 
Significance 
value 
p  
1. Do councillors inform you about the development 
projects in your community 
200 23.17  <.001** 
2. Do councillors inform you about the money spent on 
these development schemes 
200 35.03 <.001** 
3. Can you access the district office for the public 
information 
200 .28          =.59 
4. In your opinion, your complaints are heard 200 3.07          =.08 
5. Have you notices any change in the local government 
attendance 
200 12.57 <.001** 
6. What is the nature of change 200 12.57 <.001** 
** 1% significance level 
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8.3.1.3 Service Delivery and Local Government 
The association between indicators of LG service delivery performance (access, level of 
satisfaction and comparison between before and after service provision) regarding 
sewerage, water and education was assessed by employing a Chi-square test for 
independence. The test results are presented in Table 8-16. According to the test results, 
there was a significant association between the ‘level of satisfaction’ and ‘comparison 
of pre-post service delivery’ with type of ‘LG’ at 1% significance level. According to 
the cross tabulation table (Appendix 4, Table 38), for the level of satisfaction with the 
sewerage system, the higher proportion of respondents from CDGL indicated 
‘dissatisfied’ while for CDGF, 50.0% of the respondents were ‘satisfied’, and 50.0% of 
them reported dissatisfaction with the sewerage system. However, for the comparison of 
sewerage system before and after the LG system (Appendix 4, Table 40), 69.0% of the 
respondents from CDGL indicated that the sewerage system improved after the LG 
system compared to 50.0% of the respondents from CDGF indicating that the system 
improved after LG system.  
There was a significant association between indicators water provision and type of LG 
at 1% significance level, except for the level of satisfaction with water provision 
(Appendix 4, Table 45). The association between ‘before and after comparison of the 
water supply’ and ‘type of LG’ was found significant at 1% significance level. 
According to the cross tabulation (Appendix 4, Table 46), these percentages were 
higher for CDGL compared to CDGF. Overall, 81.0% of the respondents form CDGL 
indicated that the water supply was improved after LG reforms, while 65.0% of the 
respondents from CDGF reported that it was improved after LG reforms. Likewise, for 
improvement in access to water, the percentages were higher for CDGL compared to 
CDGF at 1% significance level. 75.0% of the respondents from CDGL and 54.0% of the 
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respondents from CDGF indicated that their access to water was improved after LG 
(Appendix 4, Table 42)  
For education service delivery, there was a significant association between ‘access to 
education’ and ‘type of LG’ at the 1% significance level. However, the association 
between performance of the education system before and after LG was found significant 
at 5% significance level. According to the cross tabulation (Appendix 4, Table 48), 
CDGF seemed to have more access to education (98.0%) than CDGL (69.0%). There 
was a significant association between ‘type of LG’ and ‘reasons for attending public 
school’ at 5% significance level (p=.02). For the SPSS analyses, 5 categories were 
reduced into two: quality of education and others. Once respondents were asked to rank 
the reasons for attending public schools, it was found that that mostly the first reason for 
attending a public school is high tuition fees of private schools in CDGF and the quality 
of education for CDGL. The cross- tabulation (Table 8-10 & Appendix 4- Table 50) 
also confirmed the same results, in case of CDGL most respondents send their children 
to public schools for the quality of education compared to CDGF. For the statistical 
purposes 3 categories - high tuition fees, ease of access and better facilities, were 
reduced to ‘others’ and quality of education was maintained as it is. The respondents 
from CDGF identified the high tuition fees of private education as their first reason for 
sending children to public schools, and quality of education as their secondary reason 
for sending kids to schools indicated in Table 8-10. There was also a significant 
association between improvement in teacher attendance and type of LG at 1% 
significance level. A majority of the respondents from CDGF (96.0%) indicated that 
teacher attendance was compared to CDGL (69.0%).   
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Table 8-16: Chi-square Tests for Service Delivery Performance of LG 
Comparing local government and indicators of service 
provision regarding sewerage, water supply and education  
N Yates continuity 
correction value 
Significance 
value P 
1. Are you satisfied with the sewerage system? 200 8.36 <.001** 
2. How would you compare the sewerage system before and after 
local government? 
200 6.72 
<.001** 
3. Do you have access to water? 200 8.73 =.001** 
4. Are you satisfied with the service provision? 200 3.37          =.06 
5. How would you compare water provision before and after the 
local government? 
200 5.70 
=.01** 
6. Has access to education improved after local government 
system? 
200 26.48 
  <.001** 
7. What are the reasons for attending? 200 5.40 =.02* 
8. Is there any change in teachers’ attendance? 200 23.41    <.001** 
9. How would you compare education provision before and after 
the local government? 
200 3.72 =.05* 
** 1% significance level; * 5% significance level 
 
8.3.2 Local Government Performance: An Overview 
In order to investigate the association between ‘indicators of LG performance’ with the 
‘type of LG’, a Chi-square test was performed. The results are presented in Table 8-17. 
Table 8-17: Chi-square Test for Service Delivery Performance of LG 
Comparing local governments and Indicators of local 
government performance 
N Yates continuity 
correction value 
Significance 
value p 
1. Has LG been able to improve community participation? 200 11.33   <.01
** 
2. Has local government been able to solve community 
issues? 
200 1.92   =.166 
3. Has LG been able to improve the attendance of LG 
employees? 
200 10.13 
  <.01** 
4. Has LG been able to improve service delivery compared to 
the previous system? 
200 3.46 =.06 
5. Is LG system is more transparent than before? 200 14.76    <.001** 
6. Has LG system been able to reduce corruption? 200 21.28   <.001** 
7. Has LG system been able to improve the complaints 
procedure? 
200 23.411 
  <.001** 
** 1% significance level; * 5% significance level 
 
According to the Chi-square test results shown in Table 8-17, there was a significant 
association between type of LG and community participation at 1% significance level. 
Cross tabulation (Appendix 4, Table 56) also indicated that the difference in 
percentages was higher for CDGF than CDGL. 94.0% of the respondents from CDGF 
indicated that LG system was able to improve community participation than CDGL 
(77.0%). 
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The Chi-square tests also indicated statistically significant relationship between type of 
LG and transparency of the overall system at 1% significance level. According to a 
cross tabulation (Appendix-Table 62), this trend was more visible in CDGF (98.0%) 
than CDGL (80%). Similarly, there was a significant association between ‘type of LG’ 
and the ‘extent corruption is reduced’ at 1% significance level. It was found that higher 
percentages of respondents from CDGF (100.0%) were of the view that the LG system 
was able to reduce levels of corruption compared to CDGL (79.0%). There was also a 
significant association between type of LG and improvement in complaints procedures 
at 1% significance level. Again, these percentages were higher for CDGF (96.0%) 
compared to CDGL (69.0%) (see Appendix 4, Table 64). However, there was no 
significant association between ‘before and after LG comparisons of service delivery 
performance’ and ‘type of LG’, as the level of significance was not equal to or less than 
.05 (Appendix 4, Table 61). 
8.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented research findings from quantitative data analysis of the 
community survey. Mainly, this chapter presented data in the form of contingency 
tables in order to present differences across CDGs regarding service delivery 
performance. This enabled a comparison of trends across local governments. Further, 
the researcher applied the Chi-square tests to identify any statistically significant 
association between the variables. The survey findings support the proposition that there 
is an association between community participation, accountability and local government 
performance.   
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8.4.1 Participation 
Overall trends lead us to infer that the contact between councillors and the public is 
improved and respondents seem to employ informal means of contacting their union 
councillor for their needs. Councillors also seem to take community input in 
development projects. Interesting patterns emerged regarding participation in 
monitoring committees, for instance. More respondents from CDGL were part of SMC 
than CDGF. The respondents from CDGL also indicated that their input was sought in 
development projects compared to CDGF. The reason behind this may be that 
community awareness is better in CDGL compared to CDGF. For instance, themes 
presented in Table 8-13 revealed that one of the union council in Lahore (UC 53) 
pressurized their local councillors to improve the sewerage and water supply in that 
community. The outcome of the joint effort of community and local councillors was the 
development of new sewerage pipelines and tube wells in that area. Again, this evidence 
supports the argument presented in the political decentralization perspective that 
accessibility of local councillors to local communities is one indicator of local 
government responsiveness (Young In Goldsmith 1986) and key themes (Table 8-13) 
and that the accessibility of councillors is the most valued means of participation by the 
community 
8.4.2 Service Delivery Performance 
Overall, we also tried to relate the respondent’s perception of their issues, the extent to 
which they consider local government is able to solve these problems and development 
work undertaken by the local government in those communities. It all seems related, as 
a majority of the respondents indicated that more development work was being 
undertaken to improve services than before. This evidence supports the findings of 
Faguet (2004) that spending patterns change under the local government system and 
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more funds are allocated to the services which are needed by the local communities. 
Regarding sewerage service improvement, 55% of the respondents from CDGL said 
that development work was completed and 50% from CDGF indicated that it was in 
progress. The majority of them were not dissatisfied with the overall sewerage system 
as according to them, there is an improvement, but they attributed their dissatisfaction to 
the sanitary worker/complaint procedures. Similarly, respondents seemed more satisfied 
with the water supply from both CDGs, as 72% from CDGL indicated that there were 
new tube wells in their area and it improved the continuity of supply and now water was 
available 24/7 hours. On the other hand, 31% from the CDGF said that the development 
projects to improve water supply were completed and 49% indicated that it was in 
progress. Respondents seemed satisfied with the public schools of their, and indicated 
that teacher attendance improved after LG system. However, it was found that as far as 
service delivery performance is concerned, sewerage and water coverage was much 
better in CDGL than CDGF. One of the reasons may be that more development work 
was completed in CDGL’s union councils compared to CDGF communities. However, 
respondents from CDGF agreed that LG’s development projects to improve the water 
and sewerage system were in progress. 
The results indicated variations regarding the presence of different monitoring 
committees and whether they performed an effective role in different sectors. For 
instance, majority respondents from CDGF indicated that their community had a 
sewerage monitoring committee than CDGL, whereas effectiveness of this committee 
was found better in CDGL compared to CDGF. In Education, the majority of the 
respondents agreed that there was a monitoring committee and that it was playing an 
effective role compared to other monitoring committees. Likewise, the majority of the 
respondents agreed that there were some improvements in the employees’ attendance 
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rate. However, this response was better in CDGF than CDGL. Likewise, if the trends 
are compared across sectors, the response was better in Education than Water and 
Sanitation sector. Responding to the open ended questionnaire of ‘what are the reasons 
behind the change in employee’s attendance’, The main themes were: ‘improve checks 
and balance’, ‘citizen oversight committees’, ‘councillors and government officials are 
accountable to the people’, and ‘complaints are heard’. While, respondents who said 
‘there is no change’, considered that ‘there is a lack of checks and balance’; and ‘system 
is not properly implemented’. The findings of the survey identified there was a change 
in accountability relationships.  
8.4.3 Accountability 
It was revealed through data analysis that new accountability relationships emerged 
between citizens and political representatives, and political representatives and public 
officials. As local councillors live in those communities, they are therefore constantly 
under the pressure of that community, and as a result tend to be more responsive to 
community issue as they need their votes for the next election. Government officials are 
also facing more influence from the elected representatives because of their new 
leverage in the power structure. The communities have identified that they can exert 
great influence on government officials through their local representatives. It is apparent 
from the data that the LG reforms are able to create citizen oversight and electoral 
accountability to some extent.  
8.5 CONCLUSION 
Clearly, the LG system is able to improve community participation in service provision, 
making the system more transparent than before, reduce corruption level, improve 
employees attendance, and improve the overall service delivery. Local councillors are 
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contacting their communities for identification of their needs, trying to propose 
development schemes on the basis of community input and therefore are able to deliver 
services reflecting community needs. Communities are finding it easy to access their 
councillors and pressurize political representatives, and in turn public officials for the 
resolution of their issues. Though the system may not be perfect, it is giving some 
positive results because of improved community participation. The research findings 
contribute to the political literature that there may be a reciprocal relationship between 
participation and improved service delivery performance since when community see the 
effectiveness of participation in the form of the service delivery outcomes; they will be 
more engaged in these channels. However, it seems important that the role of 
monitoring committees should be improved as it may lead to improved accountability of 
the system. The community also identified that there should be more involvement of the 
community to improve service delivery performance
9
. The next part will provide 
findings from qualitative data analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Each union has a population of 25000, and each Union Council is composed of 21 directly elected member which 
was later reduced to 13 members in total. The Nazim and Naib Nazims are elected on a joint ticket. Each Union Naib 
Nazim is part of Tehsil council as well and Nazim becomes part of District Council.  
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PART 5 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The second empirical part of this research is the qualitative analysis. It is based on the 
in-depth case studies of two local governments: City District Government Faisalabad 
(CDGF) and City District Government Lahore (CDGL). In these case studies, an in-
depth analysis of two sectors was carried out: Education and Water and Sanitation 
Sector (WSS). Each case study consisted of a number of semi-structured interviews and 
collection of background information through document analysis. The case studies 
provided the opportunity to carry out an in-depth assessment of decentralization and 
local government performance. The qualitative analysis consists of three chapters: 9, 10 
and 11. Chapter 9 provides a political analysis of local government and is based on the 
perception of political representatives. It assesses the role of political representatives in 
the policy making and implementation process. It also analyses the role of the 
institutional environment which may constrain or facilitate participation and in turn 
institutional performance of LG.   
Following on from the political analysis, Chapters 10 and 11 provide a managerial 
analysis of the public sector. They further explore the management of LG by situating 
the level of analysis at the organizational structures and processes of service delivery 
organizations. They focus on three main types of change: structural decentralization, 
performance based accountability models and the adoption of competition and 
collaborative service delivery arrangements. Public management literature argues that 
the outcomes of decentralization depend on the context, therefore the institutional 
environment will also be assessed. This analytical approach of cross case synthesis will 
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be used for this multiple case study design (Yin 2003) which will also contribute to 
identify patterns and examine similar or divergent themes as they emerge. Part 5 
synthesises qualitative and quantitative research findings in a cross case synthesis 
manner in Chapter 12 with concluding remarks in Chapter 13.  
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CHAPTER 9  
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This level of analysis is based on policy makers, and for that purpose the researcher 
interviewed the political heads of the 3 tiers of local government- District, Town and 
Union councils. The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the effectiveness of local 
policy makers in the policy making and implementation process, identifying the links 
between participation, accountability and performance. In addition to this, this chapter 
also highlights the role of the institutional environment in determining local government 
performance.  The chapter is structured around key issues: scope for policy making and 
implementation (9.2), effectiveness of participation, accountability and performance 
outcomes (9.3), and institutional environment (9.4). Section (9.5) presents the 
perceptions of political representatives regarding overall performance improvements in 
service delivery, and the last section (9.6) concludes the chapter.  
9.2 SCOPE FOR POLICY MAKING AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
The main motive behind the decentralization reforms was to involve people in service 
delivery by transferring decision making powers to the grassroots level, and to facilitate 
community involvement. The Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001 devolved 
political, administrative and financial powers to elected local governments.  
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9.2.1 Themes from City District Government Faisalabad 
According to the interviewees (Interviewee 3-Union Nazim; 1-District Nazim), this 
system had a broad scope for policy making at the local level, it helped to deal with the 
local issues at greater speed and facilitated the decision making process at the lowest 
possible level. The District Nazim, Faisalabad was of the opinion that district 
assemblies were fully empowered to make policies and implement them at the local 
level:  
“----District council Faisalabad was the first council in the entire country who 
passed public private partnership
10
 as a policy at the local level in December 
2004. Moreover, to institutionalize this policy framework, a PPP cell was 
established at the education department to facilitate the Public private 
partnership in service delivery.” (Interviewee-District Nazim) 
9.2.2 Themes from City District Government Lahore  
The main themes that emerged from the interviews were that decentralization increased 
community access to political and public officials to solve their issues and that local 
policies were more reflective of local needs. The representatives also acknowledged that 
decentralization provided an avenue for political education and brought new people into 
the system. It also promoted political diversity by giving representation to all minorities, 
which is a change to the class or feudal system deeply rooted in Pakistan. Whereas 
political representatives believed that the genuine desire behind the LG reforms was to 
bring government closer to the people, the civil bureaucracy had a different opinion:  
“the Main purpose of decentralization was to give power to the people. 
However, local representatives were not able to perform this job. We had the 
local government system before, but we do not have harmony among these 
systems. For example, General Musharaff
11
 wanted this system to further his 
own interests of weakening the political parties.” (Interviewee10- TMO, CDGL) 
                                                 
10
 PPP forms in Pakistan were quite different from the international experiences as discussed in literature review 
section-Public management perspective and these differences will be further explored in sector analysis and 
discussion chapters. 
11
 General Perveiz Musharaff introduced Local Government system in Pakistan under the Devolution plan 
2001. 
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Interviewees agreed that under the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001, local 
government had considerable powers to make policies and implement them. However, 
the researcher came across two viewpoints in terms of the actual amount of influence 
that local councils were able to exert. One of the interviewees explained that: 
“Powers of the local government were enormous, but the department did not 
follow the directives of their political heads” (Interviewee 5-Town Nazim).  
Another interviewee (Interviewee 6-Town Nazim) explained that in reality they had 
limited administrative and financial autonomy. The main factors were provincial control 
on fund allocation and posting and transfers of public officials. They could only request 
the provincial government to change or transfer a civil servant or public officials. The 
provincial government’s influence over transfers and postings had an impact on these 
officers’ loyalties. According to him, public officials or civil servants were not loyal to 
the institutions; their loyalty was with the people who had power to affect them.  
The empirical evidence of Blair (2000) indicates that giving marginalized people 
representation through quota systems, such as female representation in the councils, 
does not translate into meaningful participation. The researcher also found that women 
councillors had a different perception than male councillors regarding their influence in 
the policy making process. One of the female interviewees (Interviewee 9-Female 
Tehsil Councillor) mentioned that women had very little influence in the policy making 
process:  
“If we raise our issues in the council meetings, we are not heard by the male 
members of the council.” (Interviewee 9- (F), Tehsil Councillor, CDGL)  
Another female district councillor (Interviewee 8-Female District Councillor) 
highlighted that initially, as females, they had little influence over the policy making 
process. Then they tried to voice their concerns in the district assembly and were able to 
obtain development funds which were previously not given to female members. Being 
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female was not the only reason which influenced how much her voice was heard in 
council meetings. According to the female interviewees, party politics played a 
significant factor as well. According to the District councillor, she faced problems in the 
funds allocation process because she belonged to the opposition party. However, one 
theme was consistent in both female councillors’ interviews, that if they tried to present 
their proposals and pursue them, they were able to get them approved by the council. It 
all depended on how much they lobbied their proposals:  
“We initiated programs which were targeted at women needs such as how to improve 
their income sources, construction of schools and colleges where girls in our 
community do not have access.” (Interviewee 8-(F) District Councillor, CDGL) 
 
9.3 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
PERFORMANCE  
9.3.1 Participation  
The decentralization reforms intended to foster participation in local decision making 
processes. The political perspective argued that participation is not only an input but 
also an outcome of decentralization reforms (Crook and Manor 1998), therefore one of 
the effectiveness criteria of local government performance was to assess how far it was 
able to improve participation and engage local communities in the decision making 
process. LGO 2001 created different mechanisms of public engagement: CCBs, school 
councils and oversight committees. Interviewees were asked to what extent they 
considered that decentralization reforms improved participation.  
9.3.1.1 Themes from CDGF 
According to the political representatives:  
“----Now each union council has 13 union councillors who represent the 
interests of every other Street. This is an example of increased participation. The 
union council administers the activities of union administration and provides a 
 300 
 
critical viewpoint of others who are in opposition.” (Interviewee 2-Town 
Nazim) 
 
Another interesting theme which emerged from the interviews was a collaborative or a 
‘networking approach’ at the local level. According to one of the Union Nazim: 
“At the union council we have limited resources but we try to mobilize our 
resources by networking with each other and with the upper tiers. For example, 
we had a sewerage problem in three Union Councils (UCs) -UC231, UC232, 
and UC 233. We, all Union Nazims, sat together, consulted each other and then 
we drafted the first proposal of a sewerage project at this level and then raised 
this issue at the town level, and then sought help from the district government. 
After networking with all the tiers we were able to pool up all the resources and 
got approval of a project worth 32 billion PKRs. This could not have been 
possible without the help of the upper tiers. Similarly, I upgraded 2 schools of 
my union council, but the union council has only limited resources, and schools 
are the jurisdiction of the district government, so I raised this problem of my 
area at the district council and got approval of funds from the district 
council.”(Interviewee 3-Union Nazim) 
This reflects that the initial purpose of creating an indirect representation of the union 
council in the upper tiers (Chapter 1, Section 1.1.3) achieved its main objectives; to 
create a system of coordination among the three tiers of local government. One of the 
initiatives was to adopt a Participatory Budgetary approach. According to the District 
Nazim and district government reports, District Coordination Council (DCC) organized 
pre-budgetary meetings with all the stakeholders consisting of NGOs, CCB network and 
councillors in order to identify development schemes for the development budget of 
financial year 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. 
9.3.2 Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) 
9.3.2.1 Themes from CDGF 
The CDGF initiated ‘one-window’ operations and a ‘CCB-Help Desk’ in December 
2004 in order to streamline the CCB registration process, project approval and funding 
time and any other assistance required in the CCB. This reduced processing time for 
CCBs from several months to 45 days. According to the Strategic Policy Unit Report 
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(SPU, 2008) the initial target was to achieve a 10% annual increase in CCB 
development schemes from 2004-2008. However, the report indicates a very significant 
increase of 706 % in 2007/08 compared to 2004/2005 (206% increase from the base 
year 2003/4). However, the utilization of CCB funds remained low because of lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures and the effort required to follow up CCB projects approval and 
funds availability. On the other hand, according to the annual development plans of 
2008, CCB schemes worth Rs. 1.15 million were in progress in one town of CDGF. 
However, the researcher found mixed evidence of active participation of CCBs in 
service delivery improvements. For example, political elites from the CDGF claimed 
that they had CCB projects worth 35 billion PKR. Interviewees also mentioned some of 
the problems related to the CCB, highlighting that CCB projects faced procedural 
difficulties in their approval and this resulted in fewer CCB projects. One of the 
interviewees (4-TMO) explained that the spirit of the CCB was to identify development 
schemes on a needs’ basis and particularly in areas which were beyond the reach of 
local governments:  
“What happened was CDG like Faisalabad introduced contractorship into it. 
Contractors got schemes without competition. According to the rules, all 
development projects are awarded through competition. All schemes are first 
advertised in big newspapers, contractors compete and projects are awarded on 
the basis of permissible rates. However, the government awarded contracts 
without following due process.” (Interviewee 4-TMO, Finance, CDGF) 
Interviewee (4-TMO-Finance) explained that other factors were a lack of awareness 
regarding CCB schemes, financial constraints regarding 20% of CCB share and 
imposition of the burden of taxes (sales tax=16%, income tax=.06%, contractor’s 
profit=10%, overheads=10%). CCBs were non-profit organizations as mentioned in 
LGO 2001. Therefore, these schemes were supposed to be exempt from taxes.  
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9.3.2.2 Themes from CDGL 
According to the interviewees, community participation significantly improved in 
service provision. They emphasized that the community could access their local 
councillors for resolving their issues. According to one of the interviewees: 
 “The System has created awareness among the community, educated them how 
to resolve their issues. They know where to go for their problems. Nazim and 
Naib Nazim listen to their community issues and try to solve them.” 
(Interviewee8-(F) District Councillor) 
Interviewees’ perceptions about other channels of participation such as Citizen 
Community Boards (CCBs) were found to be mixed. According to the documents 
provided by the CDGL (see Appendix 5), the district government had a Citizen 
Community Board Monitoring Committee (CCBMC) within the Community 
Development Department. This Committee (CCBMC) had regular weekly meetings 
under the chairman of the Monitoring Committee on the CCB. One of the interviewees 
(Interviewee 1-Town Nazim) mentioned that the CCB was very active in his town, 
particularly in improving roads, sewerage and water provision. Another interviewee 
(Interviewee 6-Town Nazim) also reported that the CCB was actively involved in road 
construction and sewerage improvement. However, one of the interviewees said that the 
concept of CCB was misunderstood. He explained that the CCB suffered from 
procedural complexities and how he was able to adopt an indigenous approach to solve 
the problem of sanitation in his community on a self-initiative basis:  
“One of the communities of my union council came to me for a sanitation 
project. They were willing to contribute 20% of the funds to that project, when 
the total cost was estimated by the town administration, it was more than 9 
million PKR, and it was very difficult to raise 20% of that cost by the 
community. Then we tried to follow a low cost approach as was being adopted 
by one of the NGOs in Karachi city district. The total estimate was only about 2 
million. We were able to finish the whole project within 1 million and 50 
thousand rupees and it only took 1 month to complete. However, once we 
submitted the expenses to the town council for the release of funds, we could not 
do it till the time we gave 35 thousand rupees as a bribe to get the money 
released.” (Interviewee 7-Union Nazim) 
 303 
 
9.3.3 Oversight/Monitoring Committees 
9.3.3.1 Themes from CDGF 
The general perception regarding the monitoring committee was that they existed on 
paper and largely remained ineffective because of a lack of resources and interest on the 
part of local councillors. For example one of the interviewees explained that various 
factors were responsible for the poor performance of monitoring committees: 
“Monitoring committees were not very effective, because, first of all people 
could not devote their time to this aspect. Secondly, our own inexperience and 
lack of interest rendered them ineffective.” (Interviewee3, Union Nazim) 
9.3.3.2 Themes from CDGL 
According to Section 138 of LGO 2001, monitoring committees were to be constituted 
at the Union, Town and District tiers for each function of local government such as 
Water and Sanitation, Education, Agriculture, Community Development, CCB 
monitoring committee, District Coordination, Excise and Taxation, Finance and 
Planning, Cultural Committee, Forest and Fisheries, Industry and Labour, a Law 
Committee, Revenue committee etc. (see Appendix 5). According to the document 
analysis (Appendix 5) all these committees existed on paper from 2001-2010. However, 
once the researcher asked respondents about their effectiveness, the majority of the 
interviewees agreed that these committees existed only on paper and were not playing 
an effective role. One of the interviewees (Interviewee 8-District councillor, female), 
who was also chairperson of an Education Monitoring Committee of the District 
Government, explained that the reason behind their ineffectiveness was:  
“Females were appointed as the chairperson of monitoring committees. 
However, they were only given the designation without any powers. We did not 
have the staff, desk on the premises of the relevant department. This weakness 
rendered these committees ineffective. We were just reporting our observation 
and no action was taken on our complaints by the administration” (Interviewee 
8-Female District councillor).   
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Another interviewee (6-Town Nazim) explained that these committees lacked proper 
training and the capacity to work. The only effective monitoring committee was the 
School Council. The researcher interviewed one of the chairpersons of the School 
Council. According to her:  
“School councils were very active as schools could not spend money without 
their approval. I am the head of SMC. Every month, we have a meeting of the 
school council. The Head of the institution prepares the agenda of the school 
council and circulates it among the members. Then we discuss all issues during 
the meeting. Even, we try to mobilize the community to raise funds” 
(Interviewee9-(F) Town Councillor). 
9.3.4 Accountability  
One of the outcomes of increased participation is improved accountability of the local 
government, particularly political accountability. The local government system brings in 
a change in the existing relationship between political representatives and public 
officials of service delivery organizations. Therefore, this section intends to identify not 
only the extent to which people can hold their representatives accountable, but also the 
nature of the relationship between politicians and public officials on one hand and other 
grievance or redress procedures at the local government level on the other.   
9.3.4.1 Themes from CDGF 
Political representatives highlighted that there was a change in the accountability 
relationship between political and public officials. One of the interviewees explained:  
“There was a change in the accountability relationship, if we had a district 
council meeting, and we needed some important information regarding any 
department, or we had some complaint regarding the performance of public 
officials, we could ask them to come to the meeting and explain on that 
particular matter. It was a very balanced relationship.” (Interviewee 3-Union 
Nazim) 
  
CDGF’s officers also indicated that the system had been able to create indirect 
accountability over the public officials:  
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“If people have complaints, they will go to their union councillors, who can 
access their Nazim and this is how indirect pressure can be exerted over the 
public officials.” (Interviewee 4-TMO) 
Political representatives also reported that the internal audit system was very strong and 
no amount was released until it was verified by the audit department. However, the new 
government at provincial level started external audits of the local councils and was 
alleging that local governments had misused their resources. These allegations have not 
been proven in court so far. Political representatives were of the opinion that federal and 
provincial governments used external audits as a strategy to freeze local government 
accounts and weaken their resource base. There was a general consensus among the 
representatives that overall accountability improved. People were now aware that if 
government employees ask for a bribe, they could directly complain to their union 
council members. This resulted in an overall decrease of corruption in government 
offices. It was also interesting to note that the community survey also highlighted if they 
find an incident of corruption, they would inform their local councillors first, rather than 
go to other channels (Section 8.2.2.3, p: 264) 
Interviewees highlighted that the most important dimension was accountability to the 
public. Since the change of government at provincial level, they were facing issues in 
their relationships with public officials. Political representatives also mentioned that 
CDGF had a complaint cell with a Toll free facility (0800-11229) for the citizens to 
lodge their complaints (established in June 2007). They also emphasized that CDGF had 
developed its own website
12
 with all relevant reports and information for citizens. In 
order to reach the uneducated, CDGF had produced a series of theatre programs and 
also used radio programs in order to reach the poorest communities of this district. 
According to reports of the CDG (SPU, 2008), during the period December 2007-May 
                                                 
12
 http://faisalabad.gov.pk/ 
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2008, the complaints cell received 4046 calls, 95% of them were attended and 64% 
were resolved.  
9.3.4.2 Themes from CDGL 
In response to the question of change in accountability relationships between politicians 
and public officials, and overall improvement in accountability, interviewees expressed 
varied responses. According to the interviewees, public and political officials do not 
enjoy good accountability relationships. For the interviewees, it depended upon 
personal relationships, if a political leader is very influential and well networked then 
public officials listen to him/her. One of the interviewees (5-Town Nazim) mentioned 
that in the first tenure of local government (2001-2005) public and political 
representatives had a good working relationship, however, in the second tenure of local 
government (2005-2010) the nature of the relationship changed. This was due to the 
change of provincial government. With the newly elected provincial government in 
2008, public officials refused to take orders from political representatives. Another 
interviewee explained that as the posting and transfer of these officials was the 
responsibility of the provincial government, therefore these officials were not loyal to 
the institutions. They were loyal to the individuals who had the power to affect them.  
Responding to the question of auditing practices and their impact on accountability, 
interviewees were of the opinion that their internal audit was very strong. However, 
they were not satisfied with the external audit which was being carried out by the 
provincial government:  
“We perform an internal audit every year. We never release any amount 
payable till it is verified by the audit department. As far as the external audit is 
concerned, it was just targeted to blame the local councillors for corruption, 
such as in my town, the provincial government raised audit objection of 27 
billion, whereas my town never received any amount close to that figure” 
(Interviewee 5-Town Nazim). 
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Another aspect of accountability was dissemination of local government reports to the 
general public. One of the interviewees (Interviewee 6- Town Nazim) mentioned that 
they needed to have transparency in the system by focusing on issues such as the 
availability of a CDG budget on the local government website and an open window for 
customer complaints. However, local government could not make much improvement 
in this regard. He also explained that although they had an internal resident auditor, the 
local government staff was not very qualified to do the job. On the other hand, another 
Interviewee (5-Town Nazim) mentioned that the internal audit was very effective and 
they had skilled staff to do this job. Both of these interviewees (Town Nazim-5 & 6) 
explained that all the development projects were scrutinized before approval by the 
Town Development Committee (TDC), headed by the Town Municipal Officer (TMO). 
The TMO could only modify them with respect to technical considerations and to avoid 
duplication. Then it was forwarded to the Town Nazim for the tendering process. The 
tenders were advertised in leading newspapers and opened in the presence of people of 
that town to ensure transparency.  
Another Interviewee (5-Town Nazim) explained “corruption is deeply rooted in our 
culture”. All the public officials who are somehow connected with development 
activities get their commissions from such projects. In cases where they were not 
offered their commission, development projects faced difficulties in implementation. 
According to him, ‘It has become the norm of the society’:  
“In my first meeting with TMA administration, I made it very clear to the staff 
that I do not take commissions and nobody else should take it in my name. Still, I 
could not curb this culture.” (Interviewee 5-Town Nazim) 
Overall, interviewees were of the opinion that accountability improved under the new 
system of governance. Interviewees also emphasized that the most important is the 
accountability to the people (Interviewee5-Town Nazim; 6-Town Nazim; 8-(F) District 
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councillor).  They have to go to the people for their votes, if they do not perform well 
they cannot get re-elected.  
“As far as local representatives are concerned, they are accountable to the 
people. Their re-election determines whether they have performed according to 
the peoples' expectations or not.”(Interviewee 6-Town Nazim) 
9.4 THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
This section mainly assessed the perception of political representatives regarding their 
institutional environment and how it affected their performance. Two themes were 
dominant in the interviews: party politics and coordination issues.  
9.4.1 Party Politics 
9.4.1.1 Themes from CDGF 
Local councillors indicated that the most significant factors are the political 
environment, the lack of political commitment to the decentralization reforms and 
political interference from members of the national and provincial assemblies. In 
addition to this, interviewees also reported that party politics at the local level were a 
significant factor.  
“We cannot ignore party politics within the tiers of local government. For 
example, the Asian Development Bank allocated 80 million rupees for sewerage 
projects in every urban UC; we were not allocated that money because we did 
not attend the District Nazim meeting. We ignored collective good for personal 
interests. Bureaucracy is another important factor, but it varies from person to 
person, if political representatives use a dialogue approach and are committed, 
then the bureaucracy supports them.” (Interviewee 3-Union Nazim)  
Political representatives highlighted that democratic values were not nurtured because 
of power politics since independence.  
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9.4.1.2 Themes from CDGL 
All the interviewees had similar perceptions about their institutional environment. All of 
them acknowledged that during the first tenure of the local government there was a 
good relationship between the tiers of local government, provincial and federal 
governments on the one hand and bureaucracy on the other. They enjoyed sufficient 
resources and support from the upper tiers of government. However, after the provincial 
elections in 2008, the political scene at provincial and federal level changed. The new 
government was against all the previous policies of the General Musharaff government, 
who was the creator of the Local government system:  
“The new government did not give ownership to the new system. They 
considered this system as a threat to their financial autonomy and the new 
political blood injected through the local government system.” (Interviewee 6-
Town Nazim) 
Another interviewee explained that since the change of federal and provincial 
governments in 2008, they were facing resistance from the upper tiers in the form of 
releasing the local government share of funds. The provincial government had even 
started an external audit, not for auditing purposes but in order to target local 
governments:  
“In the first tenure party differences were important. We were from the 
opposition party of the provincial government and the district government but 
these tiers of government never interfered in our matters. They let us do our 
work. Sometimes, they affected the allocation of resources. But overall, TMAs 
were independent to work on their project. In the 2
nd
 tenure of local government, 
we had a different scenario at the provincial and federal governments. The new 
provincial and federal governments did not own the system and since then they 
have tried to undermine the local government. They never let us do our work. 
For example, the external audit by the provincial government is a vivid example 
of this situation. Its aim was to target the local government, not to check its 
organizational spending. We had Rs. 14 billion in our TMA account, but we 
cannot spend this money because of provincial government objections. This has 
also affected our relationship with the DCO and other officers. Bureaucratic 
interference has increased and now officers do not listen to us” (Interviewee 5-
Town Nazim). 
According to one of the interviewees (10-TMO) there were issues on both sides:  
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“Local representatives had the powers under devolution. Their behaviour 
towards bureaucracy changed once they came into power. This social behaviour 
of local representatives to not accept the authority of the bureaucracy created a 
rift between the two stakeholders. This in turn affected local government 
performance.”  
Tehsil Municipal Officer further (Interviewee 10-TMO) explained: “Bureaucracy 
cannot work under the political representatives as bureaucracy does not consider them 
able for the job.” According to him (10-TMO), this attitude of both political 
representatives and bureaucracy was largely responsible for undermining the local 
government system. A female district councillor (Interviewee 8-F) also explained that 
they faced administrative delays in the approval of their schemes. However, according 
to the interviewees, bureaucratic interference varied from person to person (Interviewee 
9-(F), Town councillor).  
9.4.2 Lack of Coordination among Tiers of Government 
9.4.2.1 Themes from CDGF 
The majority of the interviewees reported that one of the major issues was the lack of an 
integrated planning approach:  
“We do not have an integrated planning approach. Towns, unions or districts 
propose schemes which are often suffering from duplication and a lack of an 
integrated planning approach. At times we approve schemes in areas where they 
are not even needed. If in one community, a road is constructed, a few weeks’ 
later, the water and sanitation agency will start to build a sewerage line there. It 
is just a waste of resources.” (Interviewee 4-TMO) 
The majority of the interviewees reported that they enjoyed a cordial relationship with 
upper tiers of the government from the period 2001-2008. During this period, the local 
government system was owned and supported by the federal and provincial 
governments. As a result of federal and provincial elections 2008, local governments 
faced resistance from the newly elected government. The new government started 
trimming the system to make it ineffective and weak. The new provincial and federal 
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governments did not give ownership to the local government system. They considered 
this system a threat to their financial and administrative autonomy. It was also 
highlighted that provincial and federal governments perceived local leadership as a new 
threat.  
9.4.2.2 Themes from CDGL 
According to the interviewees, they faced confusion over the functions and 
responsibilities of different tiers during the initial six months of the local government 
system. Later on, role clarity gradually improved as political representatives became 
more familiar with the new organizational set up. They also explained that they had 
different channels for coordination such as District/Zila Mushavirat Committee (Table 
9-1).  
Table 9-1: District/Zial Mushavirat Committee 
            Source: Town Hall, CDGL 
In pursuance of Section 140 of LGO 2001, CDGL constituted the District/Zila 
Mushavirat Committee (a consultative body). The function and composition of this 
committee are given in Table 9-1. However, interviewees mentioned that although there 
were regular meetings of this committee, the enforcement mechanisms were quite weak. 
According to one of the interviewees (6-Town Nazim), one of the problems with the 
Composition of District Mushawirat Committee 
1. Membership:   
 Zila Nazim,  Naib Zila Nazim,  all the Town Nazims in a City District 
  The Zila Nazim shall be the Chairman of the Zila Mushavirat Committee and the 
District Coordination Officer shall act as its Secretary. 
  The Zila Mushavirat Committee shall meet at least once in every month or as and when 
called into the meeting by the Zila Nazim or at the request of any two members of the 
Committee and the minutes of the meeting shall be sent to the Government. 
2. The functions of the Zila Mushavirat Committee Shall be: 
 To crystallize a vision for integrated development of the district 
 To prioritize and coordinate inter-tehsil development plans 
 To resolve intra-district disputes 
 To muster the resources for crisis management; and 
 To set directions for realizing the economic potential of the district 
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implementation of the proposed solution of the Musharivat committee was, that all tiers 
were independent and mostly had conflicts over the implementation process. 
Another viewpoint was, although CDGs had a channel of internal coordination, the 
upper tiers had not devolved functions down to the lower tiers. For instance, according 
to LGO 2001, functions such as street lights and refuse collections were the 
responsibility of the Union Council, but the attendance register of employees was on the 
town council:  
“We had 130 sweepers in our union. Only 50-60 come to work. The rest of them 
paid some of their salaries to the upper administration so that they did not have 
to come to work. Even Town Nazim got commission from this.” (Interviewee 7-
Union Nazim)  
Another issue raised by the interviewees was the lack of an integrated planning 
approach in development works which was causing duplication of development 
schemes. According to one of the interviewees (Town Nazim 1), they lacked the 
concept of planning projects. For instance, the union council, town council and district 
administration proposed projects which were overlapping and were not linked together. 
They needed an IT system which can provide online data regarding the development 
schemes of different tiers of LG in order to monitor what was happening at different 
levels, improve project planning process and avoid duplication of resources. 
9.5 OVERALL PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS 
One of the assessments of performance was determining the perception of key 
stakeholders on how they viewed local government performance. 
9.5.1 Themes from CDGF 
In response to the question of overall improvements in service provision, particularly in 
education and water and sanitation, all of the interviewees were of the opinion that it 
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had considerably improved. According to the District Nazim (interviewee-1), in 
December 2002, the CDGF was able to set up a Strategic Policy Unit (SPU) as a ‘Think 
Tank’. Its key purpose was to act as a conduit in the district from where all development 
programs could be initiated and managed. Then the district government was able to 
collaborate with the Department for International Development (DFID-UK) for 
technical assistance with the approval of provincial and federal governments. According 
to the District Nazim and the performance reports issued by SPU, the district 
government was able to initiate a number of reforms in the following areas: 
1. Fiscal management: the district government enabled the local government 
departments to use a Financial Management Information System (FMIS) to 
produce reliable up to date monthly statements of cash flow and expenditure, 
and to forecast the end of the financial year. It also adopted a participatory 
budgeting process allowing all the key stakeholders- departments, local NGOs 
and CSO and councillors, to identify areas for improvement and align social 
sector spending to stakeholder priorities.  
2. Organization improvement: Workforce information and planning, training and 
development etc. 
3. Citizen focus: One window and a Help desk in the District Community 
Development department, reactivated district coordination committee (DCC), 
citizen perception survey, dissemination of information to the public on the 
district government website 
4. Capacity development: At management level, CDGF started a program of 
leadership and management training aimed at EDOs and DOs. Under this 
program, a number of teachers were sent to Malaysia and South Africa to get 
insight into the Whole School development Process which was being undertaken 
by the district government as a key approach to collaborate with NGOS to 
improve school education. Training was provided for all local councillors to 
help them understand the workings of the CCB, the participatory planning 
process and the role of a monitoring committee. Establishment of Institute of 
Learning (IOL) for teacher training.  
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5. Improvement of the information management system of the district: the 
CDGF’s main initiatives were the establishment of: a Human Resource 
Information Management System (HMRIS), CCB MIS, Revenue MIS, Road 
MIS, Geographical Information management system (GIS) in 2007, Biometric 
attendance system to control absenteeism, improve leave records and identify 
‘ghost’ employees etc. This represented CDGF’s ability to take initiatives for 
service delivery improvements. 
9.5.1.1 Themes from CDGL 
According to the majority of the interviewees, the overall local government 
performance was better than the previous system. They also acknowledged that there 
were significant improvements in sectors like education and water and sanitation. 
However, one of the respondents (Interviewee 5- Town Nazim) was not satisfied with 
the Education and WSS in his TMA:  
“My town was not having full WASA coverage. They never took the 
responsibility in our town. TMA had limited resources so it could not do a lot to 
uplift the plight of the community. Likewise, schools in my town are not having 
sufficient resources such as staff, boundary walls, drinking water etc. 
Particularly, girls’ schools are suffering because no one wants to be appointed 
to a remote area where there are transportation problems, cultural issues etc.” 
(Interviewee 5-Town Nazim) 
Another interviewee (Interviewee5- (F) Town Councillor) agreed that the quality of 
school education had improved and teacher absenteeism was reduced because of school 
councils. However, she indicated that there was no major improvement in the water and 
sanitation sector. According to the District Government, education was given the first 
priority and was allocated 18.35% of the total development budget.  
9.6 CONCLUSION 
Most of the interviewees emphasized that the present system was better than the 
previous system of governance, as local representatives were involved in the decision 
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making process, who were better informed of local needs and therefore LG policies 
reflected local preferences. The main themes identified in this chapter are summarized 
in Figure 9-1.  
 
Note: [‘+’ Indicates presence or favaourable factors]; [‘-’ Indicates absence or lack of a factor]; [‘O’ mixed 
perception]; [‘Y’ Indicates yes] 
Figure 9-1: Mapping Decentralization and its Impact on LG Performance 
It is discernible from Figure 9-1, a majority of the interviewees acknowledged that they 
had great scope in the policy making and implementation process. However, female 
councillors identified that they had little influence over policy making processes. 
According to them, they had to make a consistent effort to get their proposals approved 
by the council. They also mentioned that they received respect from the Nazim, but only 
to get their votes during the voting process. Otherwise they faced difficulties to make 
themselves heard at council meetings.  
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Political representatives also mentioned that they had more influence in the 1
st
 tenure of 
the local government (2001-2005) than in the second (2006-2010). The main reason for 
this was the change of government in the upper tiers as the result of provincial and 
federal elections in 2008. The main political parties which came into power at the 
federal and provincial level, were against all the policies of the previous Martial-Law 
Regime, which created the local government system. They never owned the system and 
this created political tensions between provincial and local governments. The 
interviewees were of the opinion that participation had significantly improved. 
However, their perception of initiatives such as CCB and monitoring committees were 
mixed. The Town Nazim from CDGL and the District Nazim from CDGF highlighted 
that CCBs were very active in their respective towns and districts. However, 
interviewees from both districts also identified certain constraints such as procedural 
difficulties and delays for the approval and release of funds.  
Document records indicated that in every annual development plan around 18-20% of 
the amount was allocated to CCB projects. However, it was not fully utilized. The 
Lahore city district government allocated a block amount of 22.2% of the total annual 
development budget 2006-2007 to CCB schemes, however, CCB schemes in that year 
were only 5.6% of the total annual development plan and only 20.1% of the total 
allocated budget for CCB was utilized. Likewise, CDGF allocated 20% of the district 
budget for CCB schemes. The target was to utilize the whole amount during the year 
2008. However, only 14.0% of the total allocated budget to CCB was utilized. Overall, 
CDGF had a more streamlined organizational set up for facilitating CCB projects, 
besides the issues of imposing taxes on such schemes.  
As far as the monitoring committees were concerned, document records identified that 
they were constituted for all the functions of the district (see Appendix 5), however, no 
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evidence of their full functioning was found in interviewees transcripts. The CDGF 
initiated a capacity building program for 32 Town Monitoring Committees in eight 
towns of CDGF on the local government monitoring system. According to the 
interviewees the main limitations were a lack of resources, transportation, proper space 
in the concerned departments and availability of time for the monitoring.  
In Lahore district, although there were capacity development programs, these programs 
were not initiated by the district government. These programs were organized during the 
first tenure of the local government with the aid of the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) in order to build the capacity of the local government. 
The researcher herself was part of such training programs as ‘Trainer of the Lead 
Trainer (TOLT). However, councillors were generally not satisfied with these training 
outcomes and needed more specific training aimed at making them familiar with the 
budgeting process and how to propose their development schemes. Hence, capacity 
issues were one of the factors stated by the interviewees as the reason for the 
ineffectiveness of monitoring committees in addition to resources, and commitment 
from the local representatives. An interesting innovation of CDGF was to adopt a 
‘Participatory Budgetary’ approach involving all the stakeholders. It also took more 
initiatives to mobilize the community and develop mechanisms for civic engagement 
and an inclusive decision making process compared to Lahore.  
The main accountability mechanisms were: accountability to the people, accountability 
relationship between political and administrative heads of the different Departments, an 
internal audit mechanism and external checks and balances. According to the majority 
of the interviewees the overall accountability improved. There were less incidents of 
corruption and employees’ attendance improved.  All the tiers of the government 
constituted complaint cells, the community could access their local representatives if 
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they found any incident of corruption or bribe.  However, the document analysis and 
interview transcripts indicated that CDGF was better in terms of dissemination of 
information and had an efficient complaint cell. The researcher also observed that the 
CDGF website had all the current information as well as a Toll free number to register 
community complaints. It also had a proper information management system for better 
integrated planning of the district (HRMIS, FMIS, and GIS). Compared to this, the 
CDGL had no such initiatives. The researcher could not access the CDGL website for 
annual development plans and other statistics about other social sectors.  
The interviewees explained that during the first tenure of the LG the situation was 
different. However, since the change of the provincial and federal governments after the 
2008 elections, their relationships with the bureaucracy at the local level were affected. 
Interviewees also had a consensus that internal audits were very effective. However, 
one of the Town Nazim from CDGL (Interviewee 6-Town Nazim) indicated certain 
constraints such as lack of skilled staff to carry out this function. All the interviewees 
were of the opinion that external checks and balances, particularly a provincial 
government audit of LG was not to check the spending, but was targeted to weaken the 
LG system.  
The institutional environment of both CDGs was not found to be very supportive in the 
2
nd
 tenure of local government because of the power struggle between the provincial 
and local governments. Both CDGSs faced interference from the provincial 
governments in the form of lack of funds. Even the resources that the district generated 
from its own tax revenues, could not be utilized because of provincial government 
restrictions. This also resulted in administrative resistance to the directives from 
administrative heads of the different departments. Political representatives from both 
CDGs identified political and bureaucratic interference as significant constraints to local 
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government performance. Another factor mentioned by the majority of interviewees 
was party politics at LG level. It was one of the factors which affected resource 
allocation for development programs. The literature on political decentralization has 
highlighted elite capture may be a potential problem, and disadvantaged groups remain 
disadvantaged as participation only reaches to mere representations (Bardhan 1997; 
Crook 2003). The study found that to some extent it was a potential problem in the 
allocation of resources to those who were well connected and had a strong party 
affiliation with the Nazim and Naib Nazims.  
Interviewees also identified a lack of coordination between tiers regarding development 
programs. They explained that the lack of an integrated planning approach caused 
duplication of development schemes and waste of resources. Regarding the coordination 
mechanisms between the tiers of LGs, interviewees mentioned the presence of the 
Mushavirat Committee, however, it was highlighted that this committee had an advisory 
status and lacked enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, the suggestion of the members 
usually failed to be implemented because of disagreements of the relevant tier of LG.  
According to the majority of the respondents from both CDGs, local government was 
able to improve its performance in the education and water and sanitation sectors. Local 
government also allocated more budgets for development projects. From the community 
survey the community suggested that they were highly satisfied with the LG system 
compared to the pre-devolution arrangements. They also considered that overall the 
CDGs improved community participation, were more responsive to local needs, and the 
overall accountability of the system is better in terms of transparency and had reduced 
levels of corruption.  
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CHAPTER 10   
SECTOR ANALYSIS-EDUCATION  
10.1 INTRODUCTION   
This chapter provides findings from the Education Sector. Firstly, an overview of the 
reform initiatives will be provided through a document analysis looking at the 
institutional environment, the delegation of financial and managerial powers to the City 
District Governments (CDGs) followed by the key stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
reforms which are organized around key issues. The chapter is organized into key 
themes: the extent of managerial autonomy (Section 10.5), user involvement in service 
provision (Section 10.6), accountability mechanisms and organizational performance 
(Section 10.7), and the role of the institutional environment on organizational 
performance (Section 10.8). Section 10.9 will discuss the collaborative service delivery 
initiatives adopted at the CDG levels and will examine how partners in collaboration are 
managing inter-organizational relationships (IORs), followed by pre-post performance 
comparison (Section 10.10). The last section (10.11) concludes this chapter.  
10.2 THE EDUCATION SCENARIO IN PAKISTAN  
According to the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement survey (PSLM), 
2006-07, Pakistan has a literacy rate of 55% (67% male and 42% female) and ranks 
135
th
 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index. It spends less than 3% of 
its GDP in the education sector which is even less than Iran (4.7%) and India, which 
spends 3.8 % of its GDP on education (EFA 2008). This suggests that Pakistan places a 
low priority on education compared to other countries. In spite of the fact that 44% of 
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the overall funds are disbursed to primary education, 24% is allocated to the secondary 
education sector and 13% is allocated to the tertiary sector, primary enrolment in 
education is reported to be the lowest in the world (EFA 2007). 
10.3 THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
An analysis of the education policies from 1947 to 2009 revealed that the National 
Education Conference in 1959 proposed for the first time that local bodies should 
manage all primary education. The New Education Policy 1969-70 further proposed 
that an autonomous district school authority should be established in each district in 
order to manage primary and secondary education. Provincial and district authorities 
should work in collaboration to enhance the quality of education. The National 
Education Policy (1992) proposed to establish a Directorate of Primary Education and 
School Management Committees (SMCs) at the village level. The National Education 
Policy (1998-2010) proposed that a district education authority should be created in 
each district to manage school education. To improve the falling dropout rate a 
compulsory primary education act was proposed.  
However, these policies were not implemented and education service delivery remained 
a very centralized affair until the decentralization reforms under the Devolution Plan 
2000. Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001 was aligned with previous national 
policies of decentralizing education to the district authorities. It transferred primary and 
secondary education service delivery from the provincial governments to the Local 
Governments (LGs). Under the new arrangements, the provincial governments are 
responsible for policy making, regulation of the social sectors, setting performance 
standards, and transferring financial resources to the local governments under PFC. The 
provincial governments also transferred the responsibilities of administration of school 
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and college education service provision to the LGs, including the opening of new 
institutions, the hiring of staff, the management of school councils and the conduct of 
examinations. A summary of the changes in the institutional arrangements is outlined in 
Table 10-1. 
Table 10-1: New Institutional Arrangements after Devolution Plan 2000 
Tier of  
Government 
Role, Responsibilities and Major Policy Initiatives Concerned 
Departments 
Federal 
Government 
 Policy formulation;  
 Setting standards and 
regulatory institutional 
framework 
 Curriculum development 
 A national framework for 
monitoring and evaluation of 
policy implementation 
 Financing through  National 
Finance Commission (NFC) to 
the Provincial government 
The legislation and policies 
concerned with education 
sector are as follows: 
1. Vision 2030 
2. National education 2009 
3. National education 
policy 2008 
4. Pakistan national 
education policy review 
white paper 2007 
5. National education 
policy1998-2010 
6. ESR 2001-2005 
 Ministry of 
Education 
(MOE) 
 
Provincial 
Government 
 Coordination with Federal 
Government  
 Policy formulation within 
national policy framework for 
the guidance of district 
government 
 Curriculum Development, 
 Financing to the local 
government through Provincial 
Finance Commission (PFC) 
The legislation and policies 
concerned with water and 
sanitation sector  at the 
provincial level is: 
1. Punjab Poverty 
Reduction Strategy 
2. Public private 
partnership strategy for 
the social sector in the 
Punjab 2008-09 
 
 Education 
Department 
 Director of 
Staff 
Development 
(DSD) 
 Punjab 
Education 
Foundation 
(PEF) 
 
Local 
Government 
 Opening of New Colleges & 
Schools, Up gradation of 
Colleges & Schools 
 Preparation of District Budget, 
Approval of Development 
schemes up to Rs.20 Million  
 Managing affairs of School 
Councils 
 Conducting of Class V & VIII 
Examinations 
 Inspection and monitoring of 
devolved institutions  
 Sanctioning of pension up to 
BS-17, Intra-District Transfers 
& Postings, Purchase of stores 
& capital goods for devolved 
institutions 
1. Policy initiatives by 
district government 
Lahore and Faisalabad 
for promotion of PPP 
reflected in the mission 
statements  
2. City district government 
Faisalabad council 
passed policy for PPP in 
2004 
 District 
Education 
Department 
Source: Adapted from PDSSP (2008) 
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The organizational restructuring at the district level created new roles and 
responsibilities. At district level, the head of the education department is the Executive 
District Officer (EDO), a newly created position, who reports to the administrative head 
of the district government (District Coordinator-DCO) and the political head of the 
district government (Nazim) and indirectly to the provincial secretary of education. 
Below this hierarchy is the District Education Officer (DEO), facilitated by a Deputy 
District Education officer (DDEO) and assistant education officers (AEO). At the grass 
root level, School Councils (SCs), also referred to as School Management Councils 
(SMCs), were set up to include the community in education service delivery. This also 
reflects the change in the accountability relationship; at school level, SMCs are 
responsible for the monitoring of schools and transparent utilization of funds. Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) became partners with the district department and 
under the ‘Adopt A School’ (AAS) program were actively playing an effective role at 
the district level which further ensured the accountability of the district government. 
10.3.1 Delegation of Administrative and Financial Powers under Devolution Plan 
2000 
The LGO 2001 revised the administrative set up of the education sector. It delegated the 
responsibilities of managing primary, elementary and high school education from the 
provincial government to the LG as summarized in Table 10-2. According to the new 
arrangements, responsibilities for hiring, firing and intra-district transfers were 
delegated from the provincial to the LGs. The EDO is responsible for the preparation of 
annual development plans, and for an effective and efficient execution of those plans. 
He contributes to the policy making of the district government by giving input to the 
DCO and by proposing by laws on education service delivery. He is responsible for the 
posting and transfers of teachers within the district and has the financial power of a 
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category 1 officer. District Education Officers (DEOs) are category 2 officers. They 
supervise and monitor the schools under their jurisdiction and report to the EDO. The 
DDEOs are category 3 officers and release teachers’ salaries. They also make 
contingency plans for their respective schools. This indicates that authority is shared 
among a large number of actors both horizontally and vertically at the district level.  
10.3.2 Financial Devolution 
Prior to decentralization, the provincial government received funds from the federal 
government under the National Finance Commission (NFC) and determined the 
education budget of their provinces. Under decentralized arrangements, the provincial 
governments allocate funds to the local governments through a Provincial Finance 
Commission (PFC) and LGs determine education budgets based on their priorities. 
Education is financed from three main sources:  
1. The District government’s own revenue sources; 
2. Provincial non-earmarked block grants to the districts; 
3. Ad-hoc federal education grants to provinces and districts (Shah 2003; Winkler 
and Hatfield 2002). 
 
The district governments considerably perform a significant role in the improvement of 
the education service delivery. Under the Devolution plan 2000, considerable 
administrative and financial powers were delegated to the education department, as 
espoused in Table 10-1 and Table 10-2. 
10.3.2.1 Budgeting Process at the District Level 
Based on the qualitative interviews with the Education Departments (EDs) and on 
document analysis, the EDs employ a bottom up planning approach for the development 
of the Annual Development Plan. This has helped schools to identify their needs and 
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develop their budget proposals. Schools submit their proposals to the education 
department for their approval. The usual process of approval is as follows: 
1. Proposals are received by the Deputy District Education Officers (DDEOs) for 
verification and approval. At this point the overall budget of the town is 
consolidated and the needs of all the towns’ schools are verified.  
2. All proposals are submitted to the respective District Education Officers (DEOs) 
for his/her approval.  
3. DEOs forwards all the budget proposals to the EDO. At this time the budget of 
the entire district is consolidated, verified, and approved.  
4. The EDO submits them to the district assembly for final approval  
5. Likewise, the union and tehsil Nazims also identify the development schemes of 
their constituencies and send their proposals to the district Education 
Department to check their feasibility. After it is approved, it goes to the DDC for 
further approval. The District assembly discusses the spending of the education 
budget and this ensures transparency. 
A pre and post devolution comparison of managerial autonomy over administrative, 
financial and other functions is presented in Table 10 2. 
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Table 10-2: Delegation of Power to the District Education Department under LGO 2001
Managerial Level Administrative Powers Financial Powers Others 
EDO/ 
Category 1 officer 
Supervision and coordination of all wings of education in the district. Appointing 
authority of grade1-15 
Review the annual performance of the district officers and subordinate staff; identify 
employee training needs; arrange training programs for them; take disciplinary action 
for maintaining of good discipline in its schools. 
Sanctions of pensions BS-17 retirement notification of officers in BS18-19 
Sanction leaves not exceeding 730 days 
(EDO was the Head of the education department and  was a newly created post. Prior 
to devolution, education department was under the direct supervision of provinces) 
Financial powers of category 1 officers; 
preparation and execution of the Annual 
Development Plan (ADP); internal audit 
and settlement of audit paras; the 
sanction of GP funds up to grade 19-20 
Collection, 
compilation and 
maintenance of 
statistical data; 
supervision of 
litigation cases 
DEO (SE) Registration of private secondary schools, conduct of middle standard examination, 
internal inspection and audit of the institutions; (Prior to decentralization director 
secondary education was responsible for the posting, transfer, promotion and 
registration of secondary school in the district)  
Financial powers of category 2 officers 
(before devolution, he was the category 
1 officer); Preparation of Annual 
development plan (ADP); grant of GP 
fund up to BS 18; reimbursement of 
medical charges up to BS. 17; award of 
scholarship on the basis of middle 
standard examination. 
The functions  
assigned by the 
competent authority 
DEO (EE) Appointing authority of elementary teachers, grade 14; promotion of teaching staff 
from BS 07-09; selection grade from BS 07-09; issuance of retirement notification; 
transfers of teaching staff;   ensure proper functioning of school councils; 
Registration of primary and elementary private schools; technical inspection and 
internal audit of the institutions; conduct of 5th grade examination 
Category 2 officers; preparation and 
execution of ADP; grant of GP funds 
advance; sanction of pensions sanction 
of medical reimbursement claim; grant 
of medical leave  
 
DDEO (EE) Appointing authority of non teaching staff from 1- 4 and PTC teachers, BS 07; ensure 
proper functioning of school councils. Sanction leaves of head teachers of elementary 
schools and AEO; sanction earned leave and ex-Pakistan leave of PTC teachers; 
forward cases of SST/EST teachers to higher authorities; ensure proper functioning of 
school councils  
Category 3 financial officers; drawing 
disbursing officers, release salaries to the 
teaching staff; prepare contingency plans 
for their schools; preparation and 
execution of budget from all schools; 
prepare the annual budget of its own 
staff; collection and monitoring of 
financial data from the institutions; 
perform internal audits and technical 
inspecting of institutions 
The functions 
assigned by the 
competent authority 
Source: author prepared from reports of  DFID, 2007and Delegation of Financial Powers, Punjab, 2006 
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10.4 MAJOR REFORM INITIATIVES AT THE CITY DISTRICT 
GOVERNMENT (CDG) LEVEL 
10.4.1 Case Study1- Education Department, CDGF 
The CDGF gives priority to education in its mission statement. To achieve this goal, a 
strategic operation unit was established in 2004. It developed the first strategic 
operation plan for the district education department. In this process various agencies 
helped the city district government, such as the department for International 
development (DFID), GHK International Ltd, and the UK under the project 
“Strengthening Decentralized Local Government in Faisalabad” (District Council 
Faisalabad report 2004). 
10.4.1.1 Service delivery Initiatives 
Strategic Operation Plan (SOP) 
A Strategic Operation Plan carried out a detailed situation analysis of the education 
sector. Subsequently, a ‘Strategic Operation Plan’ was developed to restructure the 
education set up at the district level. The completion date for the project was 2008. The 
SOP had four main objectives:  
“Enhancing its management capacity and strengthening its management system; 
training of teachers and head teachers towards improved education quality; 
encouraging community participation in the management of schools; the 
development of public private partnership in key areas” (Education Strategic 
Operation Plan 2004-2009, p: 10).  
CDGF was the first district in Pakistan where the LG developed detailed job 
descriptions and identified training needs which were provided to the LG employees 
accordingly. Interview data and document analysis confirmed that the CDGF 
significantly invested in its human resource development, a key indicator of process 
improvement.  
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Establishment of the Institute of Learning (IOL) 
Another significant development to improve access and quality of education was the 
establishment of a PPI Cell (Public Private Partnership Cell) in 2006. Faisalabad district 
was the first district in Pakistan that formulated a PPP policy at district level and took 
significant steps for its institutionalization. It implemented PPP policy through two 
main initiatives: the establishment of a PPI cell in the education department and an 
Institute of learning (IOL) at the district level. Both these initiatives were linked to the 
Whole School Development (WSD) model. The WSD model is an inclusive approach to 
involve all community members and stakeholders to improve in-school quality. This is 
one of the main grass root strategies as espoused by the education department 
Faisalabad. NGOs undertake this responsibility for about 5 years or more as agreed 
between the partners. The relationships between the partners are governed by a legal 
instrument MOU (Memorandum of Understanding), clearly specifying the roles and 
responsibilities of the partners. The organizational chart of the IOL and is provided in 
Figure 10-1, it explains how it is merged within the Education Department.   
 
Figure 10-1: Organogram of PPI Cell Faisalabad  
Source: Education Department, CDGF 
 
The key areas of responsibility assigned to the PPI cell were: identification of schools in 
need; contracting partnerships; managing partnerships; documentation and sharing of 
EDO Education 
Officer: M & E Documentation 
(1) School Development Field Officer 
(2) 
Marketing and Linkages Officer 
(1) 
Coordinator PPI Cell Policy, 
Operation/Contract 
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performance with the district government and other partners. The Education Department 
took part in the partnership through two main programs: Adopt A School (AAS) and 
School Up-gradation through Community Public Partnership. The Education 
Department has 100 schools under these two programs. These programs aimed to 
increase enrolment in schools, improve the infrastructure, teaching staff, and the 
learning environment. The WSD model was initially piloted in 13 union councils and 
250 schools. Another initiative under the PPP was the establishment of a teacher 
resource centre at district level, known as the Institute of Learning (IOL). This resource 
centre was also established in partnership with the project “strengthening decentralized 
local government in Faisalabad”. It was created to cater for the needs of teacher 
development and link it to WSD model. The WSD approach is based on the 
mobilization of community participation. IOL organized meetings among parents, local 
councillors, Nazims, and other stakeholders to create awareness regarding low school 
enrolment, teacher absenteeism, and missing facilities. The School council prepared a 
WSD plan for their communities and raised funds for school improvements. At the 
moment, CDGF has allocated Rs.300, 000 to the 245 WSD schools in rural and urban 
areas, 10% of this fund is from community contributions. The community was actively 
engaged in monitoring the construction work and school council members were also 
part of the teacher training process (SPU 2008). The SPU also conducted 6 case studies 
of WSD evaluation and found that: 
“There was a visible change in the attitude of all stakeholders. The parents, 
teachers, head teachers, community, school council, and education department 
all joined hands to focus on the achievement of the ultimate goals of quality 
education by improving all aspects of school.” (SPU 2008) 
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10.4.2 Case Study 2 - Education Department, CDGL 
10.4.2.1 Organizational restructuring  
The EDO is the head of the Education Department and is assisted by DEOs (Secondary 
Education- SE) male and female; DEOs (Elementary Education- EE) male and female. 
Below that, the hierarchy is organized according to nine towns; every town has its own 
DDEO, both male and female. The total number of DDEOs is 18. Prior to 
decentralization, there were only two DEOs and DDEOs to cater for the needs of the 
Lahore district. According to the interviewees, the organizational restructuring, under 
decentralization reforms, has brought the decision making closer to grassroots level, the 
work load was reduced and schools were managed in a more efficient way. “Now the 
system is more adaptive to the changing demands of modern times.” (Interviewee 13, 
DDEO, CDGL).  
The vision of CDGL in education service delivery is: 
“To provide quality education to all children by ensuring the enrolment of every 
child, minimizing the drop outs rate and the availability of subject specialists, a 
proper and adequate infrastructure, and the provision of missing facilities in all 
the schools of Lahore” (Nazim, CDGL) 
To achieve this mission statement, the CDGL identified the following main goals for 
education service delivery: 
 Allocation of maximum resources to education in order to ensure an 
adequate infrastructure; 
 Standard student / teacher ratio 
 Improving the educational standards to achieve a quality education provision 
for all 
 To engage philanthropists for resource mobilization 
 Improving teacher training, monitoring a devaluation system and proper staff 
development 
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 To invite and encourage the private sector in service delivery on a 
partnership basis for better management of schools (CDGL 2007). 
10.4.2.2 Service Delivery Initiatives by CDGL 
The major policy initiatives undertaken by the city district government were:  
 Public private partnerships through Adopt A School program. 
 A focus on the constitution of school councils for better management and 
supervision. 
 The provision of free textbooks. 
 
The city district government placed significant importance on the involvement of the 
private sector in the education service delivery, particularly NGOs. The rationale behind 
community participation and PPP was the maximum utilization of professional 
expertise of the private sector and the infrastructure of the government sector for an 
effective and efficient service delivery. 354 schools were adopted by NGOs under the 
Adopt A School Scheme. The main rationale behind this strategy was to improve the 
quality of education, reduce teacher absenteeism, provide the missing facilities for 
schools, provide training to teachers, increase school enrolment and make optimum use 
of assets. To optimise assets, afternoon shifts were started in selected schools.  
10.4.3 Efficient and Responsive Service Delivery Model 
The document analysis in Table 10-2 highlighted that considerable financial and 
administrative autonomy was delegated to the managers of education departments. The 
main themes that emerged from both CDGs were: the current decentralized service 
delivery framework is more “efficient and responsive to local needs” and improved the 
“decision making process at grass root level.” According to the respondents, the major 
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benefits of this system lie in the effective management of education service delivery at 
the local level.  
“To provide more facilities to communities, speed up the process of service 
delivery. Before decentralization, one person had all the powers at divisional 
level. All matters were solved at divisional level. Now, after the creation of 
districts, we were able to solve problems at the lowest level. Such as before 
decentralization there was one DEO and one DDEO, now with the creation of 9 
towns, we have nine DEOs and eighteen DDEOs monitoring the service 
provision. For instance, if the schools of Ravi town are having some problems, 
then rather than coming to me they can discuss this with the DDEO of that town. 
Therefore, the system is more effective in handling issues at the lowest possible 
level; this system has provided benefits to all- teachers, staff, head teachers, and 
the community by facilitating the process of decision making at grass roots 
level.” (Interviewee 9- DEO (F), CDGL)  
10.5 THE EXTENT OF MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY 
10.5.1 Themes from CDGF 
Theme 1: More Financial Autonomy compared to Personnel Management 
Autonomy 
The researcher’s main interest was to know how far managers could exercise their 
powers. The Head of the Education Department (EDO-CDGF) acknowledged that he 
was fully empowered to exercise his powers; however, at the same time he also 
mentioned that the powers were re-centralized at the top with the District Coordinating 
Officer (DCO). Likewise at the second managerial level the district education officers 
(DEOs) were also of the view that they had more financial powers compared to 
administrative powers, particularly regarding the hiring of staff. Again, this managerial 
level (Interviewee 3 & 4, DEO CDGF) was of the view that the powers were re-
centralized at the top: “In my opinion, powers are at the top. Nothing has been 
decentralized”, while acknowledging that:  
“In terms of financial autonomy, there are some considerable improvements. 
Prior to decentralization, we needed the approval of the upper tiers for funds 
allocation and their spending. Now we have our own budget and are free to 
utilize it according to our needs. Rather we are accountable if we do not fully 
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utilize the funds. Now the government asks us for an explanation for not fully 
utilizing the financial funds.”  
Consistently interviewees highlighted that they had less administrative autonomy and 
more financial autonomy. However, this theme was more significant at the third 
managerial level (DDEOs). According to the third managerial level (DDEOs), prior to 
decentralization, they enjoyed more administrative power. The majority of the 
interviewees (3 out of 4 DDEOs) indicated that they were partially empowered. 
Nonetheless, they also agreed that they are now more autonomous in resource allocation 
than before. These contradictions were reported as:  
“We can hire class 4 and PST (primary school teacher) teachers, we also 
perform internal audit of our schools, handle budgets, accounts etc. In reality, 
we are not fully empowered. Rather than decentralizing authority down the 
hierarchy, powers have been taken away from us. As far as financial powers are 
concerned, we are more autonomous such as I am fully empowered in resource 
allocation. I distributed Rs. 2.5 billion among my schools. The district 
government system has brought more financial resources which have enhanced 
the quality of education” (Interviewee 5- DDEO, CDGF).  
Against this backdrop, there was a question as to why managers considered that they 
were partially empowered or powers were recentralized at the top. The reason for this 
contradiction “powers have been taken away from us” seemed to be that previously 
there was only one post of DDEO in the entire district, now this post was divided 
among the 8 DDEOs of the CDGF towns for better manageability. The DDEOs seemed 
unhappy with the current situation as they felt less empowered after devolution reforms.  
10.5.2 Themes from CDGL 
Theme 1: More Financial Autonomy compared to Personnel Management 
Autonomy 
The interviewees commented that the system overall has been able to deliver services in 
a more efficient and responsive manner, the education policies at the CDGL reflect the 
needs and priorities of the local government. Now the local government is more 
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autonomous in the allocation of resources to the education sector. According to one of 
the interviewees (Interviewee 11- DEO, CDGL), before decentralization there were no 
organized efforts to support teachers if they had any problems, and provide them with 
training opportunities. It was a time consuming process to get approval from the Punjab 
government (provincial government) for the release of funds etc., however, after 
decentralization the service delivery system was faster. Under the city district 
government, things are done in a more efficient manner without procedural delays 
particularly with regard to resource allocation:  
“Now if we need funds, we can get approval from the city district government, 
otherwise it took months to get funds from the provincial government. Funds are 
now allocated to us and as a category 2 officer, I can fully utilize these funds 
according to the needs of my schools.” (Interviewee 11, DEO, CDGL) 
Nonetheless, interviewees from CDGL also indicated a mixed perception regarding the 
amount of administrative autonomy, particularly at the third managerial level. For 
instance, the Head of the Education Department (EDO) had all the financial and 
administrative powers and could exercise them fully. He did not need to seek approval 
for his decision. However, the EDO, while acknowledging that he had all the power and 
could exercise it fully, reported that power was re-centralized at the top: 
 “If we talk about real autonomy, more power at the grass root level, in reality 
power has been re-centralized at the level of the DCO.” (Interviewee 1- EDO, 
CDGL) 
At the DEO level, the researcher interviewed four DEOs (2 males and 2 females) and 
two of them were of the view that they were fully empowered (Interviewee 9-DEO (F) 
& Interviewee 11-DEO, CDGL) whereas two of them said that they were partially 
empowered. The respondents at the third managerial level i.e. DDEOs were also 
concerned with the powers they had been assigned. Out of the 7 interviewed Deputy 
District Officers (DDEOs), only three were of the opinion that they could fully utilize 
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their powers. The rest of them reported that they were partially empowered and at times 
they are only signing authorities. They just followed the orders of their superiors: 
“I am partially empowered. If I want to take any action against those who are 
not performing well, I will start getting pressure from the top. Therefore I will 
not be able to take any action. We are like puppets in the hands of our 
superiors.” (Interviewee 15, DDEO (F), CDGL) 
The third managerial level appeared to be facing more pressure from its superiors and 
political representatives in their day to day operations. It was one of the reasons why 
they needed to be careful while writing their reports on school performance, because if 
they criticized someone, it would create problems, “teachers against whom we want to 
take action will use “political patronage” to avoid sanctions” (Interviewee 14, DDEO, 
CDGL). Consistent with the themes of the ‘recentralization of power’ as found in 
CDGF, the third managerial level from CDGL (DDEOs) explained that before 
decentralization there were only two DDEOs in Lahore. Now the powers of the two 
DDEOs were shared among 18 DDEOs who were responsible for the management and 
supervision of schools in 9 towns. According to the perception of DDEOs, they were 
more autonomous before than after decentralization. Though, at the same time they 
were of the view that the manageability of the tasks improved after decentralization. 
Other factors interfering in the exercise of managerial powers were political and 
bureaucratic interference.  
Themes 2: Decision Making is a Participatory Process 
During the interview process, once the researcher asked managers ‘do they consider that 
the decision making process is participatory and are they involved in the decision 
making process before implementing it’, only one of the interviewees at DEO level 
mentioned that they were consulted in strategic decisions. Other managers in the 
education department were of the opinion that their input was not sought in the 
management of service delivery at district level. 
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“We have full autonomy according to the rules. However, if there are some 
strategic decisions regarding the implementation of a policy, the EDO consults 
us and after taking our input makes his decisions. With respect to the 
management of my school I am fully empowered, if I found that someone is 
performing very poorly, I can transfer that person; or if staff is absent, I can 
punish that person. According to the financial delegation, we get proposals from 
the schools with respect to their needs; these proposals are verified and 
consolidated for further approval from the council. Then once funds are 
released, we pass it on to our DDEOs who are the DDOs (Drawing Disbursing 
Officers) of towns and are fully empowered to allocate resources among their 
schools according to a need based formula.” (Interviewee 9- DEO (F), CDGL)   
10.6 THE EXTENT OF USER INVOLVEMENT IN SERVICE DELIVERY: 
THE ROLE OF SCHOOL COUNCILS  
The School Council gave direct representation to the community to oversee education 
service delivery and involve them in school related issues. It was mandatory for all 
government schools to constitute a 7 to 15 member council comprised of parents, 
teachers, union Nazim, students and other members of the community. The SC was 
responsible for ensuring teachers’ attendance, increasing enrolment, motivating parents 
to send their children to school, organizing co-curricular activities, taking measures to 
protect teachers/students’ rights, providing support in the distribution of free textbooks 
and stipends in the school, and taking measures to protect school buildings. The 
Councils were required to hold meetings at least once a month, develop a School 
Development Plan for the use of funds, and maintain certain records. In a move to 
encourage councils to undertake necessary small scale projects without fear of excessive 
scrutiny, the expenditures made by School Councils (SC) were taken out of the purview 
of the ‘Punjab Financial Rules’, thereby excluding SC expenditure from the audit under 
the government rules. The District Government transfer funds directly to the SCs 
accounts. All these arrangements gave SCs considerable financial and administrative 
autonomy. 
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10.6.1  Themes from CDGF 
Theme 1: School councils led to the transparent utilization of funds, resource 
mobilization, and monitoring of education provision 
The previous section highlighted that CDGF made considerable efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of SCs and they were very active in WSD (Section 10.4.1.1). The SCs had 
a significant impact on the transparent utilization of funds, resource mobilization, and 
monitoring of education provision. According to the EDO (CDGF):   
“Before school councils, schools were always looking to the government for 
finances or approval to improve schools infrastructure or overcome staff 
shortage. Now each school council has their own budget which they can spend 
according to their needs; they do not need approval from the top. The creation 
of school councils had two main outcomes: it reduced teacher absenteeism and 
improved funds utilization.” (Interviewee 2-EDO, CDGF) 
There was some evidence of direct community support in the education provision. As 
one of the interviewees (Interviewee 3- DEO, CDGF) reported that in one of the schools 
under his jurisdiction, the community financed the construction of 12 rooms in a high 
school.  
Theme 2: The Active Role of School Councils Depends on the Local context  
All the managerial levels reported the active role of SCs in education provision. 
However, at the same time, managers also explained that community participation, 
particularly the school council, was active in some places and less active in others. The 
main factor behind this variation was the local context. A local supportive context is 
comprised of the local community, local representatives such as Nazim, councillors, and 
other socio-demographic variables such as the remoteness of an area, literacy levels and 
poverty levels, etc. According to the interviewees, SCs were active in urban areas where 
people were more educated, and poverty was less:  
“The involvement of the community varies from area to area, as people who are 
well educated are actively involved, and in remote areas where literacy is very 
low, people are less active.” (Interviewee 2-EDO, CDGF) 
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Themes 3: The Role of the Head Teacher in Making School Councils Effective 
All of the interviews recognized that the head teacher played a very significant role in 
making SCs effective:  
“School councils are a very effective way of involving the community in service 
provision, finance and accountability. They have improved the performance of 
schools. However, they are more effective where people are less segregated into 
classes or regional differences and they are more educated. Another important 
factor is how the head teacher facilitates the participation process. Where the 
head teachers take an interest to involve all, school councils are more 
effective.” (Interviewee 3-DEO, CDGF) 
10.6.2 Themes from CDGL 
Themes from CDGL regarding community participation were consistent with the 
CDGF. All the managerial levels acknowledged that one of the achievements of 
decentralization was greater community participation. The main forms of participation 
were school councils, PPP, and CCB. However, CCBs were more active in CDGF 
compared to CDGL.  
Theme 1: The Impact of School Councils on School Performance: Transparent 
Utilization of Funds, Resource Mobilization, Monitoring of Education Provision, 
Reduced Teacher Absenteeism 
According to the interviewees, community participation, particularly school councils, 
was very effective in ensuring a transparent utilization of funds and monitoring the 
quality of education in their schools. It also reduced teacher absenteeism:  
“Now the city district government has allocated school councils their own funds 
and people know that during school council meetings they are being consulted 
on various issues so they participate in those meetings. 70% of the school 
council members attend school council meetings. ----They are monitoring our 
schools, which has improved the transparency of the utilization of school funds 
and teacher attendance. In some cases they have even raised funds for school 
buildings.” (Interviewee 11-DEO, (F) CDGL) 
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Theme 2: The Role of Local Context and Effectiveness of School Councils 
However, while acknowledging that community participation through school councils 
improved under the city district government, respondents pointed out that the level of 
participation varied based on various factors. Interviewees from all managerial levels 
highlighted that the socio-demographic profile of a community greatly affected the 
school councils’ effectiveness, as in rural areas the community lacked awareness 
regarding their role in school councils:  
“In my perception, school councils are not very effective; because of a lack of 
community awareness with respect to their roles in school councils or because 
of their poverty or other social or economic factors they do not want to take an 
interest. For example, in rural areas particularly, usually community members 
will not attend a meeting but will ask the head teacher to send the register to 
their homes for their signatures. There are some areas where school councils 
are active but they are very rare.” (Interviewee 9- DEO, (F), CDGL)  
A similar theme emerged from other interviewees (Interviewee 10- (F) DEO, CDGL). 
School councils were not active in remote areas where the literacy rate was low. 
Communities in rural areas lacked awareness regarding their role in the school council, 
and in such cases head teachers became the sole authority, which sometimes led to 
corruption or embezzlement of school funds:  
“The community is very active since decentralization such as school councils. 
However, it varies from area to area. Urban and rural areas have a different 
environment. In rural areas, due to the lack of education and awareness among 
the community regarding their role in the school council, school councils are 
not very active. Generally, in these areas control remains with the head of the 
institutions. In urban areas school councils help schools in finances plus moral 
support.” (Interviewee 15- DDEO, (F), CDGL)  
Overall, there was a consistent perception in both CDGs that SCs had a significant 
impact on improving accountability of the schools in terms of funds utilization and 
reducing teachers’ absenteeism in addition to resource mobilization. However, 
according to the interviewees, it all depends on the level of community involvement. If 
the community is not actively involved then the schools often become passive.  
 340 
 
10.7 THE CHANGE IN ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
The education sector has both formal and informal means to ensure accountability. 
Formal internal channels of accountability are: monitoring and supervision by managers 
(EDO, DEO, and DDEO), internal grievance procedures, and SCs. Channels at the 
district level are: District assembly and District Monitoring Committees. Vertical 
accountability arrangements at the provincial government level are through the Offices 
of the District Monitoring officer (DMO). This section mainly explored whether there 
was a change in accountability arrangements and whether organizational performance 
improved.  
10.7.1 Themes from CDGF 
Theme 1: Efficient Internal Accountability Arrangements  
There was a high level of satisfaction among the managers regarding accountability 
arrangements and a consistent perception emerged from the interviews that the 
involvement of all these channels contributed to improve the overall transparency of the 
system: “The system is more transparent than before as more people are involved in the 
service provision” (Interviewee 3- DEO, CDGF). However, managers seemed more 
satisfied with the internal accountability arrangements and less with external 
accountability channels. For instance, the Head of the Education Department (EDO) 
explained that the internal auditing process was very transparent and the term ‘technical 
inspection’ was used for this process which referred to a detailed audit of schools under 
their jurisdiction.  He also mentioned that their department had a very efficient 
complaints procedure (a Toll free number where people could register their complaints). 
In addition to this, the education department had a biometric system to monitor 
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teachers’ attendance and eliminate ghost13 teachers. Overall, interviewees had a high 
level of satisfaction with the internal audit, complaints procedures, clarity of financial 
management rules etc.  
Theme 2: Coordination and Capacity Issues 
Interviewees highlighted coordination problems between provincial level monitoring 
teams and the education department. It resulted in the duplication of work and managers 
were spending more time on completing the paperwork than on the supervision of 
schools as required by their jobs.  
“We are facing dual responsibilities and overlapping accountabilities that affect 
our performance. One example of this is MEAs. These are retired army 
personnel employed by the provincial government for the monitoring of schools. 
These employees have no knowledge of the education system. They are unaware 
of the organizational culture. When they visit schools their behavior with the 
staff is very rude. Particularly, female staff has resisted this monitoring and 
complained against their attitude towards staff. Another factor is that these 
employees have a lower rank than the head teacher, consequently, head teachers 
wonder why they should be answerable to someone who is below his/her rank.” 
(Interviewee 7- DDEO (F), CDGF) 
All of the interviewees reported their dissatisfaction with regard to the external audit, 
provincial monitoring committees and stressed the need for greater coordination among 
multiple channels. In addition to this, managers also highlighted certain capacity issues. 
They indicated that financial management training for budget preparation should be 
organized particularly at school level.  
Theme 3: Under-Utilization of Funds 
One of the concerns among the managers was the under-utilization of funds because of 
fears of external audits, complicated purchase procedures and a lack of capacity to make 
budget proposal particularly at the school level. 
                                                 
13
 Ghost school and ghost teachers is a local term used by the managers to refer to those school which 
exist on paper only and had teachers appointed in those ghost school but were drawing their salaries 
regularly.  
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“In my perception, the financial rules are not very clear to us. We do not have 
proper staff to prepare budgets. Particularly, at primary and middle school 
levels, we lack staff to prepare budget, even they don’t know how to make it. 
Because of unclear rules and a lack of capacity, there are more chances of 
corrupt practices at this level.” (Interviewee 6- DDEO (F), CDGF) 
There were some contradictions between the perceptions of the managers regarding 
financial management rules. For instance, the EDO and DDEOs were of the opinion that 
financial rules were not very clear to them.  
“The financial rules are not very clear to us. This is one of the reasons for the 
under-utilization of funds; people fear that if they utilized the funds, they may 
face an audit Para (objection). Take for example, we needed to sanction 
scholarships worth 50 million rupees, the DCO did not do it himself and asked 
me to do it. I did it. The result was an audit Para (objection) asking for its 
explanation.” (Interviewee 2- EDO, CDGF) 
Quite opposite to the EDO and DDEOs, the second managerial level (DEO) was of the 
view that financial rules were very clear. “Financial rules are very clear, we perform 
internal audit on a regular basis such as technical inspection of schools. An internal 
audit ensures transparency” (Interviewee 4-DEO, CDGF). Clearly, all the three 
managerial levels were dissatisfied with the external auditing practices.  
A document analysis also revealed that the education department was unable to fully 
utilize its non-development budget because of a lack of clarity regarding financial rules 
and a fear of audit objections. Over the last three years (2001-2004), the education 
department was able to spend 85% of its non-development (current) expenditures on 
salaries and less than 50% on the development budget. On the other hand, a report 
issued by the Ministry of Education in 2007 indicated that CDGF received a significant 
amount of funds under the Chief Minister’s accelerated program and the Punjab 
Education Sector Reform program. It was also able to allocate Rs.
14
 29. 684 million 
from its own sources to complete various small level projects under the devolved 
sectors of education. However, against the total available development budget (Rs. 
                                                 
14
 Rs. 150 = £1  
 343 
 
257.896 million) for the education sector, it could only utilize 78% of the total allocated 
budget. An amount of Rs. 197.109 million was allocated for non-salary expenditure to 
meet the most basic needs of the sector, yet an amount of Rs. 85.228 million was 
surrendered.  
The non-utilization of funds was considered a major concern by the provincial 
government. For instance, according to the Ministry of Education Report - The 
Development of Education: National Report of Pakistan (2007):  
“Due to its relative affluence and development, the city district government 
Lahore was not qualified to receive my financial assistance from the Punjab 
Education Sector Reform Program phase 1 and phase 2 as well as from the CMs 
accelerated program. The city district government was able to provide funds 
from its own budget to undertake various small projects under the devolved 
sectors of education. Against the total development budget of Rs. 393.596 
million which is approximately 52% of the total available funds. -----The city 
district government must examine the reasons to non-utilization of the allocated 
funds. He must take steps to improve the capacity of the officers who are 
responsible for executing the District Education Program.-------in respect of the 
current budget, an amount of Rs. 124.177 million was allocated for the non-
salary budget.----. An amount of 3.182 million was surrendered. The utilized 
amount of the non-salary budget was only 4% of the total salary budget.”(MOE 
2007) 
This report indicated that the CDG was able to raise the entire education budget from its 
own sources. However, it was not able to utilize all the funds because of problems with 
the financial management system and auditing practices.  
Theme 3: Transparency and Reduced Teacher Absenteeism 
Besides acknowledging the negative impact of overlapping multiple accountability 
channels, the interviewees also reported the positive outcomes of these accountability 
channels:  
“We do have overlapping accountability but the involvement of more channels 
has increased our performance and also improved accountability. Work 
performance has increased. Monitoring Committees are a contributing factor to 
improved teacher attendance and transparent funds utilization. Now people 
know that monitoring committees will come to check them. In the beginning, 
schools were afraid of monitoring committees. However, now they are 
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performing their work on a routine basis. People have become more sensible.” 
(Interviewee 6- DDEO (F), CDGF) 
During visits to the education department, the researcher had the opportunity to meet 
teachers and head teachers and observe how managers were interacting with them to 
solve certain issues. During informal conversations with the teachers, the researcher 
found that most of them were of the view that monitoring committees and their surprise 
visits were very helpful in improving teachers’ attendance and the quality of education. 
Now teachers’ lesson plans for the day were prepared and displayed in the classroom.  
The number of ghost schools and teachers was significantly reduced. Since the 
community is involved in the education service delivery, they are more aware of 
schools' problems and hence, they can check how school council funds are utilized to 
meet those problems. If the community considers that schools are making an effort to 
provide quality education for their children, they are willing to raise finances for the 
schools. 
10.7.2 Themes from CDGL 
Theme 1: Mixed Opinions Regarding Internal Audits  
The Education Department did not seem very satisfied with the internal audit system; 
however, they also expressed their dissatisfaction with the external audit practices.  
According to the EDO, the workload of the officers restrained them to go for auditing. 
Another interviewee (Interviewee 12- DEO, CDGL) explained that because of their 
busy office routine they could not devote time to perform an internal audit. Out of the 
four DEOs interviewed, two expressed that they performed internal audits on a routine 
basis. According to one of the interviewees (Interviewee 9- DEO (F), CDGL), “we 
perform internal audits on a daily basis as we monitor our schools, their records etc.”, 
however, she identified certain constraints at school level with respect to the 
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understanding of financial rules. According to her, at times schools make mistakes 
because of their ignorance of financial rules. For instance, the school administration 
spent money on schools but did not follow proper procedures and the result is an audit 
objection. It was found that the third managerial level was routinely engaged in 
performing internal audits of their schools. They were of the opinion that it has 
considerably improved school performance.   
Theme 2: External Audit 
The majority of the managers expressed dissatisfaction with the external audits. 
According to one of the interviewees (Interviewee 18- DDEO, CDGL):  
“We have frequent internal and external audits and these audits ensure the 
transparency of the system. However, I am not satisfied with the external 
auditors as they are interested only in good lunches and gifts when they perform 
their audit. If we make them happy, everything will be right; otherwise we will 
face an audit para.” 
 
Overall, the lack of coordination of the accountability channels emerged as the one big 
concern among both CDGs.    
Theme 3: Multiple accountability channels and Coordination issues 
According to the EDO (CDGL), there were many channels of accountability under the 
devolved system. However, the need was to improve this chain and make it more 
efficient by having better coordination: “When there are more bosses of one person, it 
eventually affects the performance” (Interviewee 1- EDO, CDGL). The majority of the 
managers belonging to the second managerial level agreed that they had multiple 
accountability channels which lacked coordination. However, interviewees also 
highlighted the positive impact of these channels (Interviewees 9- (F) DEO; 11-DEO; 
13-DDEO; 14-DDEO; & 15 (F) DDEO, CDGL).  
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A consistent theme that accountability arrangements lacked coordination was expressed 
by the majority of the managers belonging to the third managerial level (DDEOs). 
Overall, 50% of the DDEOs seemed dissatisfied with the accountability arrangements, 
in particular with the provincial monitoring arrangements; Monitoring and Evaluation 
Assistants (MEAs). According to one of the interviewees:  
“I insist that only people who have an awareness of the institutional 
environment of education should be responsible for monitoring. For instance, 
new MEAs are retired army personnel recruited by the provincial government 
for monitoring the schools. They do not understand the problems and issues of 
teachers and this at times results in conflict.”  (Interviewee 15- DDEO (F), 
CDGL) 
A similar opinion regarding MEAs was shared by the EDO as well. There was only one 
contrasting theme as according to one of the DEOs (Interviewee 11-DEO, CDGL) there 
were no overlapping accountability arrangements. Every superior monitored the 
subordinate’s activities; all this made the system more transparent than before. 
According to him, EDO, DEO, DDEO, DMO and Nazim all work together to improve 
the system:  
“If my DDEOs need the approval for a purchase which is beyond their financial 
powers, they can get it approved by me rather than going to the provincial 
level.” 
Theme 4: Lack of Capacity 
As far as the internal organizational set up was concerned, some of the interviewees 
from the third managerial level (Interviewee 15-DDEO & 16-DDEO (F), CDGF) 
highlighted that they had a staff shortage to prepare departmental budgets, particularly 
schools at primary level lack budget planning and its execution. This is one of the 
reasons that development funds remain under-utilized. Mostly, institutions do not utilize 
funds because they are afraid of having to face audit explanations. This perception 
regarding the lack of financial management training at school level was also identified 
by the second managerial level (DEOs). However, at their own level, they were of the 
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opinion that the financial rules were very clear to them and the budgeting process was 
very transparent [a contradiction to the EDO].  The Head of the education department 
emphasized that proper financial management training should be provided to the 
managers in order to improve transparency. While the researcher carried out data 
collection, training workshops were on-going and aimed at all the managerial tiers to 
improve their financial management skills. However, interviewees highlighted that 
these training sessions should be on a more regular basis.  
“We need to facilitate our managers by providing them with more training 
opportunities particularly financial management, provide them with transport 
facilities to improve their field inspections. We should also computerize our 
department and provide training to our staff to use it.” (Interviewee 17-DDEO, 
CDGL) 
Theme 5: Transparency 
Interviewees agreed that the involvement of more channels achieved significant results: 
transparency of the system (Interviewees 9- (F) DEO; 11-DEO; 13-DDEO; 14-DDEO; 
& 15 (F) DDEO, CDGL). Overall, 50% of the third managerial level (DDEOs) 
expressed their satisfaction with the accountability arrangements and that the presence 
of multiple accountability arrangements kept the institutions on the right track, 
improved the performance of the education system, reduced the levels of corruption and 
that the overall system became more transparent. In the absence of such arrangements, 
people can waste resources, teachers and head teachers relax and schools do not show 
good results. Overall, interviewees had a consensus that the system was more 
transparent than before. 
 “…….However, financial transparency has improved as there is the DCO, 
EDO, DEO, and DDEO to make it more transparent. In the system prior to 
provincial decentralization, the education secretary was responsible for the 
accountability of the entire system, now the sharing of accountability at the 
district level has made it more transparent.” (Interviewee 1-EDO, CDGL)  
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10.7.3 Performance Management System 
One of the reform theme identified in public management literature was a performance 
culture. In order to identify, the extent developing countries are moving to have a 
performance orientation, the interviewees were asked:  
1. What are the factors you look for performance: efficiency, effectiveness, or user 
quality? 
2. Do you have clear performance indicators; what is the use of performance 
indicators in your organization? 
3. Is more attention paid to performance for accountability or compliance of rules? 
10.7.3.1 Themes from CDGF 
The education Performance Indicators (PIs) as mentioned in the partnership 
arrangement between provincial and district governments were: % increase in 
enrolment (primary, middle, male/female); % reduction in the dropout rate 
(male/female); improvement in primary and elementary cycle completion rate to be 
agreed %; improvement in total expenditure on elementary education as a percentage of 
district budget / expenditure by A (to be decided); Reduction in the missing facilities; 
Viable closed/non-functional schools operationalized (CDF 2008). The question was to 
understand the role of these indicators on organizational performance. 
Themes 1: Clearly Documented PIs Linked to the Incentive Structure  
The researcher asked interviewees whether they had clearly documented work 
performance standards, and whether they were linked to the incentive structure. The 
majority of the respondents reported that the education department had clear 
performance standards which were circulated among all the schools. According to the 
interviewees, after decentralization more attention was paid to link performance with 
the reward structure. They also indicated that they used these performance indicators to 
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measure their performance and then rewarded schools on its basis. Interviewees 
emphasized the impact of the performance based reward system for improving the 
quality of education. According to them, teachers were now more motivated and 
schools had a sense of competition; schools competed to come in the top 20 schools to 
get the best schools and the best teacher’s awards. Schools were being assessed not only 
on outstanding results but also on how much community participation they were able to 
mobilize, controlling costs, improving enrolment, maintenance of records etc. Another 
contributing factor in improving the performance of the education sector was the focus 
on improving teacher qualifications and providing more training and resources, and 
empowering the head teacher (Interviewee 2- EDO, 3-DEO; 4-DEO; 6-DDEO (F); & 7- 
DDEO (F), CDGF) . 
“Usually performance is assessed on multiple factors such as R&D, enrolment, 
funds utilization, community participation, results. There is a scheme of 
government which gives incentives –the best school award to the best 
performing school. The head teacher of that school receives 1500 rupees per 
month for one year, and then there are different incentives for the teachers as 
well.” (Interviewee 6-DDEO (F) CDGF)  
Theme 2: Two Parallel Systems of Performance Management 
According to some of the interviewees (Interviewee 5- DDEO & 8–DDEO (F), 4-DEO, 
CDGF), although the education department had clear PIs, they were not fully 
implemented. The reason explained by the interviewees for the lack of full 
implementation was the inability on the part of the education department to 
communicate these PIs to the respective schools. On the other hand, the Head of the 
education department (EDO) highlighted the existence of two parallel systems of 
performance measurements- a performance based reward system and the traditional 
system of writing Annual Confidential Report (ACR):  
“The main indicators that we employ for measuring the performance are 
dropout, enrolment, teacher results, and funds utilization. Even the provincial 
government was giving awards to the EDO for better performance up till 2008. 
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There are some problems in the proper implementation of performance 
indicators. For example, the ACR (annual confidential report) is quite often 
biased. But, still the system is better under decentralization.” (Interviewee 2-
EDO, CDGF)  
One of the interviewees (6-DDEO/Head teacher (F), CDGF) explained the role of ACRs 
in performance management. According to her, the Head teacher is responsible for 
writing the ACRs of its teachers, while the managers of education departments (DDEO, 
DEO) write the ACRs of Head teachers. Head teachers, DDEOs and DEOs also act as 
Drawing and Disbursing officers (DDOs) and in that role are responsible for releasing 
teachers' salaries. Therefore, they exert more influence on teachers' performance 
because in the case of poor performance they can stop teachers’ salaries and even give 
them warnings or suspensions. According to the DEO (Interviewee 3- DEO, CDGF) 
“We can say in a way that we focus on both compliance with the rules and performance 
as well.” 
10.7.4 Themes from CDGL 
The education department, CDGL assessed the performance of schools against multiple 
factors: enrolment, student teacher ratio, funds utilization, community participation and 
students’ results. The formula for calculating performance, used in CDGL is provided in 
Table 10-3. 
Table 10-3: Performance Indicators of Education Department, CDGL 
Indicators and criteria Marks allowed 
 Marks for quality of education (total students pass plus grade wise position of 
students – A, A+, B, C, D, etc) 
40 
 Marks for average % of students 25 
 Increase in enrolment 05 
 Co-curricular activities 10 
 Projects completed through community participation 10 
 Utilization of funds 10 
 Dropouts (if dropout rate remains @ 14.62%, then 2 marks will be deducted 
from the overall score of the head teacher) 
-3 
Source: Education Department, CDGL 
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Theme 1: Clearly Documented Performance Standards (PIs) and Linked to 
Incentive Structure 
According to all the managerial levels, PIs were clearly communicated to schools and 
institutes were rewarded on the basis of their performance (Interviewee 9-(F) DEO; 11-
DEO; 13-DDEO; 14-DDEO; 15 (F) DDEO; 17-DDEO, CDGL). The role of PIs was 
explained by one of the interviewees as:  
“We focus on multiple criteria such as the overall result of school, and then the 
quality of education such as how many schools got grades A, A+, B, C etc., co-
curricular activities, community participation, and funds utilization. All these 
performance indicators are disseminated to all school head teachers. The 
incentive structure is linked to performance. Each year we send a Pro-forma to 
every school with all these performance indicators, schools fill in that form and 
attach all documents as proof to the district committee which is comprised of 
EDO, DEO, and head teacher etc. Then this committee physically checks the 
performance of each school. Then we award the top 20 schools for performing 
well. In case of poor performance, we transfer staff to far off areas as a 
punishment. In the past before decentralization, we had only one incentive- the 
letter of appreciation from the education board. These incentives motivate our 
people. Furthermore, salary scales have been raised and now the salary 
package is very good, which is an important factor in retaining and motivating 
good staff. If people are satisfied and feel rewarded for their performance, they 
put more effort into their work; it automatically improves the quality of 
education.” (Interviewee 9-DEO, (F) CDGL) 
The existence of clearly documented PIs also brought a positive impact on the school 
and their staff. For example, one of the interviewees (Interviewee 15, DDEO (F) 
CDGL) explained:  
“Everyone knows the indicators of performance. For example, we have ‘Dastur 
Ul Aml’, a schedule specifying the activities of each class on an annual and 
monthly basis. This schedule of activities is displayed in each class. Once we 
visit the school, we clearly know the topic of the day’s lesson and can ask 
children questions about that to know their level of understanding.”  
However, there were some inconsistent patterns shared by the third managerial level 
(DDEO), as some of them were of the opinion that PIs were not properly implemented 
while at the same time admitting that the incentive structure was linked to performance:  
“We do have performance indicators, but their implementation is not properly 
done. However, efforts are being made to link the incentive structure with 
performance.” (Interviewee 16-DDEO, CDGL)  
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These perceived inconsistencies were also shared by the EDO. While acknowledging 
that their departments focused on both qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
performance, he also mentioned that “rarely performance is the main focus” which 
contradicted his previous statement:  
“There are both qualitative and quantitative aspects on the basis of which we 
measure performance such as: results of schools, extra-curricular activities, 
financial proficiency, academic performance, administrative control.” 
According to the Head of the Education Department:  
“The system should have components, accountability for finances and 
accountability for performance to make it more efficient and transparent” 
(Interviewee 1- EDO, CDGL).  
10.8 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
The service delivery organizations operate in a wider socio-political environment, and 
external institutional factors such as governance issues, policy environment, political 
and bureaucratic factor may impact their organizational performance. Therefore, 
interviewees were asked to identify constraints on their organizational performance. The 
main factors related to the external institutional environment consisted of: political and 
bureaucratic factor, adequacy of resources, policy environment, governance issues and 
local context. 
10.8.1 Themes from CDGF 
Theme 1: Political and Bureaucratic Factors 
All managerial levels indicated that political representatives (mostly belonging to the 
provincial government) influenced the decisions regarding transfers and appointment of 
staff:  
“Political factors considerably affect our performance. For example, if we want 
to transfer a teacher, or appoint someone, a reference will come from the top to 
stop it. There is favouritism in the transfers and appointments of teachers. 
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Bureaucracy also hinders our performance by favouring their likes and 
dislikes.” (Interviewee 4-DEO, CDGF) 
According to the Strategic Operation Unit’s reports (SPU 2004) on CDGF performance, 
the provincial government was still determining administrative decisions regarding the 
hiring of teachers. The Education Department could fire staff but could not hire or post 
them on their own; this situation was worsened by the current provincial restriction on 
postings and transfers of teachers. Interviewees also highlighted that, because of the 
current economic and political instability of the local government system, they were 
facing uncertainty regarding the new educational set up. Everything was in a status quo 
and projects such as PPP Cell were inactive, as the staff was not being paid:  
“Governance issues are very significant as under the current economic 
instability we are facing financial constraints. Likewise, policies are not 
properly implemented. When there is a change in government, we experience 
changes in our policies. This all leads to only one outcome- a waste of 
resources.” (Interviewee 5- DDEO, CDGF) 
Theme 2: Policies are Consistent in Formulation but Lack Consistency in 
Implementation 
All the interviewees reported that policies in the education sector were mostly 
consistent in their content but lacked proper implementation. Frequent changes of the 
government also led to frequent changes in policies; they highlighted the need for 
coordination in policies and signified that every policy, before implementation, should 
be carefully tested for its effectiveness. The Head of the education department 
highlighted some practical issues related to policy implementation. He stressed the need 
for better coordination among policies in the education sector. 
“The main problem is that policies are not properly implemented. For example, 
a scheme was launched under the name of CPP (Community Public 
Partnership). Under this arrangement, it was proposed that primary schools 
should be converted into middle schools in the evening, middle schools should 
be upgraded to high schools and secondary schools should be upgraded to 
higher secondary schools. The government was supposed to provide the building 
while the operation and maintenance was to be performed by the community. 
The outcome of this scheme was that the people who participated in this 
 354 
 
partnership could not bear the cost at the end. If it had been done step by step, it 
would have been better. The outcome is that at the moment, 21 schools are run 
by CPP and the rest are abandoned. It was a good policy but the government 
did not consider the feasibility of this. Another example is the policy of the 
government to turn all schools into English medium. We have 2800 schools in 
Faisalabad, and it is not possible to implement this scheme as it is. It would be 
better if we gradually adopted this policy, say in the coming five years we will 
move on to English medium.” (Interviewee 2-EDO, CDGF) 
Theme 3: Governance Issues 
The interviews revealed a general consensus that factors such as regime legitimacy, 
political, and economic instability determined their organizational performance.  
Theme 4: Adequacy of Resources 
Interviewees were of the view that after decentralization, there was a significant 
improvement in the adequacy of resources. Mostly, schools had sufficient financial and 
human resources to meet their needs (Interviewee 8- DDEO (F), CDGF). However, 
managers in the education department reported that schools in remote areas lacked 
infrastructure and teaching staff; particularly primary schools in remote areas 
(Interviewee 5- DDEO; 6- (F) DDEO; 7- (F) DDEO, CDGF).  
“Particularly, in remote areas schools lack infrastructure. For instance, one of 
my schools has 200 children however it does not have a boundary wall, neither 
human nor physical resources are sufficient. The teacher/student ratio is not 
good. Mostly, schools in remote areas have poor hygienic conditions, lack 
electricity or heating provision. We should improve our facilities in these 
schools.” (Interviewee, 5-DDEO, CDGF) 
Theme 5: Local Context 
All the managerial levels highlighted that a supportive local environment, i.e., local 
councillors, Nazims, community etc., play a significant role in improving organizational 
performance.  
“The local context is supportive in terms of financing and helping us out to solve 
our problems. Even in some areas the community has provided land for the 
school building.” (Interviewee DDEO, CDGF) 
The EDO of the education department also highlighted the positive role of local context: 
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“The Community has helped to provide missing facilities in 58 schools. The 
involvement of the community varies from area to area as people who are well 
educated are actively involved and in remote areas where literacy is very low, 
people are less active.” 
10.8.2 Themes from CDGL 
Theme 1:  Political and Bureaucratic Factors 
As far as the factors affecting performance in the education sector were concerned, 
interviewees reported frequent political interference, particularly in the posting and 
transfer of staff. Bureaucratic interference was less frequent than political interference:  
“Political interference is frequent which influences our decisions regarding 
appointments, transfers, and taking action against non performing schools (Interviewee 
4- DDEO, CDGL). 
Theme 2: Policies are Consistent in Formulation but Lack Consistency in 
Implementation 
The majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that political instability led to 
frequent policy changes and in turn this affected their performance. Another concern of 
the interviewees was the uncertainty of the existing system. According to them once 
they have understood how to work under the devolved arrangements; they are now 
faced with the uncertainty that the old system will replace this existing structure which 
ultimately will affect their performance. According to the Head of the education 
department: 
“Political instability and frequent changes in the governance system are some of 
the main governance issues that are hampering our performance. There is 
uncertainty regarding the continuity of the local government system as it is 
going to end by 31 December 2010. This uncertainty has caused to delay main 
tasks as everybody wants to know the outcome of the system after its tenure. Ad-
hocism of the system is affecting the performance.” (Interviewee 1-EDO, 
CDGL) 
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Theme 3: Governance Issues 
There was a consensus among all the interviewees that governance issues such as 
political instability and lack of policy coordination affected their performance.  
“Governance issues such as rapid policy changes, political unrest, and 
economic instability all create uncertainty in our environment. This leads to a 
conflict/confusing environment- we do not know what to do and how to do it. 
This all affects our motivation and our interest is lost and many on-going 
projects are put on hold.” (Interviewee 15-DDEO (F) CDGL)  
 
Another factor in addition to the political unrest was the suicide bombings in Pakistan 
which were currently affecting the performance of schools.  
“Political instability, economic instability and the local context affect our 
performance. For example, currently, the country is facing suicide bombing 
which affect our education system. For the last year schools have been targeted 
which created a security risk and for this purpose schools were closed for weeks 
till all the schools had raised their boundary walls and arranged for security 
guards.” (Interviewee 17-DDEO, CDGL) 
Theme 4: Adequacy of Resources 
Interviewees also reflected that since decentralization there were less financial 
constraints, which was one of the reasons for the improvement of education service 
delivery. However, EDO showed concern regarding the rationalization of resources.  
“Resources are adequate but they need rationalization. In some places there are 
more resources than are needed but our dependence on the grant system makes 
us unable to rationalize them according to the needs. We need to have more 
financial autonomy to make rationalizations for better performance.” 
(Interviewee 1- EDO, CDGL) 
The third managerial level (Interviewee - 13-DDEO; 14-DDEO; 16-DDEO; & 17-
DDEO, CDGL) also emphasized that for the last few years schools had sufficient 
resources to improve the infrastructure of their schools and overcome staff shortages, 
however, the only constraint mentioned was lack of transportation facilities for the third 
managerial level which led to problems in the supervision and management of their 
schools.  
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“Schools have sufficient funds. The only resource constraint is that internally we 
do not have transportation facilities. This is a constraint on our performance. 
We are field officers and we need transport to visit the field.” (Interviewee 8-
DDEO, CDGL)  
The second managerial level also highlighted the lack of transportation facilities as a 
major constraint on their managerial level to perform their jobs appropriately.  
 “Internally, the only resource constraint is that my DDEOs do not have 
transport facilities which hinder their ability to make school visits. They should 
be facilitated in this regard as it will improve the monitoring of schools.” 
(Interviewee 11-DEO, CDGL) 
And that:  
“In reality we have to visit too many schools (345) which is not possible. Mostly, 
after I have visited a school, they relax and consider that for another 4-5 months 
we will not be able to check them. Some of the schools are in such remote areas 
that we are unable to make frequent visits to them.” (Interviewee 7-DDEO (F), 
CDGF 
Theme 5: Local Context  
The researcher also found a consensus among the interviewees that a local supportive 
context was very significant in improving their performance. The extent of community 
participation largely depended on local contingency factors such as support of the local 
community, local councillors, Nazims, demographic profile of a community etc.  
“A supportive local context significantly improves our performance. For 
example, in one of my communities in Shadrah, interest in the improvement of 
school buildings was shown. Political representatives such as local councillors, 
MPA and MNA have provided us with a school building and finances.” 
(Interviewee 15- DDEO (F), CDGL) 
The Head of the education department also highlighted the significance of the local 
context in improving organizational performance:  
“The local context such as Nazims and political representatives are very 
supportive in improving the performance of the education sector. Even under the 
uncertain environment, the system is performing better than the previous system. 
The presence of a Nazim in the locality is a positive factor as they can check our 
performance and can approach education monitoring committees or the district 
assembly to ensure accountability of the system.” (Interviewee 1-EDO, CDGL) 
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10.9 SERVICE DELIVERY INITIATIVES  
One of the key objectives of national and provincial policies and the Devolution Plan 
2000 is community participation through school councils and public private 
partnerships. The partnership is pursued to achieve access and quality of education. 
National policy documents, provincial policy papers and LG policy objectives define 
PPP as:  
“A collaboration among government and private sector companies, 
communities, individuals or NGOs in the funding, management, operation to 
support education in Pakistan. Collaboration can be between: Government 
owned institutions, Community owned sites, and Non elite private sector sites” 
(ESR 2001, p: 6) 
 
This section will examine the nature of service delivery techniques adopted at the 
district level to involve private sector participation.  
10.9.1 District Government Partnership Initiatives 
The major PPP model for education service delivery adopted by the district education 
department at the local government level is: Adopt a School (AAS) program. This is 
also referred to as School Improvement Partnership (SIP) or Whole School 
Development Model (WSD).  
10.9.2 Partnership Model in Adopt A School (AAS/SIP) Program  
The Nature of the Partnership - Project Concept 
The basic concept of the ‘Adopt a School’ program was conceived by Professor Anita 
Ghulam Ali, in 1997. The project is also known as school improvement (SIP) or whole 
school development model (WSD) which aims to improve the quality of education of 
failing or low performing  government schools through collaboration with for- profit or 
non-profit organizations or both, without a profit motive. Under this arrangement, 
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schools are adopted by partners through signing a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) for a prescribed period of time, usually for a minimum three year period. 
According to the MOU, the government pays the salaries of government teachers; 
however, if additional teachers are appointed by the NGOs, their salaries are paid by the 
respective NGO. The government also pays the utility bills, and any funds allocated to 
the school under ADP or other funding arrangements such as Education Sector Reform 
(ESR) programs. The NGO can utilize school funds (provided by the government or 
raised by the school council itself). However, the NGO bears the cost of up-gradation of 
the school such as provision of missing facilities, teacher training, building of IT labs 
etc.  
Actors and Their Interdependence in the Project 
The project involves a diversity of actors involved at various levels of participation. The 
main players involved at the district level are: 
1. Public sector: the main player at the district level is the district government, and 
the Education Department.  
2. Private sector: the private sector consists of: 
 Domestic organizations: for profit organization i.e., corporate sector; 
government sponsored non-profit organization i.e., Punjab Education 
Foundation (PEF), National Commission for Human Development 
(NCHD); individual Philanthropic organizations such as Cooperation for 
Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education CARE (Trust), Idara-e-
Taleem-O-Aghai (ITA), a national level NGO such as the Pakistan 
Centre for Philanthropy (PCP) or 
 Foreign organization: international donor organizations such as USAID, 
OXFAM, World Bank etc. 
Overall, LGs enters into partnership either with local NGOs/ intermediary NGOs. These 
intermediary NGOs get funds either from domestic organizations such as the corporate 
 360 
 
sector, or government sponsored organizations such as the Punjab Education 
Foundation (PEF), the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), 
individual philanthropic organizations, or International Donor Organizations. The 
pattern of collaboration is provided in Figure 10-2. 
 
Figure 10-2: Actors Engaged in PPP Models at District Level 
Source: Author, based on document analysis and interviews 
It is a complex web of inter-organizational relationships (IORs) as depicted in Figure 
10-2. The most active NGOs involved in the ‘Adopt A School’ (hereafter AAS) 
program in the selected case study CDGs were: ITA & CARE. Based on the 
interviewees’ perceptions and on document analysis, in the subsequent section the 
discussion will be mainly focused on how the management of IORs. The analysis 
proceeds by exploring the partnership cycle proposed by Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) 
in order to examine how partnerships evolve over time and the mode of governance.  
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Partnership Formation and Execution 
A procedural guideline for the selection of the partner organization is developed at the 
district education department. The education department collects baseline information 
about non performing schools. The partnership is either initiated by the respective 
NGO/private sector interested in working in a particular geographical area or it is 
initiated by the government sector. However, the Head of an NGO (ITA), explained 
that:  
“NGOs are rarely selected in the Adopt A School or School Improvement 
partnership program, they offer themselves if that is their interest. The only time 
they are selected is when there is an advertised expression of interest (EOI) in 
engaging NGOs for public private partnership. The education foundation does 
advertise these programs for EOIs and select NGOs for the respective programs 
which may vary from service to service or program to program.” (Interviewee 
19- NGO, Head of ITA) 
In either case, the selection of an NGO by the government or a donor organization is 
based on various factors such as prior experience or financial strength of the NGO 
proposing to adopt a school. A similar finding is reported by (Bano 2011; Rose 2011). 
According to one of the interviewees from one of leading NGOs:  
“NGOs are selected by their institutional strength, the repute of the head of the 
organization and the organization itself. Connections certainly play a vital role, 
but the scope and scale of work with substantial experience with multiple 
partners especially with government sectors at all levels are the most significant 
factors.” (Interviewee- (A) NGO) 
Another interviewee added that donor organizations based on specific interests in a 
particular geographical area, consider factors like which NGOs are already working in 
that area, check the background and operational strength of the NGO. However, one of 
the interviewees revealed that sometimes:  
“Sometimes the NGO first adopts a school (100-200) then starts looking for a 
donor organization who can provide them financial strength. Once this resource 
mobilization starts, it is no guaranty that the NGO can find a donor and NGOs 
can bring change in all schools. Sometime, they provide furniture in some 
schools, teacher training in others etc. In this situation, the education 
department start thinking that although schools have been adopted, there are no 
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real gains. This is how dissatisfaction starts among the partners.” (Interviewee 
2- NGO, [A]) 
Once schools are identified by the government sector/private sector, a negotiation 
process starts between the partners. Afterwards, a formal process of partnership begins. 
The terms of the partnerships are stipulated in the MOU regarding partners’ roles and 
responsibilities. According to the head of ITA, this MOU is not a contract in its true 
form, it is a kind of exchange, and: 
“Therefore I would call it not a contract but an agreement. The MOU sets the 
boundaries; it provides a basic framework for the partners.”  
After signing the contract, the first phase before the implementation of the partnership is 
the process of school mobilization, which is a very complex process. There are 
variations regarding how explicitly MOUs specify the roles and responsibilities of the 
partners. How an NGO deals with this process differs according to the NGOs 
philosophy. For instance, one of the leading NGOs (ITA) described this process a 
participatory planning approach, they even use the term ‘School Improvement 
Partnership (SIP)’ over ‘Adopt A School’ program. According to the head of ITA, 
during this phase they consult all the stakeholders- teachers, the head teacher, parents, 
to share with them the learning process; it is a kind of ‘open Katachery15’. This whole 
process is fully documented. Then after fully discussing the learning methodology, they 
start establishing School Councils and move to the implementation of the SIP. 
Therefore it is entirely a “participatory process.”  
On the other hand, CARE uses a more interventionist approach and the department of 
education describes it as “less participatory”. The MOU signed between CARE and the 
public sector never spells out clearly the roles and responsibilities of the partners, how 
these are to be carried out, the partnership outcomes or the coordination mechanisms. 
                                                 
15
 A local term used to refer to open forums for responding to the issues/questions of general public. 
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Another difference between the two MOUs is once ITA signs the MOU with the public 
sector it clearly outlines the coordination mechanisms, resources to be shared, and 
performance outcomes. In addition to this, ITA uses the term “collaboration” in its 
MOUs. However, CARE never refers to the term ‘collaboration or partnership’ in its 
MOU, it mentions that CARE will take over the operational management of public 
schools. Furthermore, CARE signs an MOU for a period of 10 years and is less reliant 
on donor organizations as it has its own funding base.  
Management and Supervision  
Management and supervision should be a joint responsibility of the partners 
(Brinkerhoff 2002) however in reality the NGOs have to report not only to the public 
sector but also to the donor organizations. Although, MOUs stipulate the monitoring 
and evaluation procedures, there are some variations in the way adopted schools are 
managed by the partners. For instance, CARE itself performs performance appraisals of 
the teachers according to their MOU with the Education Department:  
“CARE must evaluate and prepare appraisal reports for all, including 
Government staff. Such performance & evaluation reports about the 
performance of Government staff would carry reasonable weight and 
importance both in CARE and District Government Education Departments..... 
Management of the entire affairs of the above-referred schools shall exclusively 
vest in CARE (through the committee constituted under clause VIII above) 
subject to the overall supervision and control of the “District Government” 
within the formalities of this agreement.” (MOU, clause, 18 & 19 [a])  
Hence, the MOU fails to stipulate how partners are going to be engaged in the 
management of schools. In addition to this, such a clause is not included in other MOUs 
signed by the Education Department. According to the MOU signed with ITA, it is the 
responsibility of the NGO to submit regular/monthly reports to the education 
department. In both partnership models, the MOU fails to stipulate the role of the public 
sector in the supervision of adopted schools. In addition to this, the MOU signed with 
ITA does not specify any formal mechanism for coordination among partners. After the 
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end of the contract period, schools are handed back to the public sector. However, 
NGOs have some reservations regarding the sustainability of such projects.  
10.9.3 Themes from CDGF 
CDGF was the first district to institutionalize PPP as a policy goal on 31
st
 December 
2004 and established a PPI cell in the education department in 2006. The education 
department has been able to get into partnership with the third sector under the ‘Adopt 
A School’ (AAS) program. Since 2006, 52 schools have been adopted and linked to the 
WSD model. The community has mobilized $20, 000 to provide missing facilities in the 
adopted schools (DFID 2008). The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP) is one of the 
active players in the promotion of PPP in Faisalabad. It was established in 2001 and has 
a philosophy of “public private partnership- facilitating corporate philanthropy for 
quality education”. To achieve this goal, PCP tried to create a link between public, 
corporate philanthropists and NGOs. The overall AAS model in CDGF is a tripartite 
partnership between “civil society organizations-government-corporate philanthropists.” 
The PCP is presently signing an MOU with the district Education Department. It 
developed school improvements and development plans for corporate philanthropists 
and engaged local NGOs to mobilize communities for the operation and management of 
the adopted schools. This will also build ownership among communities and improve 
government accountability. In Faisalabad, PCP and the Faisalabad Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries (FCCI) are working jointly to mobilize the business and 
community through FCCI trade bulletins. 
Theme 1: Role Clarity and Trust Among the Partners 
All the managerial levels were satisfied with the collaborative arrangements. According 
to one of the DDEOs:  
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“Today, I visited one of the adopted schools, which was before adoption not in a 
good condition and adopters have provided the missing facilities, computer labs, 
and trained the staff to run the computer lab. We should not look to the state for 
every resource; we should try to find alternative ways of service delivery like 
PPP. These are very helpful in improving the quality of education service 
delivery.” (Interviewee 8- DDEO (F), CDGF) 
Interviewees considered that: 
“Partnership is another achievement of this system. The corporate sector, 
philanthropists, NGOs, all participate actively in service provision. However, if 
responsibilities are given to the department they can perform better than the 
NGOs. The relationship between NGOs and the public sector are based on 
mutual trust.”(Interviewee 4- DEO, CDGF) 
All the managers of CDGF were of the view that the PPP had significantly improved the 
performance of non-performing schools, and relationships are governed through formal 
(MOU) and informal arrangements (trust). They stressed that partners in collaboration 
have role clarity on every aspect of the partnership.  
“There is role clarity between the public and private sectors. Both parties sign 
the MOU which clearly spells out the responsibilities of the partners. A copy of 
the MOU is provided to the DEO and DDEO.” (Interviewee 2- EDO, CDGF) 
10.9.4 Themes from CDGL 
The leading NGO in the city district of Lahore actively engaged in AAS is CARE.  
CARE started its work as a charitable trust in 1988 with a commitment to provide 
quality education to all. In 1998, the Lahore government (then Lahore Metropolitan 
Corporation) entrusted CARE with the adoption of 9 schools. Currently, CARE has 
adopted 170 government schools and runs 14 of its own schools. These schools employ 
2000 government teachers and 100 of its own teachers. It cooperates with the education 
department in order to achieve its own objectives of quality education to less 
advantaged groups of society. According to the District Nazim, the main concept behind 
the PPP is to utilize the strong points of both sectors; flexibility and professional 
expertise of the private sector and infrastructure of the government sector to provide 
services in a more effective way.  
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Theme 1:  Lack of Role Clarity, Cooperation and Trust Among the Partners 
The main questions were related to “how inter organizational dynamics are managed” 
among the partners. Interviewees’ perception about the management of inter-
organizational dynamics revealed certain issues such as a lack of role clarity, mistrust 
and lack of cooperation and tolerance among the partners. Only one of the DEOs 
(Interviewee 11- DEO, CDGL) reported that both partners work on trust. Every DEO 
and area manager of that organization consults with each other for the smooth working 
of schools.  
Another DEO (Interviewee 9-DEO (F) CDGL) highlighted that NGO-government 
relationships have evolved over time. Initially, when AAS was started, there were 
uncertainties among the staff of adopted schools and they perceived that NGOs were 
going to be another authority over them. But slowly and gradually, this perception was 
removed and now they are clear with respect to their role. Their (NGO) main purpose 
was to facilitate learning, provide missing facilities and improve staff shortage. 
However, NGOs started monitoring staff, which raised various problems as it was not 
their role to monitor. An interviewee explained that this issue had been clarified and 
both partners agreed that if the NGO is dissatisfied with any of government teachers, 
NGO representatives will first inform them about the issue and then the Education 
Department will look into the matter and take action accordingly.  
Clearly, the general perception of the private sector in Lahore was not very optimistic 
particularly at the third managerial level. The main problems identified by the 
respondents were a lack of role clarity among partners, too much intervention in the 
learning environment and negative attitudes of the NGOs toward the public sector. This 
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led to coordination issues and mistrust among partners with one of the DDEOs reporting 
that:   
“The involvement of NGOs has improved quality of education. But we cannot 
monitor the schools adopted by them. We want to run the institutions smoothly, 
without having any clash, that is why we need to cooperate with each other in 
order to improve the overall environment. However, this cooperation is one 
sided, from the government alone. The attitude of the private sector is very rude 
towards us. I have learnt that working in the government sector needs a lot of 
patience”. (Interviewee 15-DDEO (F), CDGL) 
 
 In addition to a lack of cooperation, interviewees also highlighted the lack of role 
clarity among the partners as a major issue. “… No role clarity, have to be careful while 
writing inspection reports of adopted schools” (Interviewee 16-DDEO, LAHORE). 
Interviewees also stressed that the lack of role clarity led to mistrust among the partners. 
From the analysis, it can be inferred that the dissatisfaction was mostly found at the 
third managerial level, DDEOs. They lacked role clarity regarding the partnership 
arrangements which created mistrust between the public and private sector. They also 
highlighted that teachers of adopted schools felt insecure in these schools as adopters 
tried to closely monitor their activities such as providing them with lesson plans and 
daily performance of the staff. According to the EDO, they were trying to streamline the 
PPP by institutionalizing the PPP cell in the education department as has been done in 
Faisalabad. This will improve the trust and coordination of PPP and the department can 
vigorously pursue PPP as a service delivery option for optimal utilization of resources. 
The EDO also indicated that the Department was trying to adopt the WSD model in 
Lahore based on his prior experience in the CDGF. 
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10.9.5 Comparing the Management of Inter-Organizational Relationships (IORs) 
Overall, the study found that the management of inter-organizational relationships 
depended on the structures and processes employed by the public and private sectors for 
joint working and the institutional environment as presented in Figure 10-3.  
 
 
Figure 10-3: Management of Inter-Organizational Relationships between Partners in AAS 
According to the Figure 10-3, CDGF was managing its relationships with the NGOs 
through having a PPI cell. The signing of MOU by the partners, which clearly set out 
the partners' expectations, led to a higher level of trust among the managers of the 
education department. Although the provincial level commitment was weak, the district 
government was committed to adopt collaboration as a strategy for service delivery, as 
reflected in the local government’s initiative of institutionalizing PPP as a preferred 
strategy and the establishment of a PPI cell in the Education Department. On the other 
-
-
Management of
relationship
Formal MOU
Trust
Set expectation, Role
calrity, Coordination
mechanisms Strategies for
engagement
Instituional
Environment
History of prior
relationships
Policy
Political commitment
(Provincial level)
Bureaucratic commitment
(Provincial level)
+
+
+
+
+
-
District governemnt
commitment
+
NGO-Focal
persons/Area or District
managers
District education department-
PPI Cell/Focal persons
+ +
+
NGO philosophy,
leadership & commitment to
collaboraion
O
+
+ -
-
O
+
-
-
-
Note: [‘+’ indicates favourable/presences of that factor]; [‘-’ indicates unfavourable / absence of that factors]; 
[Brown arrows indicate ‘CDGL’ and blue arrows indicate ‘CDGF’] 
 369 
 
hand, CDGL’s institutional environment was weak both in terms of provincial level 
commitment and district government commitment to such initiatives, the relationships 
were managed through signing of formal MOUs, however, the Education Department 
had no focal person to coordinate with the third sector regarding school performance or 
resolving conflicts. Even, the MOU was unable to clarify the partners’ role and suggest 
a coordination mechanism among the partners. The study confirmed that an informal 
understanding and commitment supplanted with formal institutional arrangements was 
the key to sustain such projects over time (Thomson and Perry 2006). In addition to this, 
this study further contributes that the implementation level is the most significant in 
making these collaborative models work. 
10.10   PRE-POST PERFORMANCE COMPARISON  
Performance was assessed on the perception of the managers within the Education 
Departments along with the assessment of archival data over performance indicators 
used in the Education Sector of Pakistan. Mainly archival data were collected along 
efficiency indicators such as the student/teacher ratio, and student enrolment; 
effectiveness indicators collected data on teacher’s qualifications and the increase in the 
number of institutions as a measure of improved access to education.  
10.10.1  Themes from CDGF 
Interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the overall improvement of education 
service delivery. They highlighted that school enrolment improved, teachers 
qualifications improved and the salaries of teachers were linked to performance. In 
addition to this they also emphasized that the overall transparency of the education 
system was much better than before and community participation was significantly 
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higher under the devolved arrangements. Table 10-4 presents a comparison of 
performance data compiled from government statistics.   
Table 10-4: Comparison of Education Performance (2005-2008) of CDGF (1) 
Institutions  Number Enrolment Teaching staff 
 2006/7 2008/09 Change 
(%) 
2006/7 2008/9 Change 
(%) 
2006/
7 
2008/
9 
Change 
(%) 
Primary 
Schools 
1891 1886 -0.26 291724 295641 1.32 6987 6466 -7.46 
Middle 
Schools 
439 431 -1.82 161726 157238 -2.78 4300 4539 5.56 
High Schools 337 346 2.67 241285 240746 -0.33 5983 6583 10.03 
Higher 
secondary  
32 46 43.75 6638 8085 21.79 283 450 59.0 
Total 2667 2663 -0.15 701373 701710 .04 17553 18038 2.76 
“-” Shows a decrease in percentage 
Source: Adapted from Punjab Education Statistics (2007/2009) 
The performance of the Education Department of CDGF illustrated in Table highlighted 
that since 2006-2009, the number of primary schools decreased while primary school 
enrolment increased (1.3%). The number of middle schools decreased from 439 schools 
in 2006-07 to 431 in 2008-09 (2.7% decrease in school enrolment). Likewise, though 
there was a 2.67% increase in the number of high schools, school enrolment at high 
schools decreased by 0.3% (see Table Table 10-4). The student teacher ratio in primary 
schools was approximately 46:1, in middle school the student teacher ratio was 
approximately 36:1, and in high schools this ratio was 39:1. In 2008-09, out of the total 
enrolment (701710), 42.1% were enrolled in primary schools, 22.4% in middle schools, 
34.3% in high schools and 1.15% in higher secondary schools. 
However, according to the district education profile of 2010-2011, presented in Table 
10-5, CDGF has 2,515 institutions. The total enrolment was 603,964, out of the which, 
47.3 % are enrolled in primary schools, 24.5% in middle schools, 12.7% in high schools 
and only 1.1% in higher secondary schools. The student/teacher ratio in primary school 
was 55:1 and 36:1 in middle schools. The main issue of the district is missing facilities- 
a lack of boundary walls, electricity, water, furniture etc. Out of the 2,515 schools, 
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2,506 schools had their own building, 2,122 schools had electricity, 2,177 schools had 
drinking water, 2,243 have the toilet facilities for students, and 2,150 have a boundary 
wall. As far as the condition of the school building was concerned, 161 schools needed 
major repairs, 937 minor repairs, and 102 were in a dangerous condition and only 1,302 
schools had satisfactory building facility. This highlights the lack of facilities in 
schools. 
Table 10-5: Education Profile of CDGF (2010) (2) 
Institutions level Number of institutions Enrolment Teachers 
 Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls  Total Male Female Total  
Primary 940 723 1663 171,7 69 162130 333899 3554 2433 5987 
Middle  145 309 454 94162 78603 172, 765 1607 3160 4767 
High 200 143 343 50, 354 39048 89402 4167 2646 6831 
Higher secondary 22 33 55 2847 5051 7898 977 934 1911 
Total number of institutions 2515 Total enrolment 603964 Total number of 
teachers 
19478 
Source: Adapted from District Education Profile developed by NEMIS-AEPAM 
Through a comparison of 2008 (Table 10-4) and 2010 (Table 10-5) performance data 
indicates that the number of institutions dropped from 2,663 in 2008 to 2,515 in 2010, 
enrolment dropped from 701,710 (2008) to 603,964 (2010). The major drop in 
enrolment was at high school level. In 2008, out of the total enrolled students, 34.3% 
were enrolled in high school, however, in 2010 this ratio dropped to 12.7%. There was 
also a decrease in the total number of teaching staff from 80138 in 2008 to 19,478 in 
2010. The teaching staff increased in middle, high and higher secondary schools and 
decreased in primary schools. The data regarding the results of students was not 
available at primary and middle school levels, however, there was some data available 
at secondary school level. According to the data, a total of 111,049 students appeared in 
the 2009 Secondary School Certificate examination but only 69,730 passed (37% of the 
total number of students appeared in the exams).  
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10.10.2   Themes from CDGL 
On the other hand, respondents from CDGL reported positive improvements such as 
improved teacher qualifications, training of teachers and managers, clear performance 
standards, merit based recruitment, incentive structure, focus on missing facilities and a 
more transparent system than before. On the whole, decentralization achieved positive 
outcomes and interviewees from all managerial levels agreed that the system, though 
having some shortcoming, was better than the previous one. Performance data were also 
compiled from the government statistics and presented in Table 10-6. According to the 
2005-2008 statistics, the number of primary schools decreased by 9.10%, and primary 
school enrolment decreased by 6.41% while the number of teaching staff decreased by 
12.31%. On the other hand, the number of middle schools decreased by 1.03%, middle 
school enrolment increased by 1.89% and the number of teaching staff also increased by 
1.07%.  At the high school level there was an increase of 2.24% in the number of 
institutions, and a 6.65% increase in the number of teaching staff but enrolment 
decreased by 0.22%. Out of the total enrolment in 2008, 29.6% were enrolled in 
primary schools, 18.2% in middle schools, 52.0% in high schools, and 1.24% in higher 
secondary schools.  
Table 10-6: Comparison of Education Profile (2005-2008) of CDGL (1) 
Institutional 
Level 
Number Enrolment Teaching Staff 
 2006-07 2008-09 Change 
% 
2006-07 2008-09 Change 
% 
2006-07 2008-
09 
Change 
Primary  879 799 -9.10 150903 141231 -6.41 3899 3419 -12.31 
Middle  194 192 -1.03 85055 86694 1.89 2491 2518 1.07 
Secondary 262 268 2.24 248428 247872 -0.22 6552 7019 6.65 
Higher 
Secondary 
31 30 -3.23 5947 5915 -0.54 599 562 -6.18 
Total 1335 1259 -5.69 484386 475797 -1.77 12942 12956 0.11 
    Source: Adapted from Punjab Education Statistics (2007, 2009)  
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Current statistics published in 2011 by the National Management Information System 
(NEMIS) and the Academy of Educational Planning and Management (AEPM) are 
compiled in Table 10-7. The total number of institutions in CDGL was 1,269. The total 
enrolment was 463187. Out of the total enrolled students, 51.7% were in primary 
schools, 30.56% in middle schools, 17.07% in high schools and only 0.63% in higher 
secondary schools. The student teacher ratio in primary schools was 79:1, in middle 
school 56:1, 10:1 in high school and 3:1 in higher secondary schools. Out of the 1,269 
schools, 1,263 had their own building, 1,118 schools had electricity, 1,205 schools had 
drinking water, 1219 had toilet facilities for students and 1198 had a boundary wall. As 
far as the conditions of the school buildings was concerned, 59 schools needed major 
repairs, 315 minor repairs, 76 were in a dangerous condition and only 809 schools had a 
satisfactory building.  
A comparison of the 2008-2010 data indicates that there has been a gradual decrease in 
enrolments since 2006-07. However, in 2010 the overall primary and middle level 
enrolment increased, but high school enrolment decreased from 52.0% in 2008 to 
17.07% in 2010, besides an increase of teaching staff at this level. The researcher was 
also able to collect data of students’ results at the Secondary School Certificate 
examination. According to the Punjab Statistics (2010), the total number of students that 
appeared in the examinations were 196,935 and the total who passed were 123,307, 
only 37% of the students passed their secondary examination. It also indicates that out 
of the total enrolment of 247,872 students, only 196,935 appeared for the exam 
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Table 10-7: District Education Profile 2010-2011 CDGL (2) 
Institutions level Number of institutions Enrolment Teachers 
 Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls  Total Male Female Total  
Primary 413 326 739 107082 132424 239506  1782 1262 3044 
Middle    75 117 192 70113   71544 141657    954 1573 2527 
Secondary 155 167 322 40163   38932   79095  3606 4552 8158 
Higher secondary     6   10   16     918     2011     2929    313   590   903 
Total  1269  463187  14632 
Source: Adapted from District Education Profile developed by NEMIS-AEPAM  
10.11  CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented findings from the Education Departments of the two case study 
districts. The findings focused on the themes: managerial autonomy, participation, 
accountability, institutional environment and performance. Chapter 5 suggested a 
framework to analyse the relationship between the key variables. Applying that 
framework, the research findings of this section are summarized in Figure 10-4. From 
the evidence presented in this chapter and mapped in Figure 9-3, it is clear that 
decentralization provided managers with autonomy over finances, improved 
accountability, community participation and performance of the education sector. The 
research findings indicate that managers had significant autonomy over finances, 
however, less autonomy over personnel management. Particularly, the decisions 
regarding transfers and postings were influenced by political factors. Interviewees 
indicated that there was a significant increase in the level of community participation in 
the form of CCBs and School councils after the decentralization reforms. 
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Note: [‘-‘negative impact/unfavourable]; [‘+’positive impact/favourable]; [‘o’ mixed impact] 
Figure 10-4: Mapping Management Decentralization and its Impact on Public Sector 
Performance 
However, certain variations were noted with respect to CCB. They were more active in 
CDGF and less active in CDGL. There were some similar concerns across both CDGs 
regarding the active role of school councils in funds’ utilization, resource mobilizations, 
and monitoring schools’ performance. These factors consisted of local context such as 
the demographic profile of the community- literacy level, income level, social class, 
presence of retired people who could devote more time to school council affairs, 
commitment of Union Nazim - who is actually a member of the council or can delegate 
this task to any other member, and the role of the head teacher. Overall, the 
interviewees highlighted that school councils have been very effective in improving 
school performance.  
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The presence of multiple channels of accountability arrangements improved 
transparency of service delivery, yet, gave rise to certain issues such as lack of 
coordination among all these channels, duplication of resources etc. Mainly, external 
audits and the role of DMOs were criticized by the CDGs on the grounds that it was not 
fair. Interestingly, respondents from both CDGs had a clear idea of PIs and collected 
performance data on both, efficiency and effectiveness indicators. They also highlighted 
that PIs were linked to the incentive structure. However, there were some concerns that 
more attention was paid to complying with the rules and regulation and less to the 
accountability for performance. The researcher also found that the Education 
Department was unable to establish how well this information is utilized internally for 
long term planning purposes.  
Institutional factors such as the nature of party politics at various tiers of government, 
economic instability, political instability and a lack of consistency in policy 
implementation were cited by the respondents as the most significant factors that 
affected their organizational performance. Managers also highlighted frequent political 
and bureaucratic interference as a major constraint in carrying out their responsibilities. 
As far as the internal institutional environment was concerned, interviewees indicated 
that they had sufficient financial resources after decentralization. Certain remote areas 
needed more infrastructures. Likewise, managers indicated the need for financial 
management training, particularly at school level to improve the budgeting process 
which is actually initiated at this level. Internally, CDGL stressed the need for 
transportation facilities and IT skilled clerical staff.  
The research findings presented in Section 10.9, highlighted that partnership were the 
focus of both CDGs. In CDGL more than 300 schools were under the ‘AAS’ program 
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while CDGF had 250 schools under the ‘WSD’ program. Nonetheless, the CDGL 
seemed less satisfied with the partnerships. Particularly, the third managerial level 
(DDEO) had less role clarity leading to trust deficits among the partners. On the other 
hand, CDGF put more effort on building the capacity of the education department, 
community awareness and creating networks with the NGOs through its PPI cell. It 
seemed that this inclusive approach built trust among the partners. 
The pre-post comparison of CDG indicated the interviewees’ perception that the overall 
system performed better in terms of improved enrolment, teachers qualification, 
incentive structures, providing missing facilities, mobilizing community participation 
and redress. It facilitated decision making at the lowest possible level and increased 
access and manageability of schools.  
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CHAPTER 11  
SECTOR ANALYIS-WATER AND SANITATION 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents research findings from the Water and Sanitation Sector (WSS). 
The analysis will be carried out in a cross case syntheses manner to identify similar 
patterns or divergent themes through interview and document analysis. Firstly, 
document analysis will be carried out to provide the context of reforms highlighting the 
devolved arrangements and the amount of autonomy transferred to the WSS. 
Subsequently, key themes are identified from the interview transcripts. These are: the 
extent of managerial autonomy (Section 11.5), accountability mechanisms and their 
impact on organizational performance (Section 11.7), the role of the institutional 
environment on the performance of decentralized service delivery organizations 
(Section 11.8), followed by service delivery techniques adopted by WASAs (Section 
11.9), particularly focusing on how the Inter Organizational Relations (IORs) are 
managed among the partners. Then the last section (Section 11.10) concludes this 
chapter.  
11.2 INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE WATER AND 
SANITATION SECTOR (WSS) 
Before the Devolution Plan 2000, water and sanitation provision was the constitutional 
responsibility of the provincial government. The provincial government performed the 
function of: 
1. Policy making within the national policy framework,  
2. Financing  
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3. Ownership of assets  
4. Approval of water tariff 
5. Operation of water and sanitation provision in the provinces.  
The main document of the devolution plan, the Local government Ordinance 2001 
(LGO 2001) further devolved this responsibility from the provincial government to the 
towns/Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). Under the LGO 2001, ownership of 
water assets, collection of UIP tax (Urban Immovable Property tax), which was 
previously raised by the provinces, and the operation, maintenance and approval of 
water tariffs was devolved to LG level. For the management of macro functions and 
coordination across TMAs, responsibility was assigned to the City District Government 
(CDG). This section covers the institutional environment of the water and sanitation 
sectors, highlighting changes in the decentralized service delivery arrangement. A 
summary of the devolved arrangements is presented in Table 11-1. 
Table 11-1: New Institutional Arrangements after Devolution Plan 2000 
Tier of  
Government 
Role & Responsibilities & Major Initiatives Concerned Departments 
Federal 
government 
1. Policy formulation;  
2. Setting standards 
3. Financing through  
National Finance 
Commission (NFC) to 
the Provincial 
government 
The legislation and policies 
concerned with water and 
sanitation sector are as 
follows: 
1. Vision 2030 
2. National drinking water 
policy 2009 
3. National sanitation 
policy 2006 
4. National environment 
policy 2005 
1. Ministry of Environment 
(MOE), 
2.  Ministry of Water and 
Power (MOWP), 
3,Infrastructure Project 
Development Facility (IPDF) 
Provincial 
government 
1. Policy formulation 
within national policy 
framework 
2. Setting standards 
3. Financing to the local 
government through 
Provincial Finance 
Commission (PFC) 
The legislation and policies 
concerned with water and 
sanitation sector  at the 
provincial level is: 
 
1. Punjab urban water 
sector and sanitation 
policy 
1.Housing, urban 
development and public 
health engineering 
department (HUD&PHED) 
2.Planning and Development 
P&D 
 
Local 
government 
1. Ownership of the Asset 
of water resources 
2.  Approval of tariff 
structure 
3. Operation/service 
provision 
1. LGO 2001 
2. This level largely 
remains the 
implementing 
organization of water 
and sanitation provision 
 
Development 
authority/WASA 
Source: Adapted from SDPP (2008) 
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11.2.1 Institutional Environment  
The main players in the water and sanitation sectors are the federal, provincial and local 
governments. This section highlights the roles and responsibilities of the key actors 
involved in service provision after decentralization reforms.  
11.2.1.1 Federal Government 
As presented in Table 11-1, the federal government sets the policy guidelines for the 
WSS. The main organizations involved at the federal level are the Ministry of 
Environment (MOE), the Ministry of Water and Power (MOWP), and the Infrastructure 
Project Development Facility (IPDF). The MOE oversees the urban water supply, 
sewerage and drainage projects of the federal government in order to ensure quality 
control of drinking water.  The MOWP is responsible for the general supervision of 
irrigation, drainage, water logging and large scale water reservoirs for flood protection.  
The IPDF was established in 2006 to develop the PPP in infrastructure development and 
to provide support services such as procurement etc. Its main functions are to promote 
PPP projects proposed by public organizations, supervise PPP projects at the time of 
preparation and implementation, support the implementing agency or private partner for 
the PPP project, and coordinate among the stakeholders.  
11.2.1.2 Provincial Government 
This tier of government is responsible for the budgeting of all sewerage and water 
projects. The federal government awards funds to the provincial government under the 
National Finance Commission (NFC). In the case of international loan projects, the 
federal government becomes the borrower and it finances the loan to the provincial 
government. The provincial government then allocates it to the LGs for project 
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implementation. Most projects are funded by provincial grants awarded through PFC to 
the LGs. Revenues such as water collection charges cover the O&M cost of the water 
utility.  
The main organizations at the provincial level responsible for the WSS are Housing, 
Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department (HUD&PHED) and 
Planning and Development (P&D). HUD&PHED is responsible for the supply of 
portable water and sanitation provision in big cities. The Lahore Development 
Authority (LDA) and Faisalabad Development Authority (FDA) are the statutory bodies 
under HUD&PHED and WASA is under LDA/FDA. According to LGO 2001, 
HUD&PHED were to be devolved to the local level, but because of certain interests 
(resistance from the bureaucracy and organizational staff), remained at the provincial 
level. The Planning & Development Department is responsible for the development, 
approval monitoring and implementation of foreign funded projects in the province. It 
has an Urban Unit which is responsible for the infrastructure development for water 
supply and sewerage, and city planning and implementation in five city districts and 
four districts of Punjab.  
11.2.1.3 Local Government 
Local government ordinance (LGO) 2001 was aimed at decentralizing powers to the 
elected representatives of the District, Tehsil and Union level.  The City District 
Government (CDG) is a devolved local government arrangement under this ordinance. 
As discussed earlier in chapter 2, CDG is headed by a District Nazim (DN) who is an 
elected representative, and other executive officers, to manage different departments at 
the local level. CDG does not work under the direct control of the provincial 
government, but in cases of approval from the provincial government for major 
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development schemes, it has to move its proposals through various concerned 
administrative secretaries. In case of water and sanitation, the concerned secretary is the 
secretary for HUD&PHED.  
At the local level, the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and Faisalabad 
Development Authority (FDA) are under the LG but are autonomous organizations; 
each has considerable administrative and financial autonomy as each has its own Board 
titled Authority which consists of elected representatives and representatives of 
government departments. Each WASA has its own Act- the LDA Act and FDA Act 
respectively. WASA is a semi-autonomous organization created under these 
development authorities that has the status of a board and serves water supply, 
sewerage, and drainage under their jurisdictions. The authority is a corporate body, the 
composition of its governing body is presented in Table 11-2: 
Table 11-2: Composition of the Governing Body of WASA 
Governing Body 
1. District/ Zial Nazim  (DN/ZN)                       Member/Chairman 
2. Town Nazim                                                                                           Member  
3. Director general of the authority (DG)                                                  Member/secretary 
4. District Co-ordination officer (DCO)                                      Member 
5. Representatives of planning and development boards      Member 
6. Representatives of finance department                                       Member 
7. Representatives of HUD&PHED                                                           Member 
8. Representative of the local government & rural development,   Member 
9. Managing director of WASA            Member                                                                                                
10. Five members of the provincial assembly                                              Member 
 
 
According to the LGO 2001, the district tier is responsible for policy setting and has 
supervisory role. Section 54.1 (h) specifies that the TMA is responsible for “water 
supply and control............., sewage treatment and disposal and storm water drainage” 
(p. 31) and shares this responsibility with the respective union councils, a third tier of 
the local government.  According to section 36 of LGO 2001, the CDG has “financial 
and administrative control over “authorities providing municipal services.” Section 54 
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(2) (a) of LGO, gives the TMA power to “assign, contract out any of its functions to any 
public- private, public or private organization” (p: 32), and (f) “to set up a corporate 
body to perform any of its functions singly or jointly with other public or private 
bodies” (p. 33). Sections 36 and 182 (3) of LGO 2001 establish the CDG’s financial 
and administrative control over “authorities providing municipal services” (p: 123). 
There is no recognition of PHED in the LGO. 
According to the LGO, WASA was to be merged into the new institutional framework. 
However, in practice, WASA is under the city district government rather than the TMA. 
One of the reasons behind this, as explained by the interviewees, was the issue related to 
the capacity and manageability of the sector (Interviewee 4- Director Water & 
Distribution (WASA), CDGF). Therefore, in five CDGs in Pakistan, water and 
sanitation is provided by the district tier of local governments for better manageability, 
efficiency and coordination of water and sanitation provision.  
The institutional arrangements as presented in this section indicate multiple actors 
involved in the water and sanitation sector and there is a lack of clear assignment of 
tasks within different divisions of the WASA organizations and across the relevant 
organizations. Under the LGO 2001, WASA was the responsibility of the TMA; 
however, considering the lack of management capacities, inadequate human resources, 
and financial resources, a lack of sound project planning and implementation, it is 
managed by the CDG.  
11.3 CASE STUDY 1- WATER & SANITATION AGENCY, CDGF 
The Water & Sanitation Agency (WASA), CDGF is an agency of the FDA. Its service 
area is 75sq. Km of CDGF. People outside the WASA area are served either by the 
TMA or private service providers. The WASA is headed by a Managing Director (MD), 
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followed by Deputy Managing Directors (DMDs) and directors. It was established in 
1978 as an agency of the FDA under the Punjab Development City Act 1976. The 
governing body is comprised of: District Nazim (DN), Director General (FDA), MD 
(WASA), and members of the Provincial and National Assemblies. After the 
decentralization reforms, WASA restructured itself internally according to the functions 
it performed. One of the interviewees explained:  
“Internally we have tried to reorganize WASA according to three main functions: 
construction, admin, revenue & finance. Four years ago, we only had 1 director, 
now we have 5 directors. Now Water Resources and Research Wings are 
separated from the Maintenance department. All these changes are more efficient 
than before.” (Interviewee 4- Director Water & Distribution (WASA), CDGF) 
11.4 CASE STUDY 2- WATER & SANITATION AGENCY, CDGL 
Lahore is the second largest city in Pakistan and 87% of its population has access to 
safe drinking water. WASA (CDGL) was established in 1991 under the LDA act. Its 
organizational structure was reorganized in 2002 to achieve greater operational 
efficiency. It is headed by the Managing Director (MD). The MD is responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of operational policy, financial management, 
customer’s complaints measures and emergency countermeasures. The organizational 
chart of WASA is attached in the appendix (Appendix 2). 
11.5 THE EXTENT OF MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY  
11.6 THEME 1: LESS FINANCIAL AUTONOMY  
WASA is the responsibility of the local government, which under the LGO 2001 
receives its funds through the Provincial Finance Commission (PFC). The PFC was 
established under the LGO 2001 for the allocation of funds from the provincial 
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government to the LGs. The PFC is a formula based award and is based on factors like 
population and poverty.  The total local government budget consists of:  
1. General purpose grants 
2. Donor funded sources (development funds) 
3. Own source revenues 
The flow of funds is depicted in the Figure 11-1.  
 
Figure 11-1: Flow of Financial Transfers 
Source: Author, based on document analysis and interviews  
In the case of the district government, the main sources of revenue are 2.5% of the 
General Sales Tax (GDST) and power to levy tax on Health and Education, whereas the 
main sources of revenue for TMA is the property tax (UIP tax
16
), fees and charges for 
Union administration (the fees to license professions and vocations). Before 
decentralization, the UIP tax was collected by the provincial government and directly 
transferred to the WASA account. Under the new arrangements, TMA receives 85% of 
the tax yield collected in their territory. WASA’s share of this tax is 42.5% of the total 
receipts. WASA submits its annual development plan through the Director General 
(DG) of the authority in the governing body and after considerable discussion it is 
presented to the district assembly for its approval and then the budget is allocated to 
                                                 
16
 Under the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act (1958) the UIP tax is levied on all urban plots of land, it 
is provincial direct tax and it formed 7.5% of total provincial government tax revenue. TMA receives 
85% of the tax yield collected on their territory. The WASA share of this tax is 42.5% of the total. 
Federal government 
allocates resources 
to provincial 
government through 
NFC 
Provincial 
government 
allocates finances to 
the LG through PFC 
LG  allocates 
resources to WASA 
WASA 
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WASA by the local government. The overall process of ADP preparation at the WASA 
is presented in Figure 11-2. 
 
 
 
Source: Author, based on document analysis and interviews 
According to the LGO 2001, local councils are responsible for tariff approval. However, 
in practice, the approval of tariffs is subject to review by the provincial government 
without any clear legal basis of this review process. One of the reasons for this may be 
the financial dependency of the local government on the provincial government or due 
to the oversight role of provincial departments such as PHED. LGO 2001 clearly puts 
the responsibility of setting tariffs in the hands of local councils; however, it does not 
specify clearly the guidelines for determining tariff levels. It only states that tariffs 
should cover the operation and maintenance costs plus renewal and extension of the 
services. In practice, these guidelines are not enforced. Still, tariff rates are subject to 
provincial government approvals.  
Figure 11-2: Annual Budget Preparation 
Budget document 
 
 Summary of 
budget 
 Non development 
budget 
 Development 
budget 
 Abstract of loans 
details of loans 
Acknowledging authority in order 
of hierarchy in the Governing 
body/board of director of WASA: 
1. MD WASA 
2. DG LDA/FDA 
3. Authority(chairman district 
Nazim, DG LDA/FDA, MD 
WASA,Town Nazims, 
Representative of government 
departments HUD & PHED, 
P&D, Finance department 
4. City district government 
Assembly 
Note: Budget is prepared by WASA Finance department and presented in the authority meeting 
through DG and subsequently to the district assembly for the approval 
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11.6.1.1 Institutions Involved in Tariff Revision in Practice  
1. WASA gets Annual Rental Value (ARV) from the Ministry of Excise and 
Taxation for the preparation of tariff rises. 
2. Application for an increase in tariff is approved by the MD WASA and is 
submitted to the LDA/FDA authority. 
3. The Authority negotiates with other relevant actors like HUD&PHED. 
4. It is submitted to the district assembly.  
5. After its approval, the application is sent to the provincial government for its 
approval. 
6. Final approval is determined by the government of Punjab. 
As far as the monitoring role is concerned, monitoring committees which are described 
in section 138 of LGO 2001 were also not active with regard to the water and sanitation 
sector. District governments had these monitoring committees on paper (see Appendix 
5), however, the researcher could not validate their active role through interviews of 
both CDG. WASA has two main forms of expenditure: 1) Operating expenditure and 2) 
Capital expenditure. WASA finances its operational expenses from two main sources of 
revenues: 1) Tariff revenue and 2) UIPT. On the other hand, capital expenditure is met 
through: 1) Provincial & Federal grants and 2) Annual Development Plans (ADP). 
WASA’s finances are composed of: 1) Revenue receipts; water and sewerage charges, 
property tax (UIPT), 2) Capital receipts: provincial and federal government grants. 
Tariff revenues are unable to meet the operating costs of water and sanitation providers 
in Pakistan. They remain dependent largely on subsidies from the federal and provincial 
governments. The federal government has the largest impact on the WSS by controlling 
the allocation of funds to the provincial government, which subsequently passes on 
these allocations to the LG through the PFC award. The impact of federal funding for 
the WSS is visible through an analysis of current ‘Water Filtration Schemes’ of the 
federal government. These filtration plants were to be installed in the district and tehsil 
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levels under the project “Drinking Water Initiatives” in 2007. WASA was responsible 
for the operation and management of these plants.  However, it became a liability for 
the local government as issues related to its operation and management were not 
resolved in the details of this project. This scheme failed in CDGF (Interviewee 4- 
Director Water & Irrigation (WASA), CDGF). WASA’s financial autonomy was 
severely constrained due to the inability of WASA to revise its tariff structure during 
the period 1991-2004. In 2004, the tariff was revised; however, the local government 
only approved a 40% increase in tariff against a 100% demand from the utility (Table 
11-6). This affected the ability of WASA to meet its operational costs and is one of the 
reasons for poor service delivery. 
Besides federally funded projects, members of the provincial and national assembly also 
get funds from the respective government and it is usually spent on the water and 
sanitation sector in their constituencies. These schemes are presented to the governing 
body during the annual development planning process and discussed and approved 
there. However, the coordination of the use of these funds for different schemes is poor 
and in some cases WASA has tried to convince the members to pool these funds for 
bigger and more practical schemes.  
“Capital flows are primarily vertical. Day to day expenditures are borne by our 
revenue collection, we have sufficient to pay our salaries, electricity, utility bills, 
but for expansion in the network we need provincial resources which flow from 
the P&D department and then the politicians of the area have a massive say in 
what schemes are coming.” (Interviewee 1- MD WASA & DG, FDA, CDGF) 
Local governments are highly dependent on the provincial and the federal government 
for capital receipts. They receive most of their shares under the PFC award and have 
very limited power to mobilize revenues from its own taxes and user charges. It 
subsequently leaves these governments with limited capacity to absorb any shortfall in 
intergovernmental transfer/grants. Likewise, WASA has no independent board to revise 
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its tariff structure, as it has to be passed by the governing body, and then it is sent to the 
district assembly for approval. The District assembly then forwards it to the provincial 
government for its consent which is contrary to sections 36 and 182 (3) of LGO 2001 as 
discussed in section 11.2.1.3 of this chapter. Usually, provincial governments take a 
cautious approach in the revision of water and sewerage charges as they fear that it will 
have a negative impact on votes in their constituencies.  
11.6.2 Themes from CDGF 
Theme1: Limited Administrative and Financial Autonomy 
The managing director of WASA indicated that he had full autonomy while the second 
managerial level, the Deputy Managing Director, had less autonomy as he explained: 
“We have administrative and financial powers but because of some factors we 
are unable to exercise them fully. For instance, I am fully empowered to hire, 
fire and transfer personnel up to grade 17 but I cannot use it as I have to make a 
request to my MD for his approval, they have to communicate to others such as 
secretary, political leaders and in the end I will be informed by others what to 
do and who to hire. In WASA powers are centralized at the top like MD, people 
who are at the top of the hierarchy they have the powers.”(Interviewee 3- DMD, 
Finance and O&M (WASA), CDGF)  
Regarding financial autonomy, interviewees raised the issue of their inability to get 
approval of the tariff revision since 2004. Under section 27, subsection (1) of Punjab 
City Act 1976, WASA can revise its tariff subject to the consent of the district 
government and the provincial government.  
“We are responsible for service provision and collect tariffs from the consumers. 
If we want to increase the tariff, first the bill for revision of consumer charges will 
go to the DG, LDA for its approval, and then it will be forwarded to the district 
assembly for approval. Since 2004, there has been no revision of the water tariff. 
Political parties hesitate to increase the water charges as they think that their 
voters will not like this proposal. For tariff revision there should be a separate 
non-political board.” (Interviewee 2- MD (WASA), CDGF) 
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Theme 2: The Need for an Independent Governing Body 
However, MD emphasized the need to change the composition of the governing body 
for responsive decision making. According to him, the governing body of WASA 
headed by Nazim, seems to be a fair idea, but these governing bodies were run by 
political priorities rather than pure professional organizational priorities. Politicians 
were good for representing public interests. But still, it is a non-diversifying 
representation because in a corporate entity like WASA, these were failing public sector 
organizations: ‘dying in their own inefficiencies’. To give these organizations a 
remarkable turnaround required a crystal clear clarity into the organizational issues, an 
orientation of procedures and strategies which could lead these organizations to 
SMART working, and result in ‘allocative efficiencies’ as well as ‘service delivery 
model efficiency'. He emphasized the need for incorporating subject specialists into the 
governing body: 
“------There is a need to put subject specialists, such as sanitation specialists, 
waste water specialists, urban development specialists into the governing body.-
----This requires a change in existing laws to incorporate more people and 
moreover we need to make these organizations more responsive toward the 
governing body, otherwise we will be including inefficiencies in the name of 
autonomy. So we need more people in the decision making.”(Interviewee 1- MD 
WASA & DG, FDA, CDGF) 
11.6.3 Themes from CDGL 
Theme 1: Limited Financial and Personnel Management Autonomy  
According to the interviewees (Interviewee-6, DMD, O&M, (WASA), CDGL), the 
main effect was on the manageability of the water service provision as it was organized 
according to CDGL towns. There were some variations with respect to the exercise of 
managerial power compared to CDGF. For instance, the head of the agency 
(Interviewee 5-MD (WASA), CDGL) was of the opinion that “all powers are exercised 
by the director general LDA. I cannot even transfer an employee. I cannot transfer my 
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director.” A Deputy Managing Director (Interviewee-6, DMD, O&M, (WASA) 
CDGL), was of the opinion that he could fully exercise his managerial autonomy. 
Whereas, another Deputy Managing Director (Interviewee 8- DMD, Finance (WASA), 
CDGL) expressed:  
“We have no authority over setting compensation levels. Even we cannot decide 
what kind of meters to buy; this issue is decided by the Housing Department of 
Punjab (PHED & HUD). Any machinery that we need to buy is specified by the 
Housing Department. Although, we have more experience, yet we need their 
decision on these issues which either cause delays in decisions or the decisions 
are not based on field experiences and quite often prove wrong. Regarding 
financial autonomy, the tariff is controlled by the government. In 2004, we 
raised tariffs and afterwards it was never revised. At the same time our 
expenditures increased and budget is in deficit.”  
The WASA is a semi-autonomous organization under the CDG; however, according to 
the interviewees, WASA management cannot exercise their authority due to various 
institutional and political factors. Overall, the interviews revealed that the main 
impediments to the exercise of managerial autonomy were an insufficient legal 
framework, a top down approach to planning and political interference (Interviewee- 6, 
DMD, O&M; Interviewee 8- DMD, Finance (WASA), CDGL).  
Theme 2: Need for an Independent Governing Body 
The Managing Director of WASA (CDGL) suggested the need for a fully autonomous 
board consisting of technical people for improving organizational performance. Clearly, 
mostly interviewees from both CDGS were of the opinion that they had less autonomy 
over personnel management and all of them had a general consensus that WASA has a 
weak financial autonomy. 
 392 
 
11.7 ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
The issue of accountability lies in having clear performance indicators and linking them 
with incentive structures to make people accountable. Institutional arrangements, as 
discussed earlier, indicate that different key institutions were involved at the federal, 
provincial and local level in the water and sanitation sector leading to a lack of clarity 
regarding their roles and responsibilities and specified coordination mechanisms in 
cases of conflict. The respondents were asked about the change in accountability 
relationships, auditing practices, financial management system, and performance 
improvements as a result of the improved accountability arrangements. 
11.7.1 Themes from CDGF 
11.7.2 Performance Indicators (PIs) 
Table 11-3 presents performance data, which was internally collected against efficiency 
and effectiveness indicators. According to the effectiveness indicators, WASA’s water 
coverage increased from 50% in 2007/8 to 55% of the total population in 2008/9, 
sewerage coverage also increased from 65% in 2007/8 to 70% in 2008/9. Overall, water 
supply is intermittent, reflecting the poor quality of water provision (only 6 hours per 
day in winter), although it managed to improve its summer water supply, and now water 
is available for 24 hours. It managed to reduce the number of complaints from 500 per 
month (2006/7) to 153 in 2008/9. Poor water quality was one of the main problems of 
CDGF. In 2006/7 it could only treat 10% of its water; however, since 2007/8 its 
wastewater treatment plant can treat 70% of water. In 2005/6, WASA was able to give a 
surplus budget and cover its operating costs out of the revenue generated from WASA’s 
revenue sources.  
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Table 11-3: Performance of WASA, CDGF  
Performance of WASA (CDGF) 
Effectiveness Indicators 2006-
2007 
2007-2008 2008-
2009 
1.) Water and sewerage coverage 
1.  Water Coverage (%) 55 50 55 
2.  Sewerage coverage (%) 65 65 70 
 
2) Quality Of Service 
a)  Winter (Continuity of services (hours/day) 8 6.25 6.25 
b)  Summer (Continuity of services (hours/day)) 16 24 24 
c)  Complaints about W&S Services (% of W&S Connections) 12.5 6.3% 4.98 
d)  Wastewater treatment 10% 70% 80% 
Efficiency Indicators 
1) Water Consumption & Production 
a)  Water Production  (403 T/Wells, 40 Bulk Flow Meters 
working, Projections on average of working meters) (lpcd) 
44 44 44 
b)  Water Consumption (lpcd) 24 24 24 
c)  Metered Water Consumption (%) 1.74 1.51 5.6 
2) Unaccounted For Water (UFW) 
a)  Unaccounted for Water (UAW) 25 32 31.9 
 Accounted For Water(AFW)    
b)  Non-Revenue Water (NRW) 25 32.65 32.50 
 Revenue Water (%)    
c)  The proportion of Connections that are Metered % .024 1.75 1.74 
3) Metering Practices & Pipe Network Performance 
a)  Proportion of Functional Meter       
  - Proportion with Total Connections .024 1.75 1.74 
  - Proportion with functional Metered Connections 90 86% 86 
b)  The proportion of water sold that is metered 2.43 3.66 2.69 
c)  Pipe Breaks per Km/Yr 3 1.5 1.05 
d)  Sewerage Blockages 14 9 7 
4) Unit Operational Cost (Cost and Staffing)  
  Staff (000) Water Connections 14 7.08 5.93 
  Salary Costs as a proportion of Operation Costs (%) 37 44.2 45.29 
  Power/Electricity Costs as a proportion of Operating Costs (%) 48 42.30 41.97 
  Contracted-Out Service costs as a proportion of Operating 
Costs (%) 
- 13.49 12.73 
Financial Performance 
 Working Ratio 86% 1: 1.28 1:1.19 
Source: Adapted from documents provided by Finance and O&M Department, WASA (CDGF) 
However, according to efficiency indicators, WASA is facing the issue of Unaccounted-
For Water (UFW) and Non-Revenue Water (NRW) leading to poor collection 
efficiency. Efficiency indicators also highlight that WASA has high operating costs; the 
main expenses are staff salary and electricity. Besides the increase in operational costs, 
it also managed to reduce its staff per thousand water connections. The main factors 
behind poor collection efficiency are non-metered water and illegal connections.   
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Theme 1: Poor Implementation of Performance Indicators (PIs) 
The process of developing Performance Indicators (PIs) was started in 2006. The data 
have been collected against those indicators but the organizational workforce still has 
no clear idea of their roles and responsibilities. PIs should have been used in financial 
management, policy planning, and making managers accountable for performance. The 
current PIs were not integrated in the organizational process to achieve these outcomes. 
Interviewees also highlighted that they were not given targets to achieve and this was 
one of the reasons that they could not be held accountable for any performance 
outcomes (Interviewee 3, DMD Finance and Operations & Maintenance; Interviewee 4-
Director Water & Distribution (WASA), CDGF). One of the interviewees highlighted 
the contradiction prevalent in the application of PIs and his dissatisfaction with the 
overall performance management system: 
“We do have benchmarking/performance indicators, but the question is; are 
these standards being implemented? What is their use within the organization? 
The people, who are sitting in the organizations such as Planning and 
Development department of provincial government, or other technical 
departments of government, come and collect information but this data is not 
integrated into the organization. They will send us the target that water 
coverage should be 75%, but fail to provide funds to do so. Nobody knows how 
that information on benchmarking is generated and how the information 
collected is being utilized. We don’t have a system for collecting performance 
data on a routine basis and integrating that information for planning purposes. 
You will see progress in paperwork, but the public still is dissatisfied. It does not 
agree with the documented progress.” (Interviewee 3- DMD Finance and 
Operations & Maintenance (WASA), CDGF) 
The usual practice was that data against these indicators were collected for International 
donor agencies (such as the Asian Development Bank/World Bank) on the request of 
the provincial department (similar to the case study of WASA, CDGL), whereas, 
WASA itself lacked long term planning at its own end. The MD of WASA also 
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indicated that most schemes were planned at the provincial level without consulting the 
agency or other stakeholders or looking at the performance gaps of the organizations.  
“Schemes planned at the provincial level and reflected in the urban development 
programs may not be very need based so the need of the hour is that resource 
allocation should be guided by broad performance indicators or need 
assessment criterion.” (Interviewee 1- MD WASA & DG, FDA, CDGF) 
Theme 2: Performance contracting 
Overall, only the Managing Director of WASA was hired on a performance contracting 
arrangement for an initial period of 3 years, which was subject to renewal on the basis 
of his performance. According to the MD, he had considerable operational autonomy to 
restructure the organization and take actions to achieve organizational goals. He was the 
only interviewee who had a clear idea of PIs, however, he also expressed that the extent 
to which an organization implemented these PIs in their corporate planning process 
depended on the leadership of that organization.  
Theme 3: Efficient Grievance Procedures 
The overall incentive structure was not linked to performance as reflected by the views 
of interviewees and the compensation structure of the organization. One of the 
performance indicators of ‘quality of service’ was the number of complaints received; 
WASA (CDGF) has made efforts to streamline its internal procedures and been able to 
reduce the number of complaints received each month (see Table 11-3). The 
interviewees also indicated that they had made significant improvements in their 
grievance procedures: “We are able to reduce our complaints by having an efficient 
complaint cell” (Interviewee 4-Director Water & Distribution (WASA), CDGF). 
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Theme 4: Focus is on Compliance with the Rules 
Interviewees from CDGF highlighted that they had traditional channels of 
accountability such as auditing practices and writing Annual Confidential Reports 
(ACRs) of subordinates (Interviewee 3- DMD, Finance and O&M (WASA); 4- Director 
Water & Distribution, CDGF). However, interviewees were of the opinion that: 
“The concept of accountability comes when we have predefined targets for all 
individuals in the organizations. If as DMD, I am unaware of what my targets 
are, what my mandate is, then how is my performance going to be assessed? It 
needs to be clearly defined from top to bottom in our organization. If we define 
things at each level, then we can make people accountable for them. For 
instance, in my organization, the individual’s performance is reviewed in the 
annual confidential report (ACR) but we have not communicated to them what 
their performance targets are. Then, performance review becomes a routine 
activity. The people who are involved in service delivery, they should be given 
an assignment, and the procedure should be clearly prescribed to make them 
accountable.” (Interviewee 3-DMD, Finance and O&M (WASA), CDGF) 
One of the interviewees (Interviewee 2- DMD Finance (WASA), CDGF) commented 
“how transparent an organization is depends on the head of the organization.” He also 
mentioned that their organization’s main focus was on compliance to rules and 
regulations rather than on accountability for performance.  
11.7.3 Themes from CDGL 
11.7.3.1 Performance Indicators (PIs) 
In 2007, WASA developed its benchmark indicator based on a sample of 246 water 
utilities worldwide in 51 developed and developing countries and compiled information 
regarding the efficiency of the WASA, which is presented in Table 11-4. A comparative 
look at the financial performance of the organization as summarized in Table 11-4 
indicated that over the years 2006-2009, expenditure increased leading to a budget 
deficit each year, while operations and maintenance costs were met through government 
subsidies provided by the provincial government. Overall, the income expenditure ratio 
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increased but still was not able to cover the operating costs, as shown by the working 
ratio.  
Table 11-4: Performance of WASA, CDGL 
Performance of WASA (CDGL) 
Effectiveness indicators 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 
1) Water & Sewerage Coverage 
a)  Water Coverage (%) 87% 87 87 
b)  Sewerage Coverage (%) 82.5% 84 84 
2) Quality Of Service 
a)  Continuity of services (ut hours/day):    
b)  Winter 14 14 14 
c)  Summer 18 18 18 
d)  Complaints about W&S Services (% of W&S Connections) 7% 6.9% 6.9 
e)  Water treatment plant NIL NIL NIL 
Efficiency indicators 
1) Water Consumption & Production 
a)  Water Production  (403 Tube Wells, 40 Bulk Flow Meters 
working, Projections on average of working meters) (lpcd) 
342 360 354 
b)  Water Consumption (unit: lpcd) 242 242 242 
c)  Metered Water Consumption (unit: lpcd) 230 182 182 
2) Unaccounted For Water (UFW) 
a)  Unaccounted for Water (UAW) (unit: %) 36% 33.5% 31.6 
b)  Accounted For Water (AFW) (units %) 64.2% 66.5% 68.4% 
c)  Non-Revenue Water (NRW) (units %) 42.6% 40.2% 4..4% 
d)  Revenue Water (units %) 57.4% 59.8% 59.6% 
e)  The proportion of Connections that are Metered % 48% 49% 51% 
3) Metering practices & Pipe Network Performance 
a)  Proportion of Functional Meter       
b)  - Proportion with Total Connections (units %) 12% 12.4% 13.1 
c)  - Proportion with Metered Connections (units %) 25% 24% 25.5 
d)  The proportion of water sold that is metered (units %)  43% 42.6 42.6 
e)  Pipe Breaks (unit: breaks/Km./year) 2.09 2.1 2.1 
f)  Sewerage Blockages (unit: blockage/Km/year) 35.4 37 37 
4) Unit Operational Cost (Cost and Staffing) 
  i. Rs./M
3 Sold (unit: Rs) Rs. 3.6 Rs. 3.8 Rs. 3.25 
ii. Rs./M3 Produced (unit: Rs) Rs. 3.8 Rs. 4.0 Rs. 5.4 
  Staff /(000) Water Connections (unit numbers) 11.8 10.6 10.6 
  Salary Costs as a proportion of Operation Costs (units %) 28% 31% 31.3 
  Power/Electricity Costs as a proportion of Operating Costs (units 
%) 
47.5% 43% 44 
  Contracted-Out Service costs as a proportion of Operating Costs 
(%) 
Nil NIL NIL 
Financial Performance 
1.  Working Ratio (operating expenses/operating revenue) 1.4 1.48 1.67 
2.  Debt Service Ratio (total debt service/Operating Revenues) % 35% NIL NIL 
 
Source: Finance Department, WASA 
At present, no water treatment plant facility is available in CDGL resulting in 
waterborne diseases. Water supply is intermittent, reflecting the poor quality of service 
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provision. A review of the financial reports 2006-2009 reveals that operating expenses 
were higher than revenue receipts. The biggest expense was power and energy, and each 
year WASA had a deficit budget and relied on subsidies from the provincial 
government. The interviewees expressed that they did not have a long term/medium 
term business plan at the moment and the only planning was done in the form of Annual 
development plans. WASA collected data on benchmark indicators for the Asian 
development bank project. However, under the present circumstances, how these 
benchmark indicators were being used in these utilities for sound financial management 
and improved service delivery was an issue that needs to be addressed in the future. 
Theme 1: Lack of Corporate Planning and Integration of PIs in the Planning 
Process 
WASA needs to provide set targets based on these indicators to all its departments and 
monitor progress against them at the end of each year. They also needed to link 
organizational performance with the incentive structure which at the moment is very 
poor. Overall, the result of a poor performance management system was lack of clarity 
in roles and responsibilities of individuals as if they were not very clear what was 
expected of them. In the absence of a performance management system and 
communication of performance targets to the managers, it would be difficult to make 
them accountable as well (Interviewee-9, Director & 6-DMD, O&M (WASA); 8-DMD, 
Finance CDGL). 
Themes 2: Overlapping Accountability Channels 
The interviewees expressed that they had multiple and overlapping arrangements which 
affect their organizational performance. “One issue is discussed on many forums. We 
have internal and external checks and balances which I think are more than we 
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require” (Interviewee-6, DMD, O&M (WASA), CDGL). However, some managers 
(Interviewee-9, Director & 6-DMD, O&M (WASA), CDGL), further explained that the 
level of politics varies from department to department. For instance, the Operation & 
Maintenance, department was more exposed to political pressures because of its nature 
of tasks, whereas the finance department faces different kind of pressures from internal 
and external auditing checks.  
“We have multiple channels such as secretary housing HUD&PHED, Director 
General LDA, MD WASA, CM (Chief Minister), Nazim. The result is that at the 
end of the day we do not know what we have to do, whose orders we should 
follow? The Operation & management department is more exposed to the 
political interference from MPA/MNA etc., who can ask them to hire their 
people.”  
As far as auditing practices were concerned, the organization was of the view that it is 
transparent, however checks and balances were more than required. The agency had its 
internal auditing practices and at the end of the year, third party evaluation is also 
carried out by the resident auditor. The result of these overlapping accountability 
arrangements was the loss of productivity. There was no water and sanitation act to 
regulate this sector which might be one of the reasons for a lack of clarity in the rules 
and responsibilities, as mentioned by the respondents of both CDGs.  
Theme 2: Clear Financial rules 
Interviewees also mentioned that the budgeting process was very transparent and 
financial rules were very clear to them. The MD of WASA also mentioned that his 
organization is computerizing the complaint cell and providing their end users with a 
Toll free number and SMS facility to register their complaints and take appropriate 
actions accordingly. The researcher then viewed current development in the 
establishment of complaint cell.  
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11.8 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
9.1.1 Themes from CDGF 
Theme 1: Insufficient Human, Financial and Technical Resources 
According to the interviewees, WASA lacks sufficient human and technical resources. 
It is understaffed because of the provincial restrictions on recruitment as mentioned by 
the CDGL. The opportunities for training and progression are non-existent in the 
organization. The last tariff revision took place in 2007, still, WASA is unable to meet 
its O&M cost. However, according to the interviewees, it is able to meet 90% of its 
O&M cost at the moment through improving their collection efficiency (Interviewee 3, 
DMD Finance and Operations & Maintenance; 4-Director Water & Distribution 
(WASA), CDGF). The MD of WASA also highlighted that he faced problems of lack of 
recognition and ownership from the WASA employees as he was considered an 
‘outsider’.  
“I am a finance and management professional. The biggest issue is that these 
organizations have cyclic patterns of problems. Once I joined the organization, 
it had managerial problems for a few years. Then, once managerial problems 
were streamlined, the technical problems dominated. So initially, we tried to do 
the right things. But primarily speaking, there is another problem. These utilities 
are chains of big bureaucratic set ups. When an outside manager comes, he 
faces lack of recognition, lack of ownership in higher up and faces difficulty in 
getting resources. And it all takes time to create a space for himself. So, 
professionally he may be very good, but he is an alien to the others. An insider 
manager is well accepted but he may be inefficient. We need to ring fence such 
organizations with their own built in mechanisms of efficiency monitoring and 
remuneration.” (Interviewee 1-MD WASA & DG, FDA, CDGF) 
Interviewees also explained that they were facing HR problems like shortage of staff, 
poor incentive structure and promotion criteria. Managerial autonomy of WASA was 
also restricted because of the provincial government restrictions on hiring. They also 
faced political influences on decisions regarding hiring and posting, which restricted 
them to hire on a merit basis. According to the interviewees, they tried to reduce the 
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staff to overcome staff/cost ratio (the biggest operating expense of WASA as reflected 
in Table 11-3). They have tried to lay off those daily wagers who were getting their 
salaries but were not working in the field (Interviewee 3, DMD Finance and Operations 
& Maintenance; 4-Director Water & Distribution (WASA), CDGF). According to one 
of the interviewees (4-Director Water & Distribution (WASA), CDGF), “I, myself, 
monitored this and was able to reduce the cost from Rs.10 million to Rs.3 million. 
However, once we tried to discipline them we were approached by the political 
representatives to take a lenient approach.”  The staff shortage has severely affected 
WASA’s ability to detect illegal connections and has led to corrupt practices.  
Interviewees also highlighted constraints on their revenue generation capacity. They 
explained that since January 2007, they were unable to revise tariffs because of political 
factors. In addition to this, the local government did not transfer their share of UIP tax 
to WASA. Interviewees also mentioned the lack of machinery as one of the resource 
constraints. Besides mentioning the constraints of the organization, one of the 
interviewees (4-Director Water & Distribution (WASA), CDGF) also highlighted that 
recently they had taken initiatives to solve their problems of bills recovery. Overall, 
WASA Faisalabad is one of the first organizations able to computerize its billing system 
using its own resources and was able to improve revenue collection because of timely 
billing. In addition to the human and financial constraints and technical constraints, the 
interviewees also highlighted the need for information management systems and 
technical training of the staff (Interviewee 3, DMD Finance and Operations & 
Maintenance (WASA) CDGF).  
Theme 2: Lack of Coordination Among Different Tiers of the Government 
Institutional players lack coordination and clarity in roles and responsibilities. 
According to the interviewees, projects made by the provincial or federal level often 
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lacked the operational aspect and ignored the operation and maintenance cost which 
afterwards become a burden on the agency’s ability to meet. Once again, interviewees 
gave reference to the recent installation of the filtration plant under federal funding 
arrangements. As WASA did not own these plants, it was not clear how the operation 
and maintenance costs were supposed to be managed in the long run (Interviewee 3, 
DMD Finance and Operations & Maintenance; 4-Director Water & Distribution 
(WASA), CDGF).  
“At times politicians started schemes without a long term planning approach, 
for instance, during this local government period, 3 mineral water plants were 
installed on the concept of cost free. Now none of the institutions own this 
project. We cannot run services free of cost, as everybody will start acting as 
free riders. The result is that people have even stolen the taps off these tanks.” 
(Interviewee 4-Director Water & Distribution (WASA), CDGF) 
However, WASA’s MD added that in order to have an integrated planning approach 
and have sound operational schemes, he tried to convince the governing body through 
dialogue that only such schemes should be proposed that were on the need assessment 
basis and had operational sustainability as well.  
“----We successfully changed the whole paradigm of selection and execution of 
the project. It was a big pain and consumed lots of our energy. We spent massive 
time with politicians; we had meetings with them one by one, showed them maps 
of their constituencies, gave multimedia presentations and briefed the needs of 
those areas. We also requested the politicians to identify the needs of their 
constituencies and give us the list; we also provided them with our need 
assessment plans. When this was done, we convinced politicians that instead of 
having ‘funny schemes’, which will never be operative and will be a stigma to 
their reputation, it is much better to have successful operative schemes and they 
fully agreed. This way we ensured the sustainability issue and we got the 
consent of all stakeholders”. 
WASA gets funds from CDG. In 2006, under Sec. (2) of PFC, CDGF received 
additional funds for the water and sanitation sector in order to cover the budget deficit, 
and then in 2007 CDGF received Rs. 379 million for capital projects in the water and 
sanitation sector. However, CDG did not transfer these funds to WASA. Since then the 
dispute is with the finance department of CDGF and WASA for the release of their 
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share. Now, HUD&PHED (provincial organizations) are trying to resolve the issue. 
This is one of the examples of a lack of coordination among different tiers of the 
government which is directly affecting the performance of WASA. Similarly, WASA 
complains that their share of UIPT is not timely released from the TMA, which affects 
their performance (Interviewee-3, Director Administration; 4, Director Water & 
Irrigation (WASA), CDGF). MD (WASA) also explained that geography, the amount of 
change, the political clout, institutional strengths, and above all leadership of an 
organization are the most critical factors in determining the institutional performance. 
Planning cannot be done in isolation. It requires taking on board political leadership, 
management of the organization and other stakeholders. 
Theme 3: Governance Issues 
Interviewees from CDGF were of the view that political and economic instability 
greatly affects their performance. Particularly, in the case of economic instability, they 
get less financial resources and if governments are rapidly changing, it also affects 
commitment to different projects. They further explained that each new government has 
their own projects and they abandon the old ones to implement the new ones which lead 
to a waste of resources (Interviewee 3, DMD Finance and Operations & Maintenance; 
4-Director Water & Distribution (WASA), CDGF).  According to the Managing 
director of WASA:  
“These factors severely affect our performance, we do not have adequate 
resources, we need to replace old machinery but simultaneously economic 
recession hampers the ability of our government to collect taxes and in a way to 
allocate more resources to us.”  
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9.1.2 Themes from CDGL 
Theme 1: Insufficient Human, Financial and Technical Resources 
According to the interviewees, WASA had inadequate human resources which were one 
of the reasons for its inefficient operational management. Recruitment was restricted 
because of provincial government restrictions since 1991, resulting in the deficiency of 
technically skilled staff, and training opportunities were very few: “Personnel 
management training has not been organized for a long time. People are less qualified; 
therefore the overall quality of human resources is poor” (Interviewee- 5, MD 
(WASA), CDGL), and in some cases training programs were not linked with the service 
structure: “I attended a training course in Japan but I was never given any task to 
utilize this training course” (Interviewee -8, Director/Xean (WASA) CDGL). The 
WASA academy vision was under the process of development by the Urban Unit to 
cater for the needs of all provincial WASA agencies. However, it was essential to link 
the training programs with job enrichment for the effective utilization of capacity 
building programs. Overall, the HR deficiency of WASA is presented in Table 11-5.  
Table 11-5: Existing Human Resources in WASA 
BPS Name of Post Budgeted Existing Vacant 
20 MD 1 1 - 
20 DMD 3 2 1 
19 DIRECTOR 17 14 3 
18 XEN-DyDirector 53 45 8 
17 SDO-Asst Director 132 104 28 
Total   206 167 39 
11-16 Sr. Accountant, Steno, Sr. Sub 
Engineer etc. 
362 253 109 
5-10 Clerks, Filed Inspector Etc. 1096 897 199 
1-4 JPO, Sewerage Man 4636 4392 244 
Total   6300 5709 591 
 
According to Table 11-5, against the total budgeted staff, WASA had a deficiency of 28 
vacant seats at the grade 17 (managerial level), and 244 vacant posts at grades 11-16 
(administrative staff). 
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In the previous section, it was mentioned that overall performance of the organizations 
was measured against benchmark indicators; however, individual performance of 
employees was appraised on an Annual Confidential Report method, except for the 
Managing Director. The post of Managing Director (MD) was appointed on a 
performance contracting for three years. The contract was subject to renewal on the 
basis of performance. One of the interviewees (9, Director, P&E (WASA), CDGL) 
emphasized the need for revising the incentive structure, providing a clear job 
description and performance targets, and reviewing performance against performance 
standards. Incentive structures also needed to be linked to the performance to improve 
the motivation of employees. Overall, the interviewees were dissatisfied with the 
existing incentive structure. However, they also mentioned that their organization was 
currently working on developing job descriptions and improving performance 
management systems by having clear performance targets for all departments and their 
staff (Interviewee-9, Director; 6-DMD, O&M (WASA); 8-DMD, Finance CDGL).  
One of the Deputy Managing Directors, (8-DMD, Finance, CDGL), added that WASA 
was currently experiencing the problem of an ageing workforce that needs to be 
addressed. As there is no fresh recruitment, it was causing inadequate knowledge 
transfer across the organization and causing functional inefficiency in the organization. 
He also gave his own example that he is going to retire in the next few months; 
however, nobody is ready to take on his role.  
“Since the last 8-10 years we have had no direct induction of personnel. We are 
retiring knowledge without transfer. This is one of the major issues regarding 
HR. Employees have reached the retirement age but we are unable to transfer 
their knowledge to the next generation, for instance, I am going to retire in the 
next couple of months and no one is ready to take my place. We are retiring 
knowledge without passing it on to others.” (Interviewee 8-DMD, Finance 
(WASA), CDGL) 
 406 
 
According to the interviewees (Interviewee 8-DMD, Finance; 9-Director; 6-DMD 
O&M (WASA), CDGL) WASA was facing the issue of financial sustainability. It was 
unable to meet its operational and management cost. They mentioned that the provincial 
government was reluctant to increase tariffs as the majority of members of the 
provincial assembly (MPA) feared it would have an adverse impact on their 
constituencies. In 2004, WASA prepared the revised tariff structure proposal for a 70% 
increase; however, it was only increased by 40%. UIP is collected by Tehsil 
Administration and then WASA receives its share from TMA which is always late. 
Table 11-6 indicates that WASA Lahore proposed the request for revision of tariffs each 
year, however, it was never approved.   
Table 11-6: Proposal for Revising Tariff Structure to the Governing Body  
Year WASA’s Proposal for 
Increase in Tariff 
Approved Tariff 
April 2004 70% 40% 
June 2006 70% Rejected 
June 2007 70% Rejected 
June 2008 70% Rejected 
 
Theme 2: Lack of Coordination Among Different Tiers 
Interviewees from CDGL also highlighted the lack of coordination among different tiers 
of government, particularly in development schemes. Interviewees indicated that some 
of the programs which were federally funded were not properly evaluated from the 
operation and maintenance point of view and this resulted in a burden on WASA 
resources in the long run (federally funded Filtration Plant as mentioned earlier). 
Another impact of a lack of coordination as reported by the interviewees was a delay in 
decision making as a large number of actors were involved in service delivery and high 
coordination costs (Interviewee 5, MD; 9, Director , P&D (WASA) CDGL).  
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Theme 3: Political Interference 
Interviewees were of the view that they face frequent interference from the politicians 
which limit their administrative and financial autonomy. Mostly political interference 
was affecting the decisions regarding hiring, posting and transfers. Bureaucratic 
interference was from the LDA (Interviewee-5, MD; 6, DMD O&M; 8DMD, Finance 
(WASA), CDGL). However, they were of the view that bureaucratic interference is less 
frequent than political interference in their day to day operations. Another interviewee 
added: 
“The most influencing factor is the political interference. The provision of 
facilities is not being done on a needs basis. For example, one community 
already has a tube well and the political representatives will insist on having 
another in that community where it is not needed at all. We cannot transfer even 
one person, because if we do, we are being approached from the top not to do 
so. The system’s main drawback is that it works on references from very well 
connected people.” (Interviewee-6, DMD O&M (WASA), CDGL) 
Theme 4: Governance Issues 
Interviewees highlighted that political and economic instability adversely affects them.  
According to one of the interviewees (Interviewee- 5, MD (WASA), CDGL), policies 
are lacking consistency, however, it does not directly affect them. Others highlighted 
that the water and sanitation sector have an inadequate legal framework, they do not 
have a Water Act, and regulatory authority (Interviewee-9, Director P&D; 8, DMD 
(WASA), CDGL).  
11.9 SERVICE DELIVERY TECHNIQUES 
The ‘National Drinking Water Policy, 2009’, ‘National Sanitation Policy, 2006’, and 
‘Provincial Water and Sanitation Policy, 2006’, have stressed the importance of 
community mobilization in the identification of schemes, planning, implementation, 
monitoring and operation & maintenance after project completion. Following this, 
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district governments are experimenting with two main service delivery techniques in 
Water and Sanitation service provision: 
 Community led initiatives-Changa Pani Program (CPP) & 
 Outsourcing 
The history of NGO-public sector collaboration dates back to 1998 when the first 
initiative, the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), was carried out in Karachi, Pakistan. This 
program is reported as one of the successful community initiatives in the World Bank 
report of 1998. Later on it was adopted as a policy strategy in the National Sanitation 
Policy 2006. This project is replicated in 248 other locations in Pakistan.  In 1996, a 
local NGO known as ASB replicated this model in Punjab province and was able to 
improve access of poor communities to water and sanitation in the Hassan Pura 
community of CDGF. Then it expanded its work and collaborated with local 
government (CDGF) for providing assistance in GIS (Geographical Information 
System) for surveying the geographic area and mapping purpose. Outsourcing is mainly 
adopted in billing distribution and operation and maintenance in order to reduce the 
operational cost involved and overcome the shortage of staff and skills. It also has a 
different success rate in both CDG depending on how they are planned, implemented 
and managed in these local governments. However, a competitive bidding process was 
adopted to award these service management contracts.  
11.9.1 Changa Pani Program (CPP-Clean Drinking Water) 
Project Concept 
Changa Pani Program (CPP) is the first manifestation of the implementation of such 
policy goals. This program aims to improve water and sanitation access to the 
communities that are not served by the Water and Sanitation Agencies and where the 
cost of service provision is high. This project involves multiple levels of participation 
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and diverse actors involved in the formulation and implementation of these projects. It 
is a collaboration between public sector organizations at the regional (Urban Unit) and 
local level (WASA) on one hand and community (union council) and a local NGO 
(ASB) on the other hand. The aim of the project is to provide an efficient, reliable, 
affordable and environmentally sustainable water and sanitation system in low income 
communities. This strategic initiative aims to provide an Integrated Water and 
Sanitation Service (IWSS) through building up the self-reliance of the community to 
operate and maintain the water and sanitation provision in their areas. The overall 
project is divided up into two main components: 
1. External component:  it refers to the development of the main infrastructure such 
as trunk sewers, pump stations, tube well, service reservoir, distribution lines, 
and meter etc. and treatment plants. This is designed, built and maintained by 
the Water and Sanitation Agency. 
2. Internal component: it consists of sanitary lines inside the house, underground 
sewers in lanes (streets), water supply fitting and fixtures inside the house etc. It 
is designed, built and maintained by the community itself. 
After the completion of the project, overall maintenance and operation is handed over to 
the community. For this purpose, a water and sanitation committee referred to as the 
‘WASCO Society’ has been established. The membership of this committee consists of 
all the clients of the area served. It has a management committee which is elected by the 
direct users and consists of 7 elected members of the community. The memorandum of 
WASO clearly stipulates the role of the managing committee. It also has an account 
committee which consists of one community member, one representative from the NGO 
and WASA to oversee accounts and ensure transparency. The Management committee 
can make a purchase of Rs.50, 000. In case of a purchase above that limit, it needs the 
approval of the accounts committee. Overall, this process ensures transparency.  
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Actors and Their Interdependence in the PPP 
The project involves diversity of actors involved at various levels of participation. The 
overall project design and implementation is interplay among the national and regional 
policy makers and implementation tier at the local level. Table 11-7  lists the actors 
involved in the CPP project. 
Table 11-7: Actors Involved in the CPP Project 
KEY ACTORS ROLES 
Urban Unit  
(Provincial Government) 
It is a provincial department responsible for coordination and facilitation among 
the partners, conducting research for the policy learning of this models in other 
parts of the cities and ensuring quality in this process 
Water And Sanitation Agency 
(WASA) 
Line  agency responsible for the design, implementation and operation and 
maintenance of the external component of the project, establishing a project 
support office and financial management of the projects 
Union Council 60  
(UC 60) 
It is the union council. Union Nazim represents community voice , ensures 
transparency of the financing of the internal components, facilitates the work of 
ASB in community mobilization  
Anjuman Samajhi Bahbood 
(ASB) 
It is a local NGO with prior experience of component sharing model in the 
Hassanpura community of CDGF. This is responsible for community 
mobilization, mapping, surveying and facilitating the communication among 
partners.  
WASCO Committee WASCO committee is created for the future operation and maintenance of the 
project. it consists of 7 members, elected by the simple majority of the eligible 
general body (which consists of direct consumers). In addition to this, a 
representative of WASA and ASB will be part of the committee to oversee and 
monitor its functions and provide facilitation on any related issue.  
 
These partners in the project have signed a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU), 
which articulates how the project will be executed, explicitly delineating the 
responsibilities of the partners, mechanisms of consultation and conflict resolution (such 
as formally setting up a Steering Committee).  The selection criterion of this NGO was 
based on its extensive prior work on development of such projects in other cities. It has 
extensive technical knowledge and required skills for the social mobilization of the 
community. Prior to this project, ASB had a similar project in Hassanpura, a community 
of Faisalabad district. The local community provides the knowledge of the local 
context, resources and demands for new projects. A steering committee, Water and 
Sanitation Committee (WASCO), is being set up for coordination and conflict 
resolution through dialogue and consultation. The members of this steering committee 
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consist of government representatives, NGO representatives, and local government 
representatives. In this way, each partner brings its own competitive advantage to the 
partnership portfolio.  
Pre-Partnership Stage 
As Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) highlighted the pre- partnership stage is characterized 
by a network mode of governance. This was evident from the initial interaction pattern 
among the partners. This project was initiated to their political leadership at the request 
of the community. At the request of the political leadership, the public sector initiated 
the field survey to assess the work of the ASB. They discussed the concept of the 
project and visited the areas where this low cost project was undertaken by the NGO. 
The ASB received a formal request to visit the local community (UC 60) in 2006. This 
is how the process was initiated. According to the NGO:  
“Once we visited the site, we faced various issues, language barriers, and above 
all a lack of local knowledge of that area. It is our understanding that 
development can only be possible with the support of that area; nobody from 
outside can bring a change. During our visits we tried to look for the activists 
who can bridge the gap between us and the community and facilitate our 
process by organizing our meetings with the community.” (Head of ASB) 
Partnership Formation and Execution   
ASB conducted a preliminary needs assessment of the union council 60 and presented 
its finding regarding local demands to the Urban Unit in 2006. Later, in March 2007, 
the MOU was signed among the partners clearly specifying the roles and 
responsibilities of the partners. In this way, line agencies added the third sector into the 
community sharing model and developed an organizational structure. The total cost of 
the project was Rs.122.8 million and government funding was Rs.104.85 million. The 
government funding was inclusive of the external component cost. The total 
contribution from the community was 36% of the total cost of the component sharing 
model. This was an effective strategy to learn how community can be mobilized to pay 
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for the internal component. Poor households were facilitated through interest free 
instalments.  
The strength of this model lies in the fact that the public sector has formally 
acknowledged the role of the third sector and has institutionalized their role not only in 
the service delivery model at the local level but document analysis also reveals that 
NGOs’ role has been also formally channeled in the policy formulation process at the 
provincial level, ASB is part of the Water and Sanitation Regulatory Authority 
Committee
17
, which is responsible for the development and implementation of the first 
water act in Pakistan and National Sanitation Policy Implementation Committee 
(NSPIC, 2007)
18
.  Organizational directives also indicated that the provincial 
government is advocating line agencies and city district governments to capitalize on 
the knowledge of the CPP model and use it as a strategy for efficient and cost effective 
solutions to service delivery, considering the limited resources available to them.  
Partnership Exit 
After the project completion in 2010, its operation and maintenance was handed over to 
the WASCO. This body was awarded the contract for a period of 10 years. Public and 
Third sector representatives assumed a monitoring and facilitating role under the MOU 
of WASCO. The roles and responsibilities were clearly set out in the MOU, which 
further ensured transparency of the entire process (Interviewee-9, Director (WASA), 
CDGL; Head of ASB). 
Partnership Outcome 
One of the assessments of a partnership can be a focus on the process indicators- level 
of engagement and commitment of partners (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002), clear purpose 
                                                 
17
 According to the Notification issued by provincial secretariat of government of Punjab, 2009 
18
 According to the notification issued by the ministry of environment, Pakistan  
 413 
 
and need for partnership, high level of trust  (Harrison 1999), accountability 
arrangements (Amery, 2000), and also a focus on outcome indicators- efficiency and 
effectiveness (Burch, Borland 2001). By employing both, we can have a true picture of 
performance. According to the efficiency indicators, this project ensured 24/7 hours 
water supply compared to 6-7 hours intermittent water supply through public sector 
provision. There is no non-metered water compared to the public sector which is facing 
the biggest issue of non-revenue water. Interviewees also suggested that an overall 
partnership was an outcome of trust and a clear set of goals and increased transparency 
in project delivery. Another success of this project is increased trust in the public sector 
to initiate such arrangements and acknowledgement in the water and sanitation agencies' 
official goals that such initiatives should be the part of the annual development plan 
(Interviewee-9, Director (WASA), CDGL; Head of ASB). Faisalabad district has 
initiated such project with the same NGO.  
11.9.2 Perception from the CDGF 
According to the interviewees (Interviewee 2, DMG; 4, Director (WASA), CDGF) it 
was not a very successful scheme as it could not achieve long term sustainability.  
“At the tertiary level, we had a mega project, Changa Pani Scheme; it could not 
work efficiently. We tried to involve the community and once the project was 
approved, it became politicized because of certain interests.” (Interviewee 5-
Director, WASA, CDGF) 
When the researcher referred to various reports published regarding it as a success 
story, the MD was cautious to describe it as a success story and said that there should be 
a third party evaluation of this project. However, he was of the view that such 
interventions were workable only in small communities where there is no water and 
sewerage coverage by WASA. According to him:  
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“It is a very weak form of partnership and has sustainability issues and is 
limited in scope. Such community linked interventions add to efficiency but to 
sustain it for a bigger area is still a question”(Interviewee 1-MD, WASA, 
CDGF).  
There seem to be some elements of distrust among the partners regarding this model. 
According to the MD, the CPP did not have regulatory backup and also did not have a 
dispute resolution mechanism, in addition to this, it had avenues of corruption. 
Moreover, the NGO was not legally bound and there was a risk that the community 
could back out of the partnership. The Deputy managing director also highlighted that, 
“We have some projects with Anjuman-e-Samaji Behbood (ASB) to involve the 
community but results are not satisfactory.”(Interviewee 2-DMD (WASA), CDGF)  
One of the interviewees explained that CPP could not work as the project became 
politicized because of certain interests (Interviewee 4-Directot Water and Irrigation 
(WASA) CDGF).  The Deputy managing director said that there should be ways to 
involve the community as it could be a very cost efficient approach to reach those areas 
where it was expensive for WASA to provide water and sanitation coverage. In 
integrated models, both the community and WASA could share the cost of service 
provision. 
According to the Managing director of WASA and Chairman of FDA, the policy 
environment for PPP was favourable as there was a sufficient legal framework, PPP act, 
PPP cells etc. however, the process is stuck with the initial problems such as 
standardized documentation for implementation, criteria etc. There is no big 
achievement in this regard. There is a central PPP cell at the provincial level. The 
question is how to reach different departments, especially utilities like WASA.  
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“You have to have an outreach set up and identify PPP options. It all requires a 
lot of collaborative work and this aspect is lacking so far” (Interviewee1-MD 
(WASA); Chairman FDA
19
 CDGF).  
In response to the question, if PPP is a viable option for service delivery or if it just 
remains policy jargon, the MD (WASA) responded:  
“Honestly, it is more jargon that politicians often talk about. There is less 
political will, because if there is political will, resources must follow.”  
The Managing Director of WASA and Chairman of FDA also explained that the 
primary investor requires stable cash flows and reasonable returns. This requires a very 
congenial investment framework. These things are missing. So, it is more a jargon than 
a meaningful attractive reality. PPP as a viable option requires a lot of base work in 
terms of sector analysis, financial analysis and technical aspects of each project. There 
are rudimentary cells and a policy framework. However, the government is facing the 
challenge of picking up the right options and converting them into suitable investment 
propositions.  
Interviewees also reflected that ‘Policies and Laws’ advocate having PPP nodes at the 
district or department level; however, these were not formed at the time of this research. 
Bureaucratic commitment, like political commitments is very weak. “Bureaucracy is 
not a big risk taker and usually once a department comes to learn that it will take 10 
years to complete this project, they become disinterested” (Interviewee1-MD (WASA), 
CDGF). Until and unless the whole organization has the same level of commitment and 
shares the themes among themselves, there are low chances of success. According to 
MD, WASA (CDGF):  
                                                 
19
 Follow up interview with Chairman FDA, at the time of follow up  interview, he  was promoted and 
placed  in the Public Partnership Cell at the Planning and Development  (P&D) Department . This 
department was mainly responsible for PP policy formulation and its implementation at the regional level. 
And providing support to the local government.   
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“It is necessary that you take on board not only the contractors but also the field 
staff when policy making. Usually, policy making is a behind- the- door process 
and the implementation tier is not involved in this process.”  
This concern that planning is centralized was also highlighted by the DMD 
(Interviewee-2, (WASA), CDGF). They were never involved in the policy decisions. 
The follow up interview with the Managing Director (WASA) revealed that WASA 
(CDGF) established a WASCO committee in the beginning and preferred to sign a 
contract with them rather than an NGO. According to him, for the sustainability of these 
projects, these projects need to be small, fully independent and self-contained for the 
management of cost. Community representation should be of an extensive nature having 
representation of every section of that community. The role of NGOs would be to 
maintain coordination between the community and WASA and the mobilization of the 
community. WASA also created a new post of ‘social mobilizer’20, a person with a 
background in social sciences to facilitate the coordination between the community and 
WASA in projects like CPP. This person will be assigned a team of people for this task. 
An overview of how IORs are managed between partners in CPP project is provided in 
Figure 11-3. According to the Figure, The creation of new roles and structures seems to 
show organizational commitment to improve organizational efficiency. Overall, 
partnership experiences suggest that successful outcomes of partnerships are based on 
the institutional context, organizational factors and the local context (Batley 2011) 
                                                 
20
 This post will be function by July 2011. 
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Figure 11-3: Management of Inter-Organizational Relationships in CPP Project 
11.9.3 Themes from CDGL 
Interviewees from CDGL indicated that CPP is a successful project and could be 
replicated elsewhere, in particular in those communities where the cost of service 
provision was high. However, they want to see the sustainability of this project in the 
long run as the “issue is whether the CBO will be able to generate the cost to run it or 
not” (Interviewee 9-Director P& D (WASA), CDGL). Another interviewee added: 
“It is too early to say something about performance; we are closely monitoring 
the project. It has been only three months since it was handed over to the 
community for operation.” (Interviewee-6, DMD (WASA), CDGL) 
11.9.4 Themes from the NGO 
According to the head of ASB, the basic ingredient of partnership is ‘Trust’. However, 
he explained:  
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“Trust is based on how transparent the relationships among partners are. In 
order to build trust, it is very significant that every individual should know what 
is expected of them. If roles and responsibilities are very clear to everyone in the 
partnership, then trust builds up over time. We were four partners in this 
partnership and every partner’s roles and responsibilities were clearly 
described in the MOU and we tried to meet our expectations and perform 
according to our roles. In case we had a conflict, we all sat together in the 
steering committee and through dialogue, open discussion and consultation with 
each other, we tried to reach an agreement.” 
This was also confirmed by WASA that overall, the project was a joint collaboration of 
the community (contributing 36% of the total cost), an NGO (for social mobilization 
and technical support to the community) and WASA (for financing the external 
component and overall supervision and management).  The Head of the NGO explained 
that the entire CPP project was handed over to the community’s committee- WASCO, 
responsible for its operation and maintenance costs. In this way, WASA does not have 
to incur any further costs in service provision. According to him, throughout this 
process partners were jointly responsible for all the decisions and their implementation. 
The CPP project closely resembled the concept of ‘co-production’ (Brandsen and 
Pestoff 2006) discussed in the Public management perspective (Section 4.4.2.2).  
11.9.5  Outsourcing 
11.9.5.1  Themes from CDGF 
Theme 1: Local Context 
In 2006, WASA outsourced revenue collection. However, according to the 
interviewees, it could not achieve success because of certain internal and external 
factors. According to one of the interviewees (Interviewee 4- Director, CDGF), one of 
the main reasons was that WASA targeted a difficult area to start with (for outsourcing), 
where service quality was already very poor, the collection rate was only 10-12% and 
even WASA was unable to collect revenues from this community. This community had 
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no industry and was politically very active (in some cases they even protested and 
blocked the main roads). Overall, this community became a liability for the WASA 
regarding revenue collection. Therefore, WASA outsourced it to the contracting firm. 
According to the service management contract, the firm was supposed to collect the 
arrears and payment was to be made on collection of all arrears. Overall, WASA did not 
share any risk in this partnership arrangement. However, this was not successful 
because of the contextual factors of the community.  
Theme 2: Private Sector Capacity  
Another interviewee (Interviewee 2-DMD (WASA), CDGF) explained that the 
company, who was awarded the contract, alleged that WASA staff failed this project as 
they were against this outsourcing from the very beginning. Instead WASA employees 
generally had the perception that the company was not competitive enough. There were 
some internal organizational factors involved, such as the fear that an outside 
organization will benefit from this arrangement whereas benefits should be applied to 
all WASA staff. There were also issues of the internal capacity of the organization to 
manage outsourcing activities; some elements were resistant to change. There were also 
issues related to the capacity of externally contracted organizations as well.  
“WASA has its own perception with respect to outsourcing, as most of the 
people do not want change; they want to run the system in the old ways. We 
tried to outsource the distribution of bills, which was unsuccessful. The company 
who was given the contract had the perception that WASA staff failed this 
project. WASA’s employees are of the opinion that the company was not 
competitive enough. Another reason for the failure of outsourcing is that we lack 
internal organizational capacity to perform this activity. We do not have our 
own independent department which handles outsourcing activities; we receive 
instructions from the urban unit of planning and development regarding 
outsourcing. This unit gives us different instructions each time. In WASA, people 
do not want to accept change. They do not want to work on any creative idea. 
This idea was new to them, and that is one of the reasons for its 
failure.”(Interviewee 2-DMG (WASA), CDGF) 
 
 420 
 
Theme 3: Internal Organizational Factors 
According to the MD, WASA, a partnership in its true form has a joint management 
board, but the sharing of risks and rewards among the partners were not present in 
CDGF.  
“What we are doing is an informal way of sharing certain operational risks with 
the private sector. The Directors are themselves managing these projects. There 
is no dispute resolution forum.”  
According to the MD, there were certain profits earning options. However, these were 
the cash cows of the organization. If organizations receive Rs.100 million in lieu of bill 
collection, there is a possibility that 50 million go into their own pockets. This is the 
black economy within the cash cow segment. So, there is always internal organizational 
resistance to outsource profit earning centres to the private sector. Regarding the 
organizational capacity to manage the process of contract design, development, 
implementation and evaluation, MD, WASA explained that outsourcing was at a very 
small scale, therefore the internal organizational capacity with respect to the designing 
of the contract was also limited. However, they received consultations from other 
relevant agencies such as HUD&PHED in this regards. Overall, interviewees 
highlighted that now there is an institutional framework for PPP, the PPP Act, Laws and 
by-laws. The provincial department (P&D) is trying to develop standardized PPP 
modalities and documentation and provide support to the CDG departments.  
Theme 4: Response of WASA to Manage Outsourcing Effectively  
In the follow up interview, MD (WASA) highlighted that they had outsourced billing 
and collection and detection of illegal connections to the private sector through an open 
tendering process. However, based on their prior experience, they had piloted it in one 
of the areas.  The contract is performance oriented as WASA will pay the private sector 
not on the detection of illegal connection, but upon revenue collection from those areas.  
 421 
 
He also highlighted that most resistance comes from those people who were previously 
monitoring these activities. Therefore, if you put those people in charge of such 
activities, they would try to fail such projects as their interest is involved in it. 
Therefore, considering such factors, they had created a new post- Director of 
Implementation & Coordination. This person will directly coordinate the PPP project- 
whether outsourcing or community led initiatives.  
Furthermore, in order to overcome the fear of job losses among employees, WASA tried 
to convince its people that they should not have such fears as those who were doing 
these jobs before will be reallocated to new posts. However, according to the MD, the 
problem is not only a fear of job loss, it is about the loss of authority as well. The person 
previously monitoring these functions, had authority in the organization. Therefore, 
departments that are most affected by such ventures are the most resistant.  
11.9.6  Themes from CDGL 
Theme 1: A Phased Approach 
WASA is facing the issue of rising operational costs and increased collection 
inefficiencies (Table 11-4). To overcome these problems WASA Lahore outsourced two 
main activities in the Revenue Generation and Operation and Maintenance divisions. In 
the Revenue Division, the printing, distribution and collection of bills were outsourced 
in four selected towns. The Operation & Maintenance division outsourced detection of 
illegal connections in order to reduce the Unaccounted-For-Water (UFW).  
Theme 2: Involvement of More Than One Firm for Managing Competition 
Another strategy of WASA was to outsource these functions to more than one firm in 
order to induce competition. Therefore, it outsourced to four firms for a period of one 
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year, subject to revision on satisfactory performance.  The main objective behind 
outsourcing was to reduce the operational cost and improve collection efficiency 
(Interviewee 9-Director P&D; 6-DMD, O & M; 8, DMD, Finance (WASA), CDGL).  
According to the interviewees, this is still at the pilot testing phase, and if it is 
successful, they are planning to outsource the operation of water tube wells in the 
Operation & Maintenance division.  
Theme 3: Internal Organizational Factors 
However, interviewees identified certain internal organizational factors and concerns 
about the capacity issues of the contracted organization as the main issues to be handled 
in order to achieve successful outcomes of contracting.  
“The main challenges of outsourcing are not that we lack the technical skills to 
design contractual arrangement. Instead, we face resistance from the staff who 
were previously performing these functions because of two reasons: fear of job 
loss and break-up of the monopoly of certain internal organizational factors as 
they will have less control over matters. With respect to NGOs, we have the 
issue of integrity, as they do not report to us. This is one of the reasons that we 
have not employed one organization but rather try to develop competition 
among these organizations in order to make performance comparisons among 
these organizations. Currently, WASA has service management contracts with 4 
firms for the detection of illegal connections. So far, more than 10000 illegal 
connections have been identified and verified by WASA. For the outsourcing, a 
competitive bidding process was used.”(Interviewee 9-Director P& D (WASA), 
CDGL) 
Theme 4: Initial Efficiency Gains 
Interviewees explained that outsourcing of these functions will help them to reduce their 
operational costs and to improve their collection efficiency. For instance, according to 
the interviewees (Interviewee 9-Director P& D; 6-DMD, O & M; 8, DMD, Finance 
(WASA), CDGL) prior to the outsourcing of billing distribution, the revenue 
department was responsible for meter reading, billing and collection. It had 100 meter 
readers, 20-30 persons for billing, and 150 delivery clerks. WASA needed a projected 
number of 1,000 meter readers, 200-300 staff members for billing and 1,500 clerks for 
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delivery. In order to reduce these operational costs, printing and billing distribution was 
outsourced and it is projected that in this case the contracted organization will be paid 
Rs. 4.00 for printing and billing distribution costs (WASA was spending Rs. 4.00 on 
printing alone).  
11.10  CONCLUSION 
Overall, the institutional framework gives water and sanitation provision to the TMA, 
and gives the TMA the right to contract out any of its services to any public or private 
body; however, considering the nature of the sector, there may be issues of coordinated 
planning leading to the danger of diffused accountability and poor service delivery in 
big city district governments. Therefore, this sector is managed by the third tier of LG - 
City District Government. Interviewees from case study 1 and case study 2 identified 
that their managerial autonomy was constrained because of the insufficient legal 
framework, lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities, lack of coordination among 
different institutional players, weak accountability arrangements by not implementing 
performance standards to hold organizations accountable, and political interference in 
day to day operations. A summary of the main themes is presented in the Figure 11-4. 
The financial autonomy of WASA heavily depends on the grants of the provincial 
government which has a strong impact on WASA operations as reflected by the 
interviewees. Both of the organizations stated that although LGO 2001 delegated tariff 
approval to the district assembly, in practice it is reviewed by the provincial government 
before final approval. There needs to be a proper legal framework to streamline this 
ambiguity in the institutional framework. Other factors which influence the decision on 
tariff revision are political considerations as water and sanitation is a big social sector 
and politicians are afraid of the fact that any revision in tariff will affect their 
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constituencies. Therefore, the WASA cannot achieve financial autonomy unless it is 
given the status of a corporate entity.  
 
Note: [‘+’ Indicates presence/favourable factor]; [‘-’ Indicate unfavourable/lack of a factors]; [‘O’ Indicates mixed 
perception] 
Figure 11-4: Analysis of Management Decentralization and Performance 
Both of the case study organizations collected data against benchmarking indicators but 
none of the organizations confirmed their actual internal usage in that organization. The 
interviewees- from both CDGs, had a consensus that performance data was collected for 
the projects funded by international organizations like the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), but they could not highlight how was integrated into the planning process. Even 
one of the case study organizations, CDGF, indicated that they had no idea how data 
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was collected against these indicators. This information needs to be used for the 
planning and management of service provision and for making people accountable 
against their assignments.  
The internal institutional arrangement of both case study organizations indicated that an 
organization needed financial and human resources for effective service delivery. The 
quality of human resources was poor as there were no training opportunities and the 
incentive structure was not linked to performance. They needed to streamline their 
human resource strategies which could not be achieved unless organizations were given 
sufficient administrative autonomy to hire adequate staff and attract a highly skilled 
workforce with a competitive salary structure. Although devolution transferred 
administrative powers to the local government, the service structure is still maintained 
by the provincial government. For instance, a provincial government restriction on any 
kind of recruitment affects the local government department's ability to fill the vacancy.  
Partnership models suggest that WASA can reduce its costs and improve service 
delivery by properly managed Public Private Participation. However, WASA Lahore 
started these options in 2007 and it is too early to see their effectiveness as a service 
delivery option. On the other hand, in CDGF the results were not very positive because 
of internal resistance to change and poor planning and execution of these service 
delivery options. In order to make PPP more successful, the organization needs a shift 
in its organizational culture, management commitment to these service delivery options 
and communication across the organizational members of the possible gains of 
efficiency. It also requires that management be provided proper orientation of the 
viability of PPP options so that it can be managed in an ingenious way according to the 
needs of the sector. The usual practice is that the provincial department provides 
technical support to WASA in contract design and development, while implementation 
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and evaluation are left with WASA. As these proposals or initiatives are not based on 
knowledge of the local context and the implementation agency WASA is not included 
in the initial planning process, these initiatives lack the commitment of WASA 
employees. If schemes are developed at the local level, there are more chances of 
success and responsiveness.  
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CHAPTER 12  
DISCUSSION - CROSS CASE SYNTHESIS 
12.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to present a cross-case synthesis of the case study district 
governments and the literature presented in Chapters 2, 3 & 4 and attempts to answer 
the research questions relating to the link between decentralization and the institutional 
performance of local government. However, it is not any easy task to give a precise 
answer regarding the effect of decentralization on performance. Some problems relate to 
the collection of reliable data before and after the reforms (Pollitt 1995) and there are 
issues in terms of defining performance. An effort has been made to adopt a mixed 
method approach to collect data and assess the perception of key stakeholders (political 
heads of CDG, departmental heads of service delivery organizations, NGOs acting as 
partners in service provision and end users). However, performance changes cannot be 
attributed to decentralization alone. Bearing this in mind, some plausible explanations 
or attribution of performance outcomes as a result of decentralization reforms in 
Pakistan can be inferred. However, the overall results are based on people’s opinions 
and perceptions. The researcher has tried to ensure validity and reliability of the case 
study as discussed in the research methodology.  
This study adopted an integrative approach to explain the complexity and diversity 
inherent in the design and implementation of decentralization reforms. This literature 
was organized around three main perspectives on decentralization and institutional 
performance. Each perspective offered valuable insight into the phenomenon of 
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decentralization by emphasizing a different focus, which, once taken together, offered a 
more comprehensive view of decentralization. Therefore, the discussion is organized 
along these perspectives.  A summary of research findings is presented in Table Table 
12-1.  
Table 12-1: Summary of Research Findings 
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
SUMMARY FINDINGS 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Research Question 1.  
What has been 
decentralized and has 
decentralization really 
taken place? 
 
The research findings support that considerable political, 
fiscal and managerial autonomy has been transferred to 
the local authorities under the LGO 2001.   
1) Political perspective assessed the level of 
participation at two levels: Institutional level-
the role of local councillors in local policy 
making and its implementation process. 
Grassroots level- election results, level of 
citizen participation in the local association and 
meetings, quality and quantity of contact 
between the public, elected representatives and 
the officials of decentralized institutions.  
 Overall, political analysis indicated that 
political representatives had considerable 
influence on local policy making and its 
implementation process. However, although, 
participation is able to increase representation 
of the marginalized groups, these groups have 
to make a strong effort to make their voice 
heard in local council meetings. 
 The decentralization reforms in Pakistan 
attempted to extend participation and give 
citizen avenues of voice in local decision 
making process. The empowerment strategies 
were a mix of representative democracy 
infused with participatory democracy, giving 
direct user involvement in community 
development projects (CCB) and giving them 
control over the decision making process such 
as delegated authority (School Councils). The 
findings suggest that there is a significant 
improvement in the quantity and quality of 
participation. The local government elections 
(2001 & 2005) were considered as fair and 
competitive as the elections of national and 
provincial assemblies and voter turnout was 
more than the national and provincial elections 
(Section 12.2.1: p. 432).  
a) Fiscal Perspective assessed the nature of fiscal 
autonomy by examining the intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements.  
1. Fiscal analysis of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers revealed that local government relied 
heavily on intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
under PFC award. However, as the transfers 
were in the form of block grants, local 
governments had sufficient spending autonomy 
(Section 12.2.2: p. 438). 
b) Managerial Perspective assessed three types of 
 
 The reforms in 
developing countries 
tend to be more towards 
structural 
decentralization. The 
findings suggest that 
local government needs 
sufficient political, fiscal 
and managerial 
autonomy to provide 
responsive local 
services.  
 This study contributes 
that the implementation 
level is the most 
significant in making 
these collaborative 
models work. Overall, it 
is evident that 
partnerships evolve over 
time. Partners, through 
engagement and re-
engagement, overcome 
their differences, find 
strategies for better 
coordination and try to 
work together for 
successful outcomes. 
However, it depends on 
the willingness of the 
partners to work 
together, strategies 
employed and the 
institutional context.  
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reforms: organizational restructuring, service 
delivery techniques and performance based 
incentive structure.  
1) Extent of managerial autonomy: The focus of the 
reforms was to create independent operational units 
but not so much on the financial devolution and 
control of resources (Section 12.2.3.1: p. 445).  
2) Service Delivery Techniques: The research found 
that service delivery organizations were 
collaborating with third sector for service provision.  
In the education sector such a collaborative model 
was known as Adopt A School (AAS) program. On 
the hand water and sanitation agencies were engaged 
in co-production and contracting out some of its 
activities to the private sector/third sector (Section 
12.2.3.2: p. 449).  
3) Performance Based Accountability: The 
organizational survey and sector analysis validated 
that education departments have clear PIs and a 
performance based reward system. However, WSS 
showed a lack of both. Although, organizations 
collected information against PIs, however, it was 
not clear how these were used in the planning 
process (Section 12.2.3.3: p. 458). 
Research Question 2: 
Has decentralization 
been able to improve 
institutional 
performance of local 
government? 
 Measures of Performance: The study assessed the 
performance through internal perception of political 
heads of the local government and managers of service 
delivery organizations and external measure of 
perception such as community survey and archival data. 
Internal measures of performance  
1. According to the political heads of local 
government, the service delivery framework is much 
better under the local government system as it is 
more responsive to local needs. Local government 
allocated a major share of the budget to 
development activities, and sectors such as 
education and water and sanitation were given 
priority. The document analysis of budget 
documents also supported these research findings 
that local governments were allocating resources to 
its set objectives (Section 12.3.1: p. 462).  
2. According to the organizational survey, the 
managers of service delivery organizations reported 
that the performance of their organizations is better 
than the previous arrangements. The sector analysis 
supported these findings (Section 12.3.2: p. 468).   
External Measures of Performance: The study assessed 
the performance of local government along three 
dimensions: responsiveness, user quality and 
effectiveness through a community survey. Research 
findings from the survey indicated that decentralization 
has been able to improve the institutional performance of 
local government in terms of responsiveness, improved 
transparency, accountability and improved level of 
community involvement in service delivery (Section 
12.3.1: p. 462). These findings were supported by the 
qualitative analysis (political analysis and sector 
analysis).  
1. Effectiveness was assessed by comparing the 
objectives of the reforms set under devolution plan 
2000 and the actual outcomes of reforms.  The key 
objectives of devolution reforms were: improved 
user involvement, responsive and accountable local 
government. Local government elections (2001 and 
2005) were considered fair and competitive. The 
findings of community and organizational survey 
 
 The research findings 
suggest that there is a 
relationship between 
participation, increased 
autonomy, and better 
accountability 
arrangements. A mix of 
all these lead to 
improved institutional 
performance.  
 It also supports the 
assumption that 
decentralization is a 
context specific 
phenomenon. 
Decentralization can 
lead to improved 
performance if there is 
improved level of user 
involvement in service 
provision, strong 
accountability 
mechanisms and 
sufficient local 
government autonomy.  
 The study found that 
countries like Pakistan 
have a strong 
bureaucracy and 
suggests that centralized 
planning and 
bureaucratic layers are 
unable to deal with the 
inefficiencies of the 
public sector. There is a 
need to bring change in 
the developing countries 
public sector paradigm, 
delegating more 
responsibilities to the 
local level and more 
efforts should be 
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provided evidence of enhanced participation and its 
positive significant impact on organizational 
performance. This was also supported by the 
qualitative analysis. The community survey also 
suggested improved accountability in terms of 
reduced level of corruption, better grievance 
procedures, improved level of employees 
attendance, and overall a transparent local 
government system.  
2. User quality: the community survey indicated that 
community is satisfied with the services provided, 
particularly education and water and sanitation 
sector.  
o Education: community survey indicated 
improved access to education, satisfaction 
with the quality of service provision, and 
better service delivery performance 
compared to pre-devolution arrangements.  
o WSS: the community survey also 
indicated that the overall access to WSS 
improved after the LG system. However, 
community satisfaction was higher for 
water provision than for the sewerage 
provision. There was also a significant 
association between improved access and 
satisfaction level with the type of local 
government. It was higher for CDGL than 
CDGF.  
3. Responsiveness: community survey also indicated 
that the local government system is responsive to 
local needs.  
focused on building the 
capacities of the local 
governments. 
 
Research Question 3: 
Do accountability 
mechanisms affect the 
institutional 
performance of local 
government? 
 
Traditional Accountability Channels:  
The organizations had a mix of vertical (Provincial 
oversight and audits) and horizontal accountability 
arrangements (local council monitoring committees, local 
council itself, political heads of local government).  
 The organizational survey indicated that internal 
audits and grievance procedures were more effective 
in both education departments and WASA (CDGF), 
while grievance procedure were less effective in 
WASA (CDGL). Interview data also supported the 
survey findings that respondents considered internal 
audit transparent and financial rules were very clear 
to them. However, managers of the education 
departments seemed less satisfied with the external 
audits, provincial monitoring committee and 
financial management rules. While the 
organizational survey and interview analysis 
reported that these multiple accountability channels 
were playing an effective role in improving 
organizational performance, interview analysis also 
indicated that they were leading to issues such a 
coordination, delays etc. However, political analysis 
and community survey indicated no significant role 
of monitoring committees (Section 2.5.2).  
 Both organizations were having two parallel 
performance models: traditional Annual confidential 
reports (ACRs), and performance indicators.  
However, the education department was clearer of 
their targets and schools performance was assessed 
and rewarded against the performance indicators. 
While managers of WASAs indicated that although 
they collect data against performance indicators, 
these performance indicators were not used for the 
planning purpose. Overall, the research found 
evidence of positive impact of improved 
 
It was revealed that new 
accountability relationships 
emerged between citizen and 
local representatives, & 
between political 
representatives and public 
officials. As local councillors 
live in those communities, 
they are, therefore, under 
constant pressure of that 
community, and as a result 
tend to be more responsive to 
the community issues as they 
need their vote for the next 
elections. It also provided 
communities an indirect 
mechanism to exert greater 
influence on government 
officials through their local 
representatives. It is apparent 
that the local government 
system is able to create 
citizen oversight and 
electoral accountability to 
some extent.  
 
There is a need to shift the 
focus on performance based 
accountability model for 
better performance outcomes.  
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accountability channels on the performance of 
public sector organizations 
 Community survey also indicated that there is a 
change in accountability mechanisms. Communities 
indicated increased access to information, reporting 
of corruption incidents and improved complaint 
procedures. Respondents indicated that was a visible 
change in the improvements of employees 
attendance, and local government system was more 
transparent compared to the previous system as a 
result of improved accountability mechanisms 
(Section 12.3: p. 462). 
Research Question 4: 
What are the 
institutional factors 
that affect the link 
between 
decentralization and 
institutional 
performance? 
 
At the institutional level:  
1) Commitment to reforms: The study found that the 
commitment of provincial and federal government 
to the LG system is a significant factor as lack of 
commitment of these two players not only had an 
adverse effect on the flow of resources. It also 
affects the bureaucratic commitment as it is 
contingent on the level of commitment expressed by 
the federal and provincial governments.  
2) Coordination and party politics: At the local 
government level, the most significant factor was 
the coordination among tiers of government, lack of 
an integrated planning approach and party politics 
(Section 12.4: p. 473).  
At the organizational level:  
1) The sector analysis indicated that managers of the 
education departments perceived political and 
bureaucratic interference as the main constraint on 
their autonomy. The organizational analysis also 
supported these findings that the education 
department faced more political and bureaucratic 
interference that WASA. However, there were some 
variations across sectors and CDGs. The education 
department (CDGL) faced more political 
interference compared on the education department 
(CDGF). On the other hand, respondents from 
WASAs reported frequent political interference and 
less frequent bureaucratic interference.  
2) The study found local context very significant in 
determining the performance of schools. However, 
water and sanitation agencies were more concerned 
with their internal organizational factors. The 
interview analysis also supported organizational 
survey findings that WASA had inadequate 
resources. Overall the sector analysis revealed that 
WASA had weak internal and external institutional 
environment, weak accountability arrangements, and 
a weak social-political context compared to t 
education departments. The education department, 
besides having a weak external institutional 
environment, had a strong local context, better 
internal institutional environment and better 
accountability system (Section 12.4: p. 473).  
The service delivery models 
3) The extent to which partnerships are of collaborative 
in nature in terms of joint decision making and 
accountability depends on the commitment of both 
partners. It also suggests the significance of the 
institutional environment, particularly local context, 
organizational commitment and strategies of the  
partners in determining the successful outcomes 
(Section 12.2.3.2: p. 449).   
 
 
 These findings suggest 
the significance of the 
context, particularly the 
local contingency 
factors in determining 
the overall performance 
of public sector 
organizations.  
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The first research question of this study examined the nature and extent of 
decentralization reforms under the Devolution Plan 2000, in particular how far the 
actual decentralization has been implemented followed by examining the effects of 
decentralization on institutional performance of local government. The third research 
question aimed to assess change in accountability arrangements and its impact on local 
government performance. As this question was related to performance, in order to 
provide a more integrated response, it is partly answered in Q1 and combined in Q2.  
12.2 Q1. WHAT HAS BEEN DECENTRALIZED AND HAS 
DECENTRALIZATION REALLY TAKEN PLACE?  
This question was partly addressed in chapter 1. At the local government level, 
considerable political, administrative, and financial autonomy was transferred to local 
authorities under the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001. Chapter 1 provided a 
snapshot of significant political, administrative and financial reforms being devolved to 
the local government level. This section provides a brief review of these reforms and the 
perception of the key stakeholders regarding their realization.  
12.2.1 Political Perspective 
The political perspective focused on assessing ‘how far the LG was able to articulate 
participation in local decision making processes’ and provided a political analysis of 
local government. The political perspective provides an understanding of the 
relationship between different forms of participation and local government 
performance. The political perspective argued that a locally elected government is 
closer to the people with a better understanding of local issues, which is reflected in the 
decisions. Therefore, political decentralization will lead to more responsive and 
efficient service delivery outcomes. It focuses on voice mechanisms, such as free 
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election, political parties, formal procedures, public meetings, and opinion surveys to 
assess the link between participation and responsiveness.  
At the institutional level, participation was assessed by examining the role of local 
councillors in local policy-making and its implementation process (Chapter 9). The 
political reforms introduced a local government system consisting of three tiers: District 
council, Tehsil Council, and Union Council. Local elections were held on a non-Party 
basis. The union council was the only directly elected tier of the local government, 
which then became the Electoral College for the election of the Tehsil and District 
Councils. The Nazim and Naib Nazim of the Union Councils became part of the District 
and Tehsil council respectively. The new electoral reforms also introduced a quota 
system for the representation of peasants, worker, minorities and women. The District 
Council indirectly elected the District Nazim (DN). Therefore, there was a considerable 
accountability problem at this level as his re-election was dependent on the majority of 
District Council votes.  
Fair and competitive elections are one indicator of participation (Devas 2003). So far, 
two Local Government elections have been held, LG election 2001 and 2005. The local 
government elections were considered as fair and competitive as the election of 
National and Provincial assemblies (HASNAIN 2010). The overall voter turnout in the 
LG 2005 election (47.38%) was higher than the in the National Assembly Election 2008 
(44.11%). A comparison of the voter turnout
21
 in the province of Punjab revealed that 
the turnout for the LG 2005 elections was higher (53.45%) than the National Assembly 
elections (48.18%). However, according to the political perspective, although elections 
may increase representation through a quota system, it may not empower disadvantaged 
                                                 
21
 Collected from data of Election Commission of Pakistan available at: 
http://www.ecp.gov.pk/Misc/ReportGeneralElection2008Vol-II.pdf) 
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groups (Blair 2000). It is also argued, that ‘representative democracy alone cannot result 
in responsive and accountable local government. Representative democracy needs to be 
strengthened with empowerment strategies such as ‘participatory democracy and 
extending democracy’ (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994; King and Stoker 1996). 
The research findings of this study confirmed that although the election improved the 
representation of marginalized groups in local councils, these groups have to make a 
strong effort to make themselves heard during the council meetings (Secion 9.3, p: 299). 
The interviews with female councillors (Town and District) indicated that they had little 
influence in the policy making process and development funds were not allocated to 
them. Even the female councillors’ honorarium was less than that of male councillors; 
however, the continued effort of the female councillors resulted in the increase of their 
honorarium in the 2008/09 budget and more allocation of resources in the second tenure 
of the local government. This confirms that disadvantaged and marginalized groups 
may not be able to exert influence unless they make consistent efforts to make their 
voice heard in local council meetings.  
The research findings also showed that the profile of the individual local councillors 
such as education level, networking skills, leadership capacities may be very significant 
in exerting influence in the policy making process. For example, one of the female 
district councillors (Interviewee 8-female district councillor) had a professional degree, 
a political background, was an active member of the youth lawyers’ forums and 
contested on general seats in the LG election 2005. On the other hand, a female Tehsil 
councillor contested on the quota system, her husband was the Union Nazim and her 
appointment was based on family connections. The female District councillor was 
found to be more active in organizing the female voice and continually made efforts to 
solve issues in the community. Similar evidence was found regarding male councillors’ 
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levels of participation. Councillors who had a higher education degree, a determination 
to bring change to the system and a desire to solve community issues were more 
influential (Section 9.2.2). 
The study also found that party politics at the local level played a strong role in the 
allocation of development funds among councillors (Crook 2003; Francis 2003; Olowu 
2003). Although the local government elections were contested on a non-party basis, 
local councillors had affiliations with the major political parties at the provincial and 
national level. This was strongly evident from the interviewees’ perception that, if they 
belonged to the opposition, they had problems in the allocation of funds (Section 9.4.1, 
p: 308).  
LGO 2001 also made provision for citizen participation in service provision, financing, 
and oversight of local service providers through oversight monitoring committees, 
School Councils (SCs) and Citizen Community Boards (CCBs). A brief overview of all 
these participatory arrangements was presented in Chapter 1. However, oversight 
monitoring committees only existed on paper and remained mostly inactive. It can be 
inferred that infusing representative democracy with participatory democracy as 
proposed by Burns, Hambleton & Hoggett (1994) remains an ineffective strategy. In the 
CDGL the main factors highlighted, by the political representatives, for their ineffective 
role were: lack of proper training of councillors regarding their role and resources such 
as staff and transportation. On the other hand besides CDGF efforts to organize training 
for councillors on monitoring committees working, they remained ineffective due to a 
lack of commitment of the councillors and their inability to devote time to these 
monitoring roles (Section 9.3.3, p: 303). It also suggests that, as the role of monitoring 
committees was only to monitor and submit reports to local councils, the members felt 
that they lacked control to take action to solve problems. This led to dissatisfaction with 
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monitoring committees. They remained consultative bodies with representation 
remaining at the level of ‘tokenism’ as suggested by Arnstein (1969).  
However, the research did find evidence of the effective role of School Councils in 
improving the quality of education. The effectiveness of SCs also confirmed that 
empowerment strategy - extending democracy through direct user involvement (Burns, 
Hambleton and Hoggett 1994) gave citizen’s greater control over the decision making 
process. This is the most effective participatory strategy for meaningful participation 
(Arnstein 1969). The case study LGs (CDGL & CDGF) reported positive outcomes of 
these participatory arrangements such as improved teachers’ attendance, transparent 
utilization of funds, improved quality of education and mobilization of resources for 
small scale school projects. However, the effectiveness of SCs was found to be 
dependent on contextual factors such as the socio-demographic profile of the 
community, the role of the head teacher and the involvement of political 
representatives. Overall, SCs were less active in rural areas, where the literacy rate was 
low and socio-economic conditions were weak (Section 10.6, p: 336 Figure 10-4, p: 
375). 
The evidence with respect to CCB was mixed. The basic concept of CCB was to be a 
non-profit organization with 20% of the funds generated by the community and 80% 
contributed by the LGs, being exempted from tax. The document analysis indicated that 
mostly funds allocated to CCBs remained under-utilized. The reasons for their under-
utilization were procedural and technical requirements to obtain project approval and 
implementation (Section 9.3.2, p: 300). Besides CDGs initiatives to streamline the 
process of project approval, facilitate community and reduce delays, the actual 
allocation of funds to CCB schemes and actual utilization of funds remained quite low.  
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According to the political perspective, underlying much of the debate for local 
democracy is the importance of active involvement of citizen in local politics. The 
decentralization reforms in Pakistan attempted to extend participation and give citizens 
avenues of voice in local decision-making processes. The empowerment strategies were 
a mix of representative democracy infused with participatory democracy, giving direct 
user involvement in community development projects (CCBs), and giving them control 
over the decision making process such as delegated authority (school councils). The 
findings of this research suggest that there is a significant improvement in the quantity 
and quality of participation on the one hand and accountability relationships between 
political representatives and public officials on the other (Table 8-2, Table 8-3 & Table 
8-4). This is reflected in the key themes from the community (Table 8-13, p: 281): local 
government has improved accessibility to local representatives, resulted in the 
accommodation of diversity of local needs, and offered the community to  solve 
problems at the grass root level in a more participatory manner. Accessibility of the 
local community to local representatives was the key consideration in ensuring 
responsiveness and accountability. As local councillors lived in close proximity and had 
social ties with the local community, the local community could pressurize them to 
solve their issues and make them accountable for local government performance. Local 
councillors remained the main avenue for expressing community concerns, and as the 
community reflected, they were able to pressurize local councillors and in turn 
government officials. It also emerged that the concept of political accountability was 
very strong and that local councillors are an effective mechanism to mobilize 
community support for community problems. However, it can be inferred that effective 
participation remains dependent on contextual factors (Table 2-4, p: 48) 
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12.2.2 Fiscal Perspective 
The fiscal perspective on decentralization was mainly concerned with matching revenue 
and expenditure assignments. Their assumption was that expenditure assignment should 
match revenue assignments to make local government accountable (Chapter 3). The 
political perspective stressed that local governments need adequate resources as well as 
autonomy to decide allocations according to local preferences. The fiscal perspective 
stressed that political decentralization is a prerequisite for decentralization and local 
governments should have sufficient resources to finance their expenditures. Hence, both 
of these perspectives build upon each other. It was therefore essential to analyse inter-
governmental fiscal relations to fully grasp the nature of local government autonomy in 
service provision. To achieve this objective, an analytical framework was outlined in 
the fiscal perspective (Figure 3-1, p: 88).  
According to the framework, in order to assess the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and service delivery performance, attention should be paid to the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer system (IGFTs), the regulatory framework and 
prerequisites of decentralization (political decentralization, enabling environment, 
accountability). Considerable attention should be paid to the institutions of coordination 
among different tiers by examining IGFTs, which address the design of transfers and 
institutions of accountability to hold local government accountable for what they do 
with the resources they have been allocated.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, under the Devolution Plan 2000, local government was 
assigned a range of tax bases to create some incentives for LGs to raise their revenues. 
As illustrated in Table 12-2 (p: 439), while the district tier had been assigned various 
taxes and the right to levy various user charges, these were not very buoyant tax bases 
and some of the charges would be very hard to impose, such as fees for schools and the 
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use of health facilities, considering the fact that these services were already subsidized. 
In Pakistan, primary and elementary education is provided free in all the provinces 
(World Bank, DFID). Compared to this, the Tehsil/Town administration had been 
assigned more buyout tax bases such as Urban Immovable Property Tax (UIPT). 
According to the reports of the World Bank (2004), the new taxes and user charges 
remained underutilized.  
Table 12-2: Local Government Revenue Structure under LGO 2001 
District Council Tehsil Council Union Council 
 Education tax 
 Health tax 
 Tax on vehicles other than 
motor vehicles 
 Any other tax authorized by 
the government 
 Local rates on lands 
assessable to land revenue 
 Fees in respect of schools, 
colleges, and health 
facilities maintained or 
established by the district 
government 
 Fees by specific service 
rendered by the district 
 Collection charges for 
recovery of taxes 
 Tolls on new roads, bridges, 
within the limits of the 
districts other than the 
national and provincial 
highways 
 Local tax on services 
 Tax on immovable property (UPIT) 
 Fees on advertisement and billboards 
 Fees for fairs, agricultural shows, cattle 
fairs, industrial exhibition, tournaments 
and other public events 
 Fees for approval of building plans, and 
erection of buildings 
 Fees for licenses or permits, and 
penalties or fines for violation of the 
licensing rules 
 Charges for execution and maintenance 
of works of public utility like of 
lightening of public places, drainage 
water supply 
 Fees on cinemas, dramas, and other 
entertainment 
 Collection charges for recovery of any 
taxes on behalf of the government, 
district government, union 
administration etc. 
 Fees for licensing of 
professions and 
vocations 
 Fees on sale of animals 
in cattle market 
 Market fees 
 Charges for specific 
service rendered by the 
union council 
 Rate for execution and 
maintenance of any 
work of public utility 
like lightening of public 
places, drainage and 
water supply 
 
An analysis of the LGO 2001 revealed that although it specified the LG’s autonomy to 
set tax rates, it did not suggest ‘how’ it should be done. A comparison of LG functions 
(Figure 1-4) and fiscal resources (Table 12-2, p: 439), illustrated a mismatch between 
the expenditure and revenue assignments of LGs, particularly with the district tier 
heavily dependent upon transfers. Some studies (Kaiser 2006; Kardar 2006) on the 
fiscal autonomy of Local government in Pakistan indicate that the total expenditure of 
LGs were less than 1% of the total combined expenditure of local, provincial and 
federal governments compared to India (4%) and in advanced countries (20-35%). 
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According to the IMFs Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the ratio of Pakistan’s LG 
revenue to the total GDP is only 0.9%, compared to 3% in Ethiopia, 3.1% in Nigeria 
and 6.15 in India (World Bank 1994). However, as mentioned in Section 3.4 (p: 78), 
GFS data had certain limitations. It does not reflect the true amount of local government 
autonomy as it does not provide any information regarding the LGGs’ ‘Own Revenue 
Sources’ (OSR) and conditional or non-conditional tied grants. The structure of OSRs 
and the nature of grants reflect how autonomous LGs are in utilizing their local 
resources (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 2002; Bahl and Johannes 1994; Ebel and 
Yilmaz 2002).  
In comparison to other developing countries, which rely heavily on conditional grants as 
indicated in (Table 3-2, p: 75), the LGs in Pakistan were primarily dependent on fiscal 
transfers, which were usually one block transfers, giving LG’s spending autonomy. LGs 
were autonomous to spend these grants according to their priorities, as no conditions 
were attached to the grants (see Table 1-4, p: 23). However, the local government Own 
Source Revenue generation was far behind other decentralized countries (Cyan 2007).  
Institutions of coordination and regulatory framework play a significant role in the 
transparent and predictable transfer of financial resources to local governments 
(Dillinger 1994; Litvack, Ahmad and Bird 1998). The main institution for fiscal 
coordination was PFC. The initial support for establishing a PFC was low (DFID, ADB 
and World Bank 2004) and transfers to the LGs were not formula-based (Cyan, 2001). 
The statutory provisions for establishing a PFC were made in the amended ordinance of 
LGO 2001. The PFC award adopted a formula based transfer to LGs.  According to 
Section 120 D of LGO 2001, the fiscal award was to be based on fiscal capacity, fiscal 
need, fiscal effort and performance.  Article 4 of the LGO 2001 lays down the formula 
of distribution among District, Tehsil and Union administrations - 83.8%, 12.5%, and 
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3.69% respectively in the form of block grants. The details of general-purpose grants, 
equalization grants and tied grants have been provided in chapter 1 (Table 1-4, p: 23). 
Overall, PFC awards were based on a need-based formula:   
“......... The PFC (2006-09) prioritized the under developed districts. They were 
given relatively more funds for the development of health, sanitation, water 
supply facilities, and education” (Tribune, 2010).  
This was also confirmed by Shah (2003) investigating the merits of the PFC of Pakistan 
and concluding that PFC had a transparent formula; it is based on indicators of 
expenditure and better information about LGs, wage transfers to cover administrative 
costs. Demerits of PFC included: it has one size fits all approach; some of the indicators 
like tax effort and backwardness are questionable, there is no result culture; 
inappropriate incentives for responsive, responsible and accountable governance. This 
study found similar demerits of PFC, as political representatives highlighted that they 
had no incentives to improve the tax collection efficiency as there are no appropriate 
incentives to reward their efforts.  
Nevertheless, LGs transfers under PFC were more in the form of general purpose 
grants. Therefore, it can be argued that theoretically local governments had a higher 
spending autonomy (Musgrave 1997). As explained in chapter 3 (Section 3.3.3, p: 71), 
transfers on the basis of a formula not only make them predictable, a divisible pool also 
ensures that an increase in taxes will automatically increase the IGFTs (Bahl and 
Johannes 1994; Bird and Wallich 1993; Boadway and Shah 2007). This study found 
that PFC awards had the merits of predictable, formula based transfers from a divisible 
pool as recommended by fiscal federalism (Dillinger 1994; Litvack, Ahmad and Bird 
1998) and supported by other studies on fiscal decentralization in Pakistan that these 
transfers meet the criteria of a ‘transparent’ grant system (Bahl and Johannes 1994; 
Cyan 2007; Shah and World Bank. 2004; Shah 2005).  
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Faguet (2004) based his study on the fiscal federalism perspective and measured the 
impact of decentralization on responsiveness by assessing the change in resource flow. 
He examined the pattern of public investment at local government level and whether 
indicators of need (level of literacy, access to services) change these investment 
patterns. This study was mainly interested in understanding the Inter-governmental 
Fiscal Transfer (IGFTs) system and expenditure autonomy of the LGs in the allocation 
of resources for development and non-development funds according to local priorities. 
As has been argued earlier in this section, LGs had far greater spending autonomy, 
theoretically. The question was to assess how far, in reality, local governments were 
exercising this spending power by providing locally responsive services. Therefore, the 
researcher carried out an analysis of district government budgets focusing on 
‘development and non-development expenditures’ to understand the spending patterns 
of LGs.  
The second PFC award for the year 2006-07 allocated Rs.112 billion to LGs. The 
provincial sources were divided into 1) a provincial retained account and a 2) provincial 
allocable amount. A 2.5% GST was added to the provincial allocable amount to be 
transferred to the LGs. An analysis of district government budgets revealed that 
spending pattern changed over time and local government spending on development 
increased after 2003-04. For instance, the analysis of the CDGL budget indicated that in 
2003-04, the total district budget was Rs.4913.302 million, out of which Rs.893.105 
million were allocated to development expenditures. In 2008-09, CDGL announced a 
budget of Rs.30.73 billion out of which Rs.16.72 billion was allocated for development 
expenditures and Rs.12.98 billion for non-development expenditures. It also indicated 
that over the years, the size of the LG budget not only increased, but that a major 
proportion was allocated to development expenditures. Even the budget of the CDGL 
 443 
 
indicated that education was given the first priority in the expenditure (Rs.322.60 
million in 2005-06 and Rs.1.59 billion in 2008-09 was allocated for development 
expenditure alone). In 2005-06 district budgets, CDGL’s allocations for the education 
sector were purely from its Own Source Revenues (OSRs) indicating that increased 
spending on education was not related to tied or conditional grants and reflects a 
significant autonomy of local government in spending patterns.  
However, in 2009-2010 CDGL only announced its non-development budget and there 
was no allocation for development expenditure. The Nazim of CDGL explained that as 
the provincial government froze local government accounts and started rolling back of 
the LG system, it was neither appropriate nor possible to announce development 
budgets. Likewise, the Nazims of CDGF also explained that in 2009-2010 the local 
government could not continue its development projects because of frozen funds by the 
provincial government (Section 9.6, p: 314). Kardar (2006) reported that LG transfers 
were hardly able to meet salary expenditures let alone to spend on development needs. 
However, this study based its conclusion on the data collected between 2001-2004, 
which was the first tenure of the local government. The researcher found evidence of 
the opposite.  
Overall, a fiscal analysis of the IGFTs revealed that LGs mainly relied on the provincial 
government for funds through PFC awards. The transfers were in the form of block 
grants giving local government sufficient spending autonomy. However, the 
dependency of LGs on transfers resulted in an inability to allocate any funds for 
development activities once the provincial government either did not release funds or 
froze local government funds in their accounts. This has impacted the performance of 
the Education Sector particularly, whereby projects like PPP Cell in CDGF became 
non-functional because of lack of funds.  
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The analysis of fiscal reforms under decentralization supports the argument from a 
political and fiscal perspective that LGs need a sufficient fiscal autonomy in the form of 
Own Source Revenue (OSR). The reliance on grants leave LGs at the mercy of 
provincial or federal governments, particularly in developing countries like Pakistan, as 
provincial or federal governments use the grant structure as a controlling mechanism. 
So far, there is considerable progress in political decentralization, but fiscal 
decentralization has not been given substantial importance by the provincial 
governments. Under these circumstances, LGs cannot be held accountable for service 
delivery outcomes.  
12.2.3 Public Management Perspective - Public Sector Model 
The NPM model provides a managerial view of local government and how the public 
sector should be organized for the efficient provision of services. The decentralized 
framework proposed by NPM focused on three main changes: structural 
decentralization, performance orientation, and service delivery techniques such as 
market or collaborative models of service provision. The level of analysis moved from 
political institutions to organizational structures and processes. The focus became to 
explore and examine how the public sector is structured and engaged in local service 
provision. Therefore, the study examined the extent of managerial autonomy over 
financial and personnel management, the mix of service delivery techniques and the 
nature of the accountability model. As every perspective argued that decentralization is 
a context specific phenomenon, a comprehensive assessment of the institutional 
environment was carried out in order to understand the context of service delivery 
organization.  
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12.2.3.1 Managerial Autonomy  
Walsh (1995) argued that so far the emphasis has been on the creation of an 
independent operational unit but not so much on the financial devolution and control of 
resources. This study also found a similar evidence of the limited administrative and 
fiscal autonomy of LG. An analysis of managerial autonomy of the LG revealed that 
political and fiscal reforms were followed by devolving various functions previously 
performed by the provincial governments, such as education, health, water and 
sanitation, infrastructure etc. to LG level. As discussed in chapter 1, the executive 
branch of a district was divided into 10-13 departments, each headed by an Executive 
District Officer (EDO). Section 18 of the LGO (2001) gave the district governments 
authority to ‘change the number of posts of officials and employees of the decentralized 
offices of the district administration and tehsil and town administration’ (pp: 12-13). In 
practice, the provincial government exercised considerable influence on local 
authorities’ decisions regarding appointments, postings and transfers - most noteworthy 
there was a provincial restriction on recruitment. Even if LGs wanted to recruit for 
vacant posts, which were going to be paid from local revenue sources, the provincial 
restrictions on recruitment prevented them from filling these posts (Interviewees 1 
District Nazim-CDGF & 6-Union Nazim &7-Town Nazim-CDGL).  
To deal with the provincial restrictions, LGs started hiring staff on a contractual basis 
particularly in the Education and the Health sectors. In Particular, CDGF established 
resource centres in education and health for updating HRMIS in 2008. It was found that 
CDGF considered hiring teachers and doctors, a strong exhibition of district autonomy 
and authority (Interviewee1-District Nazim, CDGF). At the district level, CDGs had a 
district recruitment committee to fill the previously vacant positions. Authority over 
career management such as promotions and transfers varied across sectors. Overall, the 
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appointment authority for Grade 19 rested with the Nazim, for Grade 18 rests with the 
DCO, and for Grade 17 with the EDO (LGO 2001). However, although the EDOs report 
to the DCOs, their promotions and transfers are determined by the provincial 
governments. External influence over postings and transfers comes from two sources: 
provincial headquarters and Members of National (MNA) and Provincial Assemblies 
(MPA). Hence, LGs had limited financial and administrative autonomy and the role of 
central and provincial governments remained influential in key decisions.   
The focus of the service delivery reforms was to have a decentralized organizational 
structure giving managers operational and financial autonomy, user involvement, focus 
on PIs, political and managerial accountability models. The organizational and 
document analysis revealed that both the Education and Water and Sanitation (WSS) 
sectors were delivered by the provincial governments before the local government 
reforms. Under the local government ordinance, both of these functions were devolved 
to the local government and policy making and oversight was left to the provincial and 
federal government. Both sectors had the freedom to prepare their own annual 
development plans, prepare budgets and spend them according to their needs.  
Across sectors, the Education Department was devolved to CDG and transferred 
considerable administrative and financial autonomy (see Table 10-2, p: 326) compared 
to the WASA. The organizational survey (Table 7-2, p: 210) also highlighted that the 
Education Department had more financial autonomy over budget execution and 
resource mobilization and less over resource allocation. The interviews with the 
managers of the Education Departments corroborated that they had more financial 
autonomy than administrative autonomy (Section 10.5, p: 332). The reason for less 
autonomy in resource allocation was that this was further delegated to schools to 
identify their needs and the resources they wanted. The Education Department was 
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using a school based budgeting approach. Therefore, schools became more autonomous 
as they prepared their own budget. The Head teachers also had the powers of Drawing 
and Disbursing officers and releasing teachers' salaries. It also gave them a mechanism 
to manage the performance of their staff. Once budget requests were submitted to the 
education department, the education department verified them and after approval, they 
were submitted to the District assembly. Once approved by the district assembly, the 
Education Department simply passed these allocations on to schools. That is why 
managers of education were of the view that they were more autonomous in budget 
execution and in case of dissatisfaction with a school’s performance, they could stop its 
funds. The researcher’s informal conversations with head teachers of schools during 
field visits found that they were autonomous over recruitment and career management 
of teachers (Chapter 9). Overall, the Education Departments enjoyed considerable fiscal 
autonomy and a need-based or school-based budgeting approach was used to prioritize 
the schools’ needs and allocate resources accordingly. Decentralization was able to 
decentralize decision-making authority to a large number of actors both horizontally and 
vertically (Mintzberg 1979). 
The Water and Sanitation Sector (WSS) was managed by semi-autonomous 
organizations known as WASAs in each district. However, it was placed under the 
control of the City District Governments (CDGs). The main impact on organizational 
restructuring was the change in the composition of the Board of Directors and the 
budget approval process. Overall, interviewees from WASA indicated less financial and 
administrative autonomy (Section 11.5, p: 384). The findings from the organizational 
survey also indicated that WASA had more administrative autonomy than financial 
autonomy (Section 7.2.1, p: 209). There were even variations in the amount of 
administrative autonomy, which WASA managers could exercise. For instance, CDGF 
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had significant administrative autonomy except for setting compensation, while CDGL 
only had significant autonomy over firing and transfers. The main issue faced by 
managers of WASA was limited financial autonomy. They were unable to revise its 
tariff structure. Under the LGO 2001, WASA was to be devolved to the TMA (2
nd
 tier 
of the LG) however, it was retained at the district level in five city districts of Pakistan 
because of the problems of manageability and other capacity issues at the TMA level 
(Section 11.2.1.3 , p: 381). It had undergone internal organizational restructuring under 
local governments. However, its managerial autonomy was severely hampered by its 
inability to raise the tariff structure. The WSS was devolved to local government. 
However, provincial governments maintained control by not allowing the transfer of 
technical staff transfer from its provincial department (HUD & PHED) to the district 
level and by controlling the tariff revision, which was under the constitutional 
arrangements a local government mandate.  
Overall, the research findings of this study indicate that authority over the local 
administration, budget preparation, recruitment, career management, pay policy and 
performance management was limited. It was also found that there was a reluctance to 
devolve control over personnel and financial management. Larbi (1998) and Russell, 
Bennett and Mills (1999) reported similar findings from other developing countries. The 
study also found that services which are politically sensitive such as WSS face more 
frequent interventions from politicians to control access and tariffs. The managerial 
autonomy in such organizations is subject to frequent political interventions as reflected 
in provincial governments’ efforts to control tariff revisions in the WSS.  
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12.2.3.2  Service Delivery Models 
According to the New Public Management (NPM) literature, the public sector is 
adopting various service delivery options ranging from direct provision, to contracting 
out and collaborative arrangements such as partnerships (Chapter 4). Contracting and 
collaborative arrangements require a different set of organizational arrangements. The 
literature on collaborative service delivery models explains that the key feature of 
collaboration is mutuality (joint decision-making and reciprocal accountability) and 
considerable attention should be given to the institutional environment, organizational 
structures and processes for managing inter-organizational relationships (IRO). It also 
emphasized that partnerships evolve over time through a process of “engagement, 
feedback, adjustment and reengagement” (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002, p: 12). 
The research found that service delivery organizations were collaborating with third 
sector organizations for service delivery. Two indigenous models of partnership 
emerged: the Adopt A School (AAS) system and the CPP. The researcher employed 
Sullivan and Skelcher’s (2002) continuum to identify the nature of collaboration. 
According to that continuum, AAS falls in the middle of the continuum as the mode of 
governance is formal MOU. CPP is the strongest form of partnership as a formal 
governing body was constituted for governing the partnership. Both partnership models 
(AAS and CPP) illustrate that there was some degree of formality and mutuality- such 
as the partners signed the MOU in both models. CPP also had a governing body to 
resolve conflicts and provide a smooth functioning of the partnership, whereas AAS 
partnership was managed through the PPP cell in CDGF. CDGL had no key person 
from the public sector to coordinate these partnership programs.  
There is a limited analysis of the Inter-organizational (IOR) dynamics between the 
public and private sectors and the factors that affect such collaborations (Batley 2011). 
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Therefore, the study focused on how the public sector managed its relationship with the 
private sector. The main issues examined were; the nature of partnerships, the 
management of IOR and the role of the institutional environment on the performance of 
such collaborations. In the education sector, the two main NGOs involved in AAS 
partnerships were CARE and ITA. However, the nature of partnership was quite 
different. The analysis of the MOU signed by these third sector organizations with the 
Education Department indicated that the MOU signed by ITA was more explicit in 
assigning roles and responsibilities among the partners compared to CARE. An analysis 
of these two organizations working with the public sector had indicated that absence of 
clear roles and responsibilities, leads to confusions and in turn coordination issues and 
confirms the findings of Roseanu (2000) and Thomson and Perry (2009).  
According to the ITA chairperson, the relationships are managed by ‘trust, shared 
approach and participatory decision making processes’ as well as by the formality of 
the MOU to ensure that the school and the Department Of Education agree to the 
clauses of the MOU which provide an elaborate institutional framework for managing 
the partnership. However, some disagreed with this view and stated that although the 
MOU did carry some instructions, there was no coordination between planning and 
execution (Interviewee-NGO [A]). This was more evident in the MOUs signed between 
CDGL and CARE. In the case of the Education Department (CDGL), the managers 
expressed that there was no element of joint decision-making and shared approach 
(Section 10.9.4, P:365). For CDGF, the relationships were managed through trust and 
the MOU. They also indicated that roles and responsibilities were very clear to them. 
One of the contributing factors to this enhanced coordination and trust was CDGF’s 
established PPI cell for the management of partnership initiatives. There was no prior 
history of distrust between the public and third sector as was the case of CDGL. 
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However, CDGL lacked an appreciation of the NGO- public sector relationship. CARE 
has worked with CDGL since 1999, when CDGL was a Metropolitan city under 
provincial control. However, so far, both partners were unable to overcome the element 
of distrust. Therefore, it can be inferred that the prior history of relationships is a 
significant element in generating trust (Batley 2011) and if both partners are not willing 
to adopt strategies to manage the trust deficit, it will remain there. In addition to this, as 
the MOU failed to establish partners' expectations and mechanisms of joint working, it 
led to a lack of role clarity among the managers and teachers of adopted schools which 
highlights the significance of a clear set of goals as a starting point for collaboration and 
fostering trust among the partners (Huxham and Vangen 2005).  
A comparison of the MOUs (CARE-Education Department & ITA- Education 
Department) also indicated that the word ‘collaboration’ was only mentioned in the 
MOUs signed by ITA with the public sector. Care adopted schools for a 10 year period 
and had their area managers for coordination with the public sector, however, there was 
no focal person appointed from the public sector to coordinate with the third sector 
regarding management of schools. The interviewees mentioned that in case of conflicts, 
they meet the area managers to sort out the issues. However, the managers seemed 
cautious to report anything against such large NGOs who are influential and well 
connected. Overall, there was no evidence of joint decision-making or a defined 
mechanism of coordinating in the CDGL-CARE model. The Education Department 
reflected variations with respect to their perception of partnership managements 
(Section 10.9, p: 358). Indeed, the partnership model adopted in Pakistan is different 
from the partnership literature as proposed in section (Section 4.4.2.2, p: 109). These 
are service delivery partnerships and differ from PFI. However, the element of 
mutuality was found in both forms with varying degrees and, much depends on the 
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NGO’s philosophy and the willingness of the public sector to engage with each other. 
NGOs in the education sector perceived that these PPP forms are emerging in the 
unique context of Pakistan. NGOs acknowledge that these are a weaker form of 
partnership but nevertheless a very structured and shared approach to service delivery. 
However, from the comparison of partnership models (CDGL-CARE, and CDGF-ITA), 
it can be inferred that the extent to which such partnership are of more collaborative 
nature in terms of joint decision making and accountability, depends on the commitment 
of both partners (Figure 10-3, p: 368).  
Partnerships have hidden costs in their interaction and communication exchange. This 
seems to be one of the reasons that public sector managers do not have incentives to 
commit themselves in the coordination of such projects. NGOs also reflected that the 
public sector did monitor or visit adopted schools as they lacked any intrinsic or 
extrinsic motive to engage in such activities. Another plausible explanation may be that 
as partnership needs new competencies such as effective communication to create 
shared purpose, understanding, empathy, networking, conflict resolution, creativity and 
innovation and the ability to build trust among partners (McGuire 2006) and Education 
Departments lacked such capacities to work with the third sector. 
The literature on partnership, particularly from a developing country context, 
highlighted the significance of the institutional environment in determining 
government-private sector collaborative arrangements (Batley 2011; Rose 2011). In this 
study the researcher found that the implementation tier plays the most significant role in 
the outcome of partnerships. NGOs also reflected that the district might not be very 
involved in the policy making process, as it was the operational tier. Therefore, it was 
very important for them to work jointly. It was found that the extent to which partners 
adopt a collaborative approach varies from district to district. In some districts, the 
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Education Department was very active, and the DCO and EDOs were fully engaged 
with the private partners. In these cases the outcomes of partnerships were better, 
decision making was shared and partners jointly monitored the progress of the adopted 
schools. Therefore, this study suggests that the commitment of the operational tier to 
such service delivery model is a very significant factor to make these choices work. If 
the implementation department or agency does not have any incentive or commitment 
to collaborative or market based service delivery models, these initiatives fail to realize 
their desired objectives. Therefore, there is a need to bring change in the commitment 
level of the implementation tier to achieve the intended outcomes.  
Overall, the provincial and the district tiers are the main players in the institutional 
environment. The management of inter-organizational dynamics between the partners is 
affected by frequent postings and transfers in the public sector. NGOs explained that in 
the public sector people keep on changing. Even the change of a personal assistant 
affects the relationship management dynamics. These key individuals were playing the 
role of boundary spanners in relationship managements. This confirms that boundary 
spanners are the key to managing inter organizational relationships (Williams 2002). 
Therefore, the frequent transfers of key individuals involved in collaborations affected 
the outcome of such project. NGOs have to initiate the process of negotiation and 
consultation from the beginning with the person newly appointed to the job. The level 
of involvement in a partnership depends upon the commitment level of each partner and 
even each individual involved. Even NGOs had varying levels of commitment in this 
process.  
The literature also highlighted that in developing countries like Pakistan there is an 
element of trust deficit between government and third sector collaborations (Bano 
2008). This study investigated this aspect and tried to understand why it remains a 
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problem. NGOs provided two different explanations. For the Head of  ITA, it was very 
convenient for the public sector to say there is a trust deficit as it gives the public sector 
a reason not to work on such projects:  
“the trust deficit between the institutions/schools and ITA narrows in no time 
but the departmental trust deficit and more so the provincial level is 
conveniently and painfully in a status quo mode, although the conversation or 
otherwise. Double speak is thus there by design to keep partners at bay” 
(Interviewee-Head of ITA). 
Another interviewee of an NGO (Interviewee-NGO representative) mentioned that the 
element of distrust was always there from the signing of the MOU to the execution of 
projects through public private partnership (Section 10.9.2, P: 358). According to him, 
sometimes NGOs adopt a large number of schools without securing any financial 
assistance. Afterwards, NGOs start looking for a donor. If NGOs are unable to find a 
donor, they cannot deliver the outcomes. The result is that the education department 
cannot see any visible change in the adopted schools. This is how dissatisfaction starts 
building up within the public sector. Another reason for poor service delivery outcomes 
in the adopted schools is that NGOs take up a large number of schools and expand 
themselves in many areas. Already there are gaps in the MOU. NGOs usually have one 
project team which is looking after all the projects. An increased number of projects 
also affect their performance. In addition to this, one of the interviewees highlighted:  
“We can have better outcomes of the partnership, if both parties are engaged in 
every phase of the partnership and there is a shared approach to problem 
solving, project implementation and its evaluation” (Interviewee-NGO 
representative).  
Overall, the study found that management of trust depends on the structures and 
processes employed by the public and private sector for joint working and the 
institutional environment as demonstrated in (Figure 10-3, p: 368).  
Compared to this, the Water and Sanitation Sector (WSS) partnership in CPP was a 
highly formal arrangement as not only MOU explicitly specified the roles and 
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responsibilities, financing, accountability and coordination mechanisms but also 
stipulated the formation of a governing body for joint decision making and coordination 
problems. According to the head of ASB, the basic ingredient of a partnership was 
‘trust’ and they resolved their conflict through dialogue. This was confirmed by WASA 
that overall projects were a joint collaboration characterized by joint decision making 
and joint accountability (Section 11.9.1, p: 408). ASB had the advantage of community 
mobilization and WASA had the advantage of technical skills. CPP was very close to 
the concept of “Co-production” (Brandsen and Pestoff 2006). Co-production refers to a 
process in which all the parties determine that they will provide resources and labour in 
the actual delivery of services (White and Robinson 1998). In CPP project all the 
partners - public sector, third sector and the community were jointly involved in 
determining the type of service to be produced (co-determination), and how much 
finance the public sector will be contributing and how much finance the community can 
raise for the project (co-financing).  
Bano (2011) highlighted that in the OPP project (in Pakistan) NGOs did not sign any 
formal contract with the Government or WASA and its strong feature was community 
embeddedness. However, in this study, the researcher found that the strong features of 
CPP modalities in CDGL were having a joint steering committee, the appointment of 
focal persons to coordinate the partnership and a formal MOU between the partners. 
These factors led to the fostering of a clear set of expectations and a higher level of trust 
among the partners. There were elements of joint decision making and accountability in 
CPP.  This study also found that institutionalization of these projects in terms of policy 
goals and departmental strategies significantly improved the success of such projects. 
For instance, ASB tried to work with WASA (CDGF) in 1994 in the Hassanpura 
community. At that time the CPP approach was not recognized at policy level and the 
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public sector signed no formal contract with the WASA (just like OPP). It was more 
like an informal community driven project; this led to mixed results regarding the 
success of that initiative. However, the CPP initiative in CDGL had the political and 
bureaucratic support, therefore resources followed. In addition to this, the success of 
CPP in CDGL further builds the trust of policy makers on such cost effective initiatives 
and the government allocated more fund in the annual development plans for CPP 
projects to improve water and sewerage coverage in communities which demanded a 
huge investment to link with WASA’s main system for water and sewerage provision. 
Even organizations were creating new structures. For instance WASA (CDGF) created 
a new post of ‘social mobilizer’22 a person with a background of social sciences for 
coordination between the community and WASA in projects like CPP. The creation of 
new roles and structures seemed to allow organizational commitment to improve 
organizational efficiency. Overall, partnership experiences in this study suggest that the 
management of IORs depends on the institutional environment, organizational strategies 
and the local context (Figure 10-3, p:  368, Figure 11-3, p: 417).   
The NPM literature has documented evidence of service management contracts in the 
Water and Sanitation sector. It also highlighted that the institutional environment, 
organizational capacity and resistance from various stakeholders are significant factors 
in determining the outcome of such initiatives (Larbi 1998; Russell, Bennett and Mills 
1999). This study also found that the WSS had a service management contract for 
billing and the collection of bills. Initial attempts to contract out in these services in 
CDGF were unsuccessful because of internal organizational resistance, a lack of 
capacity of WASA to monitor such contracts and the inability of the private sector to 
offer the outcomes. In addition, WASA adopted outsourcing in communities which 
                                                 
22
 This post will be function by July 2011. 
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were very poor and politically sensitive (Section 11.9.5, p: 418). Hence, this study 
found that not only the internal institutional environment such as organizational 
resistance and a lack of capacity to perform new roles (Larbi 2001; Russell, Bennett and 
Mills 1999) but also the local context such as the socio-demographic profile of the 
community (Batley 1996) is very significant for successful outcomes of contracting. 
The organization (WASA-CDGF) learnt from experience. Now, the contract has 
performance incentives and it would be easy to monitor the performance of the private 
sector (Walsh 1995). In addition to his, WASA (CDGF) has also appointed a focal 
person to look after the partnership projects.  
WASA agencies are trying to contract out certain support activities. However these 
initiatives are part of a national agreement with international donor agencies and the 
implementation tier is not involved in the policy making process. It is obvious that the 
internal work force of agencies feels that they are excluded from the planning process 
and therefore they are less committed and resisting these efforts. The interview with 
MD (WASA-CDGF) also highlighted that mostly policy process is a “behind- the- door 
process and the implementation tier is not involved in this process”. This nature of 
policy process in developing countries is also highlighted (Batley 2006). Overall, 
CDGL seemed satisfied with the outsourcing of bills and the detection of illegal 
connections. The main strategies for the management of such initiatives in CDGL were: 
the appointing of a focal person, outsourcing activities to more than one actor in 
different communities and a performance oriented contract. It would be advantageous to 
solve the issues of coordination between the partners, which may prove problematic in 
the future. Follow up interviews with the MD (WASA, CDGF) also revealed that the 
organization, learning from their previous experiences with contracting, created a new 
post for the coordination of CPP and contracting out initiatives.  
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The contracting out experience suggest that the public sector needs to take a cautious 
approach as contracting out brings new transaction costs like drawing up contracts, 
monitoring, and new roles of regulating and coordination such arrangements. So far, 
both WASAs are provided with support from the central agencies in drawing up 
contracts, whereas the rest of the roles are delegated to the implementation tier. 
Considering the weak organizational capacity in the design, monitoring, and 
coordination of contracts, internal organizational factors such as a shortage of skilled 
workers, a lack of a performance culture and internal organizational resistance can 
further affect organizational efficiency. On the other hand, collaborative experiences 
suggest the significant role of the local context, organizational commitment and 
strategies in determining the successful outcomes. The overall institutional environment 
in terms of Laws and Policies seems favourable, however, partnership remains a policy 
goal which lacks political and bureaucratic commitment. 
12.2.3.3 Accountability Model  
The NPM performance model stressed having clear Performance Indicators (PIs), a 
client focus, and accountability for performance. It has brought in a new regime of 
performance management systems ranging from agreed performance targets, clearly 
stated PIs, performance contracting, complaint procedures and consumer surveys to 
ensure who is doing what and how efficiently (Hughes 2003). The research found that 
in developing countries like Pakistan there are two parallel performance models, Annual 
Confidential Reports (ACRs) and the use of PIs. The most common way to assess 
performance was by writing ACRs. However, many of the managers in the Education 
Departments considered writing ACRs an ineffective and less robust mechanism to 
measure performance. They insisted that to have a performance based reward system, it 
is important to ensure accountability and better performance outcomes (references). 
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However, there were certain variations. The overall schools’ performance was assessed 
against clear PIs and schools were rewarded according to the performance outcomes 
(Section 10.7.3, p: 348).  
Likewise, WASA’s overall performance was assessed against clear PIs. However, there 
was no clear link how this information was actually utilized (Section 11.7.3.1, p: 396). 
Interviews from WASA (CDGF) highlighted that there were no given targets to achieve 
and therefore they could not be held accountable for any performance outcomes.  A 
similar theme was evident from CDGL. The reason behind poor performance 
management systems was a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities, as the 
individuals responsible did not know what was expected of them. Only the top 
management level, the Managing Directors of WASAs, were hired on performance 
contracting on a market based salary for a period of three years and their contract was 
renewed on the basis of performance. Therefore, this study found evidence of a weak 
performance culture in WASA.  
The organizational analysis section also verified that there were significant differences 
across sectors with respect to a performance model. It was evident that the Education 
Sector had a higher proportion of respondents indicating that they had a performance 
based reward system and individuals were rewarded on the basis of performance (Table 
7-6, p: 218). WSS was of the view that they did not have a performance based reward. 
Therefore, both interviews and survey findings validated that the Education Department 
had clear performance standards, and a performance based incentive structure. WASA 
showed a lack of both. PIs remained on paper. The organizations were collecting and 
compiling data against PIs at the request of international donor organizations such as the 
World Bank, however, there was no clear use of PIs internally in WASA. It seemed that 
the top management was not motivated to use PIs for their planning approach and was 
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just passing this information on to other organizations. The interview analysis revealed 
that along with traditional methods of performance assessments (writing ACRs), service 
delivery organizations were focusing on the attainment of PIs. However, ACRs are still 
the main mechanism for assessing performance and the incentive structure in not linked 
to performance, particularly in WASA. The focus is not on accountability for 
performance but accountability for compliance to rules and regulations.  
Public sector organizations were making an effort to improve their grievance 
procedures. The Education Department (CDGF) had Toll free numbers for complaints, 
and a biometric system to monitor employees’ attendance. Interviews from CDGL 
highlighted that they had an efficient grievance procedure. The organizational survey 
also validated interviews that the Education Department had efficient grievance 
procedures in both CDGs. Interviews from WASAs also highlighted that they had an 
efficient complaint cell. However, the organizational survey indicated that a higher 
percentage from CDGL felt that they had an efficient grievance procedure compared to 
WASA (CDGF).  
The managers of service providers are not only accountable for results; they also have 
to be accountable to multiple channels. Other accountability channels include political 
accountability, internal and external audits, financial management reporting systems, 
and monitoring committees. According to the LGO 2001, the DCO is accountable to the 
District Nazim. However, the relationships between these two players are more 
complex. A strong difference between these two roles could lead to serious 
consequences for LG performance. According to political representatives (Chapter 9) 
they enjoyed a very good working relationship until 2008. However, from the 
perspectives of the TMO of both CDGs, the relationship between bureaucracy and 
politicians was a characteristic of the history of LG in Pakistan, as briefly discussed in 
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Chapter 1. It can be argued that political representatives enjoyed a strong political 
accountability over the public officials until public officials considered their political 
heads legitimate and supported by the upper tiers of the government. However, the 
provincial governments centrally controlled transfers, promotions, and appointments of 
public officials. Local political heads had less control over the bureaucracy towards the 
end of the LG system. This is an example that the politics of central-local relations 
significantly affect LG performance (Crook 2003). 
The political perspective stresses the need for political accountability, whereby citizens 
can hold their representatives accountable. The managerial model of accountability adds 
a client focus. However, political accountability still exists, but managers are now 
accountable to the politicians and the public for the performance of their organizations. 
It is not only accountability for fairness and finances but also for performance (Hughes 
2003). The decentralization reforms were able to bring a change in the accountability 
model. Now managers of service delivery organizations are accountable to the 
administrative as well as the political heads of the LG who in turn are both accountable 
to the district councils. In this way both political and managerial accountability is 
established under the LG system. However to make managers accountable for 
performance, it is necessary to clearly specify what is expected of them by having clear 
performance indicators. One of the limitations found in service delivery organizations, 
WASA in particular, was the lack of having clear PIs with a link between performance 
and planning and then linking it to an incentive structure.  
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12.3 QUESTION 2 & 3: HAS DECENTRALIZATION BEEN ABLE TO 
IMPROVE INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT? HOW DO ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
AFFECT THE INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT? 
12.3.1 Political Perspective 
From the political perspective, local governments’ closer proximity to the people will 
enable them to make responsive local policies and people can hold them accountable in 
case of poor performance. The empirical studies have examined the relationship 
between participation and performance. This study assessed the performance of LG 
along three dimensions: responsiveness, user quality and effectiveness. The 
effectiveness of the decentralization reforms was assessed by comparing the objectives 
of the reforms set earlier in the Devolution Plan 2000 and the actual outcomes of the 
reforms. One of the goals of decentralization was to improve participation. It was 
assessed by examining the set of activities aimed at engaging with or influencing public 
institutions such as voting, contacting and pressurizing local representatives (Crook and 
Manor 1998). Young (In Goldsmith 1986) argued that local councillors’ accessibility to 
people is an important consideration for ensuring responsiveness and local councillors 
are more accessible to the community than nationally elected representatives. They are 
an important avenue for expressing local opinions and complaints. The study found that 
for political representatives, accountability to the electorate was the most significant 
mechanism to hold LG accountable. This was also shown in the frequency of contact 
with their community. Local councillors seemed to manage a high level of contact with 
their constituency and made an effort to solve local issues. The findings of the 
community survey also indicated that the community contacts their union councillors or 
Nazim more frequently than the other tiers of local, provincial or federal government 
(Section 8.2.1, p: 256) for reporting complaints or community problems. The open 
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ended responses of the community survey substantiate these findings. They emphasized 
that LG has been able to create awareness among people, the system is more transparent 
than before, and the overall attendance of local government employees has improved.  
However, there were some variations across CDGs. In case study 1, the City District 
Government Faisalabad (CDGF), the community survey indicated that the frequency of 
contact with the councillors was (Section 8.3.1.1, p; 283) significantly higher than in 
case study 2, the City District Government Lahore (CDGL). It is interesting to note that 
the community’s first point of contact is the union councillor compared to other tiers of 
government for their local issue or problem (Table 8-2, p: 258). It also confirms 
Beetham’s (In King and Stoker 1996) argument that in order to be responsive, 
councillors should regularly consult with communities in the local decision making 
process. The community survey found positive evidence of councillor’s regular 
consultations with the community to seek their input in development projects.  
One of the outcomes of enhanced participation is a change in the accountability 
relationship between elected representatives, the community and political 
representatives and the managers of service delivery organizations. Improved 
accountability arrangements are indicators to measure the process dimension of 
performance in this study (Table 4-4, Section 138, p: 138). This was examined by 
looking at the quality of the relationship between the general public and their 
representatives and public officials (Crook and Manor 1998). The community survey 
(Table 8-14, p: 284) highlighted that there were significant variations with respect to the 
level of satisfaction of community meetings with their councillors and public officials 
across CDGs. Indeed, both CDG indicated a high level of contact between 1) 
community and councillors and 2) community and public officials for their local issues, 
3) a high level of satisfaction with their meetings with the respective person and 4) the 
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majority of them found their dealings to be fair and honest in both CDGs. However, this 
level of satisfaction was significantly higher for CDGF than for CDGL.  
Similarly, more respondents from CDGF seemed to contact local government 
employees for their problems, were more often satisfied with their meetings and 
reported them as honest and fair in their dealings than CDGL. The change in 
accountability was also assessed by looking at community access to information, 
reporting of corruption incidents and complaints procedures. It was found that the 
majority of the respondents from both CDGs indicated that they had access to local 
government offices for information, reporting corruption incidents, and that there was a 
change in complaints procedures. The effect of improved accountability was that the 
community considered that their complaints were heard and that the attendance of LG 
employees improved. The statistical analysis section indicated a significant association 
between the improvement of employees’ attendance and the type of LG, and this was 
found higher for CDGF. The accountability dimension was also assessed in the 
organizational survey. It was found that monitoring committees were an effective way 
of improving organizational performance, which was opposite to findings of the 
community survey and perception of political representatives (Table 7-18, p: 232).  
The section of the community survey (Section 8.3.2, p: 288) measuring the overall 
performance of the LGs indicated significant differences across the two case study 
CDGs. It was found that these percentages were significantly higher for CDGF than 
CDGL. The respondents from CDGF indicated that decentralization significantly 
improved community participation and overall transparency of the system improved, 
reduced corruption and improved the attendance of employees. This illustrates that local 
governance is able to improve not only the level of community participation, but also 
has a significant impact on public accountability mechanisms.  
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Another measure of impact of participation on performance was to assess the 
responsiveness of the LG which was defined as the degree of congruence between 
community needs and their solutions (Fried and Rabinovitz 1980). To assess this 
dimension of performance (Section 8.2.6, p: 276), the community was asked to rate 
their local issues followed by the extent LG was able to resolve these issues. The 
respondents from both CDGs indicated that to some extent local government has been 
able to solve these issues. Overall, respondents from both CDGs also indicated that LG 
service delivery performance was a little better than the pre-post devolution. However, 
no significant association was found with respect to pre-post devolution performance or 
responsiveness of LGs across the CDGs. Clearly, respondents from both CDGs were of 
the opinion that the CDGs are more responsive and the system is ‘a little better’ than the 
pre devolution arrangements.   
The interviewee analysis section with the political heads of local government illustrated 
two clear periods of local governance: 2001-2008 and 2008-2010. The first election of 
local government was held in 2001 when newly elected local authorities started their 
first tenure. In the beginning, there were problems regarding getting familiarized with 
the new system.  The federal government organized training programs for councillors to 
build their capacity. However, the system had the strong support and commitment of the 
federal and provincial governments at that time. The political heads’ perception 
regarding ‘to what extent they could exercise influence in policy making processes’ was 
that they considered themselves fully empowered to make decisions. For instance, 
CDGF’s efforts on the organizational restructuring of local authorities, initiatives such 
as a performance based budgeting system, improving the complaints procedure by 
having toll free numbers, biometric attendance, streamlining information management 
systems and facilitation in CCB are evidence of the LG's desire to bring change and 
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improve service delivery frameworks. The political perspective also advocates that local 
government offers avenues for experimentation and innovation (Goldsmith 1986). The 
research findings support this argument. The LG provided an opportunity to look for an 
indigenous solution to local problems and in this pursuit local government tiers were 
found collaborating with each other to solve the problems requiring a collaborative 
approach (Section 9.3.1.1, p: 299). 
Crook and Manor (2003) have explained the significance of central-local relations in 
determining local government performance. They argued that the political commitment 
of central government in the form of funding and the local government commitment to 
implement pro-poor policies with the support of local employees and social activists, 
were significant variables for the successful outcome of decentralization in west Bengal 
and Brazil. This study found that the central government commitment to 
decentralization reforms was significant in the implementation of decentralization 
reforms. After the 2008 National and Provincial Assembly elections, local 
representatives felt they had less autonomy to make decisions as the newly elected 
federal and provincial government were not in favour of LG and considered it as the 
brainchild of the Martial Law regime. This situation resulted in a lack of support and 
commitment from the upper tier of the government for the LGs during the period 2009-
2010. It subsequently had an adverse effect on LG autonomy both administrative and 
fiscal. Therefore, in the 2009-2010 local government budgets, CDGL allocated no funds 
for new development schemes. Both CDGs expressed that the provincial government 
also froze local government accounts and was reluctant to transfer the funds generated 
from LG’s Own Source Revenues. Another impact was on the accountability of public 
officials to the political heads and the relationship between the senior bureaucracy and 
political representatives. As these senior officials were appointed by the provincial 
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government and their career management was also determined by the upper tiers of LG, 
their loyalty remained to the provincial governments from 2008 onwards.  
Against this backdrop, interviewees felt that before 2008 they were more autonomous 
and had a better accountability relationship with public officials. However, 
marginalized groups were less influential in the policy making process. It subsequently 
led to elite capture (Blair 2000; Crook 2003; Olowu and Wunsch 2004) as it affected the 
allocation of development funds to those who were either in opposition or belonged to 
marginal groups, such as females. Therefore, party politics were significant not only at 
the upper tiers of government, but also at the LG tiers, particularly in the allocation of 
funds. These findings support the argument that to fully understand the performance of 
local government, it is necessary to pay attention to the politics of decentralization 
reforms (Crook 2003). 
The organizational survey of selected sectors also provided evidence of enhanced 
participation and its significant impact on improving organizational performance (Table 
7-3, p: 213). The findings of the organizational survey suggested both CDGs had high 
levels of community or user involvement in service provision. However, a higher 
proportion of managers from CDGL reported not only the significant level of 
community participation, but also a significant impact of this participation in 
organizational performance. The organizational survey also revealed that monitoring 
committees were playing an effective role in improving organizational performance. 
However, the community survey and political analysis did not find these committees 
playing an active role and only the school councils were found active. Overall this study 
supports the argument that there is a link between improved participation, better 
accountability arrangements and improved performance (Section 2.5.2, p: 43).  
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12.3.2 New Public Management Perspective (NPM) 
As mentioned at the beginning, it is very difficult to give a precise answer to this 
question. This study assessed performance through the perceptions of key stakeholders 
(internal and external). Internal assessment was based on the key stakeholders’ 
perception of reform outcomes in terms of improved managerial autonomy, 
participation, the accountability model and institutional factor that may affect the 
performance of service delivery organizations. In addition to this, archival data on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of organizational performance was collected. There were 
considerable achievements in the education sector since the LG reform. The main 
performance outcomes included: an active role of School Councils, greater autonomy of 
schools and the Education Department, clear performance indicators and involvement of 
the private sector. These changes significantly improved organizational performance in 
terms of transparent utilization of funds, improved attendance of teachers and reduced 
number of ‘Ghost schools’ (Section 10.7, p: 340). Furthermore, teachers were recruited 
on merit and their qualifications were improved. This was also validated by the 
community survey. It indicated improved access to education, satisfaction with the 
quality of service provision, and the education service delivery improved after the LG 
system. There were variations across LGs with respect to access to schools, and 
improved attendance of teachers. It was much better in CDGF compared to CDGL.  
Prior to devolution, one of the most common problems in the Education sector was the 
presence of ‘ghost schools’ and ‘ghost teachers’. The interview analysis of the 
Education Departments and the community survey supported the findings that these 
practices were considerably reduced as a result of monitoring committees, an active 
community and the presence of local councillors. The City District Government budget 
also revealed that education was given priority in the development budget. CDGF was 
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receiving federal and provincial tied grants for education and took several initiatives at 
the local level to improve the education service delivery. On the other hand, CDGL had 
no provincial and federal grants and allocated the major share of its budget to education 
from its own revenues (Section 9.5.1.1, p: 314), Ministry of the Education report (2007) 
also indicated that CDGL provided funds to the education sector from its source 
revenues. It also indicates that as CDGL was the provincial capital, it had better Own 
Source Revenues (OSRs) than CDGF.  
Water and Sanitation Agency in CDGL had shown some improvements in WSS 
performance since 2006 (Table 11-4, p: 397), and the performance of WASA, CDGF 
had shown improvements in WSS coverage, metered consumption of water, improved 
network performance, and quality of service provision (Table 11-3, p: 393). The 
organizational survey also indicated that managers of WASA comparing pre-post 
devolution performance perceived that the performance was better under decentralized 
arrangements. Archival data indicated that although organizations were able to perform 
better on the effectiveness indicators such as improved WSS coverage and reduced 
number of complaints. However, the efficiency indicators revealed a poor performance 
of these organizations. These organizations were hardly able to meet their operational 
costs because of Non-metered connections and consequently low collection efficiency. 
Another reason of poor collection efficiency and on metered connection was corrupt 
practices. To improve the collection efficiency and detect illegal connections, 
organizations outsourced these activities to the private sector. It is interesting to note 
that NPM type reforms were not initiated in the developed countries to control 
corruption, on the contrary at times they were criticized for promoting corruption (Lane 
2000). The developing countries experience with reforms such as outsourcing suggest 
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that they are undertaken with various motives such as the influence of the donor, 
controlling cost and even corruption as in the case of WASA in this study.  
The findings of the community survey also indicate that the overall community access 
to WSS improved after the LG system was introduced. However, the community level 
of satisfaction was higher for water provision than for the sewerage system. There was 
also a significant association between improved access and satisfaction level with the 
type of CDG. It was found that improved access and satisfaction level for water 
provision was higher for CDGL than for CDGF. One of the reasons (Table 8-8, p: 269 
and Table 8-9, p: 270) for these differences may be that much of the development work 
in Lahore was completed in WSS, but in CDGF most of the development work was still 
in progress. Likewise, communities from CDGL seemed less dissatisfied with the 
sewerage coverage than from CDGF. It was also interesting to note that WASA 
performance of CDGF (Table 11-3, p: 393 ) indicated that complaints about WSS 
reduced from 2006 to 2009, which was validated by the community survey findings, 
where the majority of respondents from CDGF indicated their satisfaction with the 
complaints procedures (Table 8-9, p: 270).  
As referred in sector analysis (Section 11.9.1, p; 408) partnership can be assessed by 
focusing on the process indicators- level of engagement and commitment of partners 
(Sullivan and Skelcher 2002), clear purpose and need for partnership, high level of trust 
(Harrison 1999), accountability arrangements (Amery 2000), and also a focus on 
outcome indicators- efficiency and effectiveness (Burch, Borland 2001). By employing 
both, we can have a true picture of performance. As far as the outcomes of service 
delivery techniques such as AAS and CPP were concerned, it cannot be said precisely 
how much the performance targets were achieved. One limitation was lack of 
comparable data to draw any generalization.  
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However, efficiency data were available on CPP alone. According to the efficiency 
indicators, the CPP project ensured 24/7 hours water supply compared to 6-7 hours 
intermittent water supply through public sector provision. There was no non-metered 
water compared to the public sector which is facing the biggest issue of non-revenue 
water. Interviewees also suggested that an overall partnership was an outcome of trust 
and a clear set of goals and increased transparency in project delivery. Another success 
of this project is increased trust in the public sector to initiate such arrangements and 
acknowledgement in the water and sanitation agencies' official goals that such 
initiatives should be the part of the annual development plan (Interviewee-9, Director 
(WASA), CDGL; Head of ASB). Faisalabad district has initiated such project with the 
same NGO. While, AAS showed mixed outcomes against process indicators. In case of 
AAS model between CARE-CDGL, there was no element of joint decision making, 
reciprocal accountability and clear goals. While ITA-CDGF, had clear goals, shared 
decision making and reciprocal accountability. As far as the contracting out of billing, 
its distribution and the collection of bills is concerned, WASA (CDGL) was optimistic 
and if successful, intends to outsource the operation and maintenance of tube wells. On 
the other hand, WASA (CDGF) had devised a new strategy based on previous 
experiences and it will take time to show any results.  
The organization had a mix of vertical (provincial oversight and audits) and horizontal 
accountability arrangements (local council monitoring committees, local council itself, 
political heads). The organizational surveys revealed that internal audits and grievance 
procedures were more effective in both Education Departments and in WASA (CDGF) 
and less effective in WASA (CDGL). On the other hand, the interviews with the 
managers of WASA in CDGL indicated that the internal audit was transparent and 
financial rules were very clear to them. One of the reasons for the ineffective grievance 
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procedure may be that WASA (CDGL) was restructuring its complaints procedures 
providing users with toll free numbers and an SMS facility and WASA (CDGF) already 
had a toll free number.  
The organizational survey and interviews with the managers of the Education 
Department indicated that managers seemed less satisfied with the external audits, 
provincial monitoring teams and financial management rules. They also highlighted that 
they had multiple and overlapping accountability channels (Section 8.3.1.2, p: 284). The 
interviewees from the Education Department highlighted that they were less clear 
regarding financial management rules, particularly schools lacked capacity to prepare 
their budgets, and at times they could not utilize all of their funds because of the fears of 
audit objections. The interview data and organizational survey highlighted that 
respondents from WASA also indicated that they had multiple overlapping 
accountability channels and the result was loss of productivity. Regarding financial 
management reporting, CDGL was of the view that they had clear financial guidelines 
than CDGF which indicated that financial rules were not very clear to them (Section 
7.4.3.3, p: 252). The main concern in WASA was the lack of PIs and a performance 
based reward structure clearly reflected in the key themes as well (Table 7-21, p: 235), 
which was greatly affecting their performance. On the other hand, the Education 
Department had better accountability arrangements and subsequently reported a 
significant positive impact on performance outcomes (Figure 10-4, p: 375).  
Overall, political analysis, sector analysis and the organizational survey indicated 
satisfaction with the internal auditing practices and dissatisfaction with the external 
auditing practices describing them as unfair and corrupt. The organizational survey, 
interviews with the political representatives and managers of service delivery 
 473 
 
organizations has emphasized that there is change in the accountability relationship and 
the system has become more transparent than before.  
12.4 Q4. WHAT ARE THE INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE 
LINK BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL 
PERFORMANCE? 
The political perspective identified many constraints that affected local government 
performance (Table 2-4, p: 48). Three explanations dominated: lack of adequacy of 
resources, lack of accountability and insufficient fiscal decentralization (Section 2.6, p: 
61). The study found that these three factors are dependent on the commitment of 
provincial and federal government to the LG system. As lack of commitment of these 
two tiers not only had an adverse effect on the flow of resources - both financial and 
technical, it also affected the bureaucratic commitment as it was contingent on the level 
of commitment expressed by federal and provincial governments. The history of LG 
reforms in Pakistan has seen political and bureaucratic resistance (Cheema, Khwaja and 
Qadir 2005; Paracha 2003). Democratically elected federal and provincial governments 
considered LGs a threat to their political base and a brain child of the Martial Law 
regime. Therefore, once in power, the political parties tended to marginalize the role of 
LGs and promised to hold LG elections. To date, after the end of the second tenure of 
local government in Pakistan, the High Court instructed provincial governments to hold 
local body elections, but the provincial governments are using delaying tactics
23
. The 
Punjab provincial government approved the ‘Local Government Bill 2012’, and 
proposed to hold a non-party election. However, no election has taken place so far
24
. 
Likewise, during this period, appointed administrators (civil servants) are running the 
administration of the District governments. Therefore, politicians and bureaucrats are 
                                                 
23
 http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/179345/ 
24
 http://tribune.com.pk/story/386808/local-bodies-punjab-cabinet-decides-to-hold-elections-on-non-
party-basis/ 
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the two main groups that affect local governments. At the LG level, the most significant 
factor was the coordination among tiers of LG and the need for an integrated planning 
approach to avoid the waste of resources (Section 9.4.2, p: 310). Considerable efforts 
were visible in CDGF to avoid the duplication of resources by having a GIS network, 
HRMIS, and a performance based budgeting system (Section 9.5). However, these steps 
were in early stages of operation. 
The public management perspective argued that a shift to devolve budgets through the 
creation of semi-autonomous organizations needs a break from the traditional 
hierarchical control (Walsh 1995). Research from other developing countries suggested 
that agencies had no real power on personnel management and a centralized control 
remains the main barrier to the autonomy of local managers (Russell, Bennett and Mills 
1999). This study found similar evidence of centralized control over administrative 
autonomy in both sectors. The provincial government restrictions over recruitment were 
the main impediment to hiring new staff to fill the vacant posts in WASA. The studies 
on performance contracting suggested that these contractual models depend on the 
separation of politics from day to day operations (Batley and Larbi 2004; Larbi 2001). 
This study found that the autonomy of the service delivery organization is mainly 
affected by political and bureaucratic interference. It also depends on the skills of the 
head of the organization and how well he is able to establish control over the 
organization and take on board all the stakeholders to achieve the goals of the 
organization. For instance, Managing Directors of WASA were appointed on 
performance contracting. However, the MD (WASA) in CDGL was facing more 
political and bureaucratic interference on the day-to-day operations and was of the view 
that he had no real power. On the other hand, the MD (WASA) in CDGF was able to 
exert more influence on the policy making and implementation process. One of the 
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reasons may be that CDGL was the provincial capital of Punjab and more politicized. 
This research found the organizations lacked the capacity for corporate planning and 
information management system (Larbi 2001; Russell, Bennett and Mills 1999). 
However, it does not support the argument that increased autonomy is linked to 
increased corruption (Batley and Larbi 2004; Nickson 2008). The managers and 
community were of the view that the overall system was able to reduce corruption as it 
is more transparent than before. The managerial perspective on the factors that affect 
institutional performance also indicated that governance issues such as political and 
economic instability had a significant impact on institutional performance.  
The Sector analysis (Chapter 10) illustrated that managers of the education departments 
perceived political and bureaucratic interference as the main constraints on their 
managerial autonomy. The organizational analysis also confirmed that Education 
Department faced more political and bureaucratic interference than the WASA (Table 
7-12, p: 225). Other significant variables were lack of consistency in policy 
implementation and coordination among different tiers of the government (Table 7-11, 
p: 224). However, there were variations across sectors and CDGs. For instance, the 
Education Department (CDGL) reported frequent political and bureaucratic 
interference, while the Education Department (CDGF) reported infrequent political or 
bureaucratic interference. On the other hand, respondents from WASAs reported 
frequent political interference and less frequent bureaucratic interference compared to 
the Education Departments. One interesting element was the local context. It was very 
significant in education sector compared to WASA (Table 7-13, p: 226). This study 
found local contingencies were very significant in determining the performance of 
schools in local communities (Figure 10-4, p: 375). Water and Sanitation Agencies were 
more concerned with their internal organizational issues such as adequacy of resources 
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(Table 7-20, p: 234). The interview analysis also supported the view that WASA had 
inadequate human, financial and technical resources. The Water and Sanitation sector 
highlighted that the institutional capacity, political support and leadership of an 
organization were critical factors in determining the institutional performance of these 
agencies. Interviews emphasized that planning cannot be done in isolation. It required 
taking on board the political leadership, the management of the organization and other 
stakeholders.  
Overall, the Sector analysis revealed that WASAs had a weak internal and an external 
institutional environment, weak accountability arrangements, and a weak socio-political 
context compared to the Education Department (Figure 11-4, p: 424). The Education 
Department, besides having a weak external institutional environment, had a strong 
local context, a better internal institutional environment, and a better accountability 
system. Therefore, it can be argued that the nature of the outcome of service delivery 
improvements depends on the context.  
12.5 CONCLUSION 
This research adopted an integrative approach to understand the link between 
decentralization and service delivery performance. The political perspective explained 
that local democracy was able to give citizens a voice in local policy making processes 
and local policies were more reflective of local needs. It also suggested that once local 
communities realize that local government is delivering its promises, they become more 
actively involved in solving their local problems. It also establishes that as local 
councillors have social ties with the community, and live in close proximity to the 
people, the community can hold them accountable if they do not perform well. 
However, the socio-political context is very significant in local government 
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performance. The fiscal perspective provided an understanding that if a local 
government is not fiscally autonomous, it can undermine the financial resources and in 
turn the performance of local government. The LG in Pakistan was given a less 
powerful tax bases however, the IGFTs largely consisted of block grants, with no 
conditions attached. This spending autonomy was reflected in LG’s allocations to 
increased development work. The spending patterns suggested that local governments 
were trying to allocate more funds to their policy objectives such as Education, 
infrastructure development and water and sanitation sectors. The key themes in the 
community survey also indicated that more development work is undertaken during LG 
system.  
The public management perspective provided an understanding of the mechanics of 
local service delivery and put forward the thesis of examining local contingency factors. 
Decentralization reforms under the NPM perspective consisted of structural 
decentralization, performance culture and a mix of service delivery techniques. The 
public sector in developing countries like Pakistan provide evidence that it is focused 
more on structural decentralization and less on delegation of operational and financial 
autonomy. There is also some evidence of competitive decentralization (Pollitt, Birchall 
and Putman 1998) in the form of contracting out, and collaborative models such as 
CPPP and AAS. The research also found evidence of PIs in both sectors, though more 
rhetoric and less reality. The performance model varied across sectors, the Education 
Departments talking more of PIs, WASA less about the use in their organizations. The 
scale of competitive decentralization and partnership models is also limited to certain 
activities. The NPM literature has already suggested that political and bureaucratic 
commitment is a necessary condition to implement reforms. This study found similar 
finding, that there are two main players - politicians and bureaucrats, who may lose in 
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this process; therefore, there is always room for manoeuvring to retain vested interests. 
Politicians are not committed to relinquishing their control over local democracy, nor 
are central agencies letting local managers manage and develop their organizational 
capacities. Where local governments have a certain amount of autonomy, they are 
trying to improve service delivery.  
The study also found that organizations did not have the capacity to design contractual 
arrangements and lacked skilled staff to monitor and coordinate such activities. 
However, within these limitations and learning from experiences, they are adapting their 
organizations to manage these contractual arrangements in a coordinated manner. 
Furthermore, as mostly the policy making process does not involve the implementation 
tier, this centralized planning approach was creating more organizational inefficiencies. 
The study found that the extent to which the collaborative forms represented joint 
decision-making and reciprocal accountability is dependent on the organizational 
commitment of both partners. The study confirms that an informal understanding and 
commitment supplanted with formal institutional arrangements is a key to sustain such 
projects over time (Thomson and Perry 2006). In addition to this, this study contributes 
that the implementation level is the most significant in making these collaborative 
models work. Overall, it is evident that partnerships evolve over time. Partners, through 
engagement and re-engagement, overcome their differences, find strategies for better 
coordination and try to work together for successful outcomes. However, it depends on 
the willingness of the partners to work together.  
The public management perspective argued that developing countries should not 
undertake NPM type reforms as NPM needs a traditional bureaucracy in order to 
succeed (Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg 2007). On the other hand, Polidano (1999) claims 
that developing countries already have an abundance of rules and procedures resulting 
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in delays, nepotism and duplication. The study found that countries like Pakistan have a 
strong bureaucracy and suggests that centralized planning and bureaucratic layers are 
unable to deal with the inefficiencies of the public sector. There is a need to bring 
change in the developing countries public sector paradigm, delegating more 
responsibilities to the local level and more efforts should be focused on building the 
capacities of the local governments.  
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CHAPTER 13  
CONCLUSION  
13.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concludes the thesis and sets out the contribution of the research to 
knowledge and theory.  
13.2 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis has made three contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it recognises the 
significance of adopting an integrated multi-perspective approach as a means to 
understand the complexities inherent in the link between decentralization and 
institutional performance. Secondly, it adopted a holistic research methodology to study 
the relationship between decentralization and institutional performance. Thirdly, it 
offers empirical evidence regarding the phenomenon of decentralization in developing 
countries like Pakistan.  
13.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE: THE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
This thesis adopted an integrated layered conceptual framework, layered in the sense 
that each perspective on decentralization added insight to the other, but, only focused on 
one aspect of decentralization. Taken as a whole, these perspectives have a more 
holistic approach to studying decentralization reforms in developing countries like 
Pakistan. Each of these perspectives was explored around core themes - participation, 
autonomy, accountability and performance. Each perspective had their own way of 
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‘seeing’ and ‘explaining’ the phenomenon of decentralization and subsequently 
different ways of accounting for the link between decentralization and performance. In 
this way each perspective offered a valuable insight on decentralization, however, each 
focusing on one aspect at the expense of others. This also suggests that each perspective 
has their own explanatory power, but when taken together, they offer a more inclusive 
approach to understand the problem of service delivery framework. This multi-
perspective approach is therefore a significant contribution to the study of 
decentralization.  
In order to provide a more holistic view of decentralization reforms and its impact on 
performance, this study based its analysis on multiple levels – policy level and 
implementation. By doing so, this study argued that although the focus of analysis is on 
public sector management, however it cannot be separated from the politics of the 
public sector. Therefore, this study adopted an integrated approach by combining 
political, fiscal and new public management perspectives in a layered manner: the 
political and fiscal analysis of local government provided the assessment of local 
government autonomy and in a way the context within which the public sector is 
operating and the NPM perspective analysed how the public sector in a developing 
country were engaged in the delivery of services. The research findings of this study 
assert that the problem of service delivery is not the problem of a particular level, and it 
cannot be explained through one perspective, rather it can only be explained if all these 
perspectives are pulled together. In this way it has highlighted the significance of the 
integrated model (Figure 4-4: p. 131), as proposed in chapter four, for the study of 
decentralized service delivery arrangements. However, whilst the conceptual framework 
has provided the base for this research project and has been empirically tested, it needs 
to be tested and explored through further studies to establish its explanatory power. 
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13.4 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE: THE RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
Mostly, studies on decentralization use a case study approach employing semi-
structured interviews and document analysis as the main data collection techniques. The 
studies from the Political perspective rarely employ a survey to assess the community 
perception of decentralization reforms and local government performance. The most 
comprehensive assessment was done by Crook and Manor (1998). While, studies of the 
fiscal decentralization perspective relied on GFS data (Huther and Shah 1998), only 
Faguet (2004) examined the link between fiscal decentralization and responsiveness by 
applying a quantitative research methodology and assessing the change in resource flow 
and the pattern of public investments based on the indicators of need (literacy and 
illiteracy rates, population with water and sewerage facilities). Studies using the New 
Public Management perspective typically used the case studies as the main research 
methodology to study NPM reforms (Batley and Larbi 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2000). To redress the deficiencies of the previous research, this thesis developed a 
holistic methodology in the tradition of naturalistic paradigm. In order to be more 
objective and rigorous, the study adopted a mixed method strategy combining 
qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. The idea of mixed method 
research itself is not unique and has been used in literature, but the way the research has 
combined qualitative and quantitative techniques in this research embedding them in 
naturalistic philosophy is unique. By developing a research methodology in which to 
embed the conceptual framework and empirical research, this thesis has made a 
significant contribution to the existing knowledge of decentralization and institutional 
performance.    
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13.5 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
FINDINGS 
13.5.1 Political Perspective  
The political analysis of local government reforms was based on examining the 
relationship between enhanced participation, improved accountability arrangements and 
responsive service delivery. In order to assess the main relationship between these 
variables, this study conducted document analysis and semi-structured interviews to 
assess the devolution of reform to local government and the perceptions of political 
heads of the local government, in particular what they considered ‘how effective local 
representatives were in local decision making processes, effectiveness of the public 
engagement mechanisms such as CCB, School Council, the value of  oversight 
committees, accountability arrangements’, and the perception of political representative 
regarding performance improvement. A community survey was conducted at grassroots 
level to examine the direct and indirect mechanisms of participation. This was linked to 
the institutional performance of the local government in terms of improved 
participation, responsive service delivery and improved accountability of the local 
government system. Overall, political representatives had a greater scope for policy 
making and its implementation and enjoyed good accountability relationships with 
public officials. Direct mechanisms for public engagement met with mixed results as 
only school councils were found to be effective in improving the quality of education 
provision, transparency funds utilization and monitoring performance of schools. 
However, the socioeconomic profile of communities found most significant variables in 
the effective outcomes of School councils. The CCBs suffered from procedural 
complexities, besides local governments’ endeavours to facilitate communities and 
allocate budget to CCB schemes. It was found most effective in raising finances for 
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sewerage and street construction projects. Overall, the evidence of its effectiveness was 
mixed. The role of oversight committees also remained ineffective, largely because of 
local representatives’ lack of interest in making these councils effective either because 
they could not devote much of their time to such activities or because they considered 
that these committees were just representative or consultative bodies lacking any real 
authority to bring change. The political elites were of the opinion that the system was 
able to deliver services in a more responsive manner than before. Certain institutional 
factors were highlighted as concerns, such as a lack of coordination among tiers of 
government, fiscal autonomy and the lack of political commitment to local government 
reforms particularly in the second tenure of local government (2006-2010).  
Besides less administrative capacity and financial resources, there were examples of 
joined up government or networking approach as referred to in the new public 
management perspective. There were some issues of re-centralization of powers, 
particularly with respect to the water and sanitation sector.  There was a lack of 
coordination not only among the local government; it was also affecting the 
development projects.  
One of the main outcomes of decentralization reforms was wider a participation of the 
community and the resolution of conflicts at the local level. The sector analysis also 
highlighted that the community was more involved in financing, delivery and 
monitoring of services; and community participation had significantly improved the 
organizational performance of these sectors. The findings from the community survey 
provided evidence that the local government system was able to improve participation, 
deliver a responsive service and increase transparency with levels of corruption reduced. 
Therefore, it can be argued that this study confirms the relationship between the main 
variables. This research contributes to the political perspective that the greater the 
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participation, the better will be the institutional performance of local government. 
However, this participation needs to be meaningful and local government should take a 
more inclusive approach to involve the community in service provision. It also validates 
the political perspective’s proposition that participation in itself is valued by the 
community. The community considers that local government enabled them to reach out 
to those who are involved in the decision making process and political representatives 
listen to their problems and try to solve them not only because they have close social 
ties with them, but also because their performance will win them the next election.  
13.5.2 Fiscal Perspective  
The research focused on assessing the nature of Inter-governmental Fiscal Transfers 
(IGFT) among the tiers of government to understand the nature of fiscal autonomy 
granted to local governments under the devolution plan 2001. Local governments were 
found to have less fiscal autonomy in terms of their own source revenue and there was a 
mismatch between expenditure assignments and revenue assignments. However, the 
design of IGFTs revealed that it had far more expenditure autonomy. It also had a 
transparent needs’ based formula and a predictable flow of funds from provincial to 
local governments through PFC. However as it was not given very buoyant tax bases, 
and therefore relied heavily on the provincial government. The result of this heavy 
reliance on IGFTs resulted in a lack of financial resources in the year 2010 which 
resulted in the non-allocation of district governments’ budgets to development funds in 
the fiscal year 2009/2010. 
13.5.3 Public Management Perspective  
The three main changes under the devolved arrangements were: organizational 
restructuring, performance focus and adoption of outsourcing and collaborative forms of 
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service provision (AAS & CPP) by the public sector. The impact of these reforms was 
assessed through an organizational survey to measure managers’ perceptions of 
decentralization reforms, including the internal and external factors that affected their 
performance and performance improvements. In addition, the semi-structured 
interviews were carried out to provide an in-depth insight into managers' perceptions. 
The sectors under local government were tanking up NPM type reforms such as 
collaborative forms of service delivery and contracting-out of support activities (billing 
& collection of bills to improve collection efficiency and detection of illegal 
connections to reduce Non-Revenue Water). The organizations focused on consumers 
as ‘clients’ and were trying to streamline their complaints procedures. User involvement 
was found more significant in School Councils and CPP projects.  
Managerial autonomy was constrained due to political and bureaucratic factors. 
Although, the performance culture has still not reflected the form as advocated by the 
NPM perspective, managers did use the term performance indicators. There was 
evidence of the use of PIs in both sectors; however, the Education Department was 
more performance orientated than Water and Sanitation Agencies. Overall, both of these 
organizations were not using performance data in their planning processes, highlighting 
a weak capacity for planning at the local level.  
The decentralization reforms brought a shift in the accountability model, as now the 
public sector was accountable to the administrative and political heads of the local 
government, who in turn were accountable to the district councils, and district councils 
were accountable to the public. The presence of different vertical and horizontal 
accountability arrangements improved their performance; however service delivery 
organizations highlighted certain issues such as lack of coordination and duplication of 
work.  
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This study also contributed to the partnership literature regarding “management of inter 
organizational relationships”. It highlighted that the management of inter organizational 
relationships is an interplay of organizational structures and processes (organizational 
strategies) adopted by both the public and private sector, and the institutional 
environment. This study also contributed to the contracting out literature by 
highlighting that besides weak capacity and internal organizational resistance much 
depended on how contracts were managed by the public sector, and local contingency 
factors. Managers of service delivery organization highlighted that their organizational 
performance was better after decentralization reforms; this was validated by the 
community survey. The community seemed satisfied with the water and sanitation 
sector and education provision to some extent.   
13.6 FUTURE DIRECTION FOR RESEARCH 
This study provided a comprehensive assessment of a decentralized service delivery 
framework in Pakistan and added to the existing literature on decentralization and 
performance. It is suggested that further research be undertaken in the following areas:  
 To conduct a community survey using a probability sampling approach over a 
larger community sample in order to have more robust findings.  
 There should be more research on the management of inter organizational 
relationship by comparing different service delivery models and by examining 
how they contribute to improvement of organizational performance.  
13.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Although the researcher has tried to ensure adequacy of conceptual and methodological 
contributions, a number of limitations have affected this study. Some of these 
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limitations were more or less inevitable; however, some of them can provide guidelines 
for future research:  
 The study was bound by time. Ideally, more case studies should have been 
included, at least one case study of all the five city districts of Punjab, Pakistan. 
The use of additional case studies would help to improve the external validity of 
research findings and generalize the case study findings to other contexts. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this research provided a comparison of the two 
largest cities of Pakistan, which have different socioeconomic profiles, and 
provided insight into the institutional performance of local government.  
 As mentioned in methodology chapter, due to the political situation in Pakistan 
and suicide bombings during the data collection period, there were access issues 
to the field sites. For instance, it was not possible for the researcher to obtain a 
larger community sample or to adopt a probability sampling approach due to 
security concerns  
 There was also a limitation regarding ‘performance’ data, therefore a direct 
comparison of performance was not possible. Likewise, the researcher could 
neither access CCB project details, nor NGOs records of adopted schools etc.  
 
The end. 
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LOCAL GOVERNEMNT 
Survey Questionnaire For The Public Officials 
Decentralization and Institutional Performance: the case study of Local Government 
Reforms 
 
My name is Seemab Ara Farooqi. I am a lecturer at the University of Punjab, Lahore. Currently, 
I am a PhD student at Stirling University, Scotland, UK. This research is part of my research 
degree. The data obtained and your responses to this questionnaire will only be used by 
University of Stirling for the purposes of academic research degree and no information provided 
will be attributed to any person in part or in full without the prior written consent. Thank you for 
participating in this study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date: --------------------------------- 
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
 
Target audience: Public officials grade 18-20 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE  
 
Please tick the relevant box 
 
Name of the organization  Education □                      WASA □ 
Name of the Respondents (Optional)                    
  
Department       Designation           
  
Qualification                    Tenure in the organization     
  
 
  Gender                   Male □        Female □ 
 
PART 1: Managerial Autonomy: 
This part of the survey is designed to assess the change in Managerial Autonomy/Discretion in 
financial and personnel management within your organization after decentralization reforms. 
 
Q1. How would you compare that Sub-National Authorities can exercise more discretion 
(power) after decentralization over the following aspects of personnel management and 
financial management? Score on the scale of 1-5, where 1 corresponds to not at all and 5 
indicates full discretion/autonomy discretion:  
 
Managerial 
autonomy 
No discretion Not significant 
discretion 
significant 
discretion 
very 
significant 
discretion 
Full  discretion 
Hiring of personnel  1  2  3  4  5 
Firing of personnel  1  2  3  4  5 
Promotion   1  2  3  4  5 
Transfers  1  2  3  4  5 
Setting 
compensation 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Career 
development  
 1  2  3  4  5 
Resource allocation  1  2  3  4  5 
Procurement   1  2  3  4  5 
Budget execution  1  2  3  4  5 
Resource 
mobilization 
 1  2  3  4  5 
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Part 2: Participation: This part of the survey is designed to assess the level of user 
involvement/community participation or citizen participation in service provision. 
 
1. Please identify the extent decentralization has been able to improve the community or 
user involvement in service provision? 
 
 Very Significantly  
 Significant    
 Not significant    
 No change   
 
2. Any example of user involvement in: 
 
Service provision         
Monitoring           
Financing          
3. Has user/community involvement improved your organizational performance? 
 Very Significantly  
 Significant    
 Not significant    
 No change   
Part 3: Institutional Environment: 
 
This part of the survey is designed to assess the internal organizational arrangement of service 
delivery organization with respect to personnel management, financial management, resource 
constraints, and political and bureaucratic support. 
 
A. Personnel Management and Financial Management  
 
1. Do your organizations hire people on the basis of:   
 Merit     
 Personal connection          
 Political connection      
2. Does your organization have a human resource information management system 
(HRMIS) containing records of employees?  
 
 Yes       □    No         □ 
3. Do you have an accounting information system in your organization?  
 
Yes       □    No         □ 
 
4. In your opinion, do you agree with the following statement with respect to written 
guidelines regarding personnel management on a scale of 1-1, where 1 corresponds to 
strongly disagree and 4 corresponds to strongly agree:  
 
Personnel management rules Strongly disagree Disagree Agree  Strongly agree 
The rules are simple for  
implementation 
 1  2  3  4 
The rules provide flexibility in 
implementation 
 1  2  3  4 
The rules are effective for 
personnel management 
 1  2  3  4 
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5. In your opinion, difficulties in hiring and retaining qualified staff affect organizational 
performance?  
 Not at all    
 Not significant   
 To some extent significant   
 Very significant  
  
6. Do you have a performance based appraisal system in your organization?  
Yes        □ No □ 
 
7. Does your organization have a system where performance targets are agreed to between 
employees and supervisors at the beginning of every year?  
 
 Yes       □    No         □ 
 
8. Does your organization perform an internal audit function?  
 
          Yes        □ No □ 
 
9. Is there any system of evaluating programs/projects implemented by your organization?  
 
Yes        □ No □ 
 
10. In your opinion, to what extent following aspects of financial management are 
performed fully, partially, or not at all? Please rate on a scale of 0-5, where 0 
corresponds to not at all and 5 in full whether these functions?  
 
Financial management functions Not at all Partially  Fully  
Budget preparation  1  2  3 
Procurement  1  2  3 
Budget execution  1  2  3 
Internal audit  1  2  3 
Preparation of end of year accounts  1  2  3 
 
  
11. How significant are the following factors in terms of resource leakage? Score on a rate 
of 0-5, where 0 corresponds to not at all and 5 corresponds to highly significant: 
 
Factors responsible 
for resource leakage 
Not at all Not 
significant 
significant Very 
significant 
Highly 
significant 
Unclear rules for 
financial accounting 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Lack of capacity to 
account for 
budgeting resources 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Weak internal and 
external auditing 
practices 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Weak sanctions 
against corrupt 
practices 
 1  2  3  4  5 
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B. Performance: 
This part of the survey is designed to identify the extent to which clear performance standards 
exist within the organization, and rewards are linked to the performance and your perception 
about performance improvements 
 
1. Are there documented work performance standards for each function in your 
organization?  
      Yes   □       No    □ 
 
2. Are targets or objective of performance clearly communicated to you?  
 Yes        □ No □ partially □ 
 
3. Are they generally achieved?  
      Yes    □        No   □ to some extent   □ 
 
4. In your organization how much importance is paid to the achievement of organizational 
objectives?  
 
 Very significant   
 Significant   
 Somewhat significant   
 Not significant at all  
  
5. In your organization to what extent your organization has achieved its 
mission/objectives?  
 
0-25%     □         26-50%    □         51-75%     □       76-100%    □ 
 
6. In your opinion, are individuals in your organization across all departments rewarded on 
the basis of performance? 
  
 Yes   □      No    □ 
 
C. External institutional factors 
This part of the survey is designed to assess the extent to which external institutional factors 
such as policy consistency/coordination between the provincial, federal and local government 
level, the extent of political and bureaucratic interference, governance issues and resource 
adequacy affect your organizational performance 
C (1). Policy coordination 
1. Agencies/departments get instructions and policies from different tiers of the 
government, some policies are consistent and some policies conflict with each other. 
Overall how do you rate this aspect of policy consistency?  
 Very consistent               
 More consistent         
 More inconsistent      
 Very inconsistent    
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2. To what extent lack of consistency in policies affects your performance? 
 Not at all     
 Not significant        
 To some extent significant        
 Very significant   
 
3. How often you disagree with the policies you are asked to implement?  
 
Often     □         occasionally    □        Rarely    □       Not at all     □ 
4. To what extent lack of coordination between different tiers of the Government affects 
your performance? 
 
 To a great extent   
 To some extent     
 Not at all       
C(2) Politcal & Bureaucratic Interference 
 
1. In your organization, how would you rate the incidents of political interference that exist 
in your organization?  
 
 Very frequent        
 Frequent          
 Infrequent       
 Almost never    
          
2. In your organization, how would you rate the incidence of bureaucratic interference from 
the upper tiers? 
 
 Very frequent   
 Frequent    
 Infrequent        
 Almost never  
 
C (3) OTHER INSTITUIONAL FACTORS  
 
1. How significant are the following aspects of governance that affect your organizational 
performance? Score on a rate of 0-5, where 0 corresponds to not at all and 5 corresponds 
to highly significant: 
 
Governance issues Not at 
all 
Not significant significant Very 
significant 
Highly 
significant 
Political instability  1  2  3  4  5 
Regime legitimacy  1  2  3  4  5 
Economic instability  1  2  3  4  5 
Lack of Political 
support 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Lack oF Bureaucratic 
support 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Lack of Supportive 
Local context 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C (4) Resource adequacy: 
To what extent your organizations have adequate/sufficient financial and human resources to 
provide an adequate level of service? Please answer on a scale of 0-5, where 0 corresponds to 
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completely inadequate/insufficient and 5 corresponds to completely adequate/sufficient. 
Adequacy of resources Completely 
inadequate 
Inadequate  adequate Completely 
adequate 
Adequacy of financial resources  1  2  3  4 
Adequacy of human resources  1  2  3  4 
Adequacy of technical resources  1  2  3  4 
Adequacy of infrastructure  1  2  3  4 
Part 4  (A) Accountability: 
This part of the survey is designed to assess the accountability arrangement within service 
delivery organizations. The focus is about accountability for performance, budget transparency 
and access to information. 
 
1. In your opinion, to what extent corruption is the significant problem of public sector as a 
whole?  
 
Very significant □  Significant □  Somewhat significant□  Not significant at all  □   
 
2. What would you say that, in your organization, corruption is;  
 
A very serious problem □      A serious problem □       A somewhat serious problem  □         
Not a serious problem at all □ 
 
3. How often the case of corruption has been reported to the public authorities?  
 
Almost always  □     Frequently  □    Occasionally □    Almost never □ 
 
4. Do you have clear guidelines regarding the budget preparation in your organization? 
 
Yes □  No □ 
 
5. Are these guidelines followed as:  
 
Fully □ Partially □ Not at all  □  
 
6. How easy is to access important records in your organization?  
 
Extremely difficult □ Very difficult □  Easy □  Very easy □ 
 
7. Have you ever met the association or groups of end users of the services produced by 
your organization? 
 
Yes □  No □ 
8. Are you obliged to share information, especially related to your organizational 
performance with them?  
 
Yes □  No □ 
 
 
9. Do you have an efficient customer complaint or grievance procedure in your 
organization?  
Yes □  No □ 
 
10. Do you have any information management system for budget transparency such as 
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accounting information system?  
Yes □  No □ 
 
11. How reliable is the information in your organization’s information management system?  
 
 Highly reliable    
 Moderately reliable   
 Partially Reliable    
 Not reliable  
 
12. Is your organization’s audit report presented to the local council/provincial/central 
committees?  
Yes □  No □ 
13. How effective is the internal audit in ensuring compliance to internal control system?  
 
 Ineffective 
 Partially effective 
 Effective 
 Very effective 
14. To what extent monitoring committees are playing an effective role in improving 
organizational performance? 
 Very Significantly  
 Significant    
 Not significant    
 No change   
 
15. To what extent multiple overlapping accountability arrangements affect your 
performance? 
 
Very significant     □  Significant    □   Not significant at all   □  
 
B. Pre-Post comparison 
7. How would you compare performance improvement before and after decentralization? 
 
 Much better     
 A little better   
 No change  
 A little worse   
 Much worse  
 
In your opinion, what is your overall perception of service delivery reforms at the sub national 
level, how it has improved the organizational performance, any issues and challenges or 
recommendation. 
 
Issues/recommendations_________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Pilot Survey Questionnaire (Date: 1st November  2009) 
  
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
 
Target audience: public officials grade 18-20 
 
Service delivery organization: Education Department and Water and Sanitation Agency 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 
Name of the organization  Education □ WASA  □ 
Name of the respondents (Optional)      
Department          
Designation          
Qualification          
Tenure in the organization        
Gender                            Male □      Female  □ 
 
Managerial Autonomy: This part of the survey is designed to assess the change in Managerial 
Autonomy/Discretion in financial and personnel management within your organization after 
decentralization reforms. 
 
1. How would you compare that Sub-National Authorities can exercise more discretion 
(power) after decentralization over the following aspects of personnel management and 
financial management? Score on the scale of 0-5, where 0 corresponds to not at all and 5 
corresponds to more discretion:  
 
Hiring of personnel 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Firing of personnel 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Promotion  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Transfers 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Setting compensation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Career development  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Resource allocation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Procurement  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Budget execution 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Resource mobilization 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Participation: This part of the survey is designed to assess the level of user 
involvement/community participation or citizen participation in service provision. 
 
2. To what extent has decentralization been able to improve the community or user 
involvement in service provision? 
 Very Significantly  □ Significant   □  Not significant   □   No change  □ 
 
3. Any example of user involvement in: 
 
Service provision          
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Monitoring            
Financing           
4. Has user/community involvement improved your organizational performance? 
 Very Significantly  □ Significant   □  Not significant   □   No change  □ 
 
5. To what extent monitoring committees are playing an effective role in improving 
organizational performance? 
 Very Significant  □ Significant   □  Not significant   □   No change  □ 
  
Institutional Environment: This part of the survey is designed to assess the internal 
organizational arrangement of service delivery organization with respect to personnel 
management, financial management, resource constraints, and political and bureaucratic 
support. 
 
Personnel Management and Financial Management  
 
6. Do your organizations hire people on the basis of:  
Merit    □   personal connection    □       political connection     □    
Payment of gifts to some public authority    □       knew a senior public official     □   
 
7. Does your organization have a human resource information management system 
(HRMIS) containing records of employees?  
Yes       □    No         □ 
 
8. Do you have an accounting information system in your organization?  
Yes       □    No         □ 
 
9. Does your organization have a system where performance targets are agreed to between 
employees and supervisors at the beginning of every year?  
 Yes       □    No         □ 
 
10. In your opinion, do you agree with the following statement with respect to written 
guidelines regarding personnel management on a scale of 0-5, where 0 corresponds to 
strongly disagree and 5 corresponds to strongly agree:  
 
Rules are simple for  implementation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
The rules provide flexibility in implementation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Rules are effective for personnel management 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. In your opinion, difficulties in hiring and retaining qualified staff affect organizational 
performance?  
Not at all   □     Not significant   □    To some extent significant   □      
Very significant  □ 
 
12. Do you have a performance based appraisal system in your organization?  
Yes        □ No □ 
 
13. Are targets or objective of performance clearly communicated to you?  
 Yes        □ No □ partially □ 
 
14. In your opinion, to what extent following aspects of financial management are 
performed fully, partially, or not at all? Please rate on a scale of 0-5, where 0 
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corresponds to not at all and 5 in full whether these functions?  
 
Budget preparation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Procurement 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Budget execution 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Internal audit 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Preparation of end of year accounts 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. What kind of budgeting approach is being implemented in you organization, such as 
 Zero based     □      incremental    □    accrual □    any other  □ Specify     .  
 
16. Does your organization perform an internal audit function?  
Yes        □ No □ 
 
17. Is there any system of evaluating programs/projects implemented by your organization?  
Yes        □ No □ 
18. How significant are the following factors in terms of resource leakage? Score on a rate 
of 0-5, where 0 corresponds to not at all and 5 corresponds to highly significant: 
 
Unclear rules for financial accounting 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of capacity to account for budgeting resources 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Weak internal and external auditing practices 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Weak sanctions against corrupt practices 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Policy coordination: this part of the survey is designed to assess the extent to which your 
organization have a policy consistency/coordination between the provincial, federal and local 
government level. 
 
19. Agencies/departments get instructions and policies from different tiers of the 
government, some polices are consistent and some policies conflict with each other. 
Overall how do you rate this aspect of policy consistency?  
  Very consistent      □        more consistent      □     more inconsistent   □     
 Very inconsistent   □ 
 
20. To what extent lack of consistency in policies affect your performance? 
 
Not at all   □     Not significant   □    To some extent significant   □      
Very significant  □ 
 
21. How often you disagree with the policies you are asked to implement?  
Often     □         Occasionally    □        Rarely    □       Not at all     □ 
 
22. To what extent lack of coordination between different tiers of the Government affects 
your performance? 
To a great extent □ to some extent    □ Not at all      □ 
 
23. In your organization, how would you rate the incidents of political interference that exist 
in your organization?  
Very frequent  □      Frequent    □     Infrequent □     Almost never   □ 
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24. In your organization, how would you rate the incidence of bureaucratic interference from 
the upper tiers? 
       Very frequent  □   Frequent  □   Infrequent □       Almost never  □ 
 
25. How significant are the following aspects of good governance that affect your 
organizational performance? Score on a scaleof 0-5, where 0 corresponds to not at all 
and 5 corresponds to highly significant: 
 
Political instability 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Regime legitimacy 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Economic instability 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Political support 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Bureaucratic support 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Supportive Local context 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Resource adequacy:  This part of survey is related to determine the resource 
adequacy/sufficiency that may affect organizational performance 
 
26. To what extent your organizations have adequate/sufficient financial and human 
resources to provide an adequate level of service? Please answer on a scale of 0-5, 
where 0 corresponds to completely inadequate/insufficient and 5 corresponds to 
completely adequate/sufficient. 
 
Adequacy of financial resources 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Adequacy of human resources 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Adequacy of technical resources 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Adequacy of infrastructure 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Performance: This part of the survey is designed to identify the extent to which clear 
performance standards exist within organization, and rewards are linked to the performance. 
 
27. Are there documented work performance standards for each function in your 
organization?  
       Yes   □       No    □ 
 
28. Are they generally achieved?  
       Yes    □        No   □ to some extent   □ 
 
29. In your organization to what extent your organization has achieved its 
mission/objectives?  
0-25%     □         26-50%    □         51-75%     □       76-100%    □ 
 
30. Are individuals in your organization across all departments rewarded on the basis of 
performance?  
  Yes   □      No    □ 
 
31. In your organization, has anyone been subject of the following sanction on the basis of 
poor performance?  
      Dismissal   □    Demotion   □    Salary decrease   □      suspension   □   
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      Postponement of promotion or pay increase  □       Warning      □   
  Initiating criminal proceeding   □  or any other   □  (specify)   
 
32. During the last one year has your organization been awarded for any of the following 
reasons?  
Providing outstanding Services □    Improving qualifications □   Excellent 
attendance record  □  No recognition   □ 
 
33. In your organization how much importance is paid to the achievement of organizational 
objectives?  
Very significant □ Significant □ Somewhat significant □ Not significant at all □ 
 
34. How would you compare performance improvement before and after decentralization? 
Much better    □ A little better □ No change □ 
A little worse □ Much worse □ 
 
Accountability: This part of the survey is designed to assess the accountability arrangement 
within service delivery organization. Focus is on accountability for performance, budget 
transparency and access to information. 
 
35. In your opinion, to what extent corruption is the significant problem of public sector as a 
whole?  
Very significant □  Significant □  Somewhat significant□  Not significant at all  □   
 
36. What would you say that, in your organization, corruption is;  
A very serious problem □      A serious problem □       A somewhat serious problem  □        
Not a serious problem at all □ 
 
37. How often the case of corruption been reported to the public authorities?  
Almost always  □     Frequently  □    Occasionally □    Almost never □ 
 
38. In the past one year, has anyone in your organization been subject to the following types 
of sanction for poor performance?  
Dismissal  □ Demotion   □ Salary decrease for a specific period   □   
Suspension of duties  □ Postponement of promotion  □   Warning   □ 
Initiated criminal proceeding  □ 
 
39. What was the cause of disciplinary action?  
Poor work performance  □  Unauthorized absence □ Working on a second job □ 
Accepting bribe  □   Embezzlement  □   Conflict with supervisor □ 
 
40. Do you have clear guidelines regarding the budget preparation in your organization? 
Yes □  No □ 
 
41. Are these guidelines followed as:  
Fully □ Partially □ Not at all  □  
   
42. How easy is to access important record in your organization?  
Extremely difficult □ Very difficult □  Easy □  Very easy □ 
 
43. Have you ever met the association or groups of end users of the services produced by 
your organization? 
Yes □  No □ 
 
44. Do you have an efficient customer complaint or grievance procedure in your 
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organization?  
Yes □  No □ 
 
45. Are you obliged to share information, especially related to your organizational 
performance with them?  
Yes □  No □ 
 
46. Do you have any information management system for budget transparency such as 
accounting information system?  
Yes □  No □ 
47. How reliable is the information in your organization’s information management system?  
Highly reliable  □ Moderately reliable  □ Partially Reliable  □  Not reliable □ 
 
48. Is your organization’s audit report presented to the local council/provincial/central 
committees?  
Yes □  No □ 
 
49. How effective is the internal audit in ensuring compliance to internal control system?  
          Very effective □   Effective □  Partially effective □ Ineffective   □ 
  
50. To what extent multiple overlapping accountability arrangements affect your 
performance? 
Very significant     □  Significant    □   Not significant at all   □  
 
In your opinion, what is your overall perception of service delivery reforms at the sub national 
level, how it has improved the organizational performance, any issues and challenges or 
recommendation. 
 
Issues________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
______Recommendations________________________________________________________
___________  
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COMMUNITY SURVEY-ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
SERVICE DELIVERY FRAMEWORK 
My name is Seemab Ara Farooqi. I am lecturer at university of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. 
Currently, I am PhD student at Stirling University Scotland, UK. This research is part of my 
research degree. The purpose of this survey is to assess the service delivery framework of local 
government system and how far it has been able to deliver efficient and responsive services and 
improve participation of the community in service provision. This survey has 5 parts. I would be 
grateful; for your valuable responses. 
 
I assure you that the data obtained and your response to this questionnaire will only be used by 
university of Stirling for the purpose of academic research and no information provided will be 
attributed to any person in part or in full without the prior written consent. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for the participating in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date:  
Seemab farooqi 
University of Stirling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 518 
 
Community Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
Part 1: Demographic profile 
A. Demographic profile 
A1.  District- please tick the relevant box 
 City District Government Faisalabad  
 City District Government Lahore  
     A2. Please write the name of your union and tehsil council 
 Tehsil council 
 Union council 
                 A3. Gender: please tick the relevant box 
 Male  
 Female 
A4. Education: please tick the relevant box 
 Illiterate  FA 
 Primary   BA 
 Middle  MA 
 Matric  Others 
A5. Age: please tick the relevant box 
 18-29 
 30-39 
 40-49 
 50 and above  
Part 2: Local Government and Citizen Participation 
B1. Do you have knowledge of Citizen Community Board (CCB)  Yes   No 
B2. Do you have knowledge School Management Committee (SMC)?  Yes   No 
B3. Do you have knowledge of water and sanitation monitoring committee?  Yes   No 
B4. Are you part of any monitoring committee?  Yes   No 
B5. Are you part of CCB?  Yes   No 
B6. Are you part of SMC?  Yes   No 
B7. Have you ever contacted your local councillor since the last 12 months- district/ tehsil/union 
councillor? 
 Yes 
 No 
B8. Have you participated in any development scheme of your area since last 12 months? 
 Yes   
 No 
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B9. Do councillors take community input or consult community members’ opinion in 
development schemes? 
 Mostly 
 According to the situation 
 Not at all 
B11. To whom would you contact for your local issues? Tick one. 
 Union councillor  MNA  Media  NGO 
 Court 
 Don’t know whom to 
contact 
 Tehsil councillor  MPA  Government 
officer 
 District councillors  Political party  Community 
member 
 Don’t want to contact as no one listen to your complaints 
B12. Have you ever contacted your local councillor for community/local issues? In case of 
‘No’, please move to question B17 
 Yes 
 No 
What was the nature of problem? Tick one.  
 Water supply  Sewerage system 
 Garbage  Education 
 Health  Gas 
 Electricity  Telephone 
 NOC  Others  
B14. Were you able to contact the person? 
 Yes 
 No 
B15. Did you find the person honest and fair in his dealings? 
 Yes 
 No 
B16. Were you satisfied with your meeting? 
 Very satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Very dissatisfied 
B17. Have you ever contact any district officer for your problem? In case of ‘No’, please move 
to question B22.  
 Yes 
 No 
B18. What was the nature of problem? Tick one.  
 Water supply  Sewerage system 
 Garbage  Education 
 Health  Gas 
 Electricity  Telephone 
 NOC  Others  
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B19. Were you able to contact the person? 
 Yes 
 No 
B20. Did you find the person honest and fair in his dealings? 
 Yes 
 No 
B21. Were you satisfied with your meeting? 
 Very satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Very dissatisfied 
Part 3: Accountability (C) 
C1. Do councillors share information regarding council meetings with the local community?  
 Yes 
 No 
C2. Do councillors inform you about the development schemes of your community? 
 Yes 
 No 
C3. Does councillor inform you about the amount spent on the development schemes? 
 Yes 
 No 
C4. Do tehsil municipal administration/district government publish information for general 
public? 
 Yes 
 No 
C5. Can people access local government offices for the public information? 
 Yes 
 No  
 Sometimes 
C6. To whom would you report for any incident of corruption? Tick one. 
 
 Union councillor  MNA  Media  NGO 
 Court 
 Don’t know whom to 
contact 
 Tehsil councillor  MPA  Government 
officer 
 District councillors  Political party  Community 
member 
 Don’t want to contact as no one listen to your complaints 
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C7. In your opinion, do you consider that your complaints are heard? 
 Yes 
 No 
C8. Have you notices any change in the attendance of local government employees after local 
government system? 
 Yes 
 No 
C9. Please explain the nature of change you have observed in local government employees 
attendance? 
 Attendance is improved 
 No change 
 Attendance is deteriorated 
Part 4:  Assessment of Local Government Service Delivery in Education and Water and 
Sanitation Provision (D) 
D: sewerage provision 
D1. Do you have sewerage system in your community? 
 Yes 
 No 
D2. Please identify the nature of service provision? 
 Public 
 Private 
D3. Do you pay for the service provision? 
 Yes 
 No 
D4. Are you satisfied with the user charges? 
 Highly satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 
D5. Is there any development scheme regarding sewerage system in your community? 
 
 None   Abandoned 
 Under progress  Has been completed 
 
D6. Is there any NGO/CBO/CCB involvement in the improvement of sewerage facilities in your 
community? 
 Yes 
 No 
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D7. Has the attendance of sewerage and sanitation staff improved after local government 
system? 
 Yes 
 No 
D8. Is there any improvement in the sewerage coverage after the local government system? 
 Improved 
 No change 
 Deteriorated 
D9. Are you satisfied with the quality of sewerage after the local government system? 
 Highly satisfied  
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
D10. Are you satisfied with the complaints procedures?  
 Highly satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
D11. Is there any monitoring committee regarding sewerage? 
 Yes 
 No 
  
D12. Does this monitoring committee play an effective role? 
 Effective 
 Not effective 
 Partially effective 
D13. What are the reasons for your satisfaction or dissatisfaction? 
 User charges are high  Complaints are not heard 
 Frequent blockage  Any other 
 
D14. How would you compare sewerage system before and after local government system? 
 Much better 
 A little better 
 Much worse 
 A little worse 
E. Water supply 
E1. Do you have water supply system in your community? 
 Yes 
 No 
E2. . Please identify the nature of service provision? 
 Public (WASA) 
 Private 
 Community 
E3. Do you pay for the service provision? 
 Yes 
 No 
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E4. Are you satisfied with the user charges? 
 Highly satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
E5. Is there any development scheme regarding water supply system in your community? 
 
 None   Abandoned 
 Under progress  Has been completed 
 
E6. Is there any NGO/CBO/CCB involvement in the improvement of water supply in your 
community? 
 Yes 
 No 
E7. Is there any improvement in the access to clean drinking water after the local government 
system? 
 Improved 
 No change 
 Deteriorated 
E8. Are you satisfied with the quality of water provision after the local government system? 
 Highly satisfied  
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
E9. Are you satisfied with the complaints procedures?  
 Highly satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
E10. Is there any monitoring committee regarding water and sanitation? 
 Yes 
 No 
E11. Does this monitoring committee play an effective role? 
 Effective 
 Not effective 
 Partially effective 
E12. What are the reasons for your satisfaction or dissatisfaction? 
 User charges are high  Complaints are not heard 
 Frequent blockage  Any other 
E13. How would you compare water supply system before and after local government system? 
 Much better 
 A little better 
 Much worse 
 A little worse 
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F. Education service delivery 
F1. Do you have access to school in your community?  
 Yes 
 No 
F2. Please identify the type of schools attended by your children? 
 Public 
 Private 
F3. What are the reasons for attending this school? 
 
 
F4. Do you pay for tuition fees? 
 Yes 
 No 
F5. Are you satisfied with the tuition fees? 
 Highly satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
F6. Is there any NGO/CBO/CCB involvement in the improvement of education provision in 
your community? 
 Yes 
 No 
F7. Is there any improvement in the access to clean drinking water after the local government 
system? 
 Improved 
 No change 
 Deteriorated 
F8. Are you satisfied with the quality of education provision after the local government system? 
 
 Highly satisfied  
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
F9. Is there any improvement in the attendance of the teachers at school after local government 
system? 
 Much better 
 No change 
 More absenteeism 
F10. Are you satisfied with the complaints procedures?  
 Highly satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
 Dissatisfied 
F11. Is there any monitoring committee regarding water and sanitation? 
 Yes 
 No 
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F12. Does this monitoring committee play an effective role? 
 Effective 
 Not effective 
 Partially effective 
F13. What are the reasons for your satisfaction or dissatisfaction? 
 High education 
standards 
 Good facilities 
 Poor quality of 
education 
 Any other 
 Ease of access 
F14. How would you compare education system before and after local government system? 
 Much better 
 A little better 
 Much worse 
 A little worse 
Part 5: Assessment of overall local government performance in service delivery (G) 
G.1 has local government system been able to improve community participation in service 
delivery?  
 To a great extent 
 To some extent 
 No change 
G2. Please give an example of how it has been able to improve community participation 
 
 
 
G3. What is the most important issue of your community? 
 
 
G4. To what extent local government system has been able to solve the above mentioned 
problem (mentioned in G3) 
 To a great extent 
 Top some extent 
 Not at all 
 Don’t know 
G5. Has local government system been able to improve attendance of local government 
employees? 
 Much better 
 A little better 
 Much worse 
 A little worse 
G6. In your opinion, to what extent local government system has been able to improve service 
delivery compared to the previous system? 
 Much better 
 A little better 
 Much worse 
 A little worse 
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G7. Would you like to explain, how it has improved service delivery compared to the previous 
system? 
 
 
G8. Is local government system more transparent than the previous system? 
  Much better 
 A little better 
 Much worse 
 A little worse 
G9. Generally, to what extent local government system has been able to reduce corruption? 
 To a great extent 
 To some extent 
 No change 
G10. Overall has local government system been able to improve complaints procedures? 
 To a great extent 
 To some extent 
 No change 
Any recommendations: 
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Organizations 
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Seemab Ara Farooqi 
Department of Management 
University of Stirling, Stirling, 
 Scotland, UK. 
 Post code: FK9 4LA 
Tel. No. 00447405992922 
Email: s.a.farooqi@stir.ac.uk 
Date  
To whom it may concern! 
 
I am a Lecturer Human Management at Institute of Administrative Science, University of the 
Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. Currently, I am enrolled at university of Stirling, UK to pursue my 
PhD studies in public sector management. 
 I am conducting research on decentralization reforms and organizational performance 
employing a public management perspective. Since 1980s public sector management has seen a 
rise in the decentralized service delivery arrangements (ranging from the concentration, 
delegation, PPP etc.), performance focus and a customer orientation under various 
technological, financial and globalization influences to tackle the problem of bureaucratic 
organizations. The rationale behind all these changes was to make a service delivery framework 
more efficient and responsive. The question is has it delivered this promise? The research on the 
topic of decentralization is focused on establishing the relationship between decentralization and 
organizational performance comparing two sectors: education and water and sanitation sector. 
We are also assessing how service delivery organizations are engaged with third sector and 
looking into the inter-organizational dynamics of such relationships. The vital part of this is the 
mapping of the institutional environment that might affect such relationships. My questions 
broadly cover the areas of managerial autonomy over financial, human resources and 
decision-making authority being decentralized to the sub national level followed by 
various institutional factors that affect the service delivery performance and how all 
these have affected the service delivery outcomes. Would you allow me to record this 
interview? I would stop the recording if you felt uncomfortable. I assure you that this 
entire interview is solely for the academic purpose. I would highly appreciate for your 
time and cooperation in this regard. 
Please be assured that information you provide will remain confidential. Please let me know if 
you need a copy of the summary of research findings and recommendation. I am also enclosing 
a reference letter from my supervision Prof. Rob Ball, expressing his support for this study.  
Thank you very much for your valuable contribution to the study. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Seemab Ara Farooqi 
 
 
Interview schedule (Managers of Service delivery organizations) 
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General questions 
 
1. What are your main areas of responsibilities? 
2. To whom do you report?  
3. To which service cadre you belong?  
4.  What were the underlying motives or drivers of change (underlying reason for 
decentralization?) probe by asking about organizational restructuring  
 
Managerial autonomy: how the new organizational arrangement has affected 
 
 Autonomy over financial and human resources: personnel management, finances, 
decision making( prompt by asking questions how real autonomy has been pushed 
down the hierarchy with respect to financial devolution, hiring and firing of 
personnel, promotion, transfers, resource allocation, decision making) 
 In your perception decentralization reforms has been able to decentralize real 
autonomy down the hierarchy Or more autonomy is followed by more central or 
provincial control? In what ways? 
 Participation-has decentralization improved the level of user involvement in the 
service provision, if yes how, and in what ways, design, development and 
implementation of service delivery (Any example of community led initiative and 
the incorporation of a wide range of civil and citizen groups in service provision; 
grievance or complaint systems, access to information, consumer surveys) 
 Competition/Collaboration as a service delivery option, the use of contracting out, 
user fees charges (issues involved that affect performance particularly focusing on 
internal technical and human skill competence and how an organization manages 
their relations with other network of organizations focusing on the clarity of roles, 
financial arrangement  and coordination between them)  
 Do you think that use of market based mechanisms for service provision has 
contributed to organizational performance?  
 Issues and challenges of using market based techniques for service provision 
 
Accountability- 
 
1. What is the change in accountability relationship; are there overlapping 
multiple accountability arrangement that affects your performance, any 
example?  
2. Does your organization ensure transparent budgeting process; believe in 
internal auditing and compliance with the rules laid out in the policy 
guidelines? 
3. What is your perception of central and provincial checks and balance over 
organizational spending?  
4. Has new system been able to make the system more transparent than before? 
 
Performance- 
 
1. What are the factors you look for performance, efficiency, effectiveness, user 
quality 
2. Do you have clear performance indicators; what is the use of performance 
indicators in your organization) 
3. Is more attention paid on performance for accountability, are there incidence of 
specific incentives or penalties for poor performance, dissemination of 
information to the public, corruption level) 
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Factor affecting performance 
 
What are the main factors that are affecting service delivery performance? 
 
Institutional environment 
 
 Political commitment (does the level of political commitment/support from 
upper tiers affects your performance, if yes/no, in what ways) 
 Bureaucratic Commitment (does the level of bureaucratic commitment affects 
your performance, in what ways) 
 
Adequacy of resources:  
 
1. Is there adequacy of funds and human resources for service provision 
(probe by asking questions related to financial dependence on 
intergovernmental grants, own revenue sources such user fees charges; 
technical skills availability for service provision) 
Policy consistency  
 
1. Are the policies made at the provincial or federal level are consistent with the 
policies at the sub national level? (Probe by asking how policies made at the 
central, and provincial government affect your performance ) 
2. Governances issues, Regime legitimacy, political instability, economic 
instability (what is the role of governance issues in your performance) 
Local context  
 
1. To what extent local context is supportive in terms of political or bureaucratic 
support/lack of interference?  
2. What is the level of citizen cooperation in service provision; the role of the 
private sector such as NGOs or CBOs?   
3. Any other factor that you think is affecting service delivery outcome at the sub 
national level? 
 
Internal organizational factors  
 
What are the internal organizational factors that affect your performance (adequacy of 
technical competence, human resources, and financial resources?) 
 
Issues and recommendation 
 
 Concluding comments on the decentralization reforms and organizational performance 
1. Overall perception of performance improvement how would you view the 
change of performance before and after the service delivery reforms, any 
recommendation or suggestion for further improvements in the system 
2. Overall, in your opinion, what are the main challenges and issues that affect 
your organizational performance 
3. Any recommendation 
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Interview Summary Sheet 1 
Interview No.                         ______________________        Date: ____________________ 
Name of the Organization    _______________________ 
Name of the respondent      ________________________                                                                     Phone: -------------------------- 
Name of City District Government          ___________    Lahore          ___________   Faisalabad 
 
General Questions                                                    Main themes/ Responses recorded                                                              Quick reflections on     interviewee transcripts 
1. Main areas of responsibilities   
2. To whom do you report?  
3. service cadre  
 
 
 
 
4. Motives or drivers of change   
 
 
 
Impact of decentralization - how the new organizational arrangement has affected 
 
1. Managerial Autonomy over financial 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Autonomy over human resources   
 
 
 
3. Participation    
4. Competition or Collaborative service  
Delivery techniques 
 
 
 
 
Accountability-  
 
1. Change in accountability relationship; 
any evidence of multiple/ overlapping 
accountability arrangement that affect 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. How organizations ensure transparent 
budgeting process; internal auditing 
practices and compliance to the rules as 
laid out in the policy guidelines? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Any change -Has new system being able   
 1 
 
to make the system more transparent 
than before? 
 
 
 
Performance  
 
4. What are the factors you look for 
performance, efficiency, effectiveness, 
user quality 
 
 
 
 
5. Are there clear performance 
indicators; what is the use of 
performance indicators in your 
organization) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor affecting performance 
1. Political commitment 
 
2. Bureaucratic commitment 
 
 
 
 
3. Adequacy of resources 
(Financial, human, technical) 
  
4. Policy consistency   
 
 
 
5. Local context (favorable or not) 
Any example 
 
 
  
6. Internal organizational factors-main 
issues identified 
 
 
  
7. Any new question in considering the next contact with this or any other site/or any other concern. 
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Interview Contact Record Sheet 2 
 
Interviewee 
Number 
Organization Respondents’ 
Names 
 
Designation Local 
Government 
Faisalabad 
(CDGF)/ 
Lahore (CGDL) 
Data & 
Time 
Any cancellation of 
appointment and 
date of 
Rescheduled 
interview 
(C/R) 
Any 
document 
obtained 
 
Y-Yes 
N-No 
Mode of 
Recording 
 
 
M-Manual 
R-Recorded 
Backup 
on 
computer 
 
Y-Yes 
N-No 
1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
6          
7          
8          
9          
10          
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Pilot interview 
Interview with DDEO      Date: 31 October 2009 
District: Lahore 
Motives behind decentralization: The motive behind decentralization is to speed the service delivery of 
education. Before decentralization, we had a divisional structure. It was not speedy and decision making was 
always a delayed. Now employees are facilitated to take immediate actions to meet the needs of teachers and 
community issues. We are able to manage our work more swiftly. 
Managerial autonomy: I can fully utilize the administrative and financial powers as per rules and regulations. It 
only becomes politicized when local councillors and Nazims try to influence us when we take actions against 
their favourites. 
Participation: it has improved significantly under city district government. Particularly the role of NGOs is very 
important in this regard. NGOs have helped us in upgrading and providing missing facilities to schools such as 
in Ichra and Hangerwal in my town. School councils are also very active in raising funds and ensuring 
transparent utilization of funds. Once schools know that community members can visit and monitor their 
performance, they really perform better. If community is not very involved then schools become very passive. 
Accountability: there should be checks at every level it improves the performance of our system, reduce levels 
of corruption and overall system becomes more transparent. If we do not have these accountability 
arrangements, then people can waste resources. The only thing is that people who are monitoring should have 
a positive attitude, they should not just look for only what is wrong but also appreciate the good things done 
by an institution. For instance we have provincial monitoring teams which are known as MEAs(monitoring and 
evaluation assistant). They have any army background and are unable to understand education environment. 
It would have been better if this task was given to those who belong to the education sector. 
Budgeting and financial rules are clear to us. We follow them fully. We have frequent internal and external 
audits and they ensure the transparency. I am not satisfied with the external auditors as they are interested 
only in good lunches and gifts when they perform their audit. If we make them happy, everything will be right. 
Performance: we have clear performance standards and they are clearly communicated to everyone. Mostly, 
we focus on effectiveness, result of each school. Performance is linked with the incentive structure such as we 
give awards to top 20 best schools for a year, then we have an award for best teacher as well. If we find 
someone not performing well, we issue warning to them.  
Resources: we have overcome the shortage of teachers; we have sufficient funds for our schools. The only 
constraint is that internally we do not have the transportation facility which is a constraint on our 
performance. We are field officer and we need transport to visit the fields. 
Political factors considerably affect our performance, mostly they try to influence our decision regarding 
postings, transfers, or if we have taken any action against a person for not performing well. 
Policy consistency is another major factor as lack of consistency creates uncertainty in the environment. We 
frequently experience policy changes with the change of government. Governance issues like, political stability 
is very important to see significant results. Every system should be given time to see its outcomes. 
Conclusion: Overall we have facilitated our school in handling their issues. Performance is improved, such as 
student enrolment has improved. Even we initiated campaign to register such kids who were not enrolled in 
any school, tried to educate the parents and also proposed fines to such parents who did not send their kids to 
school. The only limitation is that we should be more empowered to take action against those who are not 
performing well. 
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Interview Schedule for NGOs 
 
1. Mutuality: Do you think that there is shared decision making and joint 
accountability among the partners.   
2. What about trust, are relationship managed by trust or the MOU or a 
combination of both ( do you think roles and responsibilities of both partners 
are clearly spelled out in the MOU, has trust improved over time/there is deficit 
of trust among partners? What leads to distrust?)   
3. What are the accountability arrangement or how do you maintain the 
control or there is some loss of accountability;  How do you feel that NGOs 
involvement in service delivery has been able to make service providers 
more accountable or transparent ( Probe -what are the coordination 
arrangements among partners? And what kind of options you consider 
government should undertake for accountability improvement? Are NGOs held 
accountable at multiple levels (like report to a public sector organization, your 
funding organization or both -writing formal or some informal arrangements); 
can you specify governmental and non-governmental levels? What do you 
suggest for improvement based on your experience)  
4. How NGOs are selected for the partnerships, based on reputation, size, 
connections etc. 
5. What would you say about the performance of this project so far (such as 
AAS and PPP cell at Faisalabad), Outcome of partnership: do you consider 
that these partnerships are effective, synergistic and add value to the 
partnerships.  
6. Do you think there is some competition among NGOs for resources to such 
options, if yes what kind of? 
7. What are the main  issues that you have faced during the Adopt A 
school system  
8. Suggestions.  
9. Is the institutional environment favourable (probe by asking about the 
commitment from the public sector, political and bureaucratic for PPP? 
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Interview Schedule for Political Representatives 
 
 
 Scope for policy making –do you consider that there is a wide scope for policy 
making under the devolved arrangements, how would you consider the extent 
you can have an influence on the policy making and implementation process 
(probe- are there any constraints, if yes in what ways these factors limit the local 
policy making and implementation process)  
 Central local relations: 
o Do you consider that there is Role clarity with respect to powers being 
devolved to the local government level 
o How would you define your relationship with the provincial and federal 
government (probe - issues of coordination, adequacy of resources 
(financial, human, technical) 
o Relationship within the district- do you have mechanisms for internal 
coordination 
o Has the decentralization brought improvement in accountability 
relationships between elected representatives and public officials 
 What is your perception of local government monitoring committees 
 Are CCBs and school councils playing an active role (probe, in case CCBs or 
School councils are ineffective, then what are the reasons behind this) 
 Do you consider that the local government system is able to improve service 
provision (probe- particularly improvements in the level of participation, 
accountability of the system, and services such as education and water and 
sanitation sectors) 
 Major achievements of the local government system 
 Issues and challenges 
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Table 3: Document collected from the field visits 
Documents        Source 
 
Documents gathered from Town Hall, Lahore  
 
 List of Nazim 
 List of UCs 
 Administration of City District Government Lahore 
 Organizational structures, designation, names and 
telephone numbers of the managers 
 Local government ordinance 2001 
 Powers of local governments 
 Composition of local council committees, monitoring 
committees-details of the members, telephone numbers, 
addresses 
 Provincial finance commissions 
 Rules and by laws 
 Delegation of powers  
 Taxes levied by all councils 
 Audit 
 Conduct of business of district council 
 
 
 
 
Town hall city district government Lahore 
Data collected from town hall, Faisalabad city district 
government: 
 
 List of Local councillors 
 Union Councils 
 Tax collection 
 Faisalabad city district government project of 
strengthening decentralized local government (DFID, 
2005);  
 Performance report of city district government Faisalabad 
(DFID, 2008) 
 
 
Published reports available on town hall 
website: 
http://faisalabad.gov.pk/ 
Devolution plan 2001 National Reconstruction Bureau, 2001 
Policy documents related to decentralization in education and 
water and sanitation sector: 
 National Education Policies 1956-2009;  
 National Water and Sanitation policies ;  
 Provincial Water and Sanitation policies;  
 Water & Sanitation 
Urban Gazette 
2010 
 Changa Pani Program The Urban Gazette 
 Water & Sanitation 
Reports 2009 
 Water & Sanitation 
Reports 2008 
 Water & Sanitation 
Flyers 2007 
 Water & Sanitation 
Reports 2007 
 Provincial education policies;  
 National and Provincial Public Private Partnership 
frameworks (PDSSP, 2008). 
 Punjab education sector reform program 
 
 
 
 
 
Education Ministry of Pakistan 
 
www.environment.gov.pk/NEP/SanitationPoli 
cy.pdf 
 
 
 
 
http://www.urbanunit.gov.pk/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.pesrp.edu.pk/ 
 
Internal Organizational documents from WASA:  
 Data on Benchmark indicators 2007, 2008, 2009 
 Tariff structure 
 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
preparatory report for Lahore water supply, sewerage and 
Drainage improvement project 
 
WASA Lahore and Faisalabad 
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 Punjab Water and Sanitation Project-summary report, 
2006 (WASA, Faisalabad) 
 Annual budget 2007, 2008 2009 (WASA Faisalabad and 
Lahore) 
 Presentation on performance bench marking, financial and 
administrative issues (WASA Faisalabad, and Lahore) 
 
Internal organizational documents from Education department 
  
 Organizational charts 
 Public private partnership Law as passed through 
Faisalabad local council 
 Public private partnership policy & issue notes 
 Public policy framework and public policy TORs for 
education department 
 PPI – Strategy – Debriefing September 09, 2004  
 Notification : PPI Cell Personnel in the EDO- Education 
Office Faisalabad 
 
 Draft proposal: Strengthening Decentralized Local 
Government in Faisalabad: Establishing and Strengthening 
PPP initiatives  for the Education Sector in Faisalabad, 
April  24th , 2006   
 Technical Note  on the Institute of Learning (Teacher 
Training and Professional Development) 
 Memos and letters regarding PPP cell 
 
 List of performance indicators 
 School Council Rules 
 List of managers, designation, names, addresses 
 
 
 
Education department, Lahore and Faisalabad 
Education department, Faisalabad 
 
Education department, Faisalabad 
 
 
Education department, Faisalabad 
 
 
 
Education department, Faisalabad 
 
 
Education department, Faisalabad 
 
 
Education department, Faisalabad 
 
Education Department, Lahore 
Education Department, Lahore 
Education Department, Lahore 
Performance data on education quality  
 
      Punjab development statistics report 
 2006 
 2007 
 2008 
 2009 
 2010 
 
 
Planning and Development Department, 
government of Punjab 
 
http://www.pndpunjab.gov.pk/page.asp?id=65 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
TABLE 4-1: MANN-WHITNEY U TEST (MEANS RANKS) BY CITY DISTRICT 
GOVERNMENT 
Ranks 
 City District Government N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Hiring of Personnel Lahore 66 45.20 2983.00 
Faisalabad 25 48.12 1203.00 
Total 91   
Firing of Personnel Lahore 66 46.05 3039.00 
Faisalabad 25 45.88 1147.00 
Total 91   
Promotion of Personnel Lahore 66 46.68 3081.00 
Faisalabad 25 44.20 1105.00 
Total 91   
Transfer of Personnel Lahore 66 47.47 3133.00 
Faisalabad 25 42.12 1053.00 
Total 91   
Setting Compensation Lahore 66 46.54 3071.50 
Faisalabad 25 44.58 1114.50 
Total 91   
Career development Lahore 66 43.38 2863.00 
Faisalabad 25 52.92 1323.00 
Total 91   
Resource Allocation Lahore 66 43.92 2898.50 
Faisalabad 25 51.50 1287.50 
Total 91   
Procurement Lahore 66 46.11 3043.50 
Faisalabad 25 45.70 1142.50 
Total 91   
Budget Execution Lahore 66 43.87 2895.50 
Faisalabad 25 51.62 1290.50 
Total 91   
Resource Mobilization Lahore 66 43.58 2876.50 
Faisalabad 25 52.38 1309.50 
Total 91   
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TABLE 3-2: MANN-WHITNEY TEST STATISTIC 
Test Statisticsa 
 Hiring of 
Personnel 
Firing of 
Personnel 
Promotion 
of 
Personnel 
Transfer of 
Personnel 
Setting 
Compensation 
Career 
development 
Resource 
Allocation 
Procurement Budget 
Execution 
Resource 
Mobilization 
Mann-Whitney U 772.00 822.00 780.00 728.00 789.50 652.00 687.50 817.50 684.50 665.50 
Wilcoxon W 2983.00 1147.00 1105.00 1053.00 1114.50 2863.00 2898.50 1142.50 2895.50 2876.50 
Z -.48 -.02 -.41 -.89 -.33 -1.59 -1.25 -.06 -1.28 -1.45 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.62 .97 .68 .37 .73 .11 .208 .94 .20 .14 
a. Grouping Variable: City District Government 
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TABLE 3-3: MANN-WHITNEY TEST (MEAN RANKS) FOR SECTORS 
Ranks (TYPE OF SERVICE DELIVERY ORGANIZATIONS) 
 type of service delivery 
organization N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Hiring of Personnel education 32 40.34 1291.00 
WASA 59 49.07 2895.00 
Total 91   
Firing of Personnel education 32 36.94 1182.00 
WASA 59 50.92 3004.00 
Total 91   
Promotion of Personnel education 32 38.09 1219.00 
WASA 59 50.29 2967.00 
Total 91   
Transfer of Personnel education 32 29.39 940.50 
WASA 59 55.01 3245.50 
Total 91   
Setting Compensation education 32 40.33 1290.50 
WASA 59 49.08 2895.50 
Total 91   
Career development education 32 46.55 1489.50 
WASA 59 45.70 2696.50 
Total 91   
Resource Allocation education 32 45.41 1453.00 
WASA 59 46.32 2733.00 
Total 91   
Procurement Education 32 45.23 1447.50 
WASA 59 46.42 2738.50 
Total 91   
Budget Execution Education 32 50.14 1604.50 
WASA 59 43.75 2581.50 
Total 91   
Resource Mobilization Education 32 51.33 1642.50 
WASA 59 43.11 2543.50 
Total 91   
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TABLE3-4: MANN-WHITNEY TEST 
Test Statisticsa 
 Hiring of 
Personnel 
Firing of 
Personnel 
Promotion of 
Personnel 
Transfer of 
Personnel 
Setting 
Compensation 
Career 
development 
Resource 
Allocation 
Procurement Budget 
Execution 
Resource 
Mobilization 
Mann-
Whitney U 
763.000 654.000 691.000 412.500 762.500 926.500 925.000 919.500 811.500 773.500 
Wilcoxon W 1291.000 1182.000 1219.000 940.500 1290.500 2696.500 1453.000 1447.500 2581.500 2543.500 
Z -1.546 -2.479 -2.170 -4.572 -1.617 -.150 -.163 -.211 -1.129 -1.450 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.122 .013 .030 .000 .106 .880 .871 .833 .259 .147 
a. Grouping Variable: type of service delivery organization 
 
 535 
 
TABLE 3-5: CROSS TABULATION FOR PARTICIPATION AND SECTORS 
PARTICIPATION INCREASE * type of service delivery organization Crosstabulation 
 
type of service delivery 
organization 
Total education WASA 
PARTICIPATION 
INCREASE 
1.00 Count 5 7 12 
% within PARTICIPATION 
INCREASE 
41.7% 58.3% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
15.6% 11.9% 13.2% 
% of Total 5.5% 7.7% 13.2% 
2.00 Count 27 52 79 
% within PARTICIPATION 
INCREASE 
34.2% 65.8% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
84.4% 88.1% 86.8% 
% of Total 29.7% 57.1% 86.8% 
Total Count 32 59 91 
% within PARTICIPATION 
INCREASE 
35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
 
 
TABLE3-6: CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR PARTICIPATION AND SECTORS 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .256a 1 .613   
Continuity Correctionb .033 1 .856   
Likelihood Ratio .251 1 .616   
Fisher's Exact Test    .747 .419 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.253 1 .615 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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TABLE3-7: CROSS TABULATION FOR PARTICIPATION AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
PARTICIPATION INCREASE * City District Government Crosstabulation 
 
City District Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
PARTICIPATION 
INCREASE 
no change/not 
significant 
Count 5 7 12 
% within PARTICIPATION 
INCREASE 
41.7% 58.3% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
7.6% 28.0% 13.2% 
% of Total 5.5% 7.7% 13.2% 
significant/very 
significant 
Count 61 18 79 
% within PARTICIPATION 
INCREASE 
77.2% 22.8% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
92.4% 72.0% 86.8% 
% of Total 67.0% 19.8% 86.8% 
Total Count 66 25 91 
% within PARTICIPATION 
INCREASE 
72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
TABLE 3-8: CHI SQUARE TEST FOR PARTICIPATION AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.607a 1 .010   
Continuity Correctionb 4.943 1 .026   
Likelihood Ratio 5.905 1 .015   
Fisher's Exact Test    .016 .016 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.534 1 .011 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.30. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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TABLE 3-9: CROSS TABULATION FOR IMPACT OF PARTICIPATION ON 
PERFORMANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
impact on performance * City District Government Crosstabulation 
 
City District Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
impact on 
performance 
1.00 Count 8 9 17 
% within impact on 
performance 
47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
12.1% 36.0% 18.7% 
% of Total 8.8% 9.9% 18.7% 
2.00 Count 58 16 74 
% within impact on 
performance 
78.4% 21.6% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
87.9% 64.0% 81.3% 
% of Total 63.7% 17.6% 81.3% 
Total Count 66 25 91 
% within impact on 
performance 
72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Governemnt 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
 
TABLE 3-10: CHI SQUARE TEST 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.806a 1 .009   
Continuity Correctionb 5.325 1 .021   
Likelihood Ratio 6.223 1 .013   
Fisher's Exact Test    .015 .013 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.731 1 .009 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.67. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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TABLE 3-11: CROSS TABULATION FOR IMPACT OF PARTICIPATION AND 
SECTORS 
impact on performance * type of service delivery organization Crosstabulation 
 
type of service delivery organization 
Total Education WASA 
impact on 
performance 
1.00 Count 8 9 17 
% within impact on 
performance 
47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
25.0% 15.3% 18.7% 
% of Total 8.8% 9.9% 18.7% 
2.00 Count 24 50 74 
% within impact on 
performance 
32.4% 67.6% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
75.0% 84.7% 81.3% 
% of Total 26.4% 54.9% 81.3% 
Total Count 32 59 91 
% within impact on 
performance 
35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
 
TABLE 3-12: CHI-SQUARE TEST 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.297a 1 .255   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.735 1 .391 
  
Likelihood Ratio 1.259 1 .262   
Fisher's Exact Test    .272 .194 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.283 1 .257 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.98. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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TABLE 3-13: MANN-WHITNEY U TEST FOR PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT RULES 
(COMPARING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS) 
Ranks 
 City District Government N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
personnel management 
rules are simple for 
implementation 
Lahore 66 44.08 2909.00 
Faisalabad 25 51.08 1277.00 
Total 91   
personnel management 
rules provide flexibility in 
implementation  
Lahore 66 45.27 2988.00 
Faisalabad 25 47.92 1198.00 
Total 91   
personnel management 
rules are effective for 
personnel management 
Lahore 66 44.28 2922.50 
Faisalabad 25 50.54 1263.50 
Total 91   
 
TABLE 3-14: MANN-WHITNEY U TEST STATISTICS 
Test Statisticsa 
 
personnel 
management 
rules are simple 
for 
implementation 
personnel 
management 
rules provide 
flexibility in 
implementation  
personnel 
management 
rules are effective 
for personnel 
management 
Mann-Whitney U 698.000 777.000 711.500 
Wilcoxon W 2909.000 2988.000 2922.500 
Z -1.177 -.456 -1.055 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .239 .649 .291 
a. Grouping Variable: City District Government 
 
TABLE 3-15: MANN-WHITNEY U TEST FOR PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
(COMPARING SECTORS) 
Ranks 
 type of service delivery 
organization N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
personnel management 
rules are simple for 
implementation 
Education 32 53.23 1703.50 
WASA 59 42.08 2482.50 
Total 91   
personnel management 
rules provide flexibility in 
implementation  
Education 32 42.16 1349.00 
WASA 59 48.08 2837.00 
Total 91   
personnel management 
rules are effective for 
personnel management 
education 32 51.48 1647.50 
WASA 59 43.03 2538.50 
Total 91   
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TABLE 3-16: MANN-WHITNEY U TEST STATISTICS 
Test Statistics
a
 
 
personnel 
management 
rules are simple 
for 
implementation 
personnel 
management 
rules provide 
flexibility in 
implementation  
personnel 
management 
rules are 
effective for 
personnel 
management 
Mann-Whitney U 712.500 821.000 768.500 
Wilcoxon W 2482.500 1349.000 2538.500 
Z -2.007 -1.092 -1.525 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .045 .275 .127 
a. Grouping Variable: type of service delivery organization 
 
Table: 3-17: Cross tabulation for Performance management system 
are there documented work performance standard in your organization * City District 
Government Crosstabulation 
 
City District Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
are there 
documented work 
performance 
standard in your 
organization 
yes Count 57 13 70 
% within are there 
documented work 
performance standard in your 
organization 
81.4% 18.6% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
86.4% 52.0% 76.9% 
% of Total 62.6% 14.3% 76.9% 
no Count 9 12 21 
% within are there 
documented work 
performance standard in your 
organization 
42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Governemnt 
13.6% 48.0% 23.1% 
% of Total 9.9% 13.2% 23.1% 
Total Count 66 25 91 
% within are there 
documented work 
performance standard in your 
organization 
72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
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Table: 3-18: Chi-Square Tests for documented work PIs comparing CDGs 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
12.062a 1 .001 
  
Continuity 
Correctionb 
10.203 1 .001 
  
Likelihood Ratio 11.123 1 .001   
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
11.929 1 .001 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.77. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 3-19: Chi square for documented work performance standards and type of service 
delivery organizations 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.110a 1 .078   
Continuity Correctionb 2.259 1 .133   
Likelihood Ratio 3.348 1 .067   
Fisher's Exact Test    .117 .063 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.076 1 .079 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.38. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Setting of performance standards 
Table 3-20:  Cross tabulation sharing of input and type of service delivery 
organization  
 
type of service delivery organization 
Total education WASA 
sharing of 
input 
1.00 Count 28 27 55 
% within sharing of input 50.9% 49.1% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
87.5% 45.8% 60.4% 
% of Total 30.8% 29.7% 60.4% 
2.00 Count 4 32 36 
% within sharing of input 11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
12.5% 54.2% 39.6% 
% of Total 4.4% 35.2% 39.6% 
Total Count 32 59 91 
% within sharing of input 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
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Table 3-21: Chi-Square Tests between sharing input in setting PIs and Sector 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.116a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 13.420 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 16.676 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
14.950 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.66. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 3-22: Setting of performance standards comparing local governments 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.927a 1 .165   
Continuity Correctionb 1.318 1 .251   
Likelihood Ratio 1.985 1 .159   
Fisher's Exact Test    .230 .125 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.905 1 .167 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.89. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Achievement of targets 
  
Table 3-23: cross tabulation for achievement of standards  and City District Government  
 
City District Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
achievement of 
standards 
less than50% Count 47 12 59 
% within 
achievement of 
standards 
79.7% 20.3% 100.0% 
% within City 
District 
Government 
71.2% 48.0% 64.8% 
% of Total 51.6% 13.2% 64.8% 
above 50% Count 19 13 32 
% within 
achievement of 
standards 
59.4% 40.6% 100.0% 
% within City 
District 
Government 
28.8% 52.0% 35.2% 
% of Total 20.9% 14.3% 35.2% 
Total Count 66 25 91 
% within 
achievement of 
standards 
72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
% within City 
District 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
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Table 3-24: Chi-Square Tests for local government 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.285a 1 .038   
Continuity Correctionb 3.327 1 .068   
Likelihood Ratio 4.171 1 .041   
Fisher's Exact Test    .050 .035 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.238 1 .040 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.79. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Table 3-25: Chi-Square Tests for service delivery organizations 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .118a 1 .731   
Continuity Correctionb .013 1 .909   
Likelihood Ratio .118 1 .732   
Fisher's Exact Test    .819 .452 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.117 1 .733 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.25. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Are performance target generally achieved 
 
Table 3-26: cross tabulation are performance targets achieved (achievemnt1) and City District Government  
 
City District Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
achievemnt1 fully/partially Count 63 18 81 
% within achievemnt1 77.8% 22.2% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
95.5% 72.0% 89.0% 
% of Total 69.2% 19.8% 89.0% 
no Count 3 7 10 
% within achievemnt1 30.0% 70.0% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
4.5% 28.0% 11.0% 
% of Total 3.3% 7.7% 11.0% 
Total Count 66 25 91 
% within achievemnt1 72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
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Table 3-27:Chi square Square Tests for LG achievement of standards 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.198a 1 .001   
Continuity Correctionb 7.941 1 .005   
Likelihood Ratio 8.969 1 .003   
Fisher's Exact Test    .004 .004 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
10.085 1 .001 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.75. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Talble 3-28: Chi-Square Tests for sectors for achievement of standards 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.121a 1 .077   
Continuity Correctionb 2.004 1 .157   
Likelihood Ratio 3.727 1 .054   
Fisher's Exact Test    .092 .072 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.086 1 .079 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.52. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Incentive structure: do you have performance based reward system 
Table 3-29: cross tabulation for performance based appraisal system and type of service delivery 
organization  
 
type of service delivery organization 
Total education WASA 
do you have 
performance 
based appraisal 
system in your 
organization 
yes Count 18 16 34 
% within do you have 
performance based appraisal 
system in your organization 
52.9% 47.1% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
56.3% 27.1% 37.4% 
% of Total 19.8% 17.6% 37.4% 
no Count 14 43 57 
% within do you have 
performance based appraisal 
system in your organization 
24.6% 75.4% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
43.8% 72.9% 62.6% 
% of Total 15.4% 47.3% 62.6% 
Total Count 32 59 91 
% within do you have 
performance based appraisal 
system in your organization 
35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
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Table 3-30: Chi-Square Tests for sectors 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.523a 1 .006   
Continuity Correctionb 6.330 1 .012   
Likelihood Ratio 7.453 1 .006   
Fisher's Exact Test    .012 .006 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.441 1 .006 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.96. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Chi square test for local government and incentive structure 
 
Table 3-31: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.291a 1 .256   
Continuity Correctionb .798 1 .372   
Likelihood Ratio 1.327 1 .249   
Fisher's Exact Test    .334 .186 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.277 1 .258 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.34. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 3-32: cross tabulation for sectors and individuals across all department are rewarded on the 
basis of performance  
 
type of service delivery organization 
Total education WASA 
are individuals in your 
organization across all 
department rewarded on the 
basis of performance 
yes Count 22 9 31 
% within are individuals in 
your organization across 
all department rewarded on 
the basis of performance 
71.0% 29.0% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
68.8% 15.3% 34.1% 
% of Total 24.2% 9.9% 34.1% 
no Count 10 50 60 
% within are individuals in 
your organization across 
all department rewarded on 
the basis of performance 
16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
31.3% 84.7% 65.9% 
% of Total 11.0% 54.9% 65.9% 
Total Count 32 59 91 
% within are individuals in 
your organization across 
all department rewarded on 
the basis of performance 
35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
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Table 3-33: Chi-Square Tests for are individual rewarded on performance for sectors 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.434a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 24.106 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 26.601 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
26.144 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.90. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Chi square test for individuals are rewarded on performance and type of local 
governments. 
Table 3-34: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .057a 1 .811   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .057 1 .811   
Fisher's Exact Test    .809 .498 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.057 1 .812 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.52. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 3-35: Mann Whitney U test for the performance management function for local governments 
Test Statisticsa 
 
to what extent 
budget 
preparation is 
performed in 
your organization 
to what extent 
procurement 
function is 
performed by 
your organization 
to what extent 
budget is fully 
executed in your 
organization 
to what extent 
internal audit 
function is 
performed in your 
organization 
to what extent 
end of year 
account statement 
is prepared in 
your organization 
Mann-
Whitney U 
736.000 755.500 787.500 786.000 822.500 
Wilcoxon W 1061.000 1080.500 1112.500 2997.000 3033.500 
Z -.889 -.724 -.398 -.420 -.025 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.374 .469 .691 .674 .980 
a. Grouping Variable: City District Government 
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Table 3-36: Mean Ranks for sectors 
 type of service delivery 
organization N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
to what extent budget preparation is 
performed in your organization 
education 32 60.72 1943.00 
WASA 59 38.02 2243.00 
Total 91   
to what extent procurement function is 
performed by your organization 
education 32 55.33 1770.50 
WASA 59 40.94 2415.50 
Total 91   
to what extent budget is fully executed in 
your organization 
education 32 52.92 1693.50 
WASA 59 42.25 2492.50 
Total 91   
to what extent internal audit function is 
performed in your organization 
education 32 57.48 1839.50 
WASA 59 39.77 2346.50 
Total 91   
to what extent end of year account 
statement is prepared in your organization 
education 32 58.13 1860.00 
WASA 59 39.42 2326.00 
Total 91   
 
Table 3-37: Mann Whitney U test for factors for resource leakage for CDGs 
Test Statisticsa 
 
unclear rules for 
financial 
accounting are 
significant factor 
for resource 
leakage 
lack of capacity 
to account for 
budgeting 
resources for 
resource leakage 
weak internal and 
external auditing 
practices are 
significant factor 
for resource 
leakage 
weak sanctions 
against corrupt 
practices are 
significant factors 
for resource 
leakage 
Mann-Whitney U 689.500 647.500 732.000 573.500 
Wilcoxon W 2900.500 2858.500 2943.000 2784.500 
Z -1.242 -1.631 -.850 -2.290 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .214 .103 .395 .022 
a. Grouping Variable: City District Government 
 
Table 3-38: Mean Ranks for CDGs and Resource Leakage 
 
Ranks 
 City District Government N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
unclear rules for financial 
accounting are significant 
factor for resource leakage 
Lahore 66 43.95 2900.50 
Faisalabad 25 51.42 1285.50 
Total 91   
lack of capacity to account for 
budgeting resources for 
resource leakage 
Lahore 66 43.31 2858.50 
Faisalabad 25 53.10 1327.50 
Total 91   
weak internal and external 
auditing practices are 
significant factor for resource 
leakage 
Lahore 66 44.59 2943.00 
Faisalabad 25 49.72 1243.00 
Total 91 
  
weak sanctions against corrupt 
practices are significant factors 
for resource leakage 
Lahore 66 42.19 2784.50 
Faisalabad 25 56.06 1401.50 
Total 91   
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Table 3-39: Mann Whitney U test statistics for sectors and factors for resource leakage 
Test Statisticsa 
 
unclear rules for 
financial 
accounting are 
significant factor 
for resource 
leakage 
lack of capacity 
to account for 
budgeting 
resources for 
resource leakage 
weak internal and 
external auditing 
practices are 
significant factor 
for resource 
leakage 
weak sanctions 
against corrupt 
practices are 
significant factors 
for resource 
leakage 
Mann-Whitney U 710.000 892.500 628.000 763.500 
Wilcoxon W 2480.000 2662.500 2398.000 2533.500 
Z -2.006 -.443 -2.701 -1.536 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .045 .658 .007 .124 
a. Grouping Variable: type of service delivery organization 
 
Table 3-40: Mean ranks for sectors and resource leakage 
 
Ranks 
 type of service delivery 
organization N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
unclear rules for financial 
accounting are significant 
factor for resource leakage 
education 32 53.31 1706.00 
WASA 59 42.03 2480.00 
Total 91   
lack of capacity to account 
for budgeting resources for 
resource leakage 
education 32 47.61 1523.50 
WASA 59 45.13 2662.50 
Total 91   
weak internal and external 
auditing practices are 
significant factor for resource 
leakage 
education 32 55.88 1788.00 
WASA 59 40.64 2398.00 
Total 91 
  
weak sanctions against 
corrupt practices are 
significant factors for 
resource leakage 
education 32 51.64 1652.50 
WASA 59 42.94 2533.50 
Total 91   
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Table 3-41: Mean ranks for Adequacy of resources and CDGs 
 
Ranks 
 City District Government N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
to what extent your 
organization have adequate 
financial resources  
Lahore 66 45.24 2986.00 
Faisalabad 25 48.00 1200.00 
Total 91   
to what extent your 
organization has adequate 
human resources  
Lahore 66 48.27 3186.00 
Faisalabad 25 40.00 1000.00 
Total 91   
to what extent your 
organization has adequate 
technical resources 
Lahore 66 51.64 3408.50 
Faisalabad 25 31.10 777.50 
Total 91   
to what extent your 
organization has adequate 
infrastructure 
Lahore 66 52.61 3472.50 
Faisalabad 25 28.54 713.50 
Total 91   
Table 3-42: Mann Whitney U test statistics for CDGs and adequacy of resource 
Test Statisticsa 
 
to what extent 
your organization 
have adequate 
financial 
resources  
to what extent 
your organization 
has adequate 
human resources  
to what extent 
your organization 
has adequate 
technical 
resources 
to what extent 
your organization 
has adequate 
infrastructure 
Mann-Whitney U 775.000 675.000 452.500 388.500 
Wilcoxon W 2986.000 1000.000 777.500 713.500 
Z -.464 -1.419 -3.659 -4.227 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .643 .156 .000 .000 
a. Grouping Variable: City District Government 
 
Table 3-43: Mean Ranks for CDGs and adequacy of resource 
Ranks 
 type of service delivery 
organization N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
to what extent your 
organization have adequate 
financial resources  
education 32 65.02 2080.50 
WASA 59 35.69 2105.50 
Total 91   
to what extent your 
organization has adequate 
human resources  
education 32 49.78 1593.00 
WASA 59 43.95 2593.00 
Total 91   
to what extent your 
organization has adequate 
technical resources 
education 32 35.05 1121.50 
WASA 59 51.94 3064.50 
Total 91   
to what extent your 
organization has adequate 
infrastructure 
education 32 38.78 1241.00 
WASA 59 49.92 2945.00 
Total 91   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 550 
 
Table 3-44: Mann Whitney U test statistics for adequacy of resources and sectors 
 
 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 
to what extent 
your organization 
have adequate 
financial 
resources  
to what extent 
your organization 
has adequate 
human resources  
to what extent 
your organization 
has adequate 
technical 
resources 
to what extent 
your organization 
has adequate 
infrastructure 
Mann-Whitney U 335.500 823.000 593.500 713.000 
Wilcoxon W 2105.500 2593.000 1121.500 1241.000 
Z -5.280 -1.070 -3.219 -2.091 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .285 .001 .037 
a. Grouping Variable: type of service delivery organization 
 
Table 3-45: Cross Tabulation for Bureaucratic Interference 
 
Crosstab 
 
type of service delivery organization 
Total education WASA 
INTERFERENCEB infrequent/almost 
never 
Count 13 45 58 
% within 
INTERFERENCEB 
22.4% 77.6% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
40.6% 76.3% 63.7% 
% of Total 14.3% 49.5% 63.7% 
frequent/very 
frequent 
Count 19 14 33 
% within 
INTERFERENCEB 
57.6% 42.4% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
59.4% 23.7% 36.3% 
% of Total 20.9% 15.4% 36.3% 
Total Count 32 59 91 
% within 
INTERFERENCEB 
35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
 
Table 3-46: CHI square for Bureaucratic Interference 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.406a 1 .001   
Continuity Correctionb 9.916 1 .002   
Likelihood Ratio 11.310 1 .001   
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
11.281 1 .001 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.60. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 551 
 
 
Table 3-47: Chi Square for Political Interference 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .018a 1 .892   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .018 1 .893   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .543 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.018 1 .893 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.74. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 3-48: chi square test for Policy consistency 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .353a 1 .552   
Continuity Correctionb .122 1 .727   
Likelihood Ratio .349 1 .554   
Fisher's Exact Test    .626 .360 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.350 1 .554 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.79. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 3-49: Chi square test for Policy impact 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.569a 1 .210   
Continuity Correctionb .965 1 .326   
Likelihood Ratio 1.524 1 .217   
Fisher's Exact Test    .281 .163 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.551 1 .213 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.68. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 3-50: Chi square test for Coordination among tiers 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .000a 1 .990   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .000 1 .990   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .599 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.000 1 .990 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.98. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 3-51: Mean Ranks for institutional factors 
Ranks 
 type of service delivery 
organization N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
to what extent political 
instability affect your 
organizational performance 
education 32 58.13 1860.00 
WASA 59 39.42 2326.00 
Total 91   
to what extent regime 
legitimacy affect your 
organizational performance 
education 32 59.17 1893.50 
WASA 59 38.86 2292.50 
Total 91   
to what extent economic 
instability affect your 
organizational performance 
education 32 54.13 1732.00 
WASA 59 41.59 2454.00 
Total 91   
to what extent lack of 
political support affect 
your organizational 
performance 
education 32 50.89 1628.50 
WASA 59 43.35 2557.50 
Total 91 
  
to what extent lack of 
bureaucratic support affect 
your organizational 
performance 
education 32 52.34 1675.00 
WASA 59 42.56 2511.00 
Total 91 
  
to what extent lack of 
supportive local context 
affect your organizational 
performance 
education 32 60.78 1945.00 
WASA 59 37.98 2241.00 
Total 91   
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Table 3-52: Mann Whitney U test statistics for institutional performance comparing sectors 
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 
  political 
instability  
regime 
legitimacy  
economic 
instability  
lack of 
political 
support  
Lack of 
bureaucratic 
support 
lack of 
supportive 
local 
context  
Mann-Whitney U 556.000 522.500 684.000 787.500 741.000 471.000 
Wilcoxon W 2326.000 2292.500 2454.000 2557.500 2511.000 2241.000 
Z -3.337 -3.595 -2.219 -1.344 -1.786 -4.024 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .026 .179 .074 .000 
a. Grouping Variable: type of service delivery organization 
 
Table 3-53: Mean Ranks for institutional factors and CDGs 
 
Ranks 
 City District Government N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
to what extent political 
instability affect your 
organizational performance 
Lahore 66 41.98 2770.50 
Faisalabad 25 56.62 1415.50 
Total 91   
to what extent regime 
legitimacy affect your 
organizational performance 
Lahore 66 42.27 2790.00 
Faisalabad 25 55.84 1396.00 
Total 91   
to what extent economic 
instability affect your 
organizational performance 
Lahore 66 40.55 2676.50 
Faisalabad 25 60.38 1509.50 
Total 91   
to what extent lack of political 
support affect your 
organizational performance 
Lahore 66 41.35 2729.00 
Faisalabad 25 58.28 1457.00 
Total 91   
to what extent lack of 
bureaucratic support affect 
your organizational 
performance 
Lahore 66 42.46 2802.50 
Faisalabad 25 55.34 1383.50 
Total 91 
  
to what extent lack of 
supportive local context affect 
your organizational 
performance 
Lahore 66 39.71 2621.00 
Faisalabad 25 62.60 1565.00 
Total 91   
Table 3-54: Mann Whitney U test statistics comparing CDGs 
 
Test Statisticsa 
  political 
instability  
regime 
legitimacy  
economic 
instability  
 lack of 
political 
support  
 lack of 
bureaucratic 
support 
affect  
supportive 
local context  
Mann-Whitney 
U 
559.500 579.000 465.500 518.000 591.500 410.000 
Wilcoxon W 2770.500 2790.000 2676.500 2729.000 2802.500 2621.000 
Z -2.442 -2.244 -3.282 -2.820 -2.198 -3.777 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.015 .025 .001 .005 .028 .000 
a. Grouping Variable: City District Government 
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Table 3-55: cross tabulation for Access to information across sector 
 
Crosstab 
 
type of service delivery organization 
Total education WASA 
ACCESSINFOR extremely/difficult Count 13 10 23 
% within 
ACCESSINFOR 
56.5% 43.5% 100.0% 
% within type of 
service delivery 
organization 
40.6% 16.9% 25.3% 
% of Total 14.3% 11.0% 25.3% 
easy/very easy Count 19 49 68 
% within 
ACCESSINFOR 
27.9% 72.1% 100.0% 
% within type of 
service delivery 
organization 
59.4% 83.1% 74.7% 
% of Total 20.9% 53.8% 74.7% 
Total Count 32 59 91 
% within 
ACCESSINFOR 
35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within type of 
service delivery 
organization 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 3-56: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.158a 1 .013   
Continuity Correctionb 4.968 1 .026   
Likelihood Ratio 5.962 1 .015   
Fisher's Exact Test    .022 .014 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.090 1 .014   
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.09. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 3-57: Crosstab for reliability of information and sectors 
 
type of service delivery organization 
Total education WASA 
RELIABILITYI
NFO 
not/partially 
reliable 
Count 10 17 27 
% within RELIABILITYINFO 37.0% 63.0% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
31.3% 28.8% 29.7% 
% of Total 11.0% 18.7% 29.7% 
moderate/highly 
reliable 
Count 22 42 64 
% within RELIABILITYINFO 34.4% 65.6% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
68.8% 71.2% 70.3% 
% of Total 24.2% 46.2% 70.3% 
Total Count 32 59 91 
% within RELIABILITYINFO 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within type of service 
delivery organization 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 3-58: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .059a 1 .808   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 .998   
Likelihood Ratio .059 1 .808   
Fisher's Exact Test    .814 .495 
Linear-by-Linear Association .058 1 .809   
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.49. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 3-59: cross tabulation for reliability of information and CGDs 
 
Crosstab 
 
City District Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
RELIABILITYINF
O 
not/partially 
reliable 
Count 16 11 27 
% within 
RELIABILITYINFO 
59.3% 40.7% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
24.2% 44.0% 29.7% 
% of Total 17.6% 12.1% 29.7% 
moderate/hig
hly reliable 
Count 50 14 64 
% within 
RELIABILITYINFO 
78.1% 21.9% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
75.8% 56.0% 70.3% 
% of Total 54.9% 15.4% 70.3% 
Total Count 66 25 91 
% within 
RELIABILITYINFO 
72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
% within City District 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.5% 27.5% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 3-60: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
3.392a 1 .066 
  
Continuity 
Correctionb 
2.511 1 .113 
  
Likelihood Ratio 3.258 1 .071   
Fisher's Exact 
Test 
   
.077 .058 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.355 1 .067 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.42. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Table 3-61: Chi-Square Tests for Grievance procedure comparing sectors 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .130a 1 .718   
Continuity Correctionb .005 1 .942   
Likelihood Ratio .132 1 .716   
Fisher's Exact Test    .781 .479 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.129 1 .719 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.63. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 3-62: Chi-Square Tests for grievance procedures comparing LG 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.069a 1 .005   
Continuity Correctionb 6.411 1 .011   
Likelihood Ratio 7.317 1 .007   
Fisher's Exact Test    .011 .007 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.980 1 .005 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.40. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Table 3-63: Chi-Square Tests for monitoring committees for LG 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.945a 1 .047   
Continuity Correctionb 3.034 1 .082   
Likelihood Ratio 4.201 1 .040   
Fisher's Exact Test    .054 .038 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.901 1 .048 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.07. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 3-64: Chi-Square Tests for monitoring committee comparing sectors  
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .076a 1 .783   
Continuity Correctionb .002 1 .962   
Likelihood Ratio .076 1 .782   
Fisher's Exact Test    .823 .484 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.075 1 .784 
  
N of Valid Cases 91     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.60. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Appendix 4: Community Survey  
Table 5: Knowledge of CCB 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.132a 1 .144   
Continuity Correctionb 1.684 1 .194   
Likelihood Ratio 2.141 1 .143   
Fisher's Exact Test    .194 .097 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.121 1 .145   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 6: Knowledge of SMC 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .936a 1 .333   
Continuity Correctionb .650 1 .420   
Likelihood Ratio .937 1 .333   
Fisher's Exact Test    .420 .210 
Linear-by-Linear Association .931 1 .335 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 7: Knowledge of Water and sanitation committee 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.299a 1 .254   
Continuity Correctionb .994 1 .319   
Likelihood Ratio 1.300 1 .254   
Fisher's Exact Test    .319 .159 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.292 1 .256   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 44.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 8: Part of monitoring committee 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
are you part of 
any monitoring 
committee 
yes Count 16 0 16 
% within are you part of any 
monitoring committee 
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 16.0% .0% 8.0% 
% of Total 8.0% .0% 8.0% 
no Count 84 100 184 
% within are you part of any 
monitoring committee 
45.7% 54.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 84.0% 100.0% 92.0% 
% of Total 42.0% 50.0% 92.0% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within are you part of any 
monitoring committee 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 9: Chi square test 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.391a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 15.285 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 23.574 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
17.304 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 10: Part of SMC*LG 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
are you 
part of 
SMC 
yes Count 17 2 19 
% within are you part of SMC 89.5% 10.5% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 17.0% 2.0% 9.5% 
% of Total 8.5% 1.0% 9.5% 
no Count 83 98 181 
% within are you part of SMC 45.9% 54.1% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 83.0% 98.0% 90.5% 
% of Total 41.5% 49.0% 90.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within are you part of SMC 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 11: Chi Square test 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.085a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 11.399 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 14.797 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
13.020 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 Table 12: Part of CCB*LG 
 
Cross tabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
are you 
part of 
CCB 
yes Count 13 0 13 
% within are you part of CCB 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 13.0% .0% 6.5% 
% of Total 6.5% .0% 6.5% 
no Count 87 100 187 
% within are you part of CCB 46.5% 53.5% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 87.0% 100.0% 93.5% 
% of Total 43.5% 50.0% 93.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within are you part of CCB 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
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Table 13: Chi-square test 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.904a 1 .000   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
11.847 1 .001 
  
Likelihood Ratio 18.926 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
13.834 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Table 14: Chi-square test for contact with local councillors (A) 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.135a 1 .287   
Continuity Correctionb .834 1 .361   
Likelihood Ratio 1.137 1 .286   
Fisher's Exact Test    .361 .181 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.130 1 .288 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 31.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 15: Chi-square test for Local councillors contacting community (B) 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.009a 1 .315   
Continuity Correctionb .741 1 .389   
Likelihood Ratio 1.010 1 .315   
Fisher's Exact Test    .389 .195 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.004 1 .316 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 16: Chi-square test for Councillors consulting community for development projects 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.348a 1 .037   
Continuity Correctionb 3.329 1 .068   
Likelihood Ratio 4.534 1 .033   
Fisher's Exact Test    .065 .033 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.326 1 .038 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 17: Chi-square test for have you brought any local issue in the knowledge of your local 
councillor 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.587a 1 .208   
Continuity Correctionb 1.215 1 .270   
Likelihood Ratio 1.591 1 .207   
Fisher's Exact Test    .270 .135 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.579 1 .209 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 18: quality of contact-did you find the person hones/fair in his dealings*LG (A) 
Cross tabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
Did you find the 
person hones/fair 
in his dealings 
yes Count 54 79 133 
% within did you find the 
person hones/fair in his 
dealings 
40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 76.1% 100.0% 88.7% 
% of Total 36.0% 52.7% 88.7% 
no Count 17 0 17 
% within did you find the 
person hones/fair in his 
dealings 
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 23.9% .0% 11.3% 
% of Total 11.3% .0% 11.3% 
Total Count 71 79 150 
% within did you find the 
person hones/fair in his 
dealings 
47.3% 52.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.3% 52.7% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 19: Chi-Square Tests 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.333a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 19.017 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 27.867 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
21.191 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 150     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.05. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 20: Quality of contact- MEETING/Local Councillor * LG (B) 
Cross tabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
MEETING/
LC 
SATISFIED/VE
RY SATISFIED 
Count 63 79 142 
% within MEETING/LC 44.4% 55.6% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 84.0% 100.0% 92.2% 
% of Total 40.9% 51.3% 92.2% 
dissatisfied/very 
dissatisfied 
Count 12 0 12 
% within MEETING/LC 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 16.0% .0% 7.8% 
% of Total 7.8% .0% 7.8% 
Total Count 75 79 154 
% within MEETING/LC 48.7% 51.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 48.7% 51.3% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 21: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.708a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 11.572 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 18.338 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.619 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 154     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.84. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 22: contacted any district government officer for any of your problems *LG 
Crosstabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
have you ever 
contacted any 
district government 
officer for any of 
your problems 
yes Count 29 70 99 
% within have you ever 
contacted any district 
government officer for any of 
your problems 
29.3% 70.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 29.0% 70.0% 49.5% 
% of Total 14.5% 35.0% 49.5% 
no Count 71 30 101 
% within have you ever 
contacted any district 
government officer for any of 
your problems 
70.3% 29.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 71.0% 30.0% 50.5% 
% of Total 35.5% 15.0% 50.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within have you ever 
contacted any district 
government officer for any of 
your problems 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 23: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.623a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 32.003 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 34.636 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
33.455 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 49.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 24: Quality of contact- did you find the person honest and fair in his dealings * LG 
(A) 
Cross tabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
did you find the 
person honest 
and fair in his 
dealings 
yes Count 21 67 88 
% within did you find the 
person honest and fair in his 
dealings 
23.9% 76.1% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 72.4% 94.4% 88.0% 
% of Total 21.0% 67.0% 88.0% 
no Count 8 4 12 
% within did you find the 
person honest and fair in his 
dealings 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 27.6% 5.6% 12.0% 
% of Total 8.0% 4.0% 12.0% 
Total Count 29 71 100 
% within did you find the 
person honest and fair in his 
dealings 
29.0% 71.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 29.0% 71.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 25: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.396a 1 .002   
Continuity Correctionb 7.432 1 .006   
Likelihood Ratio 8.441 1 .004   
Fisher's Exact Test    .005 .005 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.302 1 .002 
  
N of Valid Cases 100     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 26: Quality of contact MEETING/DO * Local Government (B) 
Crosstabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
MEETING/D
O 
satisfied/very 
satisfied 
Count 24 65 89 
% within MEETING/DO 27.0% 73.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 77.4% 95.6% 89.9% 
% of Total 24.2% 65.7% 89.9% 
dissatisfied/ve
ry dissatisfied 
Count 7 3 10 
% within MEETING/DO 70.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 22.6% 4.4% 10.1% 
% of Total 7.1% 3.0% 10.1% 
Total Count 31 68 99 
% within MEETING/DO 31.3% 68.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 31.3% 68.7% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 27: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.741a 1 .005   
Continuity Correctionb 5.869 1 .015   
Likelihood Ratio 7.096 1 .008   
Fisher's Exact Test    .010 .010 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.662 1 .006 
  
N of Valid Cases 99     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 Table 28: CORRUPTION1 * Local Government  
 
Cross tabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
CORRUPTIO
N1 
Union 
Councillors 
Count 54 88 142 
% within CORRUPTION1 38.0% 62.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 54.0% 88.0% 71.0% 
% of Total 27.0% 44.0% 71.0% 
others Count 46 12 58 
% within CORRUPTION1 79.3% 20.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 46.0% 12.0% 29.0% 
% of Total 23.0% 6.0% 29.0% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within CORRUPTION1 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
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Table 29: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.072a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 26.445 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 29.487 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
27.932 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 29.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Table 30: acc1: does council members tell you about the meetings of council 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total lahore Faisalabad 
acc1:do council memebrs 
tell you about the meetings 
of council 
yes/ 
sometimes 
Count 30 15 45 
% within acc1:do council 
memebrs tell you about the 
meetings of council 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 30.0% 15.0% 22.5% 
% of Total 15.0% 7.5% 22.5% 
no Count 70 85 155 
% within acc1:do council 
memebrs tell you about the 
meetings of council 
45.2% 54.8% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 70.0% 85.0% 77.5% 
% of Total 35.0% 42.5% 77.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within acc1:do council 
memebrs tell you about the 
meetings of council 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
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Table 31: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.452a 1 .011   
Continuity Correctionb 5.620 1 .018   
Likelihood Ratio 6.551 1 .010   
Fisher's Exact Test    .017 .009 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.419 1 .011 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 32: do councillors inform you about the development projects in your community 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
acc2: do councillors 
inform you about the 
development projects in 
your community 
yes/ 
Sometimes 
Count 65 30 95 
% within acc2:do councillors 
inform you about the 
development projects of your 
community 
68.4% 31.6% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 65.0% 30.0% 47.5% 
% of Total 32.5% 15.0% 47.5% 
No Count 35 70 105 
% within acc2:do councillors 
inform you about the 
development projects of your 
community 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 35.0% 70.0% 52.5% 
% of Total 17.5% 35.0% 52.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within acc2:do councillors 
inform you about the 
development projects of your 
community 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 33: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.561a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 23.178 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 25.096 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 24.439 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 47.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 34: acc9- do councillors inform you about the money spent on development projects 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
acc9:do councillors 
inform you about the 
money spent on 
development projects 
Yes/ 
Sometimes 
Count 43 6 49 
% within acc9:do councillors 
inform you about the money 
spent on development projects 
87.8% 12.2% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 43.0% 6.0% 24.5% 
% of Total 21.5% 3.0% 24.5% 
No Count 57 94 151 
% within acc9:do councillors 
inform you about the money 
spent on development projects 
37.7% 62.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 57.0% 94.0% 75.5% 
% of Total 28.5% 47.0% 75.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within acc9:do councillors 
inform you about the money 
spent on development projects 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 35: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 37.005a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 35.032 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 40.654 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 36.820 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 36: Chi-Square Tests- access to local government offices for information 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .500a 1 .480   
Continuity Correctionb .281 1 .596   
Likelihood Ratio .501 1 .479   
Fisher's Exact Test    .596 .298 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.498 1 .481 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
 571 
 
Table 37: Chi-Square Tests -in your opinion, your complaint is heard 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.653a 1 .056   
Continuity Correctionb 3.070 1 .080   
Likelihood Ratio 3.676 1 .055   
Fisher's Exact Test    .079 .040 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.635 1 .057   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 38: Change in attendance of local government employees (a) 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
have you noticed any 
change in the 
attendance of local 
government 
employees 
yes Count 52 77 129 
% within have you noticed any 
change in the attendance of 
local government employees 
40.3% 59.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 52.0% 77.0% 64.5% 
% of Total 26.0% 38.5% 64.5% 
no Count 48 23 71 
% within have you noticed any 
change in the attendance of 
local government employees 
67.6% 32.4% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 48.0% 23.0% 35.5% 
% of Total 24.0% 11.5% 35.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within have you noticed any 
change in the attendance of 
local government employees 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 39: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.648a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 12.578 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 13.870 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.580 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 35.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 40: Change in attendance of local government employees (b) 
ACC7:what was the change * Local Government Crosstabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ACC7:what was 
the change 
IMPROVED Count 52 77 129 
% within ACC7:what was 
the change 
40.3% 59.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 52.0% 77.0% 64.5% 
% of Total 26.0% 38.5% 64.5% 
NO CHANGE/NOT 
IMPROVED 
Count 48 23 71 
% within ACC7:what was 
the change 
67.6% 32.4% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 48.0% 23.0% 35.5% 
% of Total 24.0% 11.5% 35.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ACC7:what was 
the change 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 41: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.648a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 12.578 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 13.870 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.580 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 35.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 42: are you satisfied with the WSS provision 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ss8:are you 
satisfied with the 
WSS provision 
dissatisfied Count 71 50 121 
% within ss8:are you satisfied 
with the WSS provision 
58.7% 41.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 71.0% 50.0% 60.5% 
% of Total 35.5% 25.0% 60.5% 
satisfied Count 29 50 79 
% within ss8:are you satisfied 
with the WSS provision 
36.7% 63.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 29.0% 50.0% 39.5% 
% of Total 14.5% 25.0% 39.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ss8:are you satisfied 
with the WSS provision 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 43: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.227a 1 .002   
Continuity Correctionb 8.369 1 .004   
Likelihood Ratio 9.313 1 .002   
Fisher's Exact Test    .004 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.181 1 .002   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 39.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 44: ss11- sewerage system before and after local government system 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ss11:how would 
you compare the 
sewerage system 
before and after 
local government 
system 
dissatisfied Count 31 50 81 
% within ss11:how would you 
compare the system of Water 
and sanitation provision before 
and after local government 
system 
38.3% 61.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 31.0% 50.0% 40.5% 
% of Total 15.5% 25.0% 40.5% 
satisfied Count 69 50 119 
% within ss11:how would you 
compare the system of Water 
and sanitation provision before 
and after local government 
system 
58.0% 42.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 69.0% 50.0% 59.5% 
% of Total 34.5% 25.0% 59.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ss11:how would you 
compare the system of Water 
and sanitation provision before 
and after local government 
system 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 45: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.490a 1 .006   
Continuity Correctionb 6.723 1 .010   
Likelihood Ratio 7.545 1 .006   
Fisher's Exact Test    .009 .005 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.453 1 .006 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 40.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 46: Access to water supply 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ws19: has you 
access to water 
improved after 
LGS 
improved Count 75 54 129 
% within ws19: has you 
access to water improved 
after LGS 
58.1% 41.9% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
75.0% 54.0% 64.5% 
% of Total 37.5% 27.0% 64.5% 
no change/ 
became worse 
Count 25 46 71 
% within ws19: has you 
access to water improved 
after LGS 
35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
25.0% 46.0% 35.5% 
% of Total 12.5% 23.0% 35.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ws19: has you 
access to water improved 
after LGS 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 47: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.630a 1 .002   
Continuity Correctionb 8.735 1 .003   
Likelihood Ratio 9.739 1 .002   
Fisher's Exact Test    .003 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.582 1 .002 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 35.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 48: satisfaction with water supply 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ws20:are you 
satisfied with the 
service provision 
dissatisfied Count 38 25 63 
% within ws20:are you 
satisfied with the service 
provision 
60.3% 39.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 38.0% 25.0% 31.5% 
% of Total 19.0% 12.5% 31.5% 
satisfied Count 62 75 137 
% within ws20:are you 
satisfied with the service 
provision 
45.3% 54.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 62.0% 75.0% 68.5% 
% of Total 31.0% 37.5% 68.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ws20:are you 
satisfied with the service 
provision 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 49: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.916a 1 .048   
Continuity Correctionb 3.337 1 .068   
Likelihood Ratio 3.937 1 .047   
Fisher's Exact Test    .067 .034 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.897 1 .048   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 31.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 50: improvement in water supply before and after local government*LG 
Cross tabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ws24:in you opinion, 
have water services 
improved after the 
local government 
system 
worse/no 
change 
Count 19 35 54 
% within ws24:in you opinion, 
have water services improved 
after the local government 
system 
35.2% 64.8% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 19.0% 35.0% 27.0% 
% of Total 9.5% 17.5% 27.0% 
improved Count 81 65 146 
% within ws24:in you opinion, 
have water services improved 
after the local government 
system 
55.5% 44.5% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 81.0% 65.0% 73.0% 
% of Total 40.5% 32.5% 73.0% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ws24:in you opinion, 
have water services improved 
after the local government 
system 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 51: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.494a 1 .011   
Continuity Correctionb 5.708 1 .017   
Likelihood Ratio 6.570 1 .010   
Fisher's Exact Test    .016 .008 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.462 1 .011 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 52: Access to education 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ed9:has access to 
education improved 
after local government 
system 
improved Count 69 98 167 
% within ed9:has access to 
education improved after local 
government system 
41.3% 58.7% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 70.4% 98.0% 84.3% 
% of Total 34.8% 49.5% 84.3% 
no 
change/wors
e 
Count 29 2 31 
% within ed9:has access to 
education improved after local 
government system 
93.5% 6.5% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 29.6% 2.0% 15.7% 
% of Total 14.6% 1.0% 15.7% 
Total Count 98 100 198 
% within ed9:has access to 
education improved after local 
government system 
49.5% 50.5% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 49.5% 50.5% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 53: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.535a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 26.484 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 33.185 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
28.391 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 198     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.34. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 54: Reasons for attending schools*LG 
Cross tabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ed5: the reasons 
for attending 
school 
others Count 53 70 123 
% within ed5: the reasons for 
attending school 
43.1% 56.9% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 53.0% 70.0% 61.5% 
% of Total 26.5% 35.0% 61.5% 
quality of 
education 
Count 47 30 77 
% within ed5: the reasons for 
attending school 
61.0% 39.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 47.0% 30.0% 38.5% 
% of Total 23.5% 15.0% 38.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ed5: the reasons for 
attending school 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 55: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.103a 1 .013   
Continuity Correctionb 5.406 1 .020   
Likelihood Ratio 6.141 1 .013   
Fisher's Exact Test    .020 .010 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.072 1 .014   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 38.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 56: teacher attendance*LG 
Cross tabulation 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ed8: in you opinion 
is there any 
improvement in 
teachers attendance 
after the local 
government system 
improved Count 69 96 165 
% within ed8: in you 
opinion is there any 
improvement in teachers 
attendance after the local 
government system 
41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
69.0% 96.0% 82.5% 
% of Total 34.5% 48.0% 82.5% 
no 
change/more 
absenteeism 
Count 31 4 35 
% within ed8: in you 
opinion is there any 
improvement in teachers 
attendance after the local 
government system 
88.6% 11.4% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
31.0% 4.0% 17.5% 
% of Total 15.5% 2.0% 17.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ed8: in you 
opinion is there any 
improvement in teachers 
attendance after the local 
government system 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 57: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.247a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 23.411 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 28.082 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
25.121 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 58: improvement in education before and after LG*LG 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
ed12:in your 
opinion, is there 
any improvement 
in the education 
provision after 
local government 
system 
better Count 86 95 181 
% within ed12:in your opinion, 
is there any improvement in 
the education provision after 
local government system 
47.5% 52.5% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 86.0% 95.0% 90.5% 
% of Total 43.0% 47.5% 90.5% 
no change/ 
worse 
Count 14 5 19 
% within ed12:in your opinion, 
is there any improvement in 
the education provision after 
local government system 
73.7% 26.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 14.0% 5.0% 9.5% 
% of Total 7.0% 2.5% 9.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within ed12:in your opinion, 
is there any improvement in 
the education provision after 
local government system 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 59: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.711a 1 .030   
Continuity Correctionb 3.722 1 .054   
Likelihood Ratio 4.887 1 .027   
Fisher's Exact Test    .051 .026 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.687 1 .030 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 60: increase in community participation*LG 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
plg1:has local 
government been 
able to improve 
community 
participation in 
service delivery 
improved Count 76 94 170 
% within plg1:has local 
government been able to 
improve community 
participation in service delivery 
44.7% 55.3% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 76.0% 94.0% 85.0% 
% of Total 38.0% 47.0% 85.0% 
not improved Count 24 6 30 
% within plg1:has local 
government been able to 
improve community 
participation in service delivery 
80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 24.0% 6.0% 15.0% 
% of Total 12.0% 3.0% 15.0% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within plg1:has local 
government been able to 
improve community 
participation in service delivery 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 61: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.706a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 11.333 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 13.474 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
12.642 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 62: Chi-Square Tests- has local government been able to solve this issue 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.765a 1 .096   
Continuity Correctionb 1.920 1 .166   
Likelihood Ratio 2.850 1 .091   
Fisher's Exact Test    .164 .082 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.751 1 .097   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Table 63: Attendance of local government employees*LG 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
plg5:Has local government 
been able to improve the 
attendance of government 
employees 
Improved Count 57 79 136 
% within plg5:Has local 
government been able to 
improve the attendance 
of government 
employees 
41.9% 58.1% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
57.0% 79.0% 68.0% 
% of Total 28.5% 39.5% 68.0% 
No 
change/more 
absentees 
Count 43 21 64 
% within plg5:Has local 
government been able to 
improve the attendance 
of government 
employees 
67.2% 32.8% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
43.0% 21.0% 32.0% 
% of Total 21.5% 10.5% 32.0% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within plg5:Has local 
government been able to 
improve the attendance 
of government 
employees 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
100.0
% 
100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
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Table 64: Chi-Square Tests 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.121a 1 .001   
Continuity Correctionb 10.133 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 11.293 1 .001   
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
11.066 1 .001 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 32.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 65: Chi-Square Tests 
plg6: in your opinion, has local government been able to improve service delivery 
compared to the previous system Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.714a 1 .030   
Continuity Correctionb 3.463 1 .063   
Likelihood Ratio 5.077 1 .024   
Fisher's Exact Test    .058 .029 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.690 1 .030 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 66: transparency of the system*LG 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
plg8: is local 
government system 
more transparent than 
the previous system 
better Count 80 98 178 
% within plg8: is local 
government system more 
transparent than the previous 
system 
44.9% 55.1% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 80.0% 98.0% 89.0% 
% of Total 40.0% 49.0% 89.0% 
no change/ 
worse 
Count 20 2 22 
% within plg8: is local 
government system more 
transparent than the previous 
system 
90.9% 9.1% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 20.0% 2.0% 11.0% 
% of Total 10.0% 1.0% 11.0% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within plg8: is local 
government system more 
transparent than the previous 
system 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local Government 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 67: Chi-Square Tests 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.547a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 14.760 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 18.918 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
16.465 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 68: Corruption and LG 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
plg9: has the local 
government system 
been able to reduce 
corruption 
To a great extent/ 
To some extent 
Count 79 100 179 
% within plg9: has the 
local government system 
been able to reduce 
corruption 
44.1% 55.9% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
79.0% 100.0% 89.5% 
% of Total 39.5% 50.0% 89.5% 
Not at all Count 21 0 21 
% within plg9: has the 
local government system 
been able to reduce 
corruption 
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
21.0% .0% 10.5% 
% of Total 10.5% .0% 10.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within plg9: has the 
local government system 
been able to reduce 
corruption 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 69: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.464a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 21.282 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 31.582 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
23.346 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 70: Complaints procedures*LG 
Crosstab 
 
Local Government 
Total Lahore Faisalabad 
plg10: has the local 
government system 
been able to improve 
the complaint 
procedures 
To a great 
extent/to some 
extent 
Count 69 96 165 
% within plg10: has the 
local government system 
been able to improve the 
complaint procedures 
41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
69.0% 96.0% 82.5% 
% of Total 34.5% 48.0% 82.5% 
Not at all Count 31 4 35 
% within plg10: has the 
local government system 
been able to improve the 
complaint procedures 
88.6% 11.4% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
31.0% 4.0% 17.5% 
% of Total 15.5% 2.0% 17.5% 
Total Count 100 100 200 
% within plg10: has the 
local government system 
been able to improve the 
complaint procedures 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Local 
Government 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 71: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.247a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 23.411 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 28.082 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
25.121 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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MONITORING COMMITTEES 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
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Appendix 5 
Structure of three tiers of Local Government under LGO 2001 
 
Table 72: Structure of City District Government in Pakistan under LGO 2001 
 
Source: NRB 2001 
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Table 73: Tehsil Muncipal Administration under LGO 2001 
 
Source: NRB 2001 
 
Table 74: Structure of Union Administration under LGO 2001 
 
 
Source: NRB 2001 
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Table 75: Monitoring Committees 
S. 
No. 
Monitoring Committee Chairman/ 
Chairperson 
Concerned Officer/EDO 
Name of Officer/EDO DO Concerned Name of DO 
1 District Coordination  
Mrs.Shabnam Shehzadi Butt, 
(Women Member) 
District Coordination Officer 
(DCO) 
Mr.Muhammad Ijaz DO(Coord) Mr.Mansoor Qadir  
2 Sports  
Mian Atique,  
UC-31 
District Coordination Officer 
(DCO) 
Mr.Muhammad Ejaz DO Sports Mr.Tariq Nazir  
3 Culture  
Mr.Mazhar Iqbal Bhalli Butt, 
UC -71 
District Coordination Officer 
(DCO) 
Mr.Muhammad Ejaz DO Sports Mr.Tariq Nazir  
4 Agriculture  
Malik Mudassir Khokhar, 
UC-121 
EDO (Agriculture) Malik Akram   
5 Forest & Fisheries  
Haji Tariq Feroze, 
UC-79 
EDO (Agriculture) Malik Akram DO Fisheries Mr.Manzoor Hussain Bhatti  
6 Livestock  
Mr.Iftikhar Ahmed,  
UC-123 
EDO (Agriculture) Malik Akram DO Livestock Dr.Malik Nawaz 
7 CCB & Monitoring 
Mr.Haaris Saleem, 
UC-89 
EDO (CD) Mr.Ghulam Abbas Gondal   
8 Cooperatives  
Mr.Sajjad Rabbani,  
UC-116 
EDO (CD) Mr.Ghulam Abbas Gondal   
9 Social Welfare  Mrs.Farah Deeba Butt EDO (CD) Mr.Ghulam Abbas Gondal DO Social Welfare Mrs.Ruqayya Akbar  
10 Industries & Labour  
Mr.Tariq Javed Tariq, UC-
142 
EDO (CD) Mr.Ghulam Abbas Gondal DO Labour Ch. Nasar Ullah  
11 
Special & Technical 
Education  
Ms. Salma Riaz, 
(Women Member) 
EDO (CD) Mr.Ghulam Abbas Gondal DO Special Education  Khalid Awan  
12 Boys Education 
Arshad Dogar,  
UC-112 
EDO (Education) Mr.Zahid Hussain Khan    
13 Girls Education 
Sajida Anjum Zuberi 
(deceased) 
EDO (Education) Mr.Zahid Hussain Khan  
  
14 Finance & Planning  
Raja Munawwar, 
UC-115 
EDO (Finance) Mr.Asim Iqbal DO (Accounts) Mian Waheed-uz-Zaman 
15 Health (Urban) 
Mr.Nawaz Natt , 
UC-19 
EDO (Health) Dr.Capt(R) Inam-Ul-Haq DO(Health)-II 
Dr. Shabbir Ahmed 
Chaudhry 
16 Health (Rural) 
Mr.Fayyaz Bhatti, 
UC-143 
EDO (Health) Dr.Capt (R) Inam-ul-Haq DO(Health)-III Dr.Amjad Azam Jafri 
17 Literacy  
Mst.Shamim Nazeer, 
(Women Member) 
EDO (Literacy) Malik Abur Rauf   
18 Code of Conduct  
Mr.Shahid Munir Malik,UC-
86 
EDO (Law)    
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19 Law  
Mst.Sameena Khan, 
(Women Member) 
    
20 Insaf 
Haji Ilyas Usman, 
UC-11 
  DO(Litigation) Syed Ali Rizvi 
21 Revenue  
Mr.Iftikhar Sindhu, 
UC-150 
EDO (Revenue) Malik Muhammad Bakhsh DO(Revenue) Mr.Suhail Shehzad 
22 Excise & Taxation  
Habib Ullah Bhatti, 
UC-84 
EDO (Revenue) Malik Muhammad Bakhsh 
DO (Excise & 
Taxation) 
Mr.Ashraf Gondal  
23 Roads & Buildings 
Ch. Ghafoor, 
UC-97  
EDO (Works)  DO (Roads)-I Mr.Sultan Mahmood 
EDO (Works)  DO (Roads)-II Mr.Khalid Siddiqu Khan 
EDO (Works)  DO (Roads)-III Syed Riaz Hussain  
EDO (Works)  DO (Build)-I Raja Azhar Sultan 
EDO (Works)  DO (Build)-II Rana Basharat 
24 Crises Management Ch. Jabbar, UC-34 EDO (Works)  
DO (Electrical & 
Maintenance) 
Mr.Khalid Mahmood 
Sabri  
25 Services (SWM) 
Mr.Tahir Altaf, 
UC-96 
EDO (Municipal 
Services) 
   
26 Environment  
Rana Sharafat Ali, 
UC-149 (Deceased) 
EDO (Municipal 
Services) 
 DO (Environment) Mr.Tariq Zaman 
27 Traffic Management 
Mian Afzal Iqbal, 
UC-106 
EDO (Municipal 
Services) 
 
DO (Passenger & 
Freight Transit 
Terminals) 
Mr.Khalid Mahmood 
Ramay 
28 WASA 
Mr.Junaid Butt, 
UC-25 
Managing Director 
WASA 
Mr.Iftikhar Ahmed   
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 EDO/M/ARSHAD/CDGL (1) EDO/M/SOHAIB/CDGF (2) 
DECENT Efficient; effective; responsive; “best system”, 
“closer to the grass root level”. 
 
Efficient; responsive; “more autonomous unit 
to facilitate service delivery as compared to the 
previous structure” 
 
“Under a decentralized arrangement all the 
matters related to a district can be handled at 
the same level whereas prior to this people 
have to go to the divisional level to sort out the 
issue. Under decentralization districts have 
become more autonomous unit to facilitate 
service delivery as compared to the previous 
arrangement.” 
 
MAN/AUT Full; powers re-centralized in DCO; “Being 
directly involved in the system I can tell you 
what are the exact differences in devolution. 
There was DDEO; DEO of various sectors and 
then directors at divisional level, there was no 
one responsible for the convergence or 
coordination at the district level. From 
divisional level, it was controlled by the 
provinces. As far as education is concerned, in 
the true picture, when it was promulgated in 
2001, the EDO was the sole in charge at the 
district level. All managerial powers of 
financial, administrative and academic were in 
EDO. Some of the powers have to be shared 
/seek instruction from the DCO. Conversely, if 
you talk about the previous system, DEO of 
secondary and elementary level were having 
very thin powers. It was not decentralized at 
all. This is the best system. There are some 
problems, if you remove them from the district 
government system, it will be an ideal system to 
follow.” 
Fully; powers are re-centralized at the top with 
the DCO 
“Before decentralization, DEO could appoint 
or transfer grade 16 and now this power has 
been transferred to the DCO after 
decentralization. Now under the new 
arrangement, EDO can transfer up to grade 10 
and above that is in the jurisdiction of DCO. 
However, being category 1 officer I can use all 
the powers that are under my jurisdiction. For 
instance, in resource allocation, posting, 
transfers all those powers which are t the 
district level, we can exercise them fully. In the 
exercise of powers, main interference comes 
from the political factors.” 
PART Very significant; wider awareness among 
people; sense of ownership;  
“User involvement has become widespread. 
This system is closer to the grass root level. 
For example people living in small cities like 
Pasrur, or Chawand do not have to go to the 
divisional level, their problem can be sorted at 
eh district level. People are widely involved in 
the system, there is wider awareness among 
people regarding to which authority to go for 
the resolution of their issues. This system is 
more decentralized against lords or 
bureaucratic system which existed before. 
People have the sense of ownership of the 
system. Before this, people had no idea of how 
to resolve their issues because divisional 
officers were located t the divisional level? For 
example, if someone living in a remote area 
like Nankana Saab, knew nothing where to go 
as powers were scattered at provincial and 
divisional level. However, under this system all 
powers are located at the district level.” 
Forms-school councils, PPP 
Role of community-monitoring, financing, 
involved in school fund utilization decisions, 
Role of NGO-financing, service management 
contract. For example, Centre of Learning was 
established in Faisalabad by pooling resources 
from the community and the corporate sector. 
“The whole school model has also initiated 
which targets to improve school from inside 
Very significant; forms-school councils, PPP 
Role of community-financing, monitoring-
“community has helped to provide missing 
facilities in 58 school” 
School councils-“Before school councils, 
schools were always looking to the government 
for finances or approval to improve missing 
facilities. Now the school council has their own 
budget which they can spend according to their 
needs and do not need approval from the top. 
The creation of school councils has two main 
impacts, firstly, it has been able to reduce the 
teacher absenteeism and secondly, funds 
utilization is improved.” 
(+) outcome of community involvement-
reduced teacher absenteeism and transparency 
in funds utilization 
CCB (Citizen Community Board) is more 
active in other districts such as Jhelum, and 
Sahiwal than Faisalabad. 
PPP- we have PPP cell 
Role clarity between the partners as MOU is 
signed between the partners, and the copy of 
the MOU is provided to the DEO and DDEO 
Example of PPP-We established institute of 
learning with the help of corporate sector 
which provides training to the teachers; also 
organized training for the school council 
members  
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out. These are based from my Faisalabad 
experience.” 
ACCOUNT Multiple overlapping accountability 
arrangement. Example; DCO, District 
Assembly, DMO (District Monitoring Officer 
of provincial government). “Need to improve 
this chain by having better coordination among 
them” 
Affect performance. 
Internal auditing-overload of officers is the 
main reason of not doing internal auditing 
regular basis; the system needs clarity; training 
of DEO AN DDEO should be organized 
regarding budgeting, financial management 
(+) outcomes on performance-improved 
transparency ; improved accountability of the 
entire system;  
(-) Impact on performance-overload of work; 
duplication of work 
Grievance procedures-the system has become 
more open. Complaint cells are established at 
the district level. 
“There are very few people who are performing 
and many agencies that are monitoring. They 
are moving with a magnifying glass to find not 
what is wrong or right but with the paradigm of 
what is wrong and what is wrong. This is the 
kind of thinking that is being implemented. As 
for my analysis very few people are involved in 
corrupt activities, but a small spot is shown as a 
blunder and this kind of attitude is damaging 
the credentials of this decentralized system and 
as a nation as well. If you only want to find out 
what is wrong and are committed to find out 
that there is something wrong, you will find 
something. However, corruption is not at the 
mass level. It is done at the top level. If 
somebody at the grass root level, say, a clerk 
does something wrong we held him 
accountable but leaves those who have looted 
the billion at the top level.” 
Multiple overlapping accountability 
arrangement-“For example, one person 
complains to DCO, Nazim and to the education 
department at the same time. Though we sort it 
out immediately once it comes to our 
knowledge, but we have to be accountable for 
that matter to all other authorities. It wastes 
our time.” 
Efficient complaint cell-take prompt actions. 
Internal auditing-transparent internal auditing 
process. One of the procedure is termed as 
technical inspection which is a detailed audit of 
our schools that are under our jurisdiction 
Financial rules not very clear. This is one of 
the reasons for underutilization of funds. 
(+) more transparency as more people are 
involved 
(-) Outcomes-waste of our time for being 
accountable to so many bosses 
“In a way we can say that checks and balances 
are very strong under the decentralized 
arrangement.” 
PERFORM Multiple criteria consisting of both qualitative 
and quantities factors-result of school, co-
curricular activities, financial proficiency, 
academic performance, administrative control; 
 “More attention is paid to accountability for 
finances than accountability for performance” 
Now the incentive structure is improved as it 
has become more performance based e.g., best 
school awards  
Multiple criteria-dropout rate, enrollment, 
result, funds utilization etc. Incentive structure 
is linked to performance. It lacks of proper 
implementation of performance indicators. 
“There are some problems in the proper 
implementation of performance indicators. For 
example, ACR (Annual Confidential Report) is 
quite often biased. But, still system is better 
under decentralization.” 
 
INST/P No Very significant; mostly affect decisions 
regarding transfers, promotion, or recruitment. 
INST/B To some extent 
  
Significant-“Bureaucracy is one of the factors 
that affect our performance. There is no 
rationalization of development work. Where 
bureaucracy wants to do some development 
they will do it where they do not want to 
undertake any development activity either they 
will demand loads of paperwork or will say 
that this is not in my competency.” 
INST/RES Adequate but needs rationalization according to 
the needs. 
I tried to develop HRMIS system here, and 
school profiling has been computerized. I have 
also organized financial managerial training.. 
Adequate-“We have adequate financial, 
technical and HR. However, in 2009/2010 
there are some constraints on the funds but it 
also varies from district to district. For 
instance, districts which are having an efficient 
revenue collection, like Faisalabad, there is 
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less financial.” 
INST/GOV Very significant as less stable environment 
create uncertainty which eventually affects 
performance-“the main governance issues-
political instability is hampering our 
performance. There is uncertainty regarding the 
continuity of the local government system as it 
is going to be end up by 31 December 2010. 
This uncertainty has caused to delay main tasks 
as everybody wants to know the outcome of the 
system after its tenure. Ad-hocism of the 
system is affecting the performance.” 
Very significant; policies are not properly 
implemented; new government rejects all 
previously approved schemes and stars new 
ones which is a waste of resources.  
“The main problem is that policies are not 
properly implemented. For example, a scheme 
was launched under the name of CPP 
(community public partnership). Under this 
arrangement, it was proposed that the primary 
schools should be converted into middle 
schools in the evening, middle schools should 
be upgraded to high schools and secondary 
schools should be upgraded to higher 
secondary schools. Government was supposed 
to provide the building and operation and 
maintenance was to be performed by the 
community. The outcome of this scheme was 
people who participated in this partnership 
could not bear the cost at the end. If it has been 
done in a stepwise, it would have been better. 
The outcome is that at the moment, 21 schools 
are run by CPP and the rest are abandoned. It 
was a good policy but the government did not 
consider the feasibility of this.” 
INST/LOCAL Very supportive; “presence of a Nazim in the 
locality is a positive factor as they can monitor 
our performance, can approach education 
monitoring committees and can go to the 
district assembly” 
Varies from community to community like if 
people are more educated they will facilitate 
our work. 
INST/INTERN None; HRMIS, computerized school profiling, 
financial manage training for DEO/DDEO; 
whole school model, merit based recruitment 
None 
RECMD More participatory approach, rationalization of 
the resources, coordination among tiers 
More training to the DEO/DDEO/Head 
Teacher and focus on performance based 
incentive structure. 
PRE/POST “In its present shape, it is more effective and 
decentralized as compared to the system prior 
to decentralization, even though it is not ideally 
decentralized, it is better than the prior 
system.” 
It is a better system than the previous one. 
“Under decentralization districts have become 
more autonomous unit to facilitate service 
delivery as compared to the previous 
arrangement.” 
CODING: EDO-Executive District Officer; DEO-District Education Officer; DDEO-
Deputy District Education Officer; M-male; F-female; DECENT/M-decentralization 
motives; MAN/AUT-managerial autonomy; PART-participation; ACCOUNT-
accountability; PERFORM-performance; INST\P-institutional environment-political 
factors; INST/B-institutional environment bureaucratic factors; INST/RS-institutional 
environment resource adequacy; INST/GV-institutional environment governance 
issues; INST/LC-institutional environment local context; RECMD-recommendations;  
PRE/POST-pre-post devolution comparison. 
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Nodes\\CONSTRAINTS POL Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:15 saf3 
Nodes\\coordinationPOL Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:10 saf3 
Nodes\\financial autonomy Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:02 saf3 
Nodes\\Initiatives in EDU Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:00 saf3 
Nodes\\INSTITUTIONAL EN POL Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:04 saf3 
Nodes\\netwrokingPOL Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:19 saf3 
Nodes\\ParticipationPOL Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:02 saf3 
Nodes\\policy making Node saf3 20/07/2012 11:57 saf3 
Nodes\\SUGGESTION POL Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:05 saf3 
Nodes\\Views on system Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:07 saf3 
Nodes\\W&S Node saf3 20/07/2012 11:59 saf3 
 
Nodes\\Cases 
Nodes\\Cases\\08_pccs Node saf3 07/12/2010 11:58 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\1.CLTS Movement in 
Pakistan, 2008, RSPN 
Node saf3 06/12/2010 13:50 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\1_Monitoring the 
quality_Dawood Shah_Vol30_o9 
Node saf3 07/12/2010 12:05 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\1-nside-cover Node saf3 16/09/2010 12:51 saf3 
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Nodes\\Cases\\2.Punjab Community 
Water Supply and Sanitation Sector 
Project 
Node saf3 06/12/2010 13:50 saf3 
 604 
 
Nodes\\Cases\\26 Study of Community 
Managed Water Supply Schemes 
(Annex) 
Node saf3 06/12/2010 13:52 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\26153FinancialPowersDi
sttGovernments8thEd 
Node saf3 14/09/2010 13:16 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\3 New Schools Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:55 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\4.Urban Water Supply 
and Sanitation Project 
Node saf3 06/12/2010 13:51 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Annex____PEF_letter Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Chap1 Node saf3 16/09/2010 12:50 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Conditions for successful 
PPPs 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 14:03 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\ddeo lahore sub Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\DDEOLAHORE Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Decentralization in the 
Education System of Pakistan 
Node saf3 07/12/2010 12:28 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Deputy Managing 
director,O&M,L 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:46 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\development_of_comm
unity_based_sanitation_infrastructure_i
n_hasanpura_faisalabad 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 10:53 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\DG FDA Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:46 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Director planning and 
evaluation,lahore 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:46 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Director water and 
distribution,FSBD 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:46 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\DRAFT_Education_propo
sal_PPI 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\DRAFT_Education_propo
sal_PPI2 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\DYMD finance and 
operations and maintenance,FSBD 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:46 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\EDOLHR Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\education policy Node saf3 14/09/2010 14:03 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\educationdevel Node saf3 17/09/2010 09:11 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\educationdevel (2) Node saf3 07/12/2010 12:26 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Filled QN_to_HUD-
PHED(water_supply_&_sanitation)-UU 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 12:57 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\FINAL PPP LAW (Final 
Vetted Copy in Word format) 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 14:03 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\fl-pdws Node saf3 13/09/2010 13:44 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\From Policy to Practice 
PPP AAS 
Node saf3 22/09/2010 16:03 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\gz-CPP Node saf3 13/09/2010 13:52 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\img008 Node saf3 22/09/2010 13:30 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\img009 Node saf3 22/09/2010 14:37 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\img010 Node saf3 22/09/2010 14:38 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\img011 Node saf3 22/09/2010 14:38 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\img012 Node saf3 22/09/2010 14:38 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\img013 Node saf3 22/09/2010 14:38 saf3 
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Nodes\\Cases\\img014 Node saf3 22/09/2010 14:38 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\img015 Node saf3 22/09/2010 14:38 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\img016 Node saf3 22/09/2010 14:37 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Institute of Learning 
Technical Note 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\interview education Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview whith DDEO Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with DDEO.fdb Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with DDEO5th 
January 2010 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with DDEO5th 
January 2011 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with 
DDEOFSDB 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with DEO Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with DEOfsbd Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with DEOL Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with EDO 
Faisalabad 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with Managing 
director,lahore 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:47 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with the DEO 
FSBD 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with the 
district council member 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:48 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with the senior 
program manager 9partnership and 
governance 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:51 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with the Tehsil 
Council officer 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:48 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with the TMO Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:48 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with the Town 
Councillor 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:48 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with the union 
Nazim 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:48 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Interview with the union 
nazim,fsbd 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:48 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\LDA_Act Node saf3 13/09/2010 13:48 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Letter DMD Node saf3 09/09/2010 12:58 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Letters first Input Feb Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\max-benefits-wands Node saf3 07/12/2010 11:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\microsoft_word__urbani
sation_and_water 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 10:52 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\MoE PPP Booklet-2004 
final 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 14:26 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Nazim Khalid Gkurki Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:52 saf3 
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Nodes\\Cases\\New Word 2007 
Document 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:49 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Pakistan_Programmes Node saf3 07/12/2010 12:23 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Performance bench 
marking - 2009 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 12:55 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Pilot interview Node saf3 27/08/2010 12:44 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\pl-puwsp Node saf3 22/09/2010 16:09 saf3 
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Nodes\\Cases\\PPP Policy & Issues  Note Node saf3 27/08/2010 14:04 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\PPP Policy & Issues  Note 
Jan 5 2010 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:56 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\PPP strategy Final PDSSP Node saf3 27/08/2010 14:42 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\PPPBooklet-
DraftMarch2004 final 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 09:19 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Public Private Initiatives 
Roll Out Plan 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\QN to WASA(water 
supply & sanitation)(1) 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 12:58 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\QN to WASA_water 
supply & sanitation_ with Answer 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 11:09 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\QuettaBRJ_402 Node saf3 07/12/2010 12:07 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\rt-PNRMWatSan Node saf3 06/12/2010 13:53 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\rt-UWSFI Node saf3 07/12/2010 11:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\rt-UWSRSFINAL Node saf3 13/09/2010 13:59 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\The PLG Tax on Transfer 
of Immovable Property Rules 2001 
Node saf3 25/11/2010 12:19 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\The Punjab Development 
of Cities Act 1976 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 11:10 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\WASA Academy PC-I 22-
12 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 12:58 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\WASA Questionnaire Feb 
2010 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 11:09 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Water and Sanitation 
Academy 31.12.2009-Amended 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 12:59 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\WhitePaper Node saf3 16/09/2010 13:58 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\WORKING PAPER 
06.01.10 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 12:59 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\WORKING PAPER 
06.01.10 Revised UU PWASA Academy 
Node saf3 09/09/2010 12:59 saf3 
Nodes\\Cases\\Workshop Outline Node saf3 27/08/2010 13:56 saf3 
 
Nodes\\Free Nodes 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\AAS Node saf3 08/12/2010 14:20 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\accountability Node saf3 10/12/2010 12:03 saf3 
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Nodes\\Free Nodes\\accountability of 
WASA 
Node saf3 07/12/2010 13:37 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\ADOPT A SCHOOL 
ASA 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:45 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\CCBs Node saf3 10/12/2010 12:08 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\decentralization Node saf3 21/09/2010 13:17 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\decentralization in 
education 
Node saf3 10/12/2010 11:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\definition of 
accountability 
Node saf3 12/12/2010 15:02 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\definition of city 
district 
Node saf3 10/12/2010 11:39 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\devolution Node saf3 10/12/2010 11:58 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\education budget Node saf3 21/09/2010 13:23 saf3 
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Nodes\\Free Nodes\\financial issues of 
WASA 
Node saf3 08/12/2010 11:37 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\financing of WASA Node saf3 07/12/2010 13:33 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\historical issues 
with LG 
Node saf3 10/12/2010 12:32 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\internal HR factors 
WASA 
Node saf3 08/12/2010 11:31 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\IOL Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:24 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\issues Node saf3 16/09/2010 15:18 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\issues of CCBs Node saf3 10/12/2010 12:11 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\issues of 
decentrlization 
Node saf3 12/12/2010 13:25 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\issues of WASA Node saf3 08/12/2010 11:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\issues of WASA 
decentralization 
Node saf3 08/12/2010 11:39 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\key achievement in 
PPP 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:41 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\key performance 
indicators of PPcell 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:07 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\legal framework of 
IOL 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:29 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\managerial 
autonomy 
Node saf3 27/08/2010 16:24 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\motives behind 
decent W&E 
Node saf3 16/09/2010 15:09 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\motives of 
decentralization 
Node saf3 10/12/2010 11:37 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\objective of IOL Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:28 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\performance 
indicators achieved 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 13:18 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\performance 
indictors1 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 13:37 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\policy gap Node saf3 21/09/2010 13:40 saf3 
 608 
 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\PPP definition Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:42 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\PPP education Node saf3 08/12/2010 14:19 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\PPP in WASA Node saf3 08/12/2010 12:07 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\PPP policy reforms Node saf3 22/09/2010 11:23 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\PPP rationale for 
service dleivery 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:14 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\PPP strategies Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:15 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\PPP wasa Node saf3 07/12/2010 13:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Free 
Nodes\\PPPinstituionlization 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:04 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\pre post 
comparison of performance 
Node saf3 16/09/2010 15:07 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\rationale for IOL Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:27 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\school councils Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:48 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\SMC Node saf3 10/12/2010 12:24 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\SURVEY Node saf3 10/12/2010 14:24 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\tariff revision Node saf3 07/12/2010 13:18 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\vision education 
department FSBD 
Node saf3 21/09/2010 12:11 saf3 
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Nodes\\Free Nodes\\WASA 
decentralization 
Node saf3 07/12/2010 13:22 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\WASA policy 
framework 
Node saf3 08/12/2010 11:59 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\water and 
sanitation context 
Node saf3 08/12/2010 11:56 saf3 
 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL LEADERS 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\accountability 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:44 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\barriers-F 
Node saf3 21/07/2012 15:15 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\CONSTRAINTS 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 13:00 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\coordination 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:44 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\education 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:45 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\FINANCIAL AUTONOMY 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 13:01 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\institutional environemnt 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:44 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\MONITORING COMMITTEES 
Node saf3 21/07/2012 15:16 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\NETWORKING 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:45 saf3 
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Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\participation 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:44 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\POLICY MAKING 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:45 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\RECOMMENDATIONS 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 13:03 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\views on the system 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:43 saf3 
Nodes\\Free Nodes\\POLITICAL 
LEADERS\\WASA 
Node saf3 20/07/2012 12:45 saf3 
 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\ACCOUNTABILITY Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:56 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree 
Nodes\\ACCOUNTABILITY\accountability 
arrangement 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:56 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree 
Nodes\\ACCOUNTABILITY\audit 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:57 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree 
Nodes\\ACCOUNTABILITY\financial rules 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:57 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree 
Nodes\\ACCOUNTABILITY\grievance 
procedures 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:57 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\INSTITUIONAL 
FACTORS 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:53 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\INSTITUIONAL 
FACTORS\bureaucratic factors 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\INSTITUIONAL 
FACTORS\governance issues 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:54 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\INSTITUIONAL 
FACTORS\intrnal organizational factors 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:55 saf3 
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Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\INSTITUIONAL 
FACTORS\local context 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:55 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\INSTITUIONAL 
FACTORS\policy consistency 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:55 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\INSTITUIONAL 
FACTORS\political factors 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:56 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\INSTITUIONAL 
FACTORS\resource adequacy 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:56 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:59 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT\incentive structure 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 14:00 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT\performance indicators 
Node saf3 17/09/2010 14:00 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\PPP Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:58 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\PPP\NGOs Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:58 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree 
Nodes\\PPP\OUTSOURCING 
Node saf3 22/09/2010 15:27 saf3 
Nodes\\Tree Nodes\\PPP\participation Node saf3 17/09/2010 13:58 saf3 
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Queries 
Queries\\accountability Query saf3 17/09/2010 16:02 saf3 
Queries\\comparison of wasa and 
education 
Query saf3 17/09/2010 16:10 saf3 
Queries\\instituiona factors Query saf3 17/09/2010 15:37 saf3 
Queries\\issues Query saf3 17/09/2010 16:07 saf3 
Queries\\managerial autonomy Query saf3 17/09/2010 12:44 saf3 
Queries\\MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY2 Query saf3 22/09/2010 15:27 saf3 
Queries\\PPP Query saf3 17/09/2010 16:06 saf3 
Queries\\pre post comparison Query saf3 17/09/2010 16:08 saf3 
 
Relationship Types 
Relationship Types\\Associated Relationship Type saf3 27/08/2010 12:42 saf3 
 
Relationships 
Relationships\\accountability 
arrangement (Associated) audit 
Relationship saf3 09/05/2012 16:12 saf3 
 
Reports 
Reports\\Coding Summary By Node 
Report 
Report saf3 05/11/2012 17:44 saf3 
Reports\\Coding Summary By Source 
Report 
Report saf3 05/11/2012 17:44 saf3 
Reports\\Node Classification Summary 
Report 
Report saf3 05/11/2012 17:44 saf3 
Reports\\Node Structure Report Report saf3 05/11/2012 17:44 saf3 
Reports\\Node Summary Report Report saf3 05/11/2012 17:44 saf3 
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Reports\\Project Summary Report Report saf3 05/11/2012 17:44 saf3 
Reports\\Source Classification Summary 
Report 
Report saf3 05/11/2012 17:44 saf3 
Reports\\Source Summary Report Report saf3 05/11/2012 17:44 saf3 
 
Results 
Results\\accountability Results Node saf3 17/09/2010 16:25 saf3 
Results\\accountability (2) Results Node saf3 09/05/2012 16:20 saf3 
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Results\\instituiona factors Results Node saf3 17/09/2010 16:33 saf3 
Results\\issues Results Node saf3 17/09/2010 16:33 saf3 
Results\\managerial autonomy Results Node saf3 17/09/2010 16:34 saf3 
Results\\PPP Results Node saf3 17/09/2010 16:35 saf3 
Results\\pre post comparison Results Node saf3 17/09/2010 16:35 saf3 
 
Search Folders 
Search Folders\\All Nodes Search Folder saf3 10/03/2012 13:15 saf3 
Search Folders\\All Sources Search Folder saf3 10/03/2012 13:15 saf3 
Search Folders\\All Sources Not 
Embedded 
Search Folder saf3 10/03/2012 13:15 saf3 
 
Sets 
Sets\\accountability Set saf3 17/09/2010 13:44 saf3 
Sets\\EDUCATION FSBD Set saf3 17/09/2010 15:07 saf3 
Sets\\instituional factors Set saf3 17/09/2010 13:45 saf3 
Sets\\managerial autonomy Set saf3 17/09/2010 16:34 saf3 
Sets\\PPP Set saf3 17/09/2010 13:47 saf3 
 
Source Classifications 
     
 
Summaries 
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